The Stake of Indonesia’s Politico-Administrative Decline amidst the Restructuring of Power Relations between Prabowo and Jokowi

Introduction

The first year of Prabowo-Gibran's administration has been filled with a series of policy agendas that are unsurprising yet still shocking. They are considered unsurprising because some programs were campaigned for during the 2024 election season, ranging from VAT (value-added tax) rate adjustments to free nutritious meal programs. However, all of them remain shocking because the use of public resources has accelerated significantly, as if to compress the realization of campaign promises for five years into just the first year. However, nothing has disturbed the public and social media discourse more than the differing interpretations of the political positions of Prabowo and Jokowi (Joko Widodo): some consider them to be in conflict, while others consider them to be part of the same oligarchy. The ambiguity of their relationship can perhaps be explained by the accelerated use of public resources mentioned above.

This article aims to review the persistence of changes in the political-administrative landscape during the Prabowo-Gibran administration (2024-2029) as a way of reading the big picture of the situation that has occurred in the past year. Rather than reviewing the situation on a case-by-case basis or targeting specific actors, whether in the August demonstrations, the pros and cons of national legislation, or environmental destruction in the name of food security, this article attempts to connect patterns between scattered events that are simultaneously manifested in reality and fill the pro and con public spaces. The argument in this article targets the implications of these events as an attempt by the Prabowo camp and the Jokowi camp (which has been dubbed the Solo club) to restructure their competitive power relations with each other, not in a zero-sum game scenario, through the mobilization of administrative resources. This constellation is facilitated by a democratic institutional framework that has not been consolidated since the beginning of the 1998 reform and was not mature before it was finally eroded by Jokowi's new post-democracy regime since the end of his first term in power ahead of the 2019 elections.

Pattern-Matching across Phenomena

One of the common logical consequences of a new administration is the continuation of governance from the previous administration through regulatory and budgetary mechanisms. In line with this logic, the end of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf administration (2019-2024) will result in turmoil during the first 100 days of the Prabowo-Gibran administration. This is marked by a series of policy breakthroughs surrounding state finances, ranging from the correction of the VAT rate from 11% to 12% for certain types of goods/services to the efficiency of the state budget of Rp306.69 trillion based on Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025. The latter has eroded the subsistence needs of ministries/non-ministerial institutions and implementing units, as well as cutting transfer funds from the national to local governments. Meanwhile, the cabinet structure is escalated, consisting of 108 ministers, deputy ministers, and ministerial-level officials, with the remaining 28 being special staff, special envoys, and special advisors. National strategic projects (Proyek Strategis Nasional, PSN) continue to run, including the operation of the Chinese loan-funded Whoosh high-speed train and the Pantai Indah Kapuk (PIK 2) project by a private company, which has been designated a PSN by seizing land from communities on the coast of Banten.  

Many explanations justify the above efficiency policy. The most prominent is its justification as a new administrative effort to compensate for the budget deficit caused by the financing of Jokowi's flagship projects, in the form of national strategic projects and mainstream infrastructure development. When the Free Nutritious Meals (Makan Bergizi Gratis, MBG; often being dubbed Makan Basi Gratis or the Free Stale Food, due to its poor quality and delivery) program was introduced, the direction of this budget reallocation became clearer, with all its subsequent justifications. Even so, the government also recorded a government budget surplus deposited at Bank Indonesia, the result of the accumulation of SILPA (budget surplus), enabling the Ministry of Finance to disburse more than Rp200 trillion to state-owned banks (himbara) at the end of the third quarter of 2025. Nevertheless, at the end of the first year, the administration was unable to increase money circulation in the community and, therefore, failed to boost economic growth until the end of 2025.

The failure of fiscal compensation was also not saved by the reallocation of the budget for the construction of the Nusantara Capital City (Ibukota Negara Nusantara, IKN) project amounting to Rp100 trillion in early 2025 as a result of the swelling of the MBG realization needs, which was originally budgeted at Rp71 trillion. For 2026, this budget swelled in line with the expansion of its target recipients to Rp335 trillion. This requirement was met by diverting Rp223 trillion from the education budget and the rest from the health sector, economic functions, and others. The deforestation of tropical forests in Papua adds to the ecological damage without any clear signs of the promised food security outcomes from this program, especially after its previous failure in Kalimantan when President Prabowo was still the Minister of Defense in the Jokowi-Ma'ruf administration.

