The Resurgence of Military Dominance in Indonesia

In March 2025, Indonesia passed an amendment to the National Military Law No. 34/2004 (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, RUU-TNI). This legislative move is viewed by civil society and human rights organizations as a regression toward Suharto’s era of “New Order”—a military dictatorship that lasted for 32 years until his ousting in 1998. The 1998 reformation movement (reformasi) triggered a period of political and social transformation, characterized by the rise of an elite democracy, a new oligarchy, the emergence of religious populism, the gradual resurgence of the military and police influence, and a façade of civilian supremacy.

The amendment of the TNI Law was supported by President Prabowo, who was elected in 2024. Prabowo is a former special forces commander involved in military operations in Aceh, Papua, and Timor-Leste, including the abduction of activists and students during the reformasi. Human rights groups accuse him of abuses under the country's late dictator, former President Suharto, who was also his father-in-law.

The TNI Law amendment establishes a framework for the integration of active military personnel into 14 civilian institutions (with a proposed increase to 19) without the prerequisite of retirement or resignation from the military. This development yields 19 million new employment opportunities for military personnel within the civilian sector. Prior to the revision, there were already 2,600 active-duty officers serving in civilian roles. Experts have fiercely debated the TNI Law, with several articles causing particular concern. For instance, Article 7 of the law allows the military to undertake additional tasks as determined by the president to support national development and conduct military operations other than war, including assisting in tackling cyber threats and peacekeeping, as well as protecting national interests abroad. This provision significantly expands military jurisdiction into areas traditionally managed by civilian institutions.

According to Article 47, the military is permitted to serve in ministries or other institutions in accordance with the president's policy. In the previous legislation, there were 10 civilian roles for which active soldiers were eligible—this is increased to 14. Furthermore, Article 53 pertains to the extension of the retirement age for soldiers at all rank levels. The retirement age limit for non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel is 55 years, while officers up to the rank of colonel have a retirement age limit of 58 years, previously 53. The retirement age limit for four-star generals, who hold the highest rank, is 63-65 years, increased from 60 years.

The legislative process preceding the law’s passage was characterized by marked haste. Deliberations were conducted over the course of less than a month in a luxury hotel rather than the parliamentary offices, resulting in a significant deficit of public participation. The passing of the TNI Law was led by the Speaker of the House, Puan Maharani. She is the granddaughter of Sukarno—Indonesia's first president, who was overthrown by the New Order military—and the daughter of the chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Although the PDI-P is nominally the opposition following the 2024 election battle favoring Prabowo, their facilitation of this law suggests a political alignment.

Through this amendment, the military implicitly conveyed its view that post-Reformasi civilian supremacy had failed to produce effective governance, development, and international credibility, thereby serving as a justification for renewed military involvement beyond its traditional defense role. In 2019, the Jokowi Government issued the Presidential Regulation No. 37 on TNI Functional Position, which indirectly revived the Dwifungsi (Dual Function) doctrine. First formulated by General Nasution in 1958, Dwifungsi legitimized the military’s role in both national defense and socio-political governance. After the 1998 reformation, Dwifungsi was abolished, and the Armed Forces (ABRI) was split into TNI (military) and POLRI (Indonesian National Police). The amendment of the TNI Law is a clear attempt to revive this dual function and violates Members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR—the legislative branch) Decree No. VI/2000 that mandates the separation of TNI and POLRI. Following this amendment, the revision of the Police Law is expected to be the next priority, taking precedence over long-awaited reforms such as the Asset Forfeiture Bill for corruptors, which has stalled for nearly 20 years.

During Jokowi's second term (2019-2024), Prabowo managed a budget of IDR 700 trillion (approx. USD 43 billion) during his five years as Defense Minister. As president, the defense budget for 2025 alone will reach IDR 372.3 trillion (approx. USD 22.5 billion). Prabowo's intention to restore and expand the military's involvement in public affairs beyond defense has created a lack of impartiality, which has been marked by widespread abuses and impunity. Following the passage of the TNI Law, the Ministry of Defense under the Prabowo administration established a “civilian public cyber operations system” with a budget of IDR 100 billion (USD 6.2 million). The unit is tasked with countering perceived threats to national sovereignty by monitoring and targeting individuals or groups whose views are considered to undermine public trust in the military and the government.