The tug-of-war over the budget described above shows that there has been a breakdown in fiscal discipline due to operational efficiency in the form of radical budget cuts that have disrupted the functioning of government. This operational efficiency is not accompanied by allocative efficiency in the sense of cost-effectiveness, but merely involves cutting expenditure without any corresponding reduction in the output and impact of fiscal policy, let alone the provision of contingency budgets, such as emergency disaster funds. Until ecological disasters such as floods and landslides in a number of provinces in Sumatra in December 2025 caused losses of more than Rp 50 trillion, the government remained silent without reallocating the 2025 budget towards post-disaster recovery. Nor did it cut the MBG funds, which reached more than Rp1 trillion per day, even though as of early November 2025, there was still a budget surplus of around Rp30 trillion.

The absence of financial sanctions against logging and mining companies linked to ecological damage in Sumatra was followed by performative public fundraising actions by some ministers. What is worse than the absence of sanctions is the supporting regulatory framework, in the form of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, which weakens policy concerns on environmental preservation and conservation by annulling the requirement for environmental impact assessments (analisis mengenai dampak lingkungan, AMDAL), as well as undermining the bargaining position of workers in industrial relations. Both this fundraising and the proliferation of permits for forest encroachment and mining activities in upstream areas and dense forest cover raise long-standing questions about the deficit of public accountability in governance since Jokowi came to power.

This accountability deficit was also the focus of public discourse when Daya Aganata Nusantara (Danantara Indonesia Sovereign Fund) was inaugurated as an institution managing public funds in the form of assets and capital, including dividends earned by state-owned banks, because part of its financial posture was supported by state financial participation. This institution, which was formed by and is responsible to the President, is a sovereign wealth fund managed under a superholding governance structure, making the Indonesia Investment Authority (INA) mediocre because it only manages co-investment funds. Only ex officio coordinating ministers and ministers in the fields of state finance, state-owned enterprises, and the State Secretariat serve on the supervisory board, which is an extension of the president. Danantara is also directly accountable to the President.

Although there are a number of state supervisory agencies that sit on the Supervisory and Accountability Committee, its nature is more ad hoc, with limited oversight of state-owned enterprises managed by Danantara. The composition of this committee is a mixture of supervisory agencies under the jurisdiction of the president (the internal control agency/BPKP, financial transaction surveillance and audit/PPATK, the Police/POLRI, and the Attorney General/Kejakgung), non-structural agencies not directly under the president (the Corruption Eradication Commission/KPK), and a high state agency at the presidential level (the State Financial Audit/BPK). Even so, the oversight and accountability mechanism for Danantara does not operate directly because it requires multiple layers of approval from the House of Representatives (DPR) and ultimately returns to the President.

In addition to budgetary politics, the proxy for all of the above events is not the political parties but the state apparatus, specifically the Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) and the Police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, POLRI). The separation of the two from the arch-institution under the armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) was one of the most prominent attributes of the 1998 reform debut, following the fall of Suharto's New Order regime. However, it was precisely at this point that an administrative imbalance between the two occurred. While the TNI is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense (Kemenhan), despite remaining accountable to the President, the POLRI is a separate entity without ministerial jurisdiction and is directly accountable to the President. Nevertheless, traces of the involvement of both institutions have always been present in the implementation of various PSNs, not to mention the continued violence by POLRI and TNI personnel, such as those that occurred during and after the August 2025 demonstrations and the armed conflict with the Papuan people.

From Proxies to Escalating Clash in the Power Relations

Competitions—if not conflict—between the TNI and POLRI are often perceived by the public as symbolic institutional opposition between Prabowo and Jokowi. However, the ambiguity of the relationship between the two divides public opinion as to whether one of them are in the same political camp or has broken ranks. Each opinion has an empirical basis to justify it. Here, we need a further lens to find the mechanism that makes the alliance or conflict between the two exist through the use of their respective proxies.

The assumption that the two were in harmony and on the same side found grounds for reconciliation after the 2019 election. Prabowo, who had been a competitor in the 2014 and 2019 elections, later joined President Jokowi's cabinet in his second term (2019-2024) for the sake of national unity—or so he claimed. After Jokowi's third term failed to materialize, the two joined forces in the 2024 election with Prabowo as the presidential candidate and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's eldest son, as his running mate. Although Gibran appears alienated in cabinet meetings led directly by Prabowo and in diplomatic interactions with partner countries, Prabowo's seasonal personal visits to Jokowi seem to affirm a simple relationship.

Within the institutional sphere, the formation of Prabowo-Gibran's 136-member cabinet accommodates half of Jokowi's old team. For this purpose, Law 39/2008 on state ministries was amended by Law 61/2024, which revised the upper limit on the number of cabinet ministers. This revision of the law was passed shortly before Prabowo-Gibran was inaugurated and took office. Outside the executive branch, the launch of Danantara Indonesia placed Jokowi on its Advisory Board alongside former president Yudhoyono. Many would not doubt that this is an indication that Jokowi holds a special place in the eyes of President Prabowo.

Regardless of the facts above, the alleged conflict between Prabowo and Jokowi is not without reason. Compared to the possibility of an alliance between the two, inferences from other facts actually show that the battlefield between them is more diverse. Among various public policies, the counterproductive relationship between the TNI and the POLRI is a field of conflict between the two, not merely symbolic but actually having fundamental roots, which are becoming increasingly apparent.

When referring to the TNI vs. POLRI proxy, the constellation is not as simple as Prabowo's military background vs. Jokowi's civilian association. Although individuals with a military background are still the preferred choice in national leadership succession, the candidate's portfolio remains the determining factor. Prabowo is not a figure who represents the reliability of those with a military background, given that he was once dismissed from the military, went into exile abroad, and is still overshadowed by allegations of human rights violations. This explains his position as the underdog in the 2009 election, when he was paired with Megawati Sukarnoputri. The same was true in the 2014 and 2019 elections, when he was paired with a figure who had been a public official and had the support of a large coalition against Jokowi's camp. Jokowi, on the other hand, was once hailed as a protagonist representing ordinary citizens from the lower-middle class without strong ties to the oligarchic elite. The reality of Jokowi's ten-year presidency has proven otherwise, with his eldest son even accompanying Prabowo in the 2024 presidential election.

The presence of Luhut Panjaitan, a veteran military officer who had a distinguished career during the New Order era and who, after the reform, became the kingmaker behind Jokowi's political camp, is a sign of the blurring of the conflict between the TNI and the POLRI when referring to the personal background of Prabowo vs. Jokowi. Thus, although political personification is common in Indonesia, neither of them adequately reflects the proxy in the TNI vs. POLRI conflict, but it must be seen in the context of the institutional relationship between the two.

Looking back to the early days of reform after President Suharto’s New Order Regime was dismantled, the conflict between the TNI and POLRI is linked to changes in the institutional setting of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). The TNI and POLRI entities were separated, in line with the dissolution of ABRI as a unified entity. The military-style professionalism of the TNI has narrowed its scope of action, confining it to the barracks and putting an end to all business activities managed by military units. The mandate for TNI reform in Law 34/2004 is contrary to the dual function doctrine of ABRI since the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in 1965-1966. This situation meant that the TNI was not as free as before, when it was a component of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) and even held various civilian public positions under the executive branch in ministries/non-ministerial institutions and local government, in line with the merger of military territorial command units with local government administrative jurisdiction at that time.

The fate of POLRI actually experienced greater freedom after separating from the TNI. This freedom did not mean that they could occupy any public office, but rather that they could maintain their civilian character. In the first decade of reform, POLRI remained true to its role as a law enforcement agency, regardless of its performance level, and did not occupy public office, except after retirement or resignation from active membership. While the TNI's territorial command area is limited to defense command matters, the civilian-based POLRI has become an integral part of regional and local leadership coordination, together with key local government officials.

The fiscal consequences of the aforementioned institutional settings are inevitable. While POLRI enjoys a full budget in the security sector, TNI must share the defense sector budget with the Ministry of Defense, even though the TNI has been divided into three branches since its inception: the army, navy, and air force. POLRI, which performs security functions, is also attached to the budget for securing local government activities. Beyond that, it is common for regulatory and supervisory functions related to traffic and citizenship good behavior to be incorporated into POLRI along with budgetary functions, in the form of non-tax state revenue (pendapatan negara bukan pajak, PNBP), such as the proceeds from the processing of driver's licenses (SIM), vehicle registration certificates (STNK), motor vehicle ownership certificates (BPKB), police clearance certificates (SKCK), etc. None of these matters is handled by the TNI, even though it is common practice to use TNI personnel to secure development projects by government agencies and even those managed by private actors, which are often disguised as other TNI roles in military operations other than war (operasi militer selain perang, OMSP), which should have a limited scope.