Furthermore, Prabowo's flagship campaign of free nutritious meals (Makan Bergizi Gratis, MBG) is targeting 82.9 million school students and pregnant women with a budget of USD 4 billion per annum and is facilitated by the military, which provides logistical support. The government may select the military as the vendor for this initiative due to its ability to meet the stringent standards set by the National Nutrition Agency. The initiative has been implemented in numerous regions, including Papua, where the military has been engaged in the distribution of the MBG program in primary schools.

Papua is a region of ongoing military conflict, and Prabowo led the military operations in Papua during the New Order. Furthermore, after the enactment of the TNI Law, the Military District Command in Merauke, Papua, made a request to the local government for data and location regarding the whereabouts and identities of Papuan students. The government and military view the activities of Papuan students with suspicion, regarding them as a potential front for the Free Papua Movement. This surveillance extends to Java as well; in one case, military personnel entered an Islamic university in Semarang ostensibly to attend an academic discussion, only for them to demand data on the attendees.

In addition, Prabowo has initiated an ambitious “food estate” project across the forest areas in Papua, with the aim of ensuring food security. It is noteworthy that a similar project has previously failed in Kalimantan. Consequently, in addition to overseeing military operations in Papua, he is well-positioned to play a pivotal role in the region's rice supply chain, particularly regarding the farmer trading and cooperative system. This is of particular importance given the prevailing practice of middlemen manipulating the supply chain to the disadvantage of farmers. Notably, Prabowo served as the chairman of the national farmers’ organization, HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia), from 2004 to 2015. It is understood that he also plans to increase the number of Military Regional Commands (Kodam) from 15 to 37 across Indonesian territory by 2025.

Militarization of Education

During the amendment process of the TNI Law, several universities in Indonesia established collaborative relationships with the TNI. These partnerships provide national defense education and physical training for students. Critics argue the primary objective is political consolidation against universities to prevent criticism of the state and suppress student movements. This reminds me of the "Normalization of Campus Life" policies (NKK/BKK—Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan) of the New Order regime in 1978, designed to depoliticize students and force them into academic confinement.

Moreover, following the inauguration of 961 regional heads (mayors, regents, and governors) after the 2024 regional elections, as well as the inauguration of 48 ministers and officials, Prabowo organized a retreat at the Military Academy Camp in Magelang for his cabinet in February 2025, continuing into April-May. Participants were required to adhere to a strict schedule, including sleeping in military tents, wearing uniforms daily, and undergoing light physical military training.

The passing of the TNI Law reinforces Indonesia's reluctance to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, which has been adopted by 123 nations. This decision is driven by apprehensions that past perpetrators of gross human rights violations may face legal consequences. This issue is particularly salient in the context of President Suharto, a former general of the 32-year New Order regime with many allegations of human rights violations during his dictatorship. President Prabowo could potentially face legal action for his alleged involvement in military operations in the New Order era and disappearances during the Reformasi movement. Moreover, the TNI Law contradicts the recommendations put forth by the Centre for Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Periodic Review, and the UN Convention Against Torture, which has been ratified by Indonesia and requires states to ensure military accountability and the protection of civil rights.

In addition to being an integrated part of the free meal program, TNI will enter the business of drug research, production, and distribution starting with the revitalization of many laboratories. The Bill Gates Foundation is making Indonesia a testing ground for tuberculosis and malaria vaccines as well as nutritional supplements for pregnant women. These initiatives support Prabowo's broader agenda, including the food estate projects that provide genetically modified seeds and fertilizers, thereby fostering dependency among farmers—effectively creating a "Green Revolution 2.0" in Indonesia.

The military works closely with state-owned companies. For example, the Bukit Barisan Military Command in Sumatra has entered a collaborative relationship with the state-owned palm oil company “PT Agrinas Palma Nusantara.” The military acts as a security provider, ensuring the uninterrupted production of Indonesia's foremost export commodity. This occurrence will likely be replicated in the plantations of prominent palm oil tycoons. Moreover, this collaboration facilitates the entry of biochemical agriculture investors into the plantation sector, opening new investment opportunities following the food sector.

This TNI law has also served as a basis for the military to practice public enforcement of criminal laws, a domain that constitutionally falls under the authority of the police. Additionally, high-ranking retired military generals from the New Order to the present day are attempting to impeach the civilian vice president. The military has transgressed the established boundaries between military and civilian spheres, prompting protesters to demand that it return to the barracks and remain there except in circumstances of war.

Protests against the new TNI law

Photo by Andriana TJ (Bandung, 20 March 2025) with permission.

Protests were held in almost 70 cities across Indonesia from March 20 to 27, 2025, with protesters demanding the following: Repeal the TNI Law; Reject dual function; Return the military to the barracks; Disband the territorial command; Prosecute generals who violate human rights, including Prabowo; Withdraw the military from Papua; Abolish the military reserve component and the conscription plan; Stop the use of “buzzers” (cyber police that spread disinformation); Disband military courts; Try military prisoners in civilian courts; Stop military involvement in civilian-public spaces, reject militarization through development, and fight fascism and militarism.

In Bandung, on 20 March 2025, protests in front of the West Java House of Representatives brought together university and secondary school students, student organizations, labor unions, artists, and members of the general public. Towards evening, the situation descended into chaos with protesters burning barriers and throwing firecrackers, stones, and Molotov cocktails towards the office. The police initially did not respond, but later it led to a chaotic chase between the “Black Bloc” groups and unidentified police officers. Many protesters hid in clothing stores, restaurants, banks, or private offices until morning, fearing arrest and violence. The atmosphere remained tense within a 2 km radius. The chaos also resulted in significant destruction to public facilities; a bank was burnt down, and a military residence near the bank was damaged.

The following day, the situation stabilized, and in the afternoon the masses congregated once more in the same location for the same protest. Notably, this iteration of the protest did not result in any confrontations, and the authorities adopted a strategy of non-intervention, effectively allowing the crowd to disperse autonomously. This approach proved effective. On 23 March, the crowd was smaller and only engaged in speeches and performance art. After this, no further protests have occurred in Bandung; however, sporadic demonstrations have persisted in various cities, exhibiting a pattern of intermittent simultaneity and sequential occurrence, extending up to 27 March. Subsequent civil initiatives focused on initiating a judicial review of the TNI law at the Constitutional Court. Individuals, civil society organizations, and students from several universities in Indonesia submitted dozens of judicial review applications.

Learning from Bandung and the experience of West Java

Bandung is the capital of the province of West Java and is a large Indonesian military base. It contains all the main facilities of the military, including places for military education and training, warehouses, two military airports, including national aircraft companies (e.g., PT Dirgantara Indonesia), and national weapons factories (e.g., PT Pindad).

Bandung is also the place of an OMSP (Military Operation Other Than War) project. In 2018, President Jokowi issued Presidential Regulation No. 15 on Accelerating Pollution and Damage Control in the Citarum Watershed—the Citarum Harum (Citarum Fragrant) Project. This regulation was decentralized through Governor Regulation 28/2019. The Citarum River deserved emergency attention—it ranks among the world's dirtiest rivers and causes flooding throughout southern Bandung. Stretching 297 km with a 6,614 km² basin, it serves 26 million people while absorbing pollution from hundreds of factories, mostly textiles.

As a result, the Special Task Force PPK Citarum was established, covering 23 sectors across the Citarum watershed. Each sector is overseen by a commander from the West Java Military Command III Siliwangi. In total, the military deployed approximately 7,000 soldiers, including 1,400 assigned specifically to upstream and nursery areas along the river between 2018 and 2025. The program operated with a budget of IDR 8 trillion (USD 5 billion), financed through loans from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.

Bandung's militarization predates the TNI Law. Mayor Ridwan Kamil (2013-2018) pioneered military-civilian collaboration to manage the city and public spaces, working with TNI, police, civil service police, and both nationalist and religious fundamentalist mass organizations. In 2016, without genuine urgency, the mayor declared a civil emergency. This enabled the TNI to commence a 'civil order' operation in public spaces, city parks, and streets. The TNI cleaned up and displaced street vendors and informal sector workers from Gasibu Sunday Market and in the town squares area (alun-alun), while securing the eviction operation like the one at Urban Kampong Tamansari.

The author witnessed this violence personally. In Cikapayang, Dago, approximately 50 soldiers from Military Command III Siliwangi attacked the Perpustakaan Jalanan (Street Library) collective, of which the author is a member. The soldiers arrived in military trucks and were visibly armed, giving the impression of a combat operation rather than a civilian law-enforcement intervention. Perpustakaan Jalanan has operated since 2010 as a grassroots street library that opens every weekend in public spaces. The initiative has since been replicated nationwide and is currently active in approximately 70 cities across Indonesia.

In 2016, then-Mayor of Bandung Ridwan Kamil (2013–2018) declared a civil emergency in response to rising street crime and publicly framed Perpustakaan Jalanan as a threat to public order. Consequently, the municipal government, in conjunction with the police and military forces, initiated a series of street operations. However, due to inadequate coordination amongst the relevant parties, the military carried out a violent dispersal of the street library's activities. This incident had a detrimental effect on the Indonesian military's reputation in both domestic and international public opinion and damaged Ridwan Kamil’s relationship with Military Command III Siliwangi.

During this period, Ridwan Kamil proposed the introduction of a mandatory military-oriented curriculum for junior and senior high schools and suggested the development of a 52-hectare military-owned property for agro-tourism purposes in the Cinambo district. The proposal to incorporate the military into the school curriculum was not realized following the Perpustakaan Jalanan incident. However, Governor Mulyadi later implemented a similar measure by introducing a mandatory six-month military camp residency program for senior and vocational high school students.

Military integration accelerated dramatically under Governor Dedi Mulyadi (2024-2029), a key Gerindra party politician—Prabowo's party. Even before the TNI Law was passed, Mulyadi formalized OMSP cooperation with the military, clearly anticipating and preparing for the law's passage. This cooperation spans public infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, water channels, electricity networks, waste management, food security, and improvement of slum areas to disaster management.

The initial phase of this militarization initiative entails the deployment of school students who are regarded as problematic by the educational institution and their parents to military encampments. A similar approach will be employed with civilians, particularly those who are considered problematic by their social milieu, even in the absence of criminal activity. Negative public sentiment becomes a panopticon that can plunge everyone into military barracks; after all, the new Criminal Code can criminalize virtually any civilian. This is civilian silencing through the most masculine means—violence guided by a populist militarist agenda.

West Java's gubernatorial regulation on military camp education has received support from the Prabowo cabinet, including Human Rights Minister Natalius Pigai and Minister of Primary and Secondary Education Abdul Mu’ti, a senior figure from one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah, and comes from one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah. The latter has proposed integrating TNI-led instruction into universities and schools. These policies, however, directly contravene existing legislation on education, human rights, and child protection.

Militarization has been further extended through Dedi Mulyadi’s collaboration with Bandung’s elected mayor, M. Farhan, for the 2024–2029 period, notably via the establishment of the Anti-Thug Task Force. This initiative targets gangsters, mass organizations deemed anti-Pancasila (Indonesia’s state ideology), religious fundamentalism, left-wing radicalism, right-wing chauvinism, and far-right nationalism—the latter two of which maintain well-documented connections with elements of the TNI and the police.

This task force formalizes military-police collaboration in the name of public security. Establishing relationships with Military Command III Siliwangi serves paramount importance for Bandung and West Java as a territorial command strategy in civilian areas—both political and geographic. Additionally, it serves as a mutual protection racket and political bulwark.

Consequently, the TNI no longer operates merely as dwifungsi but as a multifunctional force extending its reach across nearly every aspect of civilian life and governance—from education to food to environment to political control.

*Frans Ari Prasetyo is a research associate at YCAR-York University Canada and visiting fellow at the Ethnography Lab, University of Toronto.