When Jokowi took power, the mainstreaming of POLRI in government administration was more than just a law enforcement tool. While the disproportionate allocation of budgets between the security and defense sectors and the variation in sources of revenue have actually been going on for a long time, riding on the agenda and instruments of administrative reform, Jokowi seized the opportunity for reform to steer the POLRI towards its role as a tool for maintaining power.

With the enactment of Law 19/2019, after being inaugurated for his second term, President Jokowi shifted the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), which was originally a state auxiliary body, an independent institution outside the government, to be under the domain of the executive branch. The KPK's performance, which had previously been formidable under the Yudhoyono Administration (2004-2009 & 2009-2014), became underperforming, compensated by the elevation of the role of POLRI in combating corruption throughout Jokowi's second presidential term. President Prabowo appears to be competing with this trend by mainstreaming the role of the Attorney General's Office (Kejaksaan Agung, Kejakgung) in similar efforts, such as handing over the results of the KPK's red-handed capture operations (operasi tangkap tangan, OTT) to Kejakgung for follow-up after a year of Prabowo-Gibran's administration. The security of the Kejakgung office in 2025 by the TNI, which should have been carried out by the police, has increased compared to before, especially after the conflict between the Attorney General's Office and the police (POLRI) came to the fore from mid to late 2024, beginning with the arrest of members of the police special anti-terrorism detachment (Densus) 88 by the Attorney General's Office while they were tailing a Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes (Jampidus) and the subsequent response by the police mobile brigade (Brimob) convoy.

It was during Jokowi's era that active members of POLRI held public positions outside the realm of law enforcement without any prior revision of the legal-formal basis. This effort was then counterbalanced by President Prabowo through the revision of Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) into Law No. 3/2025 as a point of compromise between political factions among his supporters, without negating or reducing the scope of the TNI's role. The new TNI Law did not legalize TNI business activities but provided a legal basis for expanding the role of active TNI members to occupy fourteen civilian public positions. This differs from the ability of POLRI members to engage in business activities under applicable terms and conditions, which only requires POLRI Chief Regulation 9/2017, enacted under the Jokowi administration. However, in reality, under the Prabowo administration, the TNI's business role has not only continued in the implementation of national strategic projects (PSN) for food security, which extend from Kalimantan to Papua, but has also become the backbone of the management of the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) Program under the National Nutrition Agency (Badan Gizi Nasional, BGN).

The supremacy of POLRI seems to remain persistent. Although at the end of 2025, the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK), through its decision No. 114/PUU-XXIII/2025, prohibited active police officers from holding civil service office, POLRI has responded by creating a counter interpretation with the Police Regulation (Perpol) 10/2025. This Perpol even opens the door for active members of POLRI to hold seventeen civil service positions, more than what is permitted for TNI members under the new TNI Law. This Perpol not only violates Indonesian National Police Law 2/2002 but also the Civil Service Law, both taken into effect by Law 30/2023, and even more so in the previous, more reformist version: Law 5/2014. President Prabowo has the opportunity to curb the POLRI’s actions by issuing a government regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah, PP) as a follow-up to the Constitutional Court's decision, with concrete implementation to follow.

Conclusion

Conflict between political elites and oligarchic factions is nothing new in any country’s politics, especially Indonesia, which has not only failed to consolidate democracy but has also reversed course toward the consolidation of autocracy. However, in the escalating power struggle between former President Jokowi's camp and President Prabowo's camp, in his first year in power (2024-2025), Prabowo appeared to maintain a personal relationship with Jokowi but built an institutional and policy framework that competed with the institutional and policy settings inherited from his predecessor.

The phenomenon elucidates that the dynamics of inter-elite relations that jeopardize the fate of the political-administrative system are the result of Prabowo's efforts to restructure power relations with Jokowi and his cronies, who remain in Prabowo's cabinet. It is interesting to note that this phenomenon also marks the misuse of administrative reform instruments so that the democratic institutional setting prompts a foundation for the practice of a power state (Machtstaat), rather than a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat).