

Neither Wolf, nor Lamb

Embracing Civil Society in the Aceh Conflict

Bangkok: Forum Asia, 2004

Written by Shane Barter

The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)

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This book is the result of hard work from several persons and agencies. The Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives (CAPI) at the University of Victoria, Canada, provided the original arrangements which evolved into this project. At Forum-Asia, Somchai Homlaor, Chalida Tajarosensuk, Rashid Kang, Chutamas Wangklon, and several others worked very hard to make the research possible. Also, our Acehnese friends across Southeast Asia provided crucial critiques of the book and its author which helped steer some ideas in this text. Indonesian actors such as Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, the KIPP, IMPARSIAL, INFID, and KONTRAS also provided insight. Suggestions from Dr. Diane Mauzy, Philips J. Vermonte at the CSIS, Bradley Reuben Fidler, Quinn Dupont, Scott Guggenheim at the World Bank, Dr. Robert Bedeski, Dr. Alan Kuperman, Dr. Leslie McCulloch, and Dr. Kirsten Schulze were always appreciated. I owe a huge thank you to Melissa Duong for editing. Finally, thanks to CSIS for organizing a roundtable discussion on the ideas presented in this book.

This book is dedicated to the children of Aceh

Foreword

Imagine a peaceful field, an Eden where a simple lamb sits contently, chewing the grass at its hooves. Suddenly, there arrives a carnivore, a monster- a wolf; this figure is violent, a figure opposite to the peaceful lamb. The wolf devours the courageous lamb after a brief but futile chase. The wolf and lamb metaphor is often used to describe one nation which has a conflict with a weaker foe; it is used by Patrick Tuck, whose text *the French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb* offers a simplistic anti-French discourse from the colonial era. The same allusion is made by Uri Avnery, who asserts that Jews coexisting in a state with Arabs would be like a lamb sleeping with a wolf- you would need to provide a new lamb everyday for the wolfish Arabs.¹ Each of these writers uses this simplistic story in order to demonize their enemy. Such a metaphor justifies all actions of the lamb as necessary because they are responding to a predator, naturalizes the behavior of the wolf, and does not hold each actor to the same standards or rules in war or imperialism. There are only two players in this tale, but instead of being those who want war and those who want peace, we see only nations and their militaries. This simple, dichotomous story cannot be applied to a conflict concerning human beings...it cannot be applied to Aceh.²

Aceh lies at the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, which is roughly divided in half by the equator, at the westernmost tip of the Republic of Indonesia. It has a long, rich history as a regional power, a religious and economic hub, and is the site of one of the most intense conflicts in the world today.

This book is an introduction to the complicated story of Aceh. It has no underlying thesis, but it does have a goal; undermine the lamb and the wolf. After all, there can be no peace between the lamb and the wolf, whereas in Aceh, peace is a necessary goal for all actors. In order to undermine this story, we intend to hold all actors responsible to human rights standards. The second goal is to

¹ Uri Avnery, "the Bi-National State: the Wolf Shall Dwell with the Lamb," *Journal of Palestine Studies*.

² A note on spelling: Aceh exists under several names, from Atjeh under the Dutch, to Aceh under the Republic, and today the resistance movements call it Aceh. During the COHA Peace Process, Indonesia allowed the term Aceh but would not allow the term Republic Aceh- they agreed to Aceh, Indonesia, with GAM claiming it referred to a geographic entity. This text will use the term Aceh, not necessarily following the Government of Indonesia, but instead reflecting the reality of political control and international recognition, not to mention that it is the most commonly used term for the area.

provide an extensive bibliography for further research possibilities in the Aceh conflict, though this goal comes at the risk of ‘over sourcing.’ The final goal of this text is to look to civil society in a future peace, one not decided by military groups with similar, wolf-like worldviews. This is the story of the Aceh conflict.

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
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Detailed Map: Indonesia

Introduction

In discussing subjects which are not globally known, most commentators use stereotypes and metaphors in order to convey their point. Such strategies often put unknown subjects into dangerous, alien terms. For conflicts such as Aceh, background information must be made available in order to avoid this common mistake. While informing readers to the Aceh conflict, an endless list of writers have dwelled on Aceh's Muslim identity, labeling it "deeply Islamic,"¹ comprised of "Indonesia's staunchest adherents to Islam"² with a "stricter form of Islam,"³ "an area known by its 'strict adherence to Islam,'"⁴ "devout followers of Islam,"⁵ a "strong religious identity in Islam."⁶ They claim that "Aceh's strong Muslim culture is very pronounced and marked by a proud human spirit;"⁷ in other words, Aceh is "très teintée d'islamisme."⁸ The degree to which Aceh is Muslim has nothing to do with the need to end violence, it only serves to cloud the issue in contemporary political issues.

Writers who are hostile to the Indonesian state will use cultural difference as a cause of the conflict; the role of the military in the Indonesian state "reflects the relatively arbitrary construction of the state from a non-homogeneous colony,"⁹ or that Aceh "has a rich cultural heritage very different from than that of Java."¹⁰ This is a conservative, fallacious argument which is antithetical to multiculturalism- a facet of almost every Empire in world history- in favour of right wing contemporary realist politics. Cultural differences exist, but do not explain how the conflict came about or how it can be resolved; we must understand that "when ethnic divisions overlap with

¹ *Economist*, "Preparing for Aceh's Next Battle," Volume 356, Issue 8180 (22 July 2000).

² Dan Murphy, "Indonesian President Backs Away from Tolerance," *Christian Science Monitor*, Volume 93, Issue 8 (5 December 2000).

³ Andrew Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 23, Issue 4 (Fall 2000).

⁴ Kirsten E. Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization* (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), 1.

⁵ *Economist*, "Death and Faith in Aceh," Volume 316, Issue 7671 (8 September 1990).

⁶ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh?" *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 22, Issue 3 (2001), 438.

⁷ Karim D. Crow, "Aceh: the 'Special Territory' in North Sumatra: a Self-Fulfilling Promise?" *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Volume 20, Issue 1 (April 2000).

⁸ Arnaud Dubus et Nicholas Revise, *Armée du Peuple, Armée du Roi: Les Militaires Face à la Société en Indonésie et en Thaïlande* (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2002), 84.

⁹ Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 12.

¹⁰ *Amnesty International*, "Indonesia: Acehese Human Rights Defenders under Attack" (23 February 2000).

inequalities of economic benefits, then ethnicity can be exploited.”¹¹ It is indeed only the most conservative actors who believe that cultural differences automatically result in clashes.¹²

Several writers consider the conflict through distorted lenses, asserting that the search for rebels among civilians is “like the US soldiers in Vietnam,”¹³ and Indonesia’s anti-insurgency strategies “did not win the war for the Americans in Vietnam.”¹⁴ Although some analogies are more helpful than others,¹⁵ we must refrain from seeing such a unique and crucial subject as Aceh in alien terms without major qualifiers. This includes conflicts within (and now outside of) Indonesia’s borders such as Papua, East Timor, or other areas. Several writers see Aceh as similar to Sulawesi, where transmigration is a major reason for conflict; Acehnese responded in “fear of losing their own identity to what they see as foreign intruders,”¹⁶ and “resentment at the transmigration policies that have been initiated by Jakarta.”¹⁷ This is misleading, as Javanese transmigrants had no problems with the Acehnese until the GAM arrived, their presence was not a concern for locals at all. Parallels between Aceh and other regions are “probably more rhetorical than useful.”¹⁸ Aceh can only fit its own shape, not those of other conflicts.¹⁹

In one sense, this book seeks a complicated, non-dichotomous view of the conflict, free of the wolf and the lamb. On the other hand, it seeks to free analysis from the baggage of other conflicts to see it in its own right. In all, this book will provide a partial foundation to answer what may be the

¹¹ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, “Issues and Politics of Regionalism in Indonesia: Evaluating the Acehnese Experience,” Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, edited by Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 121.

¹² Samuel Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996).

¹³ Dan Murphy, “Aceh Civilians Caught in Middle,” Christian Science Monitor, Volume 93, Issue 38 (19 January 2001).

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, “Aceh: How Not to Win Hearts and Minds,” Indonesia Briefing (23 July 2003), 5.

¹⁵ For instance, the conflict in Yugoslavia saw a Cold War strongman fall and the periphery shatter. Comparisons such as these are helpful only if they are focused on specific aspects of conflicts.

¹⁶ Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia.”

¹⁷ Peter Chalk, “Separatism in Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 24 (2001), 254.

¹⁸ Michael Morfit, “Pancasila: the Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government,” Asian Survey, Volume 21, Issue 8 (August 1981), 849.

¹⁹ Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger, “the Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonization and the Limits of the Nation-State in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 6 (2001), 1015.

most important question in politics today; can a political system accommodate diversity? ²⁰ Secession and genocide each avoid this question, for each response is dressed in terms from seventeenth century Europe and serve to perpetuate various forms of exploitation within national borders.

Chapter one of this text will look at history: traditional empires, Dutch colonialism, the Republic of Indonesia, and Aceh in its own right are all necessary components to further understanding the conflict. Chapter two will focus on politics; the interplay between traditional Acehnese elites, the GAM, and other Acehnese groups, not to mention traditional the elites, politics, and military of Indonesia. Chapter three will look at the economics of the militaries, governments, and corporations involved in the conflict, and how economic exploitation leads to perpetuate the violence. Any discussion in economics has major ramifications for peaceful development and deserves our full attention.

The background established, chapter four will signal a shift to the micro-level by discussing what matters most; human rights will explored via a macro-level analysis, a look at Acehnese victims, a look at Javanese victims, and a look at other groups whose lives have been degraded by the constant war. Chapter five will look at civil society; how local media, academics, unions, and NGOs operate, who they are, and why they are so important. Chapter six will look at the numerous international actors involved in this conflict, itself a multileveled story which will continue to demonstrate that this war is not between two combatants. Chapter seven will focus on peace; peace plans, conflict theory, and future suggestions will act as a conclusion for the text. Chapter eight will act as a post-script, observations of the 2004 Indonesian elections and the future of Aceh, followed by a detailed appendix, bibliography, index, and pictures.

With the background and present situation detailed, our conclusion will actually be a series of conclusions, looking towards all non-violent groups as the future of Aceh. This is one where all who take up arms are the oppressors; we must ask if “the nonviolent strategy of Aceh’s student movement provides a brighter promise than GAM rifles or ABRI brutality?”²¹ It is the human rights, religious, labour, and student groups who embody an end to war, and thus they must be

²⁰ James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

²¹ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

considered the future of Aceh.²² Allowing either military to represent any group of people is inconsistent in an age of human rights.

²² Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 447.

Chapter 1: Histories

History reaches into the present in a number of ways; according to Marx:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.¹

The history of what is now the Republic of Indonesia is no different, as several combatants dress their fight in historic terms. Unlike the wolf and the lamb, which fight on instinct, the Aceh conflict is steeped in historical justifications for violence. Their chief purpose is finding legitimacy for their political stakes, and “the chief weapon they wield to achieve this purpose is history.”²

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has asserted that due to its historic role on the island, Aceh should have sovereignty over all of Sumatra;³ this is true in their Declaration of Independence (Appendix IV) and their name, the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front (ANSLF).⁴ This use of history is questionable, as each piece of territory has had multiple sources of power across the world. As the GAM should know, political rule at one point in history does not justify continued power over peripheral regions.

GAM also claims that because Aceh never surrendered to the Dutch, there is no legal basis for its being a part of the Republic of Indonesia.⁵ Further, the necessity of violence is also justified in historical terms; on 18 May 2003, the peace talks collapsed and the GAM stated that

We, the government of the State of Aceh, has (*sic*) no choice but to defend ourselves the way our forefathers had taught us to do since 1873, when another colonial power, Holland, declared war and invaded our country.

¹ Karl Marx, the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, translated by Frederic Engels (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1937).

² Edward Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity: Indonesian and Acehnese Nationalism in Conflict,” RIMA, Volume 36, Issue 1 (2002), 24.

³ Edward Aspinall, “Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights: History and the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism,” Indonesia, Issue 73 (April 2002), 16.

⁴ Aceh: the Untold Story, (Bangkok: FORUM-ASIA and SCHRA, 1999), 31.

⁵ Aceh: the Untold Story, 18.

Aspinall and Berger note that “Acehnese nationalists attempt to construct a distinct national identity by pointing to an ancient and immutable Acehnese nation and by awakening present generations to their historical traditions.”⁶ Because exploitation alone does not guarantee sovereignty, but also requires historical legitimacy, such constructions are important tactics.

Conversely, the Indonesian Government claims that Aceh is a crucial appendage to the nation; “the part it played in the independence struggle in the 1940s [is] widely celebrated in Indonesia nationalist history.”⁷ Aceh as a source of legitimacy for the Republic makes sense, as the fact that Aceh alone was not retaken by the Dutch after World War Two “was a great asset for the Republican leaders, for it showed the world that the Republic had survived.”⁸ Further, the Indonesian military tries to influence Acehnese using their version of history, using renowned Acehnese woman’s hero Cut Nyak Dien (1848-1908) as an early Indonesian nationalist, her goal being to protect the “Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia.”⁹ As with the GAM, Indonesia requires immutable historical unity as a foundation for legitimate rule.

Historical interpretation cannot be escaped in describing the war in Aceh. This was also true as Indonesia tried to escape from Dutch rule, as history was a strong weapon which made use of romantic interpretations of early empires which pointed to a proud, independent past. The promotion of GAM’s version of history is at the root of their strategy of burning down schools which teach a state curriculum. Detailing parts of history that do not conform to the said models is the first step in understanding the conflict. Is Acehnese Islam unique from Javanese, and does it fuel their sovereignty claims? Perhaps, but it was once a Buddhist Kingdom which rebelled against Central Sumatra. Did former Javanese Empires rule over Aceh? Yes, but Sumatran Kingdoms ruled parts of Java as well. Was Aceh a major part of the Independence Movement against the Dutch? Certainly, but for many of the same reasons the conflict exists today.

History is ambiguous, it is a tool, and its shape depends on political aspirations. Hasan di Tiro, the leader of the separatist GAM, believed in his youth that “as it was in the past, Aceh is an indivisible

⁶ Aspinall and Berger, “The Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1017.

⁷ Aspinall and Berger, “The Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1016.

⁸ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, the Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 30.

⁹ Indonesian National Military Homepage, “Dear God...I have Betrayed Cut Nyak Dhien’s Struggles,” <http://www.tni.mil.id/english>, accessed January 2004.

part of the Negara Republic Indonesia, so also its history too is one undivided part of Indonesian history and our slogan is one nation, one language, and one fatherland.”¹⁰ It is obvious that history is a powerful tool in this conflict, weighing like a nightmare over those involved, so it is our duty to explore it. It is for this reason that several points brought up in the history chapter will be discussed throughout the book.

1) Origins

Aceh is located at the Northern tip of the island of Sumatra, west of what is now the Thai-Malaysian border. It is located on the Sunda Shelf, a tectonic plate of almost two million square kilometers which includes the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, separated from the Sahul Shelf by the volcanic islands of Eastern Indonesia. Aceh is the western gateway to the Straights of Malacca, a shortcut from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea with seasonal winds which allowed for extensive ancient trading routes. Aceh is littered by small rivers, some large coastal swamps, and a rugged volcanic chain in the interior. Its mountains include Mounts Leuser and Abongabong, each standing about ten thousand meters above sea level. Aceh includes some island chains, including Simeulue Island, which is almost two thousand square kilometers. Aceh's flora and fauna are notable for their transitory nature, as the region is just north of the supposed *Wallace Line*, thus is a mixture of Asian and Australian specimens. The result is that much of Aceh, as well as Sumatra, hold a precious number of rare and endangered species.

Humans first arrived by way of what is now the South China Sea, then more recently along the Kra Isthmus (Malay Peninsula). There are a number of ethnic groups in Aceh, including Malays, Gayo, Alas, Batak, Redjang, and Lebong peoples, all of which speak dialects of the Austronesian language family, some being different from the Malay languages of Acehnese and Javanese, not to mention Bahasa Indonesia. The predominant Malays, Javanese and Acehnese, are generally the focus of the current conflict, as are recent transmigrants populations from other islands. A variety of ancient animist religions still permeate Aceh, modified by the early arrival of Hinduism and later Buddhism, which promoted the birth of the earliest empires of the region.

2) Empires

¹⁰ Hasan di Tiro, "Treatise on Aceh History," cited in Anthony Reid, "War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh," *Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series*, Number 1 (June 2003), 5.

Island Southeast Asia has been home to a number of overlapping and distinct empires based on a variety of economies and political systems. Thus, this section will include several of today's nations outside of Indonesian territory, as traditional Southeast Asian notions of borders contrasted the European model used today. The first evidenced regional empire was Langasuka, located on the Malay Peninsula, around 100 AD. The first evidenced kingdom in Java was the Taruma Kingdom during the fifth century. In the sixth century, the small Buddhist Kingdom of Pole existed in what now know as Southern Aceh, which was home to Indian traders and fought Central Sumatran kingdoms.¹¹ The most powerful of these kingdoms, located near modern Palembang, soon became the Empire of Sri Vijaya, which was based on controlling the trade from the Straights of Malacca.

Sri Vijaya annexed Aceh's Pole Kingdom, as well as the Malayu Kingdom in southern Sumatra. Sri Vijaya even controlled Java for a number of years until the Javanese Sailendras Empire, which practiced Mahayana Buddhism, displaced it. Soon the Sailendras Empire reached its apex, controlling a great deal of territory after absorbing the Kalinga Kingdom in Java, much of southern Sumatra, and for a dozen years even ruled over the Chenla of Cambodia.¹² When a disgraced Sailendras prince fled to a weakened Sri Vijaya and contacted China for protection from his enemies in Java, concerned Indian princes invaded Palembang, which ended the maritime power of Sri Vijaya, causing the empire to fall by the twelfth century. Sailendras then suffered from a string of natural disasters, succession disputes, and the rise of smaller Kingdoms, also ceasing to exist in the twelfth century.¹³

In the fourteenth century, the powerful Javanese Majapahit Empire essentially unified the peninsula under the military skills of Gajah Mada, a feat cited by modern Acehnese nationalists as typical of continued Javanese ambition.¹⁴ This was partly possible due to Chinese politics, as the Mongol Yuan Dynasty had sent a massive fleet to Java, destroying many rival powers and intermarrying with local leadership. The Majapahit Empire also made use of skilled Chinese refugees fleeing

¹¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica 2004 Deluxe Addition*, "Aceh."

¹² Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Volume One, the Lands Below the Winds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 132.

¹³ *Government of Indonesia Tourism Bureau*, "Majapahit," <http://www.eastjava.com/books/majapahit>, accessed October 2003.

¹⁴ Aspinall and Berger, "The Break-Up of Indonesia?" 1018.

Mongol rule, thus saw technological and political advances.¹⁵ One of the only areas Gajah Mada could not capture was actually Pajajaran in West Java, known for its long resistance and religious traditions, while Aru (Medan) and Pasai (Aceh) were conquered in 1350.

The empires of the archipelago during the fifteenth century and after were generally entrepôts, regional trading systems acting as a hub between India and China. Trade winds, the shallow South China Sea, and an abundance of spices made Java and Sumatra thrive during this 'Age of Commerce.'¹⁶ A small Sumatran trading empire arose in a regenerated Pasai Kingdom in the fifteenth century, but could not compete with Malacca on the Malay Peninsula, founded by a Sailendras descendent who rebelled against Siam and converted his Kingdom to Islam in 1414, though not without Hindu resistance. Malacca became a regional trading power but would be taken by the Portuguese in 1511. Meanwhile, Java was home to the Muslim Empire of Mataram, the last great pre-colonial empire in the region. It is interesting to note that Mataram's Sultan Agung practiced transmigration, moving East Javanese families to the sparsely populated regions of West Java. It was during the reign of Sultan Agung that the Dutch began their inroads into Java, as Agung sought Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, or VOC) support in his war with a powerful Surabaya, which was defeated in 1617, as was Madura in 1624.¹⁷

3) The Dutch East Indies

The creation of the Dutch East Indies was a slow and multifaceted process. The Dutch first arrived in 1596 when the De Houtman Expedition was attacked by Portugal and their Sultanate allies, forcing Dutch survivors to settle on Bali. In 1598, the Dutch sent twenty two ships to punish the Portuguese, themselves finding allies among local Sultanates including in Aceh. In June 1599, De Houtman was killed by the Sultan of Aceh, ending a year long anti-Portuguese alliance between the two. In December 1601, five Dutch ships decimated the thirty ship Portuguese fleet in Banten Harbour; months later, the newly formed VOC pursued the Portuguese markets, building forts as far south as Australia. This was a massive change in regional politics; "unlike the Portuguese, the Dutch never considered themselves to have a civilizing or evangelical role in Asia, but operated on

¹⁵ M.C. Ricklefs, *a History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200* (London: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), 41.

¹⁶ Please see Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680*.

¹⁷ Peter Carey, "Civilization on Loan: the Making of an Upstart Polity: Mataram and its Successors, 1600-1830," *Modern Asian Studies*, Volume 31, Issue 3 (July 1997), 716.

a purely commercial basis.”¹⁸ The era of mercantilism was suddenly altered with the arrival of new traders, technology, and strategies.

After a decade of growth and peace with Mataram, in 1628 the VOC withstood a full assault from the Javanese Empire, with Sultan Agung making peace by 1636. In 1641, the VOC, the Sultan of Aceh, and the Sultan of Johore sacked Malacca; from this point, the VOC entered into a string of treaties, avoiding military conflict with through economics and diplomacy as its power grew. A 1677 rebellion resulted in Mataram requesting Dutch help, which came at the price of extended VOC economic control, the formal recognition of Dutch Batavia, and the hiring of rival Mataram princes which resulted in rivalry between Javanese elites.¹⁹ This was the first of a series of forced treaties with local powers, extending to Riau in 1685 and the Bataks around Lake Toba in 1694. VOC and Mataram armies took Madura in 1706, then East Java, and then deported ethnic Chinese traders in 1740. Such actions resulted in Chinese and Javanese guerillas operating in VOC plantations for decades.

After Napoleon invaded the Netherlands, French and Dutch revolutionaries declared the Batavian Republic in 1795. Batavia was soon attacked by the British, who took Malacca and other VOC forts in 1796. British power in the region had been growing for some time; the British East India Company arrived in Aceh in 1602, when Aceh sent two ambassadors to London and allowed the British to build a small fort in 1611. After several friendly visits to Java under Captain James Cook, English ships unsuccessfully attacked Batavia as far back as 1619. British settlement begun with Fort Marlborough in western Sumatra in 1714, and grew further with the acquisition of Penang in 1786. By the time of the French Revolution, the British were in position to challenge Napoleonic Holland’s power in the region.

After dissolving the VOC in 1798, the Dutch Indies appointed Daendels Governor General in 1807, whose prime focus was increasing economic productivity. The British finally took Java in 1811, agreeing to return the Indies to the new Netherlands administration only after a period of British rule under Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles,²⁰ who ended forced labour in favour of taxation and

¹⁸ Angus Maddison, “Dutch Income in and from Indonesia: 1700-1938,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Volume 23, Issue 4 (1989), 648.

¹⁹ Carey, “Civilization on Loan: the Making of an Upstart Polity,” 711.

²⁰ For a unique biography of Raffles, please see <http://rmbr.nus.edu.sg/history/raffles.htm>

temporarily displaced much of the Javanese elite.²¹ One of Raffles' goals was to end several forms of slavery, including the systems of forced delivery which would fuel the Dutch economy upon their return.²²

The Dutch formally regained control of Java in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814, which was amended by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. The 1824 document gave British possessions in what is now Indonesia to the Dutch, and the Dutch conceded Malaysia to the British. This Treaty, to which no local powers were privy, created the borders which are generally maintained today, including the formal recognition of Raffles' Singapore.²³ Article Nine of the document gave all of Sumatra to the Dutch; however an Appendix recognized that Aceh was an independent state under Dutch stewardship.²⁴

As Daendels returned to undo many of Raffles' reforms, he brought with him an era of high colonialism, where Dutch agents were no longer allies but instead employers of Javanese elites in an era of returned *corvée* labour. This, alongside particular differences between British and Dutch choices for local rule and brutal Dutch responses to small revolts, led to a major rebellion by the Javanese. Prince Diponegoro, whom Raffles saw as heir but the Dutch opposed, led an uprising from 1825-30. The Java War caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and nearly bankrupted the Dutch East Indies.²⁵ The War ended when the Dutch offered to talk with the Prince, but captured him when he came to negotiate, an action we will consider much later in our study.²⁶

After 1830, Governor General Johannes Van Den Bosch created the Culture System, which aimed at paying for Dutch Wars through an extended version of traditional *corvée* labour. This system saw Javanese set aside labour as well as land for plantations in a forced delivery system of taxation. The Culture System provided major income for the Netherlands government, which created a fictitious colonial debt in order to justify its profits from the newly created plantations.²⁷ In 1845

²¹ Maddison, "Dutch Income in and from Indonesia," 651.

²² H.R.C. Wright, "Raffles and the Slave Trade in Batavia," *the Historical Journal*, Volume 3, Issue 2 (1960).

²³ H.R.C. Wright, "The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East: 1814-1824," *the Economic History Review*, Volume 3, Issue 2 (1950).

²⁴ The full text Dutch version of the Treaty can be found at www.antenna.nl/wvi/nl/dh/geschiedenis/traktaat.html

²⁵ Peter Carey, "The Origins of the Java War," *the English Historical Review*, Volume 91, Issue 358 (January 1976), 61.

²⁶ Justus M. van der Kroef, "Prince Diponegoro: Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism," *the Far Eastern Quarterly*, Volume 8, Issue 4 (August 1949), 448.

²⁷ Maddison, "Dutch Income in and from Indonesia," 653.

the forced delivery system, in which people ate what was left over from a predetermined supply of export crops, operated at its most brutal capacity as the crops failed and peasants starved.

Economic exploitation resulted in social unrest. Van Den Bosch created the first East Indies Army, which was forced to put down major rebellions from ethnic minorities in the North Sumatran Padri War of 1838. Rebellions in Bali as well as in Batavia resulted in military action against Asian and even some European dissenters. One of the liberal Europeans was E.D. Dekker, who wrote *Max Havelaar* under the name Multatuli, critiquing Dutch and Javanese exploitation of the peasantry; “this book is chaotic...the writer lacks skill...no talent...right, right...all right! But...THE JAVANESE IS MALTREATED! For: *the SUBSTANCE of my work is irrefutable*”²⁸ (his emphasis). As the Dutch and Javanese Priyayi elites became richer due to this maltreatment, they sought to expand their territory, signing the Treaty of Sumatra with Britain in 1871, where Britain agreed to amend the 1824 Treaty and allow the Netherlands to invade Aceh.²⁹

The next half decade saw the Dutch fighting in Aceh, but also increased infrastructure; profits lessened as sugar prices dropped, so rail and telegraph lines as well as more sophisticated political control was established in new territories and crops. The Dutch created new industries, including what would later become Shell Petroleum, an opium monopoly, and massive rubber plantations. At the same time, new leaders came to power, such as Snouck Hurgronje, who had studied and promoted local Islam and its schools. In 1901, Queen Wilhelmina introduced the Ethical Policy, ending forced delivery on most crops. This was the time when Raden Adjeng Kartini became a major literary figure and early maternal feminist, opening women’s schools and expanding primary education in the Indies. In 1903, the first Javanese were elected into the colonial administration.³⁰ Thus, as the Dutch solidified borders through military and diplomatic means and expanded economic exploitation, the Javanese did see some liberalization among elites who had banded together in part to oppose Dutch and Chinese economic power.³¹ This was limited to Java however,

²⁸ Edward Douwes Dekker (Multatuli), *Max Havelaar: or the Coffee House Diaries of the Dutch Trading Company* (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 318-319.

²⁹ Please see Appendix I- Treaty of Sumatra

³⁰ *Serajah Indonesia*, “Dutch Imperialism: 1830-1910,” <http://www.gimonca.com/sejarah/sejarah05.html> accessed October 2003.

³¹ Amry Vandebosch, “A Problem in Java: the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies,” *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 3, Issue 11 (November 1930).

as bloody invasions in Bali, Aceh, and Sulawesi were grim reminders of the foundation of Dutch power.

One of the results of this contradiction was the creation of political associations. In 1905, the *Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah* was founded by Kyai Haji Samanhudi; on 10 September 1912, Cokroaminoto changed the organization's name to *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic League) and expanded its mandate. In the same month, the Indische Party was formed, its leaders immediately exiled, and in 1914 the Dutch communist Sneevliet founded what would become the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Thus, as a result of the opportunities for elite Javanese, new political forces were created. The Dutch responded by creating a token National Parliament, which angered local groups working towards genuine inclusion expected after the *November Promise*- a statement wherein the first steps towards independence would be taken. Sarekat Islam soon founded a secret revolutionary wing, while the PKI and its chairman, Tan Malaka, joined the Comintern and translated Lenin's texts into Javanese; the group attempted to establish a Communist Republic in 1926, but was crushed. In 1927, the *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) was founded by Sukarno and Dr. Cipto Mangunkusum after its leaders attended several international anti-colonial conferences.

Detail 1.0 Sukarno

Also known as Kusnasosro.

Born 6 June 1901, died 21 June 1970.

Indonesia's first President (r. 1949-1966), son-in-law and protégé of Omar Said Cokroaminoto, and initiator of both Pancasila and Guided Democracy.

Sukarno was a populist, a socialist, and a nationalist, speaking several languages both in linguistic as well as political terms. Sukarno worked against the Dutch, worked with and against the Japanese, worked with and against the Americans, and as he moved towards the Soviet Union, was the victim of a coup in late 1965.

The Dutch government tried to control these new political parties while further expanding the economy. Like Sultan Agung before them, the Dutch actively pursued transmigration of the heavily populated Java, this time to Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Ambon. This was also a time of Japanese economic expansion into the region, such as its Borneo Oil Company,³² an object of fear among Dutch officers who noted "a certain affinity" between the Japanese and some Indonesian

³² Richard Robson, "Politics & Markets in Indonesia's Post-Oil Era," in *the Political Economy of Southeast Asia*, eds. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31.

dissidents.³³ In the late 1930s, the Dutch Government rejected Indonesian autonomy shortly before the Netherlands was invaded by the Nazis on 10 May 1940. After years of planning its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese began their invasion of the Indies, consistently decimating Australian and Dutch forces, taking full control of the Indies by March 1941. Indonesian leaders Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir all worked with the Japanese to some extent, although the leaders were skeptical in light of forced labour, the use of comfort women, and authoritarian policies. Despite atrocities, the Japanese did provide military and political training, promoted the use of the Bahasa language, and released political prisoners of the Dutch.

4) The Republic of Indonesia

On 17 August 1945, Japan granted Indonesia independence, with Sukarno declaring independence, writing a constitution, and promoting his Pancasila days before the official Japanese surrender in Jakarta. In October, the Indonesian military was formed, fighting both the fleeing Japanese as well as the incoming British Indian forces. As the Dutch returned, they were critiqued by pre-Cold War America for their resurrection of colonialism: American scholars asserted that the Indonesians are “leaders in the struggle for emancipation of the subject peoples of the earth.”³⁴ Global criticism and Indonesian strength led to the March 1947 Linggarjati Agreement, where the Dutch recognized Indonesia sovereignty in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, but continued to control other islands and supported discontent in Java.

The Dutch continued to rule over the outer islands for several reasons; first, there were great profits to be had in local crops. Second, there were sizable Christian populations they sought to protect. Third, locals here were not rebellious due to a greater affinity and to less organization. But the Netherlands was not content to lose the larger islands, and soon instigated a series of attacks as their military rebuilt itself.

³³ Bob de Graaff, “Hot Intelligence in the Tropics: Dutch Intelligence Operations in the Netherlands East Indies during the Second World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 22, Issue 4 (October 1987), 563.

³⁴ Raymond Kennedy, “Dutch Plan for the Indies,” *Far Eastern Survey*, Volume 15, Issue 7 (10 April 1946), 102.

Detail 1.1 Pancasila

Sukarno's Five Principles of the Indonesian state were first proclaimed during the Japanese Occupation on 1 June 1945. They include:

- 1) The belief in one god
- 2) Global humanitarianism
- 3) The unity of Indonesia
- 4) Rule by consent
- 5) Social justice

Pancasila continued to be used by Suharto's New Order, making use of its vague nature to suggest the continuity and vision of his rule. Suharto organized massive Pancasila classes for every government employee in the late 1970s, as well as using it to control the Indonesian Military.

The Dutch again attacked; by July 1947 their *Police Actions* across the Indies had almost wiped out Republican leaders. The international community condemned Dutch action, but the Dutch responded by creating thirteen mini-states from allies in Sumatra, West Java, and other islands. The PKI rose up in 1948 against all sides, but were forced underground during the Second Dutch Police Action, which saw the Dutch regain control of Java, a time when only Aceh remained outside of Dutch control. The international community boycotted the Dutch and the Indonesian underground persevered, forcing a ceasefire in January of 1949, and by December the Republic was official. Indonesia had become a recognized state.

In December 1950, Indonesia restarted Dutch transmigration policies from Java and Bali to Kalimantan and other areas. The new state tried to remain cohesive in light of uprisings such as the *Darul Islam* (House of Islam) Rebellion, a six year rebellion begun largely in response to the Republic's multi-faith platform of Pancasila.³⁵ In April 1955, the Asia-African Bandung, Conference was held, a major step for Indonesia's autonomous role in world affairs and the foundation for what was to be the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. Here, President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta, and Premier Sastroamidjojo delivered major speeches and negotiated the first agreements with the People's Republic of China.

Meanwhile, demobilized and fractured military forces were critical of the government, which collapsed months later. As a result, Sukarno introduced *Guided Democracy* on 5 July 1959, which

³⁵ Morfit, "Pancasila," 844.

he labeled “a system in harmony with the soul of the Indonesian people.”³⁶ On 1 May 1963, West Irian was handed from the Dutch to Indonesia by the United Nations (UN) in an attempt to balance Indonesian hostility to the creation of a Malay state. The creation of Malaya resulted in Indonesian walking out of the UN and other international bodies, as well as sending support to local guerillas. Anti-Chinese and anti-American riots also occurred around the fractured Republic. As the PKI claimed 18% of the population,³⁷ the United States funded many anti-communist paramilitary groups such as the PRRO and PERMESTA.³⁸ Sukarno announced the second Indonesian Revolution, the bringing of Socialism, in 1965.³⁹

Detail 1.0 Suharto

Also known as Mohamed Suharto, born 8 June 1921.

Suharto was born to poor farmers in Central Java, joining the military during World War Two. Suharto rose to power under Guided Democracy, involved in what has been labeled a coup, as the military abducted the President to save him from Communists. Suharto took over as President in 1966, clinging to his dictatorship until 1998 when he was forced out of office.

Suharto and his large family are impressively corrupt, using their political power to become one of the richest families in the world. Suharto’s trials were called off on account of his supposedly failing health.

It was predicted in 1964 that if Sukarno should fall, “a struggle for power could take place...between the Army and the PKI.”⁴⁰ After a supposed coup attempt in September 1965 against several military and political leaders, General Mohamed Suharto proclaimed himself President to guard against future anti-Sukarno revolts,⁴¹ immediately carrying out one of the bloodiest anti-Communist massacres of the Cold War.⁴² In Aceh, local rulers embraced the purge of communists on behalf of the Indonesian state; the military received the blessing of councils of Ulama to kill the atheists. This was the beginning of Suharto’s New Order Government. Sukarno was a nationalist, while Suharto was a modernizer- his New Order was “modernization theory made

³⁶ President Sukarno, quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, “Guided Democracy in Indonesia,” the Far Eastern Survey, Volume 26, Issue 8 (August 1957), 113.

³⁷ Ewa T. Pauley, “Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?” Asian Survey, Volume 4, Issue 9 (September 1964), 1058.

³⁸ Aspinall and Berger, “The Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1006.

³⁹ Serajah Indonesia, “the Sukarno Years: 1950-1965,” <http://www.gimonca.com/sejarah/sejarah09.html> accessed October 2003.

⁴⁰ Pauley, “Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?” 1063.

⁴¹ Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993), 121.

⁴² For an analysis of the controversy of this issue, please see Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965-66,” Asian Survey, Volume 42, Issue 4 (2002), 550-563.

flesh.”⁴³ A revamped Pancasila and expanded military were the primary tools in ending regional rebellions, though “virtually none of the unrest in that period had been formally secessionist.”⁴⁴ Suharto’s ‘strongman’ tactics ensured that no legitimate forum existed to vent regional discontent, tactics which slowly created secessionist feelings for the first time in the Republic.

For over thirty years, Suharto ruled Indonesia through military power, based roughly on the nation-building efforts of Sukarno but allied with the United States against communism. Suharto acted as a censor, jailing left-wing dissidents such as Pramodya Ananta Toer, who responded with works of fiction to critique (neo) colonial power; “aren’t the Natives here ruled by their own rulers? Kings, sultans, bupati? In their turn this brown government is controlled by a white government.”⁴⁵ Suharto’s rule by force helped to create such opposition, as was the case in the economic realm; his *Repelitas*, or five year economic programmes, managed to create some economic growth, although based on military control, nepotism, inequality, and other forms of corruption. In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, ignoring an empty December 12 United Nations plea; the World Bank, Europe, the USA, and Japan continually financed Indonesia’s bloated debt and allowed the New Order to continue its rule.

Suharto and his weakening Golkar Party balanced the military, religious leaders, students, and business, holding power until the arrival of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997, itself partly a product of the impressively corrupt dealings of the New Order Government. As the economy collapsed and food prices soared, riots broke out across the country. On 21 May 1998, Suharto was forced to step down, with Vice-President Habibie becoming the new President. Habibie was met with unified opposition from Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, as religious and political conflicts exploded around the country. Finally, on 15 July 1999, a relatively fair election saw Abdurrahman Wahid become President after Muslim parties unified to oust Megawati, whose party earned more votes.⁴⁶ On 4 September 1999, East Timor voted 78% for independence, after which the Indonesian military and its militias

⁴³ Patrick Smith, “What Does it Mean to be Modern? Indonesia’s Reformasi,” *Washington Quarterly*, Volume 22, Issue 4 (Autumn 1999).

⁴⁴ Aspinall and Berger, “The Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1008.

⁴⁵ Pramodya Ananta Toer, *This Earth of Mankind* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 218.

⁴⁶ Please see ANFREL, *Democratization in Indonesia: Report of the 1999 Election Observation Mission* (Bangkok: ANFREL and FORUM-ASIA, 1999).

attacked and the United Nations intervened. Megawati became President on 23 July 2001 after Wahid was removed by a unanimous vote.

The major changes in Indonesia are indeed impressive, but since the fall of Suharto, operations in Aceh have continued, if not accelerated. Regarding the end of the New Order, Pramodya Ananta Toer cautions that “the current regime is a new New Order...the bureaucracy has stayed the same, as has the military.”⁴⁷ We will now look at Acehnese history in its own right, and how it parallels Indonesia’s development.

5) Aceh

Acehnese history is a difficult subject, as sources from all angles are loaded with assumptions which wish to provide a foundation for terrorism, independence, or integration; we must be wary of those who claim that “Acheh, on the island of Sumatra, was an internationally recognized independent state for thousands of years.”⁴⁸ Scholars such as John R. Bowen have analyzed the different historiographies, such as the use of *serajah* (Bahasa) or *tawaikh* (Arabic) as a title for Acehnese history; he notes that one of the goals of recent scholars is to “establish an early date for the founding of an Islamic Kingdom in Aceh and create a series of precise temporal links from one kingdom to the next...to fortify the sense of historical continuity.”⁴⁹ He concludes that Acehnese attempts to create a unique history work well with Jakarta’s goals of having one culture per province, as it displaces historical and minority difference within Aceh. Such historiography is typical in independence struggles, including Indonesia’s, as groups “justify their claims to self-determination by constructing ethno-histories of glorious independent statehood stretching back to antiquity.”⁵⁰ This section will try to shed light on the complicated history of Aceh.

Of all historical statements which sever Aceh from Java, there is little doubt that “Aceh’s economic, political and cultural linkages were to the Indian Ocean and the Malayan Peninsula, not to the world

⁴⁷ Interview with Pramodya Ananta Toer, in Forum-Asia, *Indonesia Post-Soeharto* (Bangkok: ANDi, FORUM-ASIA, and AJI, 1999), 176.

⁴⁸ Hasan di Tiro, “Denominated Indonesians,” (20 January 1995).

www.asnlf.net/asnlf_int/frame_ges_int/frame_int.htm, accessed October 2003

⁴⁹ John R. Bowen, “Narrative Form and Political Incorporation: Changing Uses of History in Aceh, Indonesia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Volume 31, Issue 4 (October 1989), 683.

⁵⁰ Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity,” 14.

of the Java Sea dominated first by Java and then the Dutch.”⁵¹ As mentioned, the region was once a Buddhist Kingdom named Pole around 500 AD, consisting of about 150 villages and home to extensive rice agriculture.⁵² Pole was conquered by Sri Vijaya, which dominated Sumatra for centuries while also teaching peripheral areas sophisticated methods of statecraft. Several kingdoms grew in this region as Sri Vijaya declined, including Pasai, which between 1290 and 1520 was a cosmopolitan port, home to the growth of both Muslim and Malay literature until it was invaded to become part of the Sultanate of Aceh, based in Banda Aceh.⁵³ The Sultanate of Aceh has its roots in the Kingdom of Lamurai; at the end of the fifteenth century, this growing Kingdom began to incorporate smaller kingdoms into its sphere. Under Sultan Ali Mugatay Syad, Lamurai took Pasai, North Sumatra, and Pedir by 1524, only a decade after the he had proclaimed himself the first Sultan of Aceh.⁵⁴

Regrettably, several writers believe that the Portuguese invasion of Malacca and subsequent persecution of Muslims “was the main reason for the rise of Aceh.”⁵⁵ There is some truth to this, as Portugal brought their Crusades with them, causing an exodus of Muslims from Malacca to Aceh in 1511. But this explanation is too simplistic; Aceh grew based on maritime trading which predated the Portuguese. Regional trade was previously dominated by several powers, of which Malacca was only one. But the Portuguese were a factor in Acehnese growth, as their involvement in Pasai in 1523 was one reason for the Acehnese invasion of the fiefdom in 1524. But Aceh regarded Portugal as just another power, also invading Aru and Gasip in Eastern Sumatra due to local political intrigue.

Aceh was an expansionary power by almost every definition, including economic, cultural, and military.⁵⁶ To state that Aceh was established when Sultan Ali ‘united’ small Kingdoms or that his court ‘promoted’ its form of Islam is to understate the invasions of nearby realms.⁵⁷ In 1530, Sultan

⁵¹ Reid, “War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh.”

⁵² Edwin M. Loeb, *Sumatra: its History and People* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), 218.

⁵³ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

⁵⁴ For the GAM’s list of Acehnese Sultans, please see Appendix II

⁵⁵ Loeb, *Sumatra: its History and People*, 218.

⁵⁶ Ito Takeshi, *the World of Adat Aceh: a Historical Study of the Sultanate of Aceh* (PhD Thesis: Australian National University, 1984).

⁵⁷ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 10-11.

Salahuddin came to power, soon failing in two massive invasions of Malacca in 1537 and 1547; Christian European sources note that the invaders often attacked local civilians, though such writers also note that Aceh's loss was pre-ordained by heaven, and should be taken as hostile accounts.⁵⁸ Aceh successfully invaded the Batak region of North Sumatra in 1539- its inhabitants used as slaves along with the Nias people- and then temporarily defeated their traditional rival, Johore, in 1565.⁵⁹ In 1567, a succession dispute resulted in a pause in Acehnese growth after the loss of Johore in 1570 and failed military expeditions against Malacca in 1568, 1573, 1575, 1577, and 1582.⁶⁰

Continued losses and succession disputes were halted in the early seventeenth century. One of the major reasons for the string of military defeats was the stagnancy of Acehnese tactics in response to Portuguese weaponry, as Acehnese generals lacked the firepower to breach large stone walls, failed to use zigzag formations against cannon, and failed to find regional allies. This era saw a slow advance in international relations; the first Acehnese delegation went to the Ottoman Empire in 1552, which eventually resulted in Turkish weapons and military training decades later, as Turkey wanted to control the spice trade through the Red Sea against its major rival in Portugal.⁶¹ Aceh also established relations with the British and Dutch; each nation sent envoys to Iskandar Muda, whom they dubbed 'the new Alexander.'⁶² In June 1602, Sir James Lancaster secured Acehnese permission for a British factory, which was operational by 1613. The Dutch also made agreements with Aceh, as the two conducted joint military operations against Portugal; later, the Acehnese tolerated "the Hollanders, who maintained in general a friendly intercourse with her, to remain in quiet possession of Malacca."⁶³ Finally, Aceh created alliances with several sultans as near as Demak and as far away as India. In diplomatic circles, this was the beginnings of Aceh's arrival on the world scene.

⁵⁸ William Marsden, the History of Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Reprints, 1966), 428.

⁵⁹ In this era, Aceh relied on large-scale slavery, but not in the Western sense, as slaves were well-treated and not bound for life, in contrast to the Americas. The most important element of the slave trade is that it created a hierarchy between Malay Acehnese and minority groups while also assimilating the groups in Acehnese society. Please see Loeb for details, 230-232.

⁶⁰ Pierre-Yves Manguin, "Of Fortresses and Galleys: the 1568 Acehnese Siege of Melaka, after a Contemporary Bird's-Eye View," Modern Asian Studies, Volume 22, Issue 3 (1988), 625.

⁶¹ Anthony Reid, "An 'Age of Commerce' in Southeast Asian History," Modern Asian Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1 (February 1990), 8.

⁶² Fernand Bernard, A Travers Sumatra: de Batavia a Atjeh (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1904), 195.

⁶³ Marsden, the History of Sumatra, 448.

Detail 1.2 Sultan Iskandar Muda

Born 1589, ruled 1607-1636, died 1636.

Ending a long series of succession struggles, Iskandar ruled Aceh as it took a major role in regional politics, economics, and military.

Iskandar was a skilled tactician and a monopolistic businessman. Where his predecessors unilaterally invaded Malacca, Muda worked with Portugal's enemies and fortified any gains before expanding further, especially through regional trading networks.

By Iskandar's death in 1636, Aceh had still not conquered Portuguese Malacca. However, Aceh did control much of the Malay Peninsula as well as most of Sumatra, more importantly having fortified their existing territory.

This political growth was mutually reinforced with the end of thirty years of succession disputes in the form of Sultan Iskandar Muda in 1607, the so-called 'Golden Age of Aceh.' As Iskandar came to power, Aceh was home to 50,000 persons, had several enemies and allies, and a long string of military defeats. Under Iskandar, Aceh expanded into North Sumatra, largely assimilating several tribes such as the Gayo and converting them to Acehnese Islam.⁶⁴ After retreating from a massive invasion of Malacca in 1615, Iskandar focused on smaller strongholds of the Portuguese and their allies, taking Kedah and Perak on the Malay Peninsula and then territories in North Sumatra, including Nias and Indrapura. Iskandar began to make several enemies in the region, notably with the Dutch and British; as his power grew, he felt that he did not need allies in his fight against Portugal. But Iskandar could not take Malacca, dying after a failed invasion in 1636.

Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1636-1641) was the short-lived successor of Iskandar Muda. Thani focused on implementing Islamic Laws, but his greatest triumph came when Acehnese and Dutch fleets finally toppled Malacca, Aceh content with their allies ruling in the port.⁶⁵ After Iskandar Thani died in 1641, Aceh saw what many consider to be its distinguishing feature among Muslim powers: Aceh was ruled by consecutive female Sultans. After Thani's widow held power, Queen Maghayat held power for almost thirty years, her rule plagued with internal rebellion and shrinking borders. The next two Queens held power only briefly and are rarely noted in Acehnese history, known only for concluding major economic treaties with British merchants.

⁶⁴ Bowen, "Narrative Form and Political Incorporation," 673.

⁶⁵ Loeb, *Sumatra: its History and People*, 219.

During the late seventeenth century, Acehnese power waned, its territories breaking away as Dutch power grew. Sultan Jauhar al-Alam spent years with English sailors, resulting in passable English skills, several European mercenaries in his armies, and some controversial habits such as drinking alcohol.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the Sultan looked to recapture break-away territories in 1809. Jauhar al-Alam regulated trade and demanded cash tribute, creating monopolies on several products bought by Europeans. As Raffles tended to changes in the Dutch system, he “thought well of Jauhar al-Alam and was sympathetic to his attempts to assert his authority throughout the country.”⁶⁷ From 1760 until 1819, there were six major British missions to Aceh, and though relations were cordial, no diplomatic breakthroughs occurred, as Acehnese rulers did not have great interest in such politics. This led to a disinterested British court, which was content with Penang and soon Singapore; as one observer noted, this amounted to the “total abandonment of (Britain’s) political connexion (sic)” with Sumatra.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Dutch looked to expand its newly reclaimed Empire.

During the Java War, Aceh again began to grow as the weakened Dutch left a power vacuum in Sumatra, though the Sultan still lived in “but a shell of his former Kingdom” by the time the Dutch invaded in 1873.⁶⁹ The Dutch invasion was foreseen by Acehnese leaders, as they appealed to England, Turkey, India, Japan, France, and finally the United States for an alliance against the Dutch as the Treaty of Sumatra was signed in 1871. But the Dutch were determined to expand their political economy and restore their pride which had been wounded by the Java War; “the ghost of Diponegoro...tormented the Dutch subconscious.”⁷⁰ After the Dutch were informed of arms entering Aceh from Singapore and of a failed Acehnese attempt at creating an alliance with the Americans on 25 January, the invasion was ordered in April of 1873; the Aceh War had begun.

Even though the first Dutch military expedition was a disaster, the Aceh War was still seen as hopeless by most observers; “there are many peoples who go to war who have no desire to be

⁶⁶ Lee Kam Hing, the Sultanate of Aceh: Relations with the British 1760-1824 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 94.

⁶⁷ Lee, the Sultanate of Aceh, 141.

⁶⁸ John Anderson, Acheen and the Ports on the North and East Coasts of Sumatra (London: Oxford Historical Reprints, 1971), 158.

⁶⁹ Loeb, Sumatra: its History and People, 224.

⁷⁰ James Siegel, Shadow and Sound: the Historical Thought of a Sumatran People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 43.

victor. They go to war and die in the thousands, like the Acehnese now.”⁷¹ This was “the biggest, bloodiest, costliest military operation in Dutch colonial history.”⁷² The Acehnese military and tropical diseases resulted in thirty five years of warfare, along with thirty years of guerilla warfare, and countless casualties of Dutch and native troops, themselves a fraction of the losses endured by the Acehnese.

From 1873-1893, the ‘First Phase’ of the Aceh War saw conventional warfare. By 1874, the Dutch controlled most of the towns, but due to their cruelty they had no support; in 1878 General Van der Heijden burned down five hundred villages, inflating the growing resistance of Ulama (religious teachers) movements led by Teungku Cik di Tiro. As with most invasions, force was able to capture towns but not hearts. The ‘Second Phase’ of Guerilla War from 1893-1904 saw mobile warfare, after which Sultan Tuanku Daud Syah finally surrendered, though he supported the smaller guerilla movements for decades.

From 1904 to 1913, the ‘Last Phase’ made use of local troops to conduct searches for remaining guerillas; in 1904, Captain Van Daalen led another massacre, while in 1907 Acehnese guerillas surprised a Dutch unit and local sympathizers with a massacre of their own. The renewal of aggression after 1905 was partly a result of the inspiration sweeping Asia after the Japanese defeat of Russia.⁷³ However this inspiration was short-lived. Despite claims to the contrary, by 1913 “the Dutch could at last be said to have conquered Aceh,”⁷⁴ and the divisions created by the war and the militarization of society continue today. As argued by socio-historian J.I Bakker, “the story of the Aceh War is not merely one of military conquest. Equally important, especially in the long run, is the story of the use of legitimate authority.”⁷⁵ Bakker argues that the legacy of violence nurtured by the war has far reaching implications for the present conflict. The Aceh War also stunted political growth in the region, with party organization not coming until just prior to World War Two.

⁷¹ Toer, *This Earth of Mankind*, 224.

⁷² Siegel, *Shadow and Sound: the Historical Thought of a Sumatran People*, 43.

⁷³ Anthony Reid, “the Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942,” *the Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 35, Issue 1 (November 1975), 53.

⁷⁴ Anthony Reid, *the Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 7.

⁷⁵ J.I Bakker, “the Aceh War and the Creation of the Netherlands East Indies State,” in A. Ion, A. Hamish and E.J. Errington (eds.), *Great Powers and Little Wars: The Limits of Power* (New York: Praeger, 1993), 53-82.

Detail 1.3 PUSA

(Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh)

A crucial actor spanning across several wars, the PUSA was a group of Ulama which joined together to fight Dutch / Ulambaang power, then Japanese, then Dutch, and finally Indonesian control. After years of political collusion between the Ulambaang and the Dutch, Aceh had few political parties compared to Java until the creation of the PUSA.

Led by Muhammad Daud Beureueh, the PUSA led Aceh out of WW2 and was a major actor in the Darul Islam rebellion and is claimed by the GAM to be their predecessor. But the PUSA was a religious organization which never fought for its own states, unlike current groups in Aceh.

The first major Acehnese organization was the *Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh* (PUSA), formed by Muhammad Daud Beureueh in May 1939. The formation of the PUSA must be seen in terms of the power struggle between the *Ulambaang* (business elites) and the *Ulama* (religious leaders), which will be discussed in chapter two. This division is crucial as the Japanese arrived, as the Ulama had already contacted Japan decades prior as well as being inspired by this Asian power. As World War Two began, the PUSA met with Japanese officials and organized major uprisings against the Dutch; on 16 December 1941, they organized in Penang, with Japan sending radio broadcasts in Acehnese and training PUSA and youth brigades for fifth column work. The Japanese were astounded that Acehnese leaders such as Said Abu Bakar “made no significant demands of the Japanese in return for their services.”⁷⁶ On 19 February 1942, Acehnese leaders rose up prematurely, assisted by some dissident Ulambaang, with a full rebellion four days later and Japan arriving on 15 March 1942.

As was the case throughout the region, pro-Japanese forces were soon discouraged by the brutality of their allies. The Japanese resented their dependency on the PUSA leadership, trying to balance the Ulama with the Ulambaang. The PUSA organized groups both for and against the Japanese, securing arms through official channels while recruiting peasants for a holy war; on 15 November 1942 a Japanese transport was attacked with heavy losses and the surrender of weaponry. Such battles became frequent in rural areas, while in other regions the Japanese continued to arm the Acehnese for a continued struggle for independence, going so far as to remain as trainers after the Japanese surrender. On 3 May 1945, Acehnese guerillas took the Japanese outpost at Pandrah without a single loss, with the Japanese defeat following shortly. Though we must resist biased historiographies which state that Aceh was “the only Non-European and non-American native

⁷⁶ Reid, “the Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites,” 55.

resistance, faced by Japan Imperial Army in the whole East Asia,”⁷⁷ a strange thought in light of Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Burmese, and several other larger resistance movements, the Acehese fight against Japan was certainly notable.

The Ulama / Ulambaang rivalry came to a head in the aftermath of the war; some Ulambaang, such as Teuku Mohammad Daud, wanted a return to Dutch rule for their own security. Some in each camp, including those allied with Sarekat Islam, worked for the Republic of Indonesia and its President Sukarno; the Ulambaang supported a Republic with their power intact, while the Ulama and the PUSA supported an Islamic Republic. The latter group won the battle in both military and political terms, as Ulambaang power was undermined with the appointment of Daud Beureueh as the Republican military commander against the Dutch in 1947. His and the PUSA's power grew as the Republic fell to the Dutch and Aceh was the only stronghold remaining, keeping its own economic power outside of Javanese and Dutch control.⁷⁸ In a meeting with Acehese Ulamas, Sukarno was pushed to promise that Indonesia would be governed on Islamic principles. It is crucial to note that at this time, “there was no significant support among the Acehese leadership for a separate Acehese state.”⁷⁹ As Indonesia became a state, it was with widespread support in Aceh.

The ‘Special Recognition’ of Aceh was rescinded in 1950 and the Islamic principles were seemingly displaced by the vaguely multicultural policy of Pancasila; Aceh lost even its provincial status after being incorporated into a Medan-centered North Sumatran Province, and some PUSA leaders were arrested in 1951.⁸⁰ From 20 September 1952, the Darul Islam Rebellion was waged throughout Indonesia, in Aceh under the power of Daud Beureueh and the PUSA. The Republic quickly made concessions and the people tired of war, so Daud slowly lost his support as he kept fighting. On 9 April 1957, a ceasefire was signed and Aceh once again gained provincial status, with Daud abandoned by the full peace agreement on 14 May 1959.⁸¹ Aceh gained ‘Special

⁷⁷ Dr. Lukman Thaib, *Political Dimensions of Islam in Southeast Asia*, (Kuala Lumpur: National University of Malaysia, 1996), 29.

⁷⁸ Clive J. Christie, *a Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism, and Separatism* (London: Tauris, 1996), 147.

⁷⁹ Aspinall and Berger, “The Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1016.

⁸⁰ An exception was Deputy Prime Minister Sjafruddin; please see Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin.

⁸¹ Please see M. Nur el-Ibrahimi, *Peranan Tgk. M. Daud Beureueh dalam Pergolakan Aceh* (Jakarta: Media Dawah, 2001).

Territory' status, meaning cultural and religious autonomy, on 7 December. After being pushed into an alliance with the communists, a weakened Beureueh was isolated by the 1960s; he remained in obscurity until his death in 1987.⁸²

After a decade of upheaval across the archipelago, Suharto's New Order brought discontent to Aceh once again, but this time it was of a secessionist nature. At first Aceh was involved in the war against communism, where several Muslim groups alongside the Indonesian military rounded up the atheist PKI, an almost forgotten disregard of human rights by the team of Acehnese militants and the Republican Army.⁸³ In reference to anti-communist violence, we must remember that for separatist historiography, "Acehnese violence that supported rather than threatened the nation must be forgotten."⁸⁴ As the Red Scare abated, the New Order pursued modernization programmes which were based on resource extraction, with liquid gas and mineral exports underway by 1971 from Aceh. It was such economic exploitation which resulted in the creation of the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement- GAM). Military cruelty existed for decades, but came to a peak in 1989 when Aceh became a Military Operation Area (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM), an era where the GAM found its first traces of popularity. This is where today's conflict is said to have begun.

6) Conclusions

Writers who claim that Islam's early beginnings accounts "for the relative fervor with which it is embraced there"⁸⁵ assume that longevity equals fervor, it ignores the diversity of Acehnese history, and it is a conservative and transparent attempt to explain today's conflict with but a few words. In fact, observers throughout history noted that Banda Aceh was remarkably cosmopolitan, with open trade and tolerance for others.⁸⁶ A detail of regional history does not point to Acehnese sovereignty, but it does demonstrate a degree of autonomy, as would a detail of Balinese or Sulawesi history. Aceh has been home to several rebellions; however they have each had radically different origins, some being traditional, some religious, some in defense, some in offense, some in politics, and some in economics. The Dutch, Japanese, and the Republic have each been allies as

⁸² Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 29.

⁸³ Siegel, *Shadow and Sound: the Historical Thought of a Sumatran People*, 272.

⁸⁴ Elizabeth Frances Drexler, *Paranoid Transparencies: Aceh's Historical Grievance and Indonesia's Failed Reform* (Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, University of Washington, 2001), 81

⁸⁵ Murphy, "Indonesian President Backs Away from Tolerance."

⁸⁶ James Siegel, *the Rope of God* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 37.

well as enemies to Acehnese elites, while the stories from the population as a whole have not been heard.

Several writers who are hostile to the Republic of Indonesia note that it is an artificial creation, that Acehnese culture is unique and therefore deserves its own state, and that separatism in Indonesia is “a natural if regrettable consequence of the ethnic, linguistic, and geographic heterogeneity.”⁸⁷

Again, such a stance is entirely conservative, far more repressive than Indonesia’s Pancasila, which stresses diversity. Those who critique the artificial nature of Indonesia must also see Acehnese historicism in the same vein. Several observers note that “where governments and cultural elites can command only tenuous loyalty from citizens, the past is often used for nation building.”⁸⁸

Indonesian nationalism was created in opposition to Dutch colonialism, dressed with overtures to an imagined past. For its part, Acehnese nationalism is created in opposition to the Indonesian (and Dutch) powers, resulting in an almost identical form of nationalism. Each rely on partial stories and romantic views of feudal societies, each create histories which serve to fit their own projected shapes.

We must comprehend the complicated histories of the region in order to make sense of the histories offered by all sides and to see today’s conflict in its own terms. This foundation has been an attempt to provide background for the political actors of the next chapter, while also raising serious objections to their use of history and thus their credibility.

⁸⁷ Geoffrey Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does: the Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh,” in Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, edited by Benedict Anderson (Cornell: SEAP Publications, 2001), 213.

⁸⁸ Michael Wood, “the Historical Past as a Tool for Nation Building in New Order Indonesia: a Preliminary Examination,” in Good Governance and Conflict Resolution in Indonesia: from Authoritarian Government to Civil Society (Jakarta: IAIN Jakarta Press, 2000), 97-106.

Chapter 2: Politics

The conflict in Aceh is between political actors; knowing their backgrounds, leaders, and divisions is necessary to knowing the conflict. This chapter will look at the political agendas of several groups, even those which are not always seen as political such as security forces. This chapter will also pick up on where the first chapter left off, with the rise of the GAM and the escalation of the current conflict in Aceh; first it will detail the Ulama / Ulambaang conflict and how it impacts the current struggle, then the GAM, and finally other Acehnese groups and political parties. Then we will detail the roles of the aristocracy in Java, the political parties in Indonesia, and the role of Indonesian security forces. Chapters five and six, which detail civil society and international politics, are of course extensions of this chapter, though it is important to detail the economics and human rights of the conflict between the two in order to understand why civil society is so important. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the complicated political realms in Aceh, which is no simplistic conflict between government and rebel or between colonizer and resistor. This will then allow us to discuss the economics which result from and perpetuate the political power, namely the elitist nature of the dominant actors.

1) Acehnese Elites

Acehnese elites as a source of conflict have been the focus of several scholars, including Anthony Reid, W.F. Wertheim, and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin; the latter avers that such an approach assumes “that Aceh’s political development in the post-independence period were basically an extension of its past politics.”¹ He further outlines that many leaders in Jakarta, such as former Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, take this view, as it absolves them from guilt. Sjamsuddin concludes that this elite struggle is one of many major elements in the current conflict, but obviously not the lone factor.

Historically, Acehnese elites were comprised of three groups: the Ulama (religious teachers), the Ulambaang (business elites, traders), and the Sultanate (Muslim government). The balance between literati, traders, and government continued until the Dutch ended the Sultanate in 1903, after almost four centuries of rule; this “upset the traditional balance of power between Aceh’s major

¹ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 3.

sociopolitical forces.”² In the ensuing vacuum of power, both the Ulama and the Ulambaang became political actors, with the Dutch and Javanese generally supporting the latter and the popular support generally residing with the former. This has concrete implications today, as GAM often declares its demand (and candidacy) for “the restoration of a pre-colonial Islamic sultanate.”³ GAM also declares that its leader Hasan di Tiro is currently the Sultan of Aceh, presumably based on his family’s previous power base, as their database is highlighted by a well-researched genealogy of the di Tiro bloodline.⁴ In an interview with *Inside Indonesia*, a GAM official stated that “the sultan will be Dr Hasan Tiro, who is now resident in Sweden. He will return to rule Aceh.”⁵ This antidemocratic, feudal mindset drives the GAM leaders, despite the fact that di Tiro’s ancestors were not Sultans but instead Ulama. The Ulama / Ulambaang conflict is generally marked by each side attempting to fulfill the political role of the Sultanate.

Elite conflict accelerated when the Dutch attempted to recreate its successful policies in Java by elevating the business elites into governmental roles, roles which were more visible than Dutch power while subservient at the same time. Dutch / Ulambaang collusion became entrenched in 1908 under Governor Swart, who paid very high wages for capable local agents. The Dutch became reliant on the Ulambaang, scared to introduce reforms which may weaken their hold and restart total warfare. The basis of Ulambaang power was trade, which in a Muslim economic hub was all-important. In 1938, the Ulambaang opposed the recreation of a Sultan under the Dutch until they petitioned to have their own leaders made into Kings.⁶ With several exceptions, Ulambaang corruption and power grew under the Dutch until the arrival of the Japanese. Displaced by the PUSA and the Japanese, Ulambaang indecision over whether to support the Dutch or the Republic weakened their post-war power. The Ulambaang decision to work within the despised North Sumatran Provincial Government further weakened their support, as their concern was to “regard the authorities in Java as their allies in taking revenge against the PUSA leaders.”⁷ The conflict became violent with the creation of the *Badan Keinsyafan Rakyat* (BKR), a group of Ulambaang

² Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 16.

³ Tom McCawley, “On Neutral Ground: Rebels Face Indonesian Government,” *Christian Science Monitor*, Volume 92, Issue 120 (12 May 2000).

⁴ Free Aceh Movement, “Acehnese History,” www.asnlf.net/asnlf_int/frame_ges_int/frame_int.htm, accessed October 2003.

⁵ Vanessa Johanson, “the Sultan will be Dr. Hasan Tiro,” *Inside Indonesia*, Volume 60 (Fall 1999).

⁶ Reid, *the Blood of the People*, 29.

⁷ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 48.

and Jakarta officials which arrested PUSA leaders and distributed pamphlets calling the PUSA Dutch agents.

Historically, the Ulama were Muslim intellectuals, based on prayer, literature, and other cultural realms which made them critical of the Dutch presence.⁸ The Ulama were once opposed to party politics due to the example set by the Ulambaang and the Dutch; this changed with Daud Beureueh and the PUSA.⁹ The PUSA first battled with the Ulambaang regarding the position of Islam in schools and later became a great source of resistance both alongside and against the Japanese. After the Japanese were defeated, the PUSA and its associates became leaders against the Dutch. In a 1945 statement, the Ulama showed their devotion to Allah and the Republic as well as their resentment towards the Dutch and Ulambaang; “in Java, the Dutch and their henchmen have committed aggression against the freedom of the Republic of Indonesia.”¹⁰ The PUSA was the strongest postwar player in all of Indonesia, reflected by the diverse forms of power held by Daud Beureueh, who fell from power only towards the end of the Darul Islam Rebellion in 1959.

A World War Two memoir from a Japanese captain focuses on the two groups, the author suggesting that Sumatra lagged behind the world in this feudal contest, one perpetuated by the Dutch. The officer continues to describe how each party pressed remaining Japanese troops for weapons, and how each fluctuated between supporting Japan, Aceh, and Indonesia.¹¹ The Japanese pitted the two groups against each other, whereas Jakarta used the same strategy as the Dutch, where they backed the weaker party for the sake of balance, but unlike the Dutch, kept political control for themselves. This pushed the PUSA to sever its links with Indonesian parties such as Hatta’s MASYUMI.

Under the context of the Cold War, as Sukarno drifted towards the Soviet camp, so too did the Ulambaang. Despite their own elite nature, the BKR was joined by leftist students who rejected the

⁸ Alfian, “the Ulama in Acehnese Society,” in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, edited by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

⁹ Yusny Saby, *Islam and Social Change: the Role of the Ulama in Acehnese Society* (PhD Thesis, Temple University, 1995).

¹⁰ For the full statement, please see Appendix III, Statement of the Acehnese Ulama to Fight Against Dutch Return.

¹¹ Ushiyama Mitsuo, “Recording of the End of the War in the Northern Part of Sumatra,” *the Japanese Experience in Sumatra*, edited by Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (Athens Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), pp. 375-396.

feudal power base of Beureueh and the PUSA in a major pro-Suharto rally on 30 July 1951.¹² This was one of the major reasons, aside from religion, that the Ulama worked so closely with the Republic to kill communists in the 1960s. Further complication came as non-Ulama PUSA, or *Zuama*, organized, as did non-PUSA Ulamas, the PERTI (Islamic Education) Movement. The Ulambaang and the Republic arrested many PUSA leaders and ignored their demands, adding fuel to the rebellion and Darul Islam.

Since this time, the bloody conflict between these traditional sources of power has been eclipsed, as the role of the Sultanate has been filled while each side has fought for power. The Republic of Indonesia is the Sultan; it holds political power, becoming the major enemy of both groups through its poor exercise of that power. The conflict between the Ulama and Ulambaang is still crucial, for an independent Aceh would have to solve this problem, one which is steeped in history and surfaces in the GAM today. After the fall of the PUSA in 1959, the conflict was temporarily settled, though each group remains a powerful actor which cannot be forgotten or homogenized when viewing the conflict today because the same forces are still political actors; “Golkar aligned itself with the traditional nobility; the religious leaders joined the PPP.”¹³ The Ulama Council (MUI) remains a generally impartial group within Aceh, while several Ulambaang work within the business circles of the GAM.

2) The Free Aceh Movement

Detail 2.0 GAM / ANSLF Flag



This flag has become the image of resistance to Indonesian rule even for those who do not support the GAM, balancing Islamic and military icons. The GAM claims that this flag is 3,500 years old, itself a part of its legal basis for sovereignty.

However, at several recent peace rallies, protestors have consciously flown United Nations flags, not that of the GAM.

¹² Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 58.

¹³ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 440.

In 1971, the Republic of Indonesia began the process of extracting liquid gas from Aceh, as well as other economic projects typical of the New Order regime, with profit being siphoned off to Jakarta. On 29 November 1976, the *Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front* (ANSLF, or Free Aceh Movement- GAM)¹⁴ was founded as its leadership arrived from abroad. This leadership had recently lost out in their bids to handle gas contracts, thus the origins of the GAM is based on elite interests; it was then comprised mainly of intellectuals, including western educated elites.¹⁵ On 4 December 1976, the GAM released its Declaration of Independence, labeling the Javanese as colonialists and issuing a call to the international community that Aceh should have statehood, as “a worthy contributor to human welfare the world over.”¹⁶ But the international community showed little interest and GAM military strategies were initially unsuccessful, causing GAM leaders such as Hasan di Tiro to flee the country on 29 March 1979.

Detail 2.1 Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro

Born 4 September 1930



From a wealthy family with considerable historical notoriety, di Tiro was educated at Columbia and Fordham Universities in law. An early Indonesian nationalist, he acted as the Republic's UN Ambassador in the 1950s.

Di Tiro's power comes from business; he is the President of Doral International, a large gas company with ties in banking and agriculture. He has also written many books on both the history of Aceh as well as on the colonial nature of Javanese rule, as well as early articles supporting the Indonesian state. Though prone to exaggeration, di Tiro remains the leader of several levels of resistance.

Di Tiro was awarded an honorary law degree in 1975, and in the last decade has worked from Sweden to solidify Acehnese diplomatic ties in the international community. The supposed Sultan has devoted his life to creating his own country, free from Javanese rule in favour of his own.

After the 1987 national elections, several academics saw the conflict as over; “Indonesian economic development has created its own pervasive network of opportunities...and Aceh is securely within

¹⁴ The name ANSLF, used by GAM leaders in international circles, is controversial because it claims rule over Sumatra, thus, the term GAM is most often used.

¹⁵ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 28.

¹⁶ Please see Appendix IV, Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra.

that network.”¹⁷ After a decade of preparation, GAM rose up in 1989. Why did the GAM choose 1989? The changing nature of the Cold War was likely a factor, as former training centers were no longer viable bases. Further, the interventionist doctrine of President Bush likely influenced leaders hopeful of international involvement. When the GAM arrived, so did the Indonesian military, whose brutal response ensured that the GAM would have a solid foundation with the Acehnese people. The Government of Indonesia made Aceh a Military Operations Area (DOM), where “rather than working to ameliorate sociopolitical and economic conflict through open dialogue, the central government mobilized the military.”¹⁸ After years of human rights abuses, the Asian Economic Crisis and the subsequent death of the New Order resulted in the end of the DOM Period on 8 August 1998; however given the severity of the abuses, to be detailed in a later chapter, there could be no return to normal life without major changes. Suharto’s handpicked GOLKAR successor, Habibie, promised a new era in Aceh.

The Habibie government made no efforts at reconciliation; instead, the government actually increased military action on the grounds that its soldiers were attacked when preparing to leave Aceh. The reaction of the Indonesian military is logical from their position, as after the fall of Suharto, GAM leaders “returned to Aceh from Malaysia and other parts of the world.”¹⁹ The Republic saw the obvious effects of its own weakness after years of abuse; Mosques were openly used to denounce Indonesian crimes, the GAM grew in leaps and bounds, and past human rights abuses were recognized by the international community. For the first time, GAM had a prominent following, as it adopted the human rights language used in the struggle in East Timor. Despite claims to have been fighting for thirty years, “the declaration of Aceh Merdeka on December 4, 1976 was much more significant in 1999 and 2000 than it was in 1976.”²⁰ With great support, the GAM was in a position to retaliate against Indonesian power, as each military rallied to destroy the other and war broke out across the region.

2.1 Troubled Foundations

The GAM was created by nepotistic foreign educated elites. Hasan di Tiro’s claim to the Sultanate based on an imagined bloodline has “totally misrepresented (his ancestor’s) role as something like

¹⁷ Dwight Y. King and M. Ryaas Rasjid, “the GOLKAR Landslide in the 1987 Indonesian Elections: the Case of Aceh,” *Asian Survey*, Volume 28, Issue 9 (September 1988), 921.

¹⁸ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

¹⁹ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 445.

²⁰ Drexler, *Paranoid Transparencies*, 87.

the earlier sultans in order to give himself the absurd claim to embody Aceh's monarchy."²¹ His cousin, Dr. Zaini Abdullah, was among the group's founders and in 2002 was named Minister of Foreign Affairs, with most GAM founders holding doctorates and having powerful family connections. The hierarchical structure of the GAM is obvious, although it has been challenged in recent years by newer factions. At the grassroots level, several Acehnese activists see the GAM as more consistent with the Acehnese people. Even though there are a number of common criminals who join the GAM in order to gain access to arms,²² the elitism found in GAM leadership is absent at the local level, where immediate community survival, not visions of political power, fuel the resistance. However as an organization, the GAM is still elite, despite its anti-elitist rhetoric.

In 1979, the GAM fled to what di Tiro calls "a friendly country in Africa."²³ This is a complicating factor, as the country that the GAM fled to- and was armed and trained in- was Libya.²⁴ The purpose of the GAM Declaration was to undermine the view that they are terrorists and fanatics, but they were then trained by Qaddafi, a man who overthrew his King, expelled foreigners, invaded Chad, Egypt, and Sudan, assassinated Jewish leaders, and hijacked several civilian aircrafts with massive death tolls. In fact, di Tiro was the chair of a Libyan group against Zionism throughout the 1980s.²⁵ Even though the GAM is not responsible for Libya's actions, their association gives fuel to its critics and to victims of Libyan attacks. The Singaporean Government has asserted that the GAM has trained alongside the JI and al Qaeda, and many GAM weapons and bomb materials come through Southern Thailand separatists. In sum, the GAM has worked with some violent terrorist groups and has failed to come to terms with these associations.

Regardless of whether GAM has a just cause or not, their foundation is questionable. GAM's greatest challenge is to prove their legitimacy, which will not be accomplished until its origins and hierarchy are properly addressed. This goal has historical parallel in Aceh; the PUSA knew that "it would be difficult to gain support from the Western powers" unless they could "show that the Darul

²¹ Reid, "War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh," 9.

²² Edward Aspinall, "Anti-Insurgency Logic in Aceh: Military Policy of Separating Civilians from Guerillas Generates More Resistance," *Inside Indonesia*, Issue 76 (Fall 2003), 24.

²³ Hasan di Tiro, *the Price of Freedom: the Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro* (1984), 225. Available online at <http://www.asnlf.net/>.

²⁴ Nicole Gaouette, "Muslim Women in Freedom Fight," *Christian Science Monitor*, Volume 91, Issue 145 (23 June 1999).

²⁵ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 41.

Islam was a democratic movement, as well as a unified force.”²⁶ Like the PUSA, the GAM has the funding and popularity to become a legitimate actor.

2.2 A Popular Movement

As GAM has extended its popular support, it has made tremendous advances in becoming a legitimate actor, with solid diplomatic, academic, and economic relationships. This is partly a result of the actions of the Indonesian military; as explained by Aspinall and Berger:

GAM remained a relatively isolated group in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its present mass support is a direct product of the brutal tactics employed by the military to repress the movement from the time of its birth.²⁷

There can be no doubt that the GAM has the support of the majority of the Acehnese people; its twenty third anniversary celebration was massive, as the Indonesian forces could do nothing to stop it. This popularity is based on negative identification wherein GAM popularity stems from TNI brutality, not the GAM’s policies. They have used the opportunities presented to them to become a sophisticated organization which presents itself as a capable government, not just a rebel group.

We must be critical of this popularity. Scholars note that “nationalism is more likely to evolve in an illiberal and exclusionary direction when it is articulated...in relation to threatening others.”²⁸ This illiberal tendency has already been observable in how the GAM deals with minorities. Christian and ethnic minorities fear repression in an independent Aceh, as the GAM leadership’s national vision is overtly racist. Di Tiro sees the Acehnese struggle as an “instinct of survival of the herd, the group, the race, the nation, and the state,” which has resulted in great violence to the Javanese communities in Aceh.²⁹

Several writers which support the GAM against Indonesia note that in states which only promote a single dominant culture, where there is no room for not willing to be assimilated, “ethnic alienation is to be expected.”³⁰ But this notion is more fitting to the GAM, as it has a lesser commitment to diversity than does Indonesia’s concept of Pancasila, which although far from perfect, is far more advanced and tolerant than anything the GAM has offered its minorities.

²⁶ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 236.

²⁷ Aspinall and Berger, “the Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1017.

²⁸ Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity,” 23.

²⁹ Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity,” 18.

³⁰ Lukman Thaib, “Aceh’s Case: Possible Solution to a Festering Conflict,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Volume 20, Issue 1 (April 2000), 103.

In their consistently professional work, Human Rights Watch documented GAM threats to and extortion of NGOs who are accused of holding autonomy meetings. GAM has also threatened journalists, causing *Serambi Indonesia* to close after the GAM disagreed with the neutral wording of a major story.³¹ The root of the GAM's widespread support is opposition to the Government of Indonesia as well as its populism. These are troubled foundations to minority groups and dissenting opinions. In sum, the GAM grows via negative identification; one would be hard pressed to answer why they support the GAM without mention of the TNI and Indonesian State

2.3 Structure

The specific divisions of the GAM are a difficult topic. Indonesian sources state that the GAM includes up to 800 persons, though others believe it may be closer to 2,000.³² Working with American intelligence, the RAND Corporation has provided estimates of the GAM's structure. The GAM is divided into an infantry division, a police force, an intelligence unit (*Cantoi*), a women's wing (*Inong Balee*), and a special *Karades* squadron for delicate missions. GAM also collects both donations and tax revenues, carries out political propaganda, and has a large supply of arms which are largely Indonesian and Thai issue.

Leadership is also a complicated matter. The first divide is between GAM leadership in Sweden and the GAM on the ground in Aceh; leaders in Sweden are relying on the assertion that they have little control over soldiers in their ongoing court case brought on by Sweden's suspicion of human rights abuses. Some Acehnese recognize that the GAM ground personnel are popular, whereas the elite government comprises a very separate force.³³ This same point is hinted at by World Bank leaders, who note that the old guard is driven by memories of previous rebellions, whereas the youth is motivated by defending their friends from further atrocities.³⁴ This division leads us to question the involvement of the GAM leadership in talks, as GAM members on the ground have much more to gain from peace.

³¹ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, Volume 13, Issue 45 (August 2001), 25.

³² Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia," 255.

³³ Conversation with Samsul Bahraini, KONTRAS-Aceh, 3 November 2003.

³⁴ Conversation with Scott Guggenheim, World Bank Social Development Group, 7 April 2004.

In addition to differences between elites and grassroots support, the GAM has witnessed a divide in its leadership in the last few years. This is not only crucial for the credibility of the GAM, but also complicated the peace process; “the divisions within the movement lead many analysts to doubt the rebel’s unity and ability to enforce a peace agreement on the ground.”³⁵ There are numerous factions, but the largest split occurred as di Tiro’s health deteriorated after a stroke in 1997. The dominant group, whose banner is the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF),³⁶ is headed by Foreign Minister Malik, whose power base is in Singapore and who now lives in Sweden. This is the group which controls rebel fighting, was involved in the peace process in 2001, and has the most power.

The second group- though both groups claim their sole legitimacy- is the Government Council of the Free Aceh Movement (MP-GAM), led by Dr. Husaini Hasan and Yusuf Daud. The MP-GAM has only recently lost power to the ANSLF, partly due to the COHA peace talks; although it has “no military capability in Aceh or overseas, Indonesian intelligence believes it has the better international information network.”³⁷ The difference between the groups is that the stronger ANSLF-GAM promotes a Sultanate, whereas the weaker MP-GAM works towards an Islamic Democracy. The MP-GAM claims to be a pacifist organization, whose existence was necessary when di Tiro fell ill and “the ‘original’ GAM in Stockholm was taken over and run and ruined by a handful of his close but illiterate relatives.”³⁸ The split occurred in 1994, and has been a heated fight ever since. The MP-GAM, and its subsidiary, the Free Aceh Movement in Europe (FAME),³⁹ are involved in a fight with Malik’s forces, claiming that their murdered Secretary General Teuku Don Zulfahri was killed by “an Acehnese traitor sent by Malik Mahmood of Aceh Sumatra Liberation Front.”⁴⁰ Zulfahri was killed in June 2000, days into the Humanitarian Pause. In Aceh, the ANSLF-GAM exterminated the MP; “once one had been marked as MP, one would be hunted by one’s own people.”⁴¹ The peace negotiations held by the HDC marginalized the MP-GAM, which lost the title of ‘the resistance’ and gave more power to the ANSLF.

³⁵ McCawley, “On Neutral Ground: Rebels Face Indonesian Government.”

³⁶ Please see their official website, <http://www.asnlf.net/>.

³⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, “the Structure and Nature of GAM,” Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, Scotland (9 April 2001).

³⁸ M. Yusuf Daud, “What is the Free Aceh Movement?” (28 November 1999), available online at <http://hem.passagen.se/freeaceh/fame.htm>.

³⁹ Please see <http://hem.passagen.se/freeaceh/fame.htm>.

⁴⁰ Dr. Husaini Hasan, “Condolences on the Assassination of Teuku Don Zulfahri,” FAME website (1 June 2000), <http://hem.passagen.se/freeaceh/940.htm>, accessed October 2003.

⁴¹ Alif Imam, “Did Not Come to Be Beaten,” Acehkita (15 November 2003), 20.

A third group with nominal importance is a Muslim wing known as the Front Mujahidin Islam Aceh (FMIA), which broke off in protest of the secular nature of the GAM. The leaders of this group have put their context in light of the Darul Islam Rebellion, using specific terms such as the Islamic Republic of Aceh, which was one of six states in Darul Indonesia in the late 1950s. The FMIA has nominal support; they deserve attention mainly in light of post-911 anti-Islamic witch hunts, to demonstrate the diversity of opinions faced by post-conflict Aceh, and their violent extermination by the GAM demonstrates the character of the rebel group.

Thus, along with GAM's growing sophistication has come division, as several groups want power based on their particular vision and greed. Again, the historical parallels are important, as previous resistance groups had deep chasms as well; the PUSA was bitterly divided on the question of negotiating with the Republic to the point of assassinations between the factions. The most important issue is how each works to end violence and how each can work with independent Acehnese actors, as these two indicators will best demonstrate how the GAM may function as a government, regardless of it being of a federal or a provincial nature. But peace may be a long way off, and GAM as a whole is still based largely around military resistance and offensives.

2.4 Military Power

The army of the GAM, the Aceh National Armed Forces (TNA- formerly known as AGAM) cannot be separated from the GAM; GAM is an army and relies on force.⁴² This is why this section does not have a separate heading for the Acehnese military as a political force as it does for Indonesia. Despite the collusion between the Indonesian military and governments, they are often in conflict and do have some different personnel; in fact, their differences are part of the reason for the continuation of the conflict. But in Aceh, there is no separation between the groups, although this is to be expected by a resistance movement, it is still necessary to keep in mind.

The GAM's military command has six regions: Pidie, West, East, North Aceh, South Aceh, and Banda Aceh. Each region has a commander, under him a district commander, and under him a battalion commander.⁴³ Its arms come from the Indonesian military, Thailand, Cambodia, and

⁴² Dan Murphy, "Military Reasserts Power, Casualties Mount in Aceh," Christian Science Monitor, Volume 94, Issue 168 (24 July 2002).

⁴³ Gunaratna, "the Structure and Nature of GAM."

Malaysia, as well as from raids on the EXXON-Mobil blasting facilities. After Thai rebels raided a southern blasting depot in 2004, the same material was found weeks later in a Medan bombing. These arms allow for the survival of the group, which is why peace agreements have stumbled when insisting they give up their weapons; GAM commander Abu Sofyan Daud stated that “GAM will not hand over its weapons to anyone” during any peace process.⁴⁴

GAM’s greatest strength is the lack of sophistication and the barbarity of the Indonesian military. Its greatest weakness is when it duplicates such action; there is no doubt that the Indonesian Government has gone to great efforts to make GAM out to be violent, but to say that all GAM abuses have been the product of Republican duplicity is too great a compliment to the planners in Jakarta.

In early 2003, hundreds of schools were burned to the ground; the GAM and the Republic blamed each other, “though evidence suggests that the rebels rather than the government were mainly responsible for the mass arson.”⁴⁵ The GAM and its supporters have attacked military envoys, civilian groups, and have pushed Javanese residents from their homes; they move “beyond military targets, attacking Javanese migrants, suspected Indonesian sympathizers, and perceived symbols of Javanese domination.”⁴⁶ The International Crisis Group (ICG) states that GAM “is a guerilla group that in addition to routine ambushes...has engaged in targeted assassinations, hostage-taking, arson, and extortion.”⁴⁷ The Movement attacks policemen with or without combat duties, and the term ‘civilian’ is not recognized by either military force.⁴⁸ The details will be covered in the chapter on human rights; the point is that the GAM’s political image has been clouded by such actions, no matter sabotage from Jakarta, the result is the same. Just as the Darul Islam Rebellion saw dissent grow due to their brutal tactics, for “in no way should Muslims be killed by their Muslim brothers,”⁴⁹ the GAM will lose support if it remains a military actor.

Thus, very recently, groups in Aceh have distanced themselves from the violence of the GAM; an Acehnese women’s activist states that “I’m very angry with the Indonesian government, but I’m

⁴⁴ *Economist*, “the Peacemakers from Switzerland,” Volume 365, Issue 8304 (21 December 2002).

⁴⁵ *Economist*, “No Early Victory: Indonesia Faces a Long and Bloody War against Aceh’s Separatism,” Volume 367, Issue 8325 (24 May 2003).

⁴⁶ Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia,” 255.

⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, “Aceh: How not to Win Hearts and Minds,” 1.

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 38.

⁴⁹ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 208.

also very angry at GAM. Neither side is interested in peace.”⁵⁰ Slowly, autonomous civil society is taking root and offering peaceful, non-elite representation for the Acehnese people. Much of this is likely a response not only to violent GAM policies, but also their virulent nationalism, as seen in their Acehnese calendar, school curriculum, and ethnic violence towards Javanese. It is statements such as the 21 July 2002 Stavager Declaration, where the GAM promised to work with NGOs and within peace dialogues, which may elevate the GAM from being a purely military organization. This statement promised to work with all aspects of Acehnese civil society, a hint that the GAM may be capable of creating its own policies, ideas not in reaction to the Indonesian state. For now, such proactive policy is rare.

3) Other Acehnese Political Actors

The GAM and its wings are not the only political actors in Aceh, a reality obscured by several peace agreements and documentation. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto puts it succinctly:

There is disagreement among Acehnese over how to achieve an independent state, with supporters of both violent struggle and non-violence. The former method is championed by Teungku Hasan di Tiro and other supporters of the Free Aceh Movement and its armed wing, the latter by students, Muslim student groups, Islamic school students, and the Islamic teachers.⁵¹

It was such groups, not the GAM, who have organized a series of massive rallies in favour of a peaceful solution. On 8 November 1999, hundreds of thousands gathered in Banda Aceh, one of dozens of sporadic assemblies organized by student groups.⁵² Banda’s only Catholic Priest, Father Fernando, believes that GAM propaganda exaggerates their role in such movements, and that not everybody is demonstrating for independence.⁵³ During the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), there were numerous protests, including hunger strikes; the Supreme Commander of the Joint Security Council states “I was surprised to see a group of university students protesting as hunger strikers right in front of our new office.”⁵⁴ Numerous groups protested numerous aspects of the peace agreement, with stances that were not the same as the GAM.

⁵⁰ Murphy, “Military Reasserts Power, Casualties Mount in Aceh.”

⁵¹ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 447.

⁵² Lucian Kim, “the Next Battle for Indonesia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, Volume 91, Issue 241 (9 November 1999).

⁵³ Vaudine England, “Breaking Away,” *New Republic*, Volume 222, Issue 2 (10 January 2000).

⁵⁴ Major General Tanongsuk Tuvinum, *148 Days in Aceh: A Diary of the Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)*, (Bangkok: Peace Operations Division, 2003), 137.

There are organized groups in political and civil society outside of student groups, although civil society shall be dealt with in a later chapter. One such group is the Congregation of Dayah Religious Scholars of Aceh (*Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh*, HUDA), which consists of about 550 headmasters. This group is not the same as the GAM, although their support of a referendum “was endorsed by the armed wing of Aceh Merdeka.”⁵⁵ In 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Reis met with HUDA leaders to discuss this issue, as the HUDA is a respected conduit of student, Muslim, and educated opinions.

Aceh’s provincial government must also be considered, though most observers rightfully see it as an extension of Jakarta. Tim Kell notes that Law Number Five from 1974 places the governor as “both leader of his region and an instrument and extension of the arm of central government.”⁵⁶ Governor Abdullah Puteh has provoked Acehnese groups by working with the military and for having no popular stances. Puteh is seen as a major problem by civil society, the GAM, and the Republic because of his brutal corruption; his coming indictment will be a major step forward for bringing change to Acehnese development.⁵⁷ Thus, though nominally Acehnese, Indonesian party politics do not serve the Acehnese people. This is why we must be critical of promises of decentralization which are defined in terms of more power for the provincial government.

This said, there is also support for federal political actors based in Aceh. Until 1987, the Development Unity Party (PPP) had over 50% of support from Acehnese voters. In 1987, Golongan Karya, or GOLKAR, came to power, surprising several commentators because they are Jakarta based; GOLKAR was Suharto. In the 2004 DPR Elections, Muslim Parties, GOLKAR, and the Democratic Party each had great support; although this election allowed for few freedoms, it must be admitted that these parties have some base. Though federal elections are far from perfect, or even decent conduits for Acehnese politics, one must keep in mind that not all persons in Aceh are Acehnese and that not all Acehnese share a disdain for national politics. There are several areas in South Aceh where Acehnese support the Indonesian state, pockets of support which would likely secede from an independent Aceh. Perhaps even more importantly, the pockets of Javanese transmigrants must also be considered.

⁵⁵ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.

⁵⁶ Tim Kell, *the Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1995), 33.

⁵⁷ Kurniawan Hari and Nani Farida, “House Supports Aceh Prosecutors Over Graft Cases,” *Jakarta Post* (5 May 2004).

The 1987 GOLKAR victory has been explained by transmigration policies which brought Javanese to Aceh throughout the 1980s, a victory duplicated in 1992.⁵⁸ A simplistic explanation, this includes a valuable point; there is, or was, a sizeable Javanese population in Aceh. Many Javanese transmigrants have become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs, see later chapters) as a result of GAM intimidation; too often “civilians thought to be helping security forces have been beheaded.”⁵⁹ Despite being a result of Republican expansionist strategy, the Javanese transmigrants were and are still a political force that has been repressed by the GAM. If a stable political solution is to be found, this group, as well as Acehnese who support Indonesian politics, must be respected in a diverse political environment. And to those who respond to this reasoning with disdain, those who do not respect the political aspirations of transmigrants because of the government’s goal of sending them, we must accuse them of being anti-democratic and against the ideals of human rights.

Other overlooked groups are the indigenous ethnic minorities; in a struggle against majority domination from Jakarta, it is hypocritical for Acehnese and scholars to marginalize these voices, as it only demonstrates that an independent Aceh would recreate minority exclusion by the nation-state.⁶⁰ Traditionally, the Gayo peoples opposed rule which is based on bloodline, a belief transplanted to them from traditional Acehnese thought, where rulers “had to exhibit signs of internal power or blessing to be accepted.”⁶¹ This means that Hasan di Tiro and Megawati Sukarnoputri each have to prove their ability to the traditional elements of these groups. Gayo traditions do not respect hierarchy and do not accept fixed territorial borders, areas where the GAM and the government of Indonesia have a common foundation. The Gayo, Alas, and Tamiang (Malays) people all voted for GOLKAR throughout the 1980s, as their political aspirations are not identical to those of the majority Acehnese.

Acehnese politics are a series of struggles between elites, between different armed wings, between different ethnic groups, and identities such as ‘Muslim’, ‘rebel’, and ‘minority’. Indeed, the ‘lamb’ has been undermined to some extent, as there are several unique forces, though none be sheepish. Despite the oppressive nature of the political scene in Aceh from several groups, diversity survives,

⁵⁸ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 440.

⁵⁹ *Economist*, “Death and Faith in Aceh.”

⁶⁰ Please see John R. Bowen, *Sumatran Politics and Poetics: Gayo History, 1900-1989* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), Iwabuchi Akifumi, *the People of the Alas Valley: A Study of an Ethnic Group in Northern Sumatra* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁶¹ Bowen, “Narrative Form and Political Incorporation,” 677.

although weakened. The next sections will document the Indonesian political actors; to return to our metaphor, they will document the complicated nature of the ‘wolf’.

4) Javanese Elites

As in Aceh, traditional power in Java was modified by Dutch colonialism, but not completely rewritten. Long before the arrival of Europeans, the Javanese Priyayi class had a sophisticated feudal culture, including shadow puppetry (*Wayang Kulit*), orchestras (*Gamalen*), and an aristocratic form of the Javanese language.⁶² As the Dutch arrived, they simply formed a new, often invisible layer over top of the existing elites, essentially accelerating traditional forms of exploitation; “no significant change occurred in the traditional relationship between the ruler and the ruled.”⁶³ Raffles’ reforms tried to undermine this to some extent, and the Java War was a partial result. It is important to note that even the Java War was no peasant rebellion, as it was the result of an angered Prince Diponegoro seeking power against rival royalty. After the Java War, a new system was created to expand Dutch profits.

Van Den Bosch’s Culture System recreated the pre-Raffles’ system of relying on local rulers, but was far more exploitative, as the Indies moved into an era of ‘High Colonialism.’ Priyayi power grew extensively at this point, as “a certain percentage of crops were given to the native hierarchy as well as to government officials.”⁶⁴ We must recognize that “the Dutch ruled, but daily government remained in the hands of Priyayi” because production was organized along the lines older forms of tribute.⁶⁵ However, as education and other infrastructure grew, albeit at a far slower rate than did impoverishment, many elites questioned their role in this system.

Persons such as Raden Kartini and E.D. Dekker were the results of these changes, as education and liberalism spread in some circles. The old system was one where “the Priyayi did not see themselves as traitors to the traditional order or as betrayers of their peoples...rather they were merely respecting what they understood as power.”⁶⁶ But in the 1900s, this changed. Foreign educated Javanese began to feel a sense of Indies nationalism as well as Muslim brotherhood,

⁶² David Joel Steinberg, ed. *In Search of Southeast Asia* (Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 87.

⁶³ D. R. SarDesai, *Southeast Asia: Past & Present* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 67.

⁶⁴ SarDesai, *Southeast Asia: Past & Present*, 96.

⁶⁵ Steinberg, *In Search of Southeast Asia*, 152.

⁶⁶ Carl A. Trocki, “Political Structures in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume Two, Part One*, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 84.

creating political parties and challenging Dutch rule. Throughout this opposition to Dutch rule, groups looked back to elite Javanese history and culture as the defining features of local nationalism.

Indonesian politics are marked by the dominance of elite Javanese actors and institutions, a major factor in the anger of Acehnese and other groups. Even among rival Javanese elites, there exist certain shared assumption; “even to call Megawati, Rais and Wahid ‘democrats’ or ‘oppositionists’ is a misnomer.”⁶⁷ This said, there exist divides between Muslims and modernizers as well as between the military and civilians, as in Aceh. Some leaders look to international actors, while others look to the Indonesian nation. Indonesian politics are a complicated subject, so we will limit our study to major groups as they pertain to Aceh.

5) Politics in Indonesia

Detail 2.3 **GOLKAR**

(Golongan Karya)



Deeply rooted in the military, GOLKAR was an organization of ‘functional groups’ throughout the New Order Period. Thus, it was less a political party and more of a military-economic bureaucracy.

After years of rule under Suharto, in 1998 Habibie took over the party. Voted into opposition in the 1999 elections, GOLKAR has tried to become a political party based on its experience in office and its reformed mandate. In the 2004 DPR elections, it narrowly won a plurality of seats in the parliament.

Please see <http://partai-golkar.or.id/>

This section will be insufficiently brief; for more information on Indonesian politics in 2004, please see the post-script. Already discussed have been the Sarekat Islam, the rise of party politics under Sukarno, and the actions against the Communist Party (PKI). The entire party system was eliminated by the Indonesian military and GOLKAR in the 1960s. Throughout the New Order Period, only the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) were

⁶⁷ World Socialist Website, “the Indonesian Elections and the Struggle for Democracy,” (21 May 1999), www.wsws.org/articles/1999/may1999/indo-m21.shtml, accessed October 2003.

allowed to run against the predetermined victor; GOLKAR. GOLKAR was ‘the non-party,’ with Suharto at the helm and show elections every five or so years. This does not mean that politics ceased to exist, as factions within GOLKAR, economic elites, and military rulers all fought for privilege and wealth within the one-party system. But overall, Indonesia was a dictatorship; GOLKAR controlled the economy, had stakes in the military, and continues as a major political contender to this day, although it has undergone a major transformation towards being a more democratic actor.

Detail 2.4 PPP
United Development Party



The other party allowed by Suharto, the PPP was a merger of Muslim Parties, Masyumi, and the Islamic Education Movement (PERTI).

The PPP became a major factor in the 1999 elections, as it and the other Muslim parties supported Abdurrahman Wahid of the PKB over Megawati of the PDI-P. The PPP is led by Hamzah Haz, Vice President of Indonesia.

Detail 2.5 PDI
Indonesian Democratic Party



One of the two political parties tolerated throughout the New Order era, the PDI was formed of several Christian Parties, the Nationalists Party (PNI), and several others, and has no cohesive ideology other than reverence to Pancasila.

The PDI split going into the 1999 elections, as the PDI won 3 seats and the PDI-P won a majority.

Throughout the New Order, the PDI and the PPP occupied a strange role in Indonesian politics. The PPP represented Islam, whereas the PDI was a sort of mixture of other groups in Indonesia. In Aceh, the struggle was always between the PPP and GOLKAR, as the PDI never won more than six percent of the popular vote, a failure repeated in 2004. But GOLKAR could never really lose on the national level as long as Suharto was in power and GOLKAR had a guaranteed number of military seats. Such a system could not last forever; when the Asian Economic Crisis forced Suharto from office, party politics were reborn.

Leading up to 1998, the PDI had grown considerably, relying on disdain for Suharto and the popularity of Megawati Sukarnoputri. The PDI splintered, as Megawati led the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) as the elections approached. GOLKAR was faced with the challenge of becoming a functional political party, while a number of Muslim parties grew out from

the grasp of the PPP. The opposition to a GOLKAR return was united in 1999, as Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) of the National Awakening Party (PKB), Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN), and Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P openly critiqued the ruling body.

The results of the June 1999 and April 2004 votes are listed below:

Party	MPR Seats 1999	DPR Seats 2004
PDI	151	104
GOLKAR	118	125
PKB	51	53
PPP	58	57
PAN	34	53
PKS	7	46
Democrat	-	58

When the MPR met in October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid was chosen to be Indonesia's first elected President in decades. His support from rival Muslim parties allowed him to overtake Megawati, especially after GOLKAR dropped from the race and the military seats (38) switched to oppose her.

President Wahid also promised a new approach to the Aceh conflict. In their fair assessment of Wahid's rule, Aspinall and Crouch note that "post-1998 governments made substantial concessions aimed at addressing at least some of the grievances of Aceh's people."⁶⁸

Abdurrahman Wahid's rule could be best described as confused; the Far Eastern Economic Review stated that "he has a good heart...he is erratic. Basically, he could not govern."⁶⁹ As he came to power, he fluctuated on the promise of an Acehnese vote; "I support a referendum as their right. If we can do that in East Timor, why not in Aceh?" while two weeks later, added "the plan now is to have the referendum on Aceh six months after the ending of the current situation."⁷⁰ Meanwhile, peace talks dragged and ceasefires were ignored by all sides. Wahid created a Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM) under Acehnese Human Rights advocate Hasballah Saad. Wahid offered new autonomy and economic revenue to Aceh and other regions,⁷¹ a major break from Suharto or Habibie, but failed to stop the military action while negotiating. As Wahid was forced out of office, Megawati began her term using similar tactics, but soon began a more militarist approach.

⁶⁸ Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, *the Peace Process and Why it Failed*, East-West Center, Washington, 2.

⁶⁹ Arief Budiman, cited in Bob S. Hadiwinata, *the Politics of NGOs in Indonesia: Developing Democracy and Managing a Movement* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 82.

⁷⁰ England, "Breaking Away."

⁷¹ Please see www.gusdur.net

Detail 2.6 Megawati Sukarnoputri

President, Republic of Indonesia

Born on 23 January 1947 to Indonesian President Sukarno and his second wife Fatmawati, Megawati abandoned her future career in agricultural engineering when her father was overthrown. In 1970-1, her father and husband both died; in March 1973 she remarried and raised her family, her husband having strong business connections.

In 1986, a PDI chairman requested Megawati run in local elections, and within six years she was made head of the party. After winning the popular vote in the 1999 elections, she became Vice-President for two years, and then became President as Wahid was forced from power.

Megawati has few political stances outside of Pancasila; she opposed the Timor Referendum and takes a militant stance in Aceh. Her power is based on the military, though moving into the 2004 Presidential vote, she has courted Muslim groups.

Megawati came to power amid widespread popularity. She tearfully told an Acehnese audience in 1998 that “when your female leader is running this country, she will not allow one drop of blood to be spilled of the people whose achievements were so great in the struggle for Indonesian independence.”⁷² But since becoming President, she has become “tough on separatism” to satisfy voters and the military.⁷³ As a result, Megawati “represents an essential continuity with the Suharto mentality constrained only by a stronger pro-democratic policy.”⁷⁴ This reflects her lack of political commitment as well as the reality of Indonesian politics; the conflict is deeply imbedded and cannot be solved quickly by any party.

One of Megawati’s greatest shortcomings is her lack of power over the military. She has drifted towards the armed forces and has failed to commit sufficient resources to military trials or reforms. The next section documents the political role of the Indonesian security forces, defined as political to the extent they had seats in parliament and have a degree of power over the president, not to mention their historical role within GOLKAR and that military leaders consistently hold political offices.

⁷² Angus McIntyre, “Megawati Sukarnoputri: from President’s Daughter to Vice President,” Bulletin for Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 32, Issue 1 (January 2000).

⁷³ Andrew Marshall, “Bloody Days in Indonesia,” Time Volume 161, Issue 22 (2 June 2003).

⁷⁴ Hon. Jim Sutton, New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, “Military on the Comeback Trail,” Indonesia Human Rights Committee (Spring 2003).

6) Indonesian Security Forces

The Indonesian Security Forces must be considered political for several reasons; throughout the New Order and today, “the army remain(s) the key political institution.”⁷⁵ In Indonesia, the military has always been “involved in many affairs of state that elsewhere (are) not normally associated with military forces”; the TNI is “the dominant political institution in the country.”⁷⁶ Not only does the military rival political actors, but in some ways the state has become “reliant upon the TNI to fulfill a number of functions in relations to state cohesion.”⁷⁷ A 2003 Military White Paper noted that the TNI faces non-traditional threats within the country, which observers see as a result of the dual function of the military.

The Indonesian military is political for three reasons. First, they have a formal political role, as described in their former *Dwifungsi* (dual function) policy of security and economic power; this is evidenced in their previously guaranteed parliamentary seats. This seat allotment will end in the 2004 elections, though generals have recently formed their own political parties. Second, they have divisions within their own ranks of a political nature, as some groups compete or clash with others and in so doing perpetuate conflicts. Third, and perhaps most importantly, their savage tactics create political resistance and allow for a greater crisis to develop. This last aspect has several parallels, such as wars against terrorism, a notion which will carry us into our final section.

6.1 Dwifungsi

Detail 2.7 Dwifungsi

Official Military Doctrine until 1998

Dwifungsi is a product of the territorial nationalism embedded in Pancasila and the fear of disintegration during the origins of the New Order. First articulated in General Nasution’s 1958 speech, the Doctrine states that the military has two functions: a security and a sociopolitical role. The two are similar though, as security is generally internal. Thus, the Indonesian Armed Forces’ mission is to protect the idea of the Indonesian state, of Pancasila; this Doctrine is of immense importance when describing military brutality in guerilla campaigns.

In 1982, Dwifungsi gained legal recognition in the new Defense Code, and continues to inform military decisions despite its formal abolition.

⁷⁵ Aspinall and Berger, “The Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1008.

⁷⁶ Global Security Organization, “the Military of Indonesia,” www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia, accessed October 2003.

⁷⁷ Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, 138.

The Republican Military, the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, or TNI, came out of World War Two and the anti-Dutch War as a tremendously powerful and popular group. The Dutch policy of assigning military commanders to government power was duplicated under the crisis of the war for independence. Under Suharto, the military was renamed the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, or ABRI, which included the army, navy (ALRI), air force (AURI), and police (POLRI). The New Order gave ABRI a political role, as it alleged that with Muslim and Communist uprisings, force was necessary to save the Republic: internal security was paramount over external in order to protect the nation. In the words of General Benny Moerdani, the sociopolitical role of the military “represents nothing less than the need to create public militancy in order to maintain national stability...national potential, together with ABRI sociopolitical power, is the motor of national stability.”⁷⁸ This has been critiqued by several reformers; in a 1998 interview, House Speaker and Presidential Candidate Amien Rais stated that “the dual function of the armed forces must immediately be brought to an end.”⁷⁹ Shortly after, the policy was ended, though the mindset of the military continues and the power gained by Dwifungsi allows for former military actors to become potential leaders. Although the ghosts of this policy linger, we must give some credit to progressive TNI leaders for formally ending this policy.

Throughout the New Order, ABRI held a variety of non-military roles, including economic roles, which will be discussed in the next chapter, and official political appointments; in 1997, they held “the key posts of defence, interior, political affairs and information.”⁸⁰ When Suharto fell, their existence was threatened, so major changes were necessary. The ABRI became the TNI once again on 1 April 1999, when the armed forces were overhauled in light of the end of the New Order and the DOM era in Aceh was followed by Operation Authority (*Operasi Wibawa*). But the political clout of the TNI remains staggering, as Cabinet Member and TNI Commander General Wiranto was briefly the Vice Presidential candidate of President Habibie and is a 2004 Presidential candidate. The TNI is not under the control of Indonesian politicians, as President Wahid’s calls for

⁷⁸ General L. Benny Moerdani, “On Promotion to Defense Minister,” cited in Bilveer Singh, *ABRI and the Security of Southeast Asia: the Role and Thinking of General L. Benny Moerdani* (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 145.

⁷⁹ Interview with Amien Rais in *Indonesia Post-Soeharto*, 29.

⁸⁰ *World Socialists Website*, “the Indonesian Elections and the Struggle for Democracy.”

a ceasefire were ignored by the military.⁸¹ This fact- the *realpolitik* of the Indonesian military- makes it unwise to guess what the ‘true’ intentions of political leaders have been.⁸²

The funding structure perhaps makes this entrenchment unavoidable; only 30% of the TNI budget comes from the government, the rest being made up by business ventures, informal taxation and extortion, and private security.⁸³ The TNI receives only 1.8% of the national budget, so links to foreign business “quadruples the TNI’s overall income.”⁸⁴ Foreign companies work with military as much as political officials; “extortion by the police and military is a fact of life for the foreign companies.”⁸⁵ A lawsuit launched in June 2001 in the United States against EXXON-MOBILE claims that “the company directed the forces to a considerable extent, and that the military used facilities and resources provided by ExxonMobil.”⁸⁶ EXXON-Mobil’s complicity will be covered in detail in the next chapter. The first reason the TNI is a political actor, its political and economic mandate, is a major factor in the Aceh conflict.

6.2 Anatomy

The anatomy of the TNI, the second political role, is also a complicated issue.⁸⁷ As noted by Tapol’s Liem Soei Liong, military divisions are “a major cause of violent outbursts in the Indonesian archipelago.”⁸⁸ In December 2003, two TNI camps have formed over the Aceh issue and modernization in general; Commander Sutarto and General Ryamizard Ryacudu have different visions, with the weaker yet more popular Ryacudu representing an anti-modernizing force.⁸⁹ Sutarto, on the other hand, is foreign educated and understands how to create a modern military- as such he has initiated several human rights training programmes. Several formal institutions exist in the Indonesian military; the Ministry of Defense and Security (HANKAM) is a nominal body, as the President of Indonesia is the Supreme Commander of the TNI in an active fashion. The

⁸¹ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 5.

⁸² For example, critiquing Wahid for not ending military control upon his election cannot be considered a reflection of his “real priorities.” Seeing the all results of his tenure as his *real* priorities is a political statement that ignores politics. See Lesley McCulloch, “Business as Usual: Until Gus Dur Can Bring Military Business Activities under Control, They Won’t Go Back to the Barracks,” *Inside Indonesia*, Volume 63 (Summer 2000).

⁸³ The Military of Indonesia, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia.

⁸⁴ Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, 9.

⁸⁵ *Economist*, “the Peacemakers from Switzerland.”

⁸⁶ Robert Weissman, “Deadly Drilling in Aceh,” *Multinational Monitor*, Volume 22, Issue 7 (Summer 2001).

⁸⁷ Please see Appendix V, Anatomy of the Indonesian Military

⁸⁸ Liem Soei Liong, “It’s the Military, Stupid!” in *the Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, edited by Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2000), 210.

⁸⁹ *TAPOL Bulletin*, “Extension of Martial Law Continues Misery in Aceh,” Issue 173 / 174 (December 2003), 2.

governing body was, until March 2000, BAKORSTANAS (The Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security), which itself succeeded KOPKAMTIB in 1985. This group was a political actor in internal security, running the infamous Buru Island Prison and arresting political dissidents. There are two intelligence agencies which are technically outside of the military structure; the BAIS (Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency) and the BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordinating Agency). The BAKIN is the more powerful of the two since the 1992 reforms and is responsible directly to the President.

The army is of greatest concern regarding Aceh. KOSTRAD (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*) is the strategic command, based in Jakarta. Its mandate includes military and economic planning of various military groups, including KOPASSUS (*Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat*), Indonesia's Special Forces Regiment, an elite team which is the equivalent of the American SEALs. The KOPASSUS are trained to kill; in the words of an Acehnese government official, "if you're taken away by the military you have a fifty-fifty chance of coming back. If you're taken by Kopassus you can forget it."⁹⁰ Even within the TNI, major divides exist between brigades; the Aceh TNI jealously controls the Iskandar Muda Military Region, a historical contest between Acehnese Republican troops.⁹¹ There are divides between the 'green' TNI, which is more Islamic, and the 'red and white' TNI, which is based on the Republic. Further, the army is hostile to the navy and most of all the air force, which is "considered by the army to be a politically suspect organization."⁹² But the greatest conflict within the Indonesian security forces is between the army and the police (POLRI).

The TNI and POLRI have a tedious relationship, as the army has "contempt for the police,"⁹³ and believes that they are "not up to the job."⁹⁴ Several police officers are resentful of military excesses which disrupt the police's community role by "wanting to create problems with normal Indonesians."⁹⁵ Such sentiments have resulted in clashes between the police and the army in West Timor and Ambon, with "resentment ... occasionally spilling over elsewhere."⁹⁶ The duties of the POLRI are blurred with those of the military; the National Defense Law of 1982 and Police Law of 1997 elevated the police to combat status. In fact, from 1997 until 1 April 1999, the police were a

⁹⁰ Amnesty International, "Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993."

⁹¹ Aceh: the Untold Story, 26.

⁹² Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, 8.

⁹³ International Crisis Group, "Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won't Work," Indonesia Briefing (9 May 2003), 5.

⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: the War in Aceh," 14.

⁹⁵ North Sumatran Police Officer, interview with author, September 2003.

⁹⁶ Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, 181.

part of the ABRI. Within the police, there is the BRIMOB, a paramilitary elite group formed in 1945 to infiltrate and crush rebellions, including Aceh. The PPRM (riot police) and Military Police have also been active players in Acehnese politics. Even the police, properly defined, have sub-district, district, and provincial divisions.

Militias are also prominent; in July 2003, President Megawati openly endorsed the Constitutional Rights of people to organize and defend themselves against rebels.⁹⁷ The use of militias is a fundamental aspect of human rights abuses and the failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants by both sides, as will be described in Chapter Four. There are several such groups:

- RATIH works with the TNI and includes the KAMRA (People's Security Force) and WANRA (People's Resistance), providing informal, part time assistance across the Republic
- The HANSIP (Civil Defense Force) is similar, operating in almost every Indonesian Province
- The PAM SWAKARSA (Voluntary Militia) is a more confusing group, working alongside other groups on an informal basis
- Others include the Noble Warriors Upholding Pancasila, Defend the State, Village Security Youth, and the Laksar Rakyat (People's Militia)

Recently in Aceh, the BERANTAS (People's Anti-Separatist Front) has taken on major importance, a group most certainly linked to East Timorese groups from a decade prior.⁹⁸ In April 2004, BERANTAS was hired to monitor the DPR elections in GAM strongholds. Finally, the radical Islamic *Laskar Jihad* had also been involved in various conflicts, although less in Aceh than in other regions.

Thus, like the GAM, the TNI is a complicated, factionalized group; this perpetuates conflict, as any group which showed weakness would lose power to other divisions. Military compartments have taken on their own identities, competing with one another to become national heroes through brute force. This is a major reason for the third political function of the TNI: its actions create political opposition. In this environment, Indonesia's military strategies look "more like propaganda ordered up by the Free Aceh Movement."⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Shawn Donnan, "Megawati Sparks New Human Rights Fears in Aceh," *Financial Times*, 2 July 2003. Available online at www.indonesia-house.org/focus/militer/070303Mega_milisi.htm, accessed December 2003.

⁹⁸ *TAPOL Bulletin*, "Extension of Martial Law Continues Misery in Aceh," 3.

⁹⁹ Murphy, "Aceh Civilians Caught in the Middle."

6.3 Responses

The Human Rights abuses in Aceh by the TNI created a foundation for the GAM; GAM's popularity is not due to their policies, but instead their opposition, thus its power is gained through negative identification, as discussed. In the mid-1990s, the ABRI began a policy of 'shock therapy,' where they ensured that anti-GAM operations were brutal and visible in a disgusting attempt to scare Aceh into peace. Throughout the DOM-era, the ABRI killed their opposition and in so doing created support for the GAM, which had no support base at that time. The TNI's actions created the GAM, which make it a political actor.

In a discussion with the author, Major General Darmono disagreed with this argument, though he seemed to admit that the GAM does not have popularity due to their own policies. He did not see the military as creating the GAM, but instead looked to higher political circles for the creation of the rebel movement. Perhaps this is true of the GAM leaders, but its support and its troops are not motivated by issues of political sovereignty but instead stories of friends being hurt and by a stagnating economy. The Major General makes a strong point though as it regards the ANSLF, but perhaps the GAM leaders are too different a group than the ground forces.

The TNI has sought to change its tactics since this era. In 1999, the military was reorganized; reverting to the TNI was expected to have popular resonance, as was its new 'Humanitarian Approach' in its fight for 'the hearts and minds of the people.' To this end, human rights training programmes have slowly changed the troops, while media campaigns have slowly changed the government's side. When the Cession of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) fell apart in May 2003, Martial Law was declared and the abuses continued. On 19 May, Indonesia launched its largest military operation in almost thirty years, promoting the GAM cause to the civilian population. Armed Forces Commander General Endiartono Sutarto ordered his troops to exterminate opposition within six months.¹⁰⁰ When the TNI attacked Aceh en masse, "it took less than 72 hours for the army's new 'humanitarian' approach to fall apart."¹⁰¹ Human Rights abuses, a hallmark of the DOM Period of ABRI rule, immediately reoccurred under Suharto's successors, though leaders such as Sutarto seem more willing to admit their faults than before. The next logical steps in these reforms are trials for crimes committed in Aceh, not for ground-level troops, but for the officers

¹⁰⁰ Business Week Online, "Indonesia Aims at Aceh, Again," (22 May 2003).

¹⁰¹ Economist, "No Early Victory."

who command them. Such actions would, to a certain extent, depoliticize the TNI and move towards peace in Aceh.

7) Conclusions

Several commentators believe that the war in Aceh “is a conflict between two diametrically opposed political visions.”¹⁰² This could not be further from the truth, as both the GAM and the Government of Indonesia want political power, project sacred borders, use populism, and rely on violence as a means to gain their goals. Further, as this chapter has demonstrated, there are more than two groups involved; this simplistic dichotomy undermines discussions greatly, ignoring divisions within each and assuming that the GAM has a legitimate mandate from the Acehnese people. The next chapter is economics, the foundation of the conflict which demonstrates more than any other issue how similar the interests of the GAM and the Republic can be, while also highlighting the fragmented nature of both groups. Chapters two and three will lay a foundation for describing human rights abuses by all parties, demonstrating that there are no simple explanations for the Aceh conflict.

¹⁰² International Crisis Group, “Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won’t Work,” 8.

Chapter 3: Economics

Economic exploitation and development is the foundation of both war and peace, and Aceh is no different; observers of various stripes agree that “the Aceh conflict has its origins in plain and simple economics.”¹ They note that “a system of profit, power, and protection that benefits certain groups has emerged, and it is this that largely explains the violent conflict.”² They agree that the conflict began due to the uneven distribution of resources under the New Order government, with Aceh’s “natural wealth has gone almost entirely to Jakarta.”³ The United Nations 2002 Conflict Report states that uneven revenue distribution is “foremost among grievances” in the Aceh conflict.⁴

This is not unique, as the Sultanate of Aceh fought Malacca for shipping rights and the Dutch were hated due to the exploitative Culture System. Even commentators hostile to the economic foundations argument of the current conflict allow that “Aceh’s history is told largely in terms of trade.”⁵ The GAM’s Declaration of Independence states that “Aceh, Sumatra has been producing revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese neo-colonialists.”⁶ It is paramount to understand the economic aspects of the conflict if we are to understand how to bring about a just peace.

This chapter shall briefly review the history of economic exploitation in Indonesia as it pertains to the conflict in Aceh. Then the economics of the Republic, which includes government, military, and the Asian Economic Crisis, will be detailed in depth. Then the GAM will be examined as an economic entity. The principle resource in Aceh, oil, will be addressed before a conclusion is made regarding the economics of peace. Though some GAM commentators claim that “economic factors

¹ Michael Shari, “Giving Peace a Chance in Aceh,” *Business Week Online* (30 December 2002).

² Leslie McCulloch, “Greed: the Silent Force if the Conflict in Aceh,” November 2003. Available online at www.transparency.org.

³ Dan Murphy, “Intensified Fighting Shuts ExxonMobil Gas Plant,” *Christian Science Monitor*, Volume 93, Issue 76 (15 March 2001).

⁴ Cited in Graeme Hugo, “Pengungsi- Indonesia’s Internally Displaced Persons,” *Asia and Pacific Migration Journal*, Volume 11, Issue 3 (2002), 309.

⁵ Dr. Lukman Thaib, *the Roots of the Achehnese Struggle* (Kuala Lumpur: UKM Press, 1996), 3.

⁶ di Tiro, *the Price of Freedom*.

were not the most important factors in Aceh conflict (sic)”⁷, that instead the conflict is rooted in clashing identities, we must resist such neo-conservatism and understand that there is nothing inherently violent in difference. Instead, greed on both sides makes use of ethnic differences in order to maintain their privilege.

1) History

The history and politics of elite interest in both Java and Aceh provide an excellent backdrop in understanding the current economic situation. Recall that Aceh grew rapidly partly due to the Portuguese invasion of Malacca in the sixteenth century. Aceh became the primary entrepôt for Indian goods in the archipelago due to its position at the gateway of the Malacca Straights, as it “had taken over part of Melaka’s role as the terminus for Indian Muslim shipping.”⁸ There is a reason why the period of empires in Southeast Asia is called an Age of Commerce and is precisely why the Dutch and British presence originated in the form of the Dutch and British East India *Companies*. The Dutch, like the Portuguese before them, became a part of a long-standing system of commerce, though differed from the Portuguese in that they had almost no evangelical role- they sought only profit. This history has direct bearing on cries of colonialism and exploitation today, as Indonesia and Aceh each contain great wealth alongside great poverty and have a legacy of anti-colonial revolt.

The VOC went out of business despite the surging economy because private trade was preferable; Adam Smith himself noted that “of all the expedients that can...stunt the natural growth of a colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual.”⁹ The Dutch taxation system fuelled the pending Java War; “fundamental to an understanding of the people’s role in the Java War...is the odious and inhuman exploitation by the tollkeepers.”¹⁰ Under a system of private enterprise, political hegemony, and brutal exploitation, the Dutch and Priyayi elites saw the Indies GDP double from 1870 to 1910, and then double again by 1929.¹¹ This was based on the described Culture System of forced delivery of export crops such as sugar, rubber, tobacco, coffee, and tea;

⁷ Lukman Age, “Tracing the Roots of the Conflict in Aceh: A Critique of the Indonesian Government’s Version of the Problem and its Proposed Conflict Solution,” *the SEASCN Bulletin* (April-June 2002), 12.

⁸ Reid, “An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asian History,” 22.

⁹ Adam Smith, *A Brief Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations* (London: Penguin Classics, 1992), book IV, chapter 7.

¹⁰ Justus M. van der Kroef, “Prince Diponegoro,” 440.

¹¹ Maddison, “Dutch Income and From Indonesia,” 655.

these exports were so crucial to the Dutch economy that even Queen Wilhelmina's Ethical Policy did not affect the most precious exports. The wealth of Hollanders grew ten fold from 1828 until 1928, when profits dropped due to the Depression and World War Two. Their fight for the Indies after World War Two was an attempt to rebuild Holland economically, as political pride was a minor aspect of the Dutch Empire; unlike the French, the Dutch wanted their colonies almost solely for economic reasons. In sum, the Culture System was created in order to pay for the Napoleonic Wars as well as capturing more territory for the purposes of political pride, including Aceh. We must keep this in mind, as after the Asian Economic Crisis, Indonesia launched its most brutal campaigns into Aceh. Wars have a way of boosting political power and are often (wrongfully) assumed to boost economic growth. What this tells us is that meaningful economic development must be found in Indonesia if Aceh is to thrive.

In Aceh, the growing economic clout of Sultan Jauhar al-Alam resulted in Ulama / Ulambaang conflict as well as greater piracy, two factors which aided the Dutch invasion. When the Dutch sought to return after the Depression and World War Two, they were met with much firmer resistance. As described, the infrastructure created by the Dutch, the corporate ventures from Japan and the United States, and finally the Japanese Occupation had created a new class of Indonesian, meaning Javanese, rulers. It was with these men that the Republic was founded and a new economy was to be built.

2) The Republic of Indonesia

How does a former colony, whose economy is based on plantation labour and layered exploitation, grow as an independent country? The popularity and power which the new leaders and their military had in the Post War era was substantial, thus we can expect little autonomy for the Indonesian economy from political and military spheres. In 1957, the Indonesian military took over newly nationalized Dutch corporations, which continued the colonial legacy by embedding the military in a command economy.¹² Considering that the Aceh War is fuelled by corruption and exploitation by these formerly anti-colonial Republican actors, the transitional period and the nature of economic hegemony is a useful story to describe.

¹² Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, 199.

2.1 Government

Sukarno used development to bring about his nationalist vision, while Suharto used nationalism to pursue uneven development. The economics of the Darul Islam demonstrate Sukarno's concerns; the rebellion occurred because the government did not have any plans for the development of Aceh. To Sukarno, this was a crucial event because it threatened his idea of the Indonesian nation. In response to the violence, the government immediately promised "that a twenty million rupiah grant would be allocated for the region," and promised to "develop the region's economy once security was restored."¹³ The budget for Aceh immediately increased, as road expenditure tripled from 1952 to 1953 and education was expanded, albeit via the state model. The rebellion was slowly diffused as "the Acehnese could see that some development really did occur", with schools being built and the economy thriving despite the government's lack of funds.¹⁴ The rebellious leaders were undermined by government actions which increased local development and prosperity.

The Sukarno years saw poor results in the economic realm, largely due to the legacy of colonialism; "by 1965, when he was toppled, a strongly competitive force emerged- multinational capital- which saw in Indonesia a source of raw materials, cheap labour, and a large market."¹⁵ As Suharto took power, "decades of economic decay and capital dis-investment had brought the Indonesian economy to the brink of catastrophe."¹⁶ The New Order was based on military power and economic development which it justified via nationalism, via Pancasila. Its megaprojects were similar to other nations during this era, although the benefits were more concentrated in elite reserves; this uneven development caused Indonesia to grow immensely, however "these changes also laid the groundwork for new forms of discontent."¹⁷ The state had a major role, with import substitution, state corporations, and later export systems based on low wages and attractive tax breaks for foreign companies. During this era, manufacturing grew several times over, while agriculture plummeted; urbanization accelerated, and even the rural regions were now connected to the metropolis as never before. The centralization of politics and economics were the hallmarks of New Order developmental policy.

¹³ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 132.

¹⁴ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 306.

¹⁵ Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "the Caste System and the Revolution," *the Mute's Soliloquy: a Memoir* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 252.

¹⁶ Martin Rudner, "the Goals and Performance of the First Five-Year Development Plan," *Modern Asian Studies*, Volume 10, Issue 2 (1976), 249.

¹⁷ Aspinall and Berger, "the Break-Up of Indonesia?" 1007.

The vehicle for economic growth was the Repelita (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*, or Five Year Plan). These plans were typical of Indonesia's 'Middle Path', which borrowed from each Cold War power, using state development and transmigration to achieve growth. Repelita I (1969-73) was based on the economic role of the military; "as the vanguard of the New Order, the ABRI...was to play a critical role in the formulation and implementation of the First Five-Year Development Plan."¹⁸ Repelita II (1974-78) witnessed few changes from its predecessor, though it included much needed yet ineffective population reduction programmes. Due to increasing poverty, Repelita III (1979-83) included several vague descriptions of equity, which managed to "evoke a picture of the good society rather than articulating strategies for its achievement."¹⁹ Repelita IV (1984-88) focused on oil revenues in light of recent global politics, while Repelita V (1989-93) further expanded oil as well as diversified manufacturing. The Repelita programmes continue today although with less importance due to IMF controls. Under Suharto, these Plans provided the guidebook for the resource extraction which neglected peripheral regions such as Aceh and increased the power of Jakarta's elites.

The result of state-led growth has been tremendous corruption; the following is an insufficiently brief survey of only one of Suharto's six children, Tommy Suharto. Tommy Suharto was granted a US\$100 million loan to establish PT Goro supermarkets and a farmer's cooperative association in April 1994, selling his shares four years later for US\$112 million and leaving the farmers with the loan. Tommy Suharto also had a monopoly on school children's shoes and clove supplies throughout Indonesia, as well as alcohol sales in Bali through his Islamic Alcohol Commission.²⁰ He owns twenty two luxury apartments in England, his Humpuss Conglomerate owns natural resource rights in dozens of nations, and in 1993 he became a majority shareholder in Lamborghini. Tommy Suharto and his father's golf partner Bob Hasan embezzled US\$ 87 million from Greenpeace's Forest Renewal Programme, for which each were eventually brought to trial though not convicted.²¹ Tommy Suharto was soon sentenced to eighteen months for embezzling US\$ 11.2 million in government land through real estate investments. In 2000, he escaped and the judge who

¹⁸ Rudner, "the Goals and Performance of the First Five-Year Development Plan," 250.

¹⁹ Morfit, "Pancasila: the Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," 846.

²⁰ Pete Engardio, "the IMF Should Quit Playing Politics," *Business Week*, Issue 3731 7 May 2001), 86.

²¹ Robson, "Politics & Markets in Indonesia's Post-Oil Era," 34.

convicted him was assassinated, thus when Tommy Suharto was caught in November 2001, he was charged and then convicted for fifteen years for arranging the murder.²²

His father's verdict has been blocked due to supposed health problems, while the prosecution argues he is fit for trial.²³ All of Suharto's six children have been involved in resource extraction from Aceh, namely in Pertamina and PT Arun gas plants. In 2004, Tut-Tut Suharto announced her candidacy for President, her backing being her family's massive capital which is still outside of the hands of the lenders who made her power possible. In the end, the Suharto family controlled 1,251 corporations and was worth US\$ 16 billion.

Thus, the Indonesian economy was, and to a great extent remains, a state-led, corrupt economy based on resource exploitation from the periphery. The nature of the Indonesian economic system creates prime conditions for fragmentation. These conditions are further created by the next factor; the agent for economic growth in these regions is not only the government, but a fragmented and corrupt military. The result is that the military not only fights for the idea of national unity, but also for their economic interests. Conflict, not to mention poverty, cannot end until this system is transformed.

2.2 Military

Almost every conflict has roots in economic exploitation; when the military is the source, it is difficult to imagine an alternative to conflict in a developing country. The very structure of the Indonesian military and economy helped to instigate and helps perpetuate the conflict in Aceh. The former *dwifungsi* doctrine should be understood as a triple role; aside from being security and sociopolitical forces, the military is also a prime economic force.²⁴ As described in chapter two, only 30% of the TNI budget is provided through the state, and in Aceh the TNI requires hundreds of millions of US dollars. Including the unofficial cost of arming regional militias as well as personal profits, one would expect the need for funds to be even greater.

²² Phil Zabriskie, "Throwing the Book at Suharto," *Time*, Volume 160, Issue 4 (5 August 2002).

²³ *BBC News*, "Trial Postponed for 'Sick' Suharto" (31 August 2000).

²⁴ Leslie McCulloch, *Trifungsi: the Role of the Indonesian Military in Business* (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2000).

Thus, in order to operate at its current capacity, the Indonesian military must become involved in regional economies, which simultaneously heightens local discontent and entrenches military interests in perpetuating conflict; “Aceh is simply too lucrative a place for military officers who rely so heavily on non-budgetary sources of income.”²⁵ For instance, KOSTRAD alone owns shares in film companies, an airline, and a Volkswagen assembly plant. The military is defined by the New Order’s Pancasila education programme as an agent for “economic justice” and providing a foundation for development.²⁶

The former Minister of Defense, General Benny, describes the military’s economic role as a process of creativity and problem solving:

It is essential that stagnation be eliminated by introducing new ideas and approaches in order to achieve a breakthrough. A good example is the way in which the ABRI has carried out deregulation in the transportation sector where four middle-ranking officers with the rank of Colonel, assumed duties as administrator at four main ports. Another example may be seen at the Sukarno-Hatta International Airport, where the post of Administrator has been filled by an officer of equivalent rank.²⁷

The reasoning offered for this system is that in a territory so vast and diverse as Indonesia, a country without enough funds to supply its defenses, the military must take up this role to develop the nation and to survive. There is some credence to the point that several development projects could never have been completed without the vast resources, in terms of expertise, equipment, and manpower, of the Indonesian military. We must remember that militaries and development were one force in creating today’s most developed nations, that Benny’s comments have some foundation. But the military has failed to develop the economy and has abused its own people, so the argument is not an issue.

In *Power, Politics, and the Indonesian Military*, Damien Kingsbury divides the TNI’s economic activities into official, grey, and black markets. In official markets, the TNI and its competing branches are financed by foreign corporations in what is the majority source of official market capital. For example, in Lhokseumawe, the largest taxpayer and funder of the TNI is the PT Arun gas plant, where its partner EXXON-Mobile faces charges in an American court for supporting human rights abuses. This demonstrates that even in official markets, working alongside known

²⁵ International Crisis Group, “Aceh: How not to Win Hearts and Minds,” 7.

²⁶ Morfit, “Pancasila: the Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government,” 846.

²⁷ General L. Benny Moerdani, “On Promotion to Defense Minister,” 152.

international actors, the military operate in a shady context. The grey market overlaps with the official markets here, defined as quasi-legal economic operations. This includes leasing out military equipment and protection for foreign corporations, speculation and rents sought by military leaders, and informal taxation. Setting up tolls along roads is a major drain on the Acehese economy, as transportation costs in Aceh are higher than any other Indonesian province; in one instance of such exploitation, the TNI stated to Acehese workers that contributions to the soldiers are necessary because they did not like inhaling vehicle fumes.²⁸

Detail 3.0 **Logging in Aceh**

Throughout Indonesia, improper logging practices have resulted in soil erosion, flooding, forest fires, and the loss of animal habitat. The creation of National Parks has done little, as logging operations, such as those within Aceh's Bukit Tigapuluh National Park, operate illegally. But even the legal operations use illegal methods, are tied to the military, and are overabundant.

The following are some of the logging companies operating within Aceh (Ministry of Forests 1998, reprinted in Down to Earth issue 47, November 2000):

PT Asdal	PT Dina Maju	PT Graha Citra	PT Gruti	PT Hargas Industri Timber
PT Lembah Bakti	PT Aceh Inti	PT Medan Remaja		PT Wajar Corp
	Timber	Timber		
PT Aceh Prima Plywood	PT Alas Aceh	PT Alas Helau		PT Baybem Woyla
	Perkasa			
PT Lamurl Timber	PT Narindu	PT Overseas Lumber		PT Tjipta Rimba Jaya
		Indonesia		
PT Truasamas Karya Inti	PT Wiralanau	PT Aceh Nusa Indra		PT Aceh Swaka Wana Nusa
		Puri		

Several groups have been active in correcting the damage done to the environment and economy, while others have worked to bring these negligent companies to justice. Please see chapter five on Civil Society.

In the black market; the TNI has been involved in the marijuana trade, prostitution, and weapons trading with the GAM. The political editor of the Jakarta Post, Mr. Ridwan Max Sijabat, stated that:

The Indonesian military has been involved in the trafficking of marijuana but, so far, it has not been taken to task. As for GAM, proceeds from its trafficking of marijuana to Sumatra and Java allow it to buy more arms to keep the rebels in the fight against the military. There is no way either side will want to back away from such riches.²⁹

²⁸ Acehkita, "Amri's Revenge" (2 January 2004), 18.

²⁹ The Singapore New Paper, "Is The War in Aceh All About Money?" (21 May 2001). Available Online at <http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/top/story>, accessed January 2004.

In 1982, ABRI soldiers were caught with 260 kilograms of marijuana, and in another case shortly after, eight police officers and a bureaucrat were sentenced to life imprisonment for a similar crime.³⁰ The drug trade is often an extension of the conflict between the police and army of Indonesia; in 2000, three police officers were arrested by the air force for smuggling 430 pounds of marijuana, and in 2002 the police arrested some TNI members for using their vehicles to transport drugs.³¹

Such activities have concrete effects for the conflict; “business interests, from illegal logging and raking off a slice of the oil and gas profits, to alleged drug running, and even supplying GAM with weapons, are part of the reason the generals do not want to cooperate.”³² Despite government accusations against nearby nations, the majority of the GAM’s weapons come from “corrupt sources within the TNI.”³³ Government forces have their own roads for illegal logging, and during the monsoon season the competition for the better route often leads to violence. Fertilizer has also been a resource of great contention. Four hundred families were relocated to build the ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer Plant in the 1970s. In the 1980s, several lawsuits were brought against such plants, as several gas leaks from them had destroyed crops and hospitalized children.³⁴

The TNI and other Indonesian security forces also make money when persons are forced to flee their homes and become IDPs. Human Rights Watch has documented the looting which takes place when families flee the violence; one victim describes that when he returned home, his possessions “were gone...taken by soldiers who asked for Rp. 300,000 to return our goods to us.”³⁵ Another major economic factor is everyday ‘donations.’ As the TNI moves from village to village, coffee, food, and cigarettes are expected to be given to them by the locals without charge. They also use the people’s homes and vehicles for their own pleasure, sometimes keeping their prize afterwards. The GAM is certainly guilty of this as well; though gifts are more often given voluntarily, the force behind these actions is only one point. Such everyday exploitation slowly impoverishes the people further. A biased source is one which asserts that any group of men with guns is given goods

³⁰ Drexler, *Paranoid Transparencies*, 105.

³¹ McCulloch, “Greed: the Silent Force of the Conflict in Aceh,” 18.

³² Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

³³ International Crisis Group, “Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won’t Work,” 8.

³⁴ Kell, *the Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion*, 18.

³⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Aceh under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War,” Volume 15, Issue 10 (December 2003), 43.

voluntarily, thus the GAM and the TNI, as well as other factions, have a major negative impact on local economies due to daily meals and living expenses.

Due to such business dealings, as well as in coffee, fish, and palm oil, *it can be difficult to distinguish between the TNI and GAM*; however *it is possible to tell the rich from the poor*, regardless of their ascribed identity. The lack of entry-level jobs or functional systems of law, the human rights violations, as well as the disruption of everyday life all aspects of this war on the poor persons of the region. This is an under-valued aspect of this and other conflicts, although it has been addressed regarding famines and economic collapse, to which we will return shortly.

In sum, the corruption endemic to the Indonesian state and its security forces perpetuate the conflict. The previous chapter assessed the different power structures between the government and the military, thus it should not be surprising that even if the government wants peace, the military does not allow it. When troops were withdrawn in 1998, the ensuing riot which resulted in the continuation of military power was believed to have been “staged by departing troops unhappy at being taken away from their lucrative sources of income.”³⁶ The nature of the Indonesian systems resulted in the massive scale of the 1997 Economic Crisis, as the regime’s closed, crooked political economic system was incompatible with a globalized economy.

2.3 The Asian Economic Crisis

The Asian Economic Crisis was not caused by the aforementioned political economic problems which plague the Indonesian state, as its cause had nothing to do with Indonesia at all. Instead, the Republic’s disgusting corruption exacerbated it. Indonesia’s slow recovery has been worrisome, but “more than anywhere else, it is possible to put a finger on what is wrong.”³⁷ The problems which were brought to the surface were bank fraud, a high deficit, and the very nature of Indonesian politics.

Years of corruption and nepotism resulted in foreign banks losing everything to Indonesian elites who had used the same collateral on countless loans. In 1988, the Indonesian bank licensing system

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: the War in Aceh,” 8.

³⁷ Philippe F. Dehaise, Asia in Crisis: the Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 123.

was liberalized, and as a result specific banks were created for specific economic transactions without due attention to credit; in addition, each bank tried to outbid the other to garner deposits. Suharto's children each owned several banks, some as cover for their personal projects. Suharto himself gained millions by foreclosing on Bank Duta in the early 1990s.

Another major problem was the national debt, which went from 80% of the annual GDP in 1991 to 140% in 1998.³⁸ Much of this money was knowingly lent by Western powers such as the World Bank to the corrupt New Order, and as the crisis hit, the Indonesian people, including Acehnese, had to pay back predatory western governments and international financial institutions (IFIs). The issue of debt forgiveness is a challenge to the post-Breton Woods regulatory system, and a crucial reminder when we see these governments and IFIs acting as altruists in recent development efforts.

The final major problem was the nature of the quasi-military regime; in systems of absolute rule, investors exit quickly in times of crisis. This is an overlooked argument, for when a country is run by a single family and its clients, and no mechanisms for replacing him or her, "the only option open to investors, as the value of their assets continued to plummet, was exit."³⁹ There is clearly an inconsistency between free-market capitalism and dictatorial regimes, as global investors are not under the power of such figures and can defect.⁴⁰ The people living under such a system have no such option, as they lack the power and mobility to leave their country, aside from becoming refugees. Although growth rates may be higher in state-led growth, the potential for collapse is far greater; an open democracy with transparent spending is both just and stable.

Thus, the crisis hit hard, as loans were defaulted upon, banks foreclosed, savings were lost, and investor confidence has not yet returned. Exchange rates of Rupiah per American dollar went from 2,300 in 1996 to 7,500 in 1998, with inflation soaring from 6.6% to 47%. As a result, a massive US\$ 43 billion package was agreed to under the conditions that Indonesia fight corruption, guarantee transparency, and end monopolies.⁴¹ Their plan made no mention of years of loans to the

³⁸ Dehaise, *Asia in Crisis*, 126.

³⁹ Andrew MacIntyre, "Political Institutions and the Economic Crisis in Thailand and Indonesia," in *the Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis*, edited by T.J. Pempel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 155.

⁴⁰ This point is also skillfully put forth by Amartya Sen, as development in several definitions depends on working democracy and transparency. Please see Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999).

⁴¹ *CIA World Factbook 2000*: Economic Aid, Recipient.

New Order, placing the burden on the Indonesian people. Again, in times of crisis in an undemocratic system, the burden falls on the masses, the population which is the least responsible; “the Asian crisis swiftly revealed how thin and fragile was the New Order's prosperity. In two years, it had pushed seventy million Indonesians, one-third of the population, back below the poverty line.”⁴² The impoverished masses include millions of Acehnese, but perhaps more important for Aceh was the backlash to come.

It has already been detailed that the Dutch exacted its worst exploitation after the Napoleonic, Java, and World Wars in order to pay off debts and to boost national morale. After the economic crisis hit, Indonesia was weakened and the GAM grew along with civil society. The rebels saw a destabilized enemy, GAM monetary reserves- in foreign currencies- were of greater value for buying supplies, and Aceh had even higher unemployment. The TNI leaders had lost its sources of income and the nation had lost its confidence. The result was that the resources of Aceh took on a greater significance in economic and ideological terms. For now, it is useful to explore the GAM economy before reaching any conclusions on the region in general.

3) The Economy of the GAM

The GAM's existence and its success are draped in favourable economic conditions. At the same time, many of the GAM's major detriments are as well. This section will look at the GAM's economic origins, its popularity, and its dubious economic transactions. The goal of this section will be to examine the environment which made the GAM viable and necessitates its critique- a corrupt military economy.

This point is opposed by Leslie McCulloch, who states that “the ‘greed’ of the Aceh Merdeka is merely a diversion” because it fails “to explain the real motivation of the conflict.”⁴³ She further states that the GAM “might not also (sic) benefit from the conflict environment,” but insists this is less than the TNI and is only a problem to foreign observers.⁴⁴ Her research focuses on the greed of the TNI in the conflict environment, ignoring the GAM dealings even when they are alongside the TNI because they are alleged not to be a factor in the continuation of the conflict. Several authors

⁴² Smith, “What Does it Mean to be Modern?”

⁴³ McCulloch, “Greed: the Silent Force of the Conflict in Aceh,” 28.

⁴⁴ McCulloch, “Greed: the Silent Force of the Conflict in Aceh,” endnotes, 31.

who research conflicts take this approach, rightfully noting that exploitation by corrupt state militaries is an under-appreciated aspect of conflicts and must be overcome. However, we must resist limiting our focus to the state, as this interpretation relies on a dualistic model of the conflict for its cohesion, it ignores legal and moral issues, it promotes the nation-state as the only unit of worth, it ignores the effects of the Acehnese people, and it ignores the nature of the hopeful future government. Above all, it naturalizes the transactions of the Acehnese lamb, yet demonizes those of the Indonesian wolf, which as in our metaphor, is a fantasy which robs the weaker party of agency. Focusing on only the TNI insinuates that the GAM is not important enough to scrutinize. Not only are the economics of the GAM of crucial importance for the people of Aceh, but it is also a reflection of their legitimacy as a potential governmental body.

3.1 Economic Origins

As has been stressed throughout this text, the GAM, like the Diponegoro and Darul Islam before it, is led by economic elites. Di Tiro is from an aristocratic family, was educated in New York, and owns several companies; such a background is necessary in order to provide a reasonable economic base in order to oppose the Indonesian state. Such wealth allowed for the GAM to train in Libya, buy weapons, and gain recognition for their struggle. Di Tiro is also considered a *de facto* Sultan in waiting. According to the GAM website, di Tiro is

...a well-known international businessman, a revolutionary, a world traveler who feels at home in the West as much as in the East. As a successful businessman he presided the Doral Interna-tional Ltd. New York, a company active in the field of investment banking, *petroleum, natural gas*, agriculture, husbandry, shipping and aviation industries (emphasis added).⁴⁵

This is directly contradicted by his early socialist rhetoric; di Tiro once believed that Aceh is “at the feet of the multinationals to be raped,” while colonialist corporations “buy and sell us in the international market.”⁴⁶ It is crucial to note that at this time, di Tiro had business interests in almost all the areas which Indonesia exploits in Aceh. Di Tiro was among the losing bids for the original oil exploration contracts in Aceh in 1974; the GAM is stacked with elite businessmen who lacked political ties to Jakarta and therefore lost power during the New Order.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ “Tengku Hasan M. Di Tiro, BA, MA, PhD., LL.D- Head of State of Aceh Sumatra,” www.asnlf.net/, accessed November 2003.

⁴⁶ Hasan di Tiro, cited in Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 18.9

⁴⁷ Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 223.

Not only does the di Tiro family have great wealth, but several other elite Acehnese families do as well. This is why it was Acehnese money which bought the Republic of Indonesia its' first aircraft, laying the foundation for Garuda Airways, the current national operator. Acehnese capital helped build the Republic; such funds founded "diplomatic outposts in Singapore, India, and the United Nations, and contributed to the Indonesian government coffers at a time when the new republic was almost bankrupt."⁴⁸ The wealth of Acehnese elites was based on trade monopolies, acting as colonial middlemen, money lenders, and exploiting workers. Thus, like the exploitation at the hands of Javanese rulers today, Acehnese elites are not clean of the blood of the people; it is a curious phenomenon known to the developing world that the economic elite complain the most of exploitation. It should be noted that some scholars see traditional Acehnese business dealings as lacking the exploitation of corporatism, as transactions were more egalitarian and moral than in other regions.⁴⁹ If this is the case historically, we must question if it would in fact carry over to a modern Aceh, one part of a globalized economy and governed by a corporatist GAM leadership, as di Tiro claims his group to be.

Let us examine the argument that Aceh is exploited. In any just country, redistribution of wealth is necessary for just growth; Aceh, being one of the richest provinces, should be expected to lose money in order to benefit peripheral regions. So the argument should not be whether or not Aceh loses money by being part of Indonesia, but instead if that money reaches disadvantaged areas or not. It is obvious that it does not, it ends up in the offshore accounts of Suharto's cronies. This failure is why we label the Indonesian system corrupt. But the GAM does not consider this point; it only takes the selfish route of entitlement, not misdistribution because its own ranks seek personal profit, not economic parity across the region.

The elite origins of the GAM are problematic when compared to its anti-elitist rhetoric. Its website states that they fight for "the preservation of their economic and natural resources which are being plundered by the Javanese colonialists and their foreign backers under the guise of 'developments.'"⁵⁰ The GAM is founded on anti-corporate, anti-elitist struggle, yet run by aristocratic businessmen. Thus, predictions that Aceh will become "a prosperous region similar to

⁴⁸ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh?" 439.

⁴⁹ Siegel, *the Rope of God*, 199, as well as several conversations with Acehnese activists.

⁵⁰ "The Aims of the ANSLF," www.asnlf.net/, accessed November 2003.

the small but wealthy kingdoms of Kuwait and Brunei”⁵¹ ring true, as these elite kingdoms offer no space for human rights, democracy, or redistribution of wealth.

Another aspect of GAM’s foundations is in the Indonesian military economy; after the Suharto-era crackdown against military corruption and drug running, several disgraced officers joined the GAM. These officers were major forces in this era, as they provided the first field military training for GAM soldiers; without disgruntled government soldiers, the “Aceh Merdeka rebellions might not have amounted to very much militarily.”⁵² In fact, twenty percent of GAM soldiers tried after the first wave of the DOM era were former ABRI men. This is an excellent reason why the TNI and the GAM have such common practices today- their worst elements are the same core of soldiers.

3.2 Negative Identification- GAM Popularity

Just as the GAM has found political support simply by opposing a murderous enemy, it has also found support by opposing the TNI’s exploitative business practices. The widespread GAM support is a result of negative identification, as opposed to positive identification, where people would proactively choose the GAM according to their specific policies or ideology. The GAM grew as the Indonesian government grew more exploitative; “an explicitly secessionist movement only appeared...as a result of the intensified modernizing and centralizing efforts of the New Order.”⁵³ How has Indonesia worked to change this?

Foreign media sources note that US\$ 540 is offered by the Indonesian government for every gun turned in, a year’s wages for the average Indonesian, and that Aceh’s budget is the highest of any province in Indonesia.⁵⁴ These are half-truths; nothing has been done to halt, let alone admit, that TNI soldiers sell guns to the GAM. Companies in Aceh “have employed very few local Acehnese, filling most of the posts with people from Java and other regions.”⁵⁵ This is even admitted by the same media source which promotes the programme, as “work is being held up because Javanese engineers...are leaving the province.”⁵⁶ This argument should be modified, as it appears that

⁵¹ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 439.

⁵² Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 236.

⁵³ Aspinall and Berger, “the Break-Up of Indonesia?” 1016.

⁵⁴ *Economist*, “Death and Faith in Aceh.”

⁵⁵ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 439-440.

⁵⁶ *Economist*, “Death and Faith in Aceh.”

several Acehnese work for these corporations, but lack the education to fill high-level posts; thus, the issue is really about education, which the GAM undermines by burning schools and Indonesian undermines by not promoting local technical schools. It remains true that Acehnese remain impoverished “because most of them (have) too little education to get...jobs.”⁵⁷ Aceh has a 30% unemployment rate, proof that development is narrow while at the same time fuel for GAM recruiters.

3.3 Contemporary Economics of the GAM

The GAM receives funding through a number of sources outside of elite business interests. Taxation of several forms supplements their struggle, collected via tolls, voluntary contributions, and forced collection. We should note that the GAM does spend a great deal of money in its home areas on local infrastructure and construction, as its ranks at the grassroots have often joined in order to benefit their community. But at the leadership level, and at the grassroots level to their opposition, their nature is far from credible.

Tax collection is an interesting facet of the GAM, as it is heavily critiqued by activists; however such an act is consistent with its assumed role as Aceh’s government. During the Darul Islam Rebellion, “taxes were collected from traders, both Acehnese and non-Acehnese...either voluntarily or forcefully.”⁵⁸ GAM tax collectors act on historical precedent and are theoretically consistent with their self-proclaimed governmental powers. Forced taxation is a feature of all governments; while discussing the failure of peace talks, the Vice Foreign Minister of Japan put partial blame on the GAM, which continually “imposed forceful tax collections on the people.”⁵⁹ But Japan, like all states, collects forced taxes. The point here is not that the GAM cannot collect taxes, but whether they have the legitimacy to do so and if it is carried out properly. The contrast is demonstrated with regards to corporate taxation:

All local businesses pay a tax to the ANSLF, as a percentage of profits, up to and including the giant EXXON-Mobil operated Arun liquefied gas plant near Lhokseumawe. On one occasion the Arun plant had been closed down by the ANSLF for refusing to pay its taxes and, at one stage, two of its American employees were killed.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ England, “Breaking Away.”

⁵⁸ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 209.

⁵⁹ Yukio Takeuchi, Vice Foreign Minister of Japan, “Press Conference on Peace Failure” (19 May 2003).

⁶⁰ Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, 225.

During the Humanitarian Pause and the COHA, the GAM siphoned funds from development aid and 'taxed' NGOs working in UNDP Programmes at gunpoint, to the point that the UN sent an official complaint to the JSC.⁶¹ Their taxation during the COHA, especially in areas in Central and Southern Aceh where they lack support, has no justification because they were given allowances so that the practice would end.

Within the ranks of the GAM, taxation is often corrupted into extortion and carried out by violence. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of young men joining the GAM due to "the possibilities for extortion that possession of a gun opens up."⁶² Other writers comment that "Indonesian soldiers and GAM fighters continue to extort money from locals."⁶³ The GAM must also consider that "in Aceh there are two parties claimed themselves as 'nation' and both of them collected taxes"; this is something several Acehnese persons claim neither side considers.⁶⁴ If the GAM is a government, it must demonstrate that its taxation adds to public goods and that measures are taken to curb corruption.

Simply put, the GAM has not managed to do this yet. The GAM and the TNI each rely on informants in order to track the resources of Acehnese, where "both sides use operatives who are little better than thugs."⁶⁵ The information collected has disastrous results, as "both armies routinely steal from civilians and execute alleged informants and 'traitors'."⁶⁶ The second quotation is interesting, as the GAM is stated to be an army, not a government, a judgment likely informed by public opinion. A military, either the TNI during Martial Law or the GAM during the COHA, is not the proper agent for tax collection. As the GAM spies on its people in order to track the opposition's informants and to gauge potential sources of wealth, it exists far outside of government roles. It is useful to look to a particular industry as a case study, one which will demonstrate the failures of the Indonesian military and the GAM.

The largest source of income in Aceh is oil. This subject merits its own discussion, as the embedded nature of the TNI and the extortion from the GAM are all linked to this industry. Oil is

⁶¹ Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 25.

⁶² Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 6.

⁶³ *Economist*, "A Ceasefire Without Monitors: the Peace Deal in this Turbulent Indonesian Province is in Trouble," Volume 367, Issue 8319 (10 April 2003).

⁶⁴ Radzie, "Vehicle Tax ala GAM," www.acehkita.com, accessed February 2004.

⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 6.

⁶⁶ Murphy, "Military Reasserts Power, Casualties Mount in Aceh."

the source of foreign involvement, it creates side markets such as shipping and treatment plants, and it demonstrates the similarities between the Indonesian and GAM leaders.⁶⁷

4) The Oil Economy

The oil economy is not the only important sector of the Acehnese economy, but is given the most attention because of its high level of international involvement and because it is a far more interesting topic than others, such as fertilizer. Although we must not exaggerate Aceh's Petroleum supplies, which some writers claim "represent 80% of the total revenue of the Javanese colonialist regime in 'Indonesia,'"⁶⁸ this industry is still of crucial importance. In the early 1960s, Indonesia was home to several oil companies, most run by different faction of the military through the former Dutch colonial system. Under the New Order, and with soaring global oil prices, these groups were merged into Pertamina, which was granted a monopoly and staffed by Suharto loyalists from the ABRI, namely General Ibnu Sutowo. By 1974, this massive corporation had a larger fleet than the Indonesian Navy.⁶⁹ Foreign corporations were heavily involved as well; Canada's Asmera oil was one of the early exploiters of the resource, sinking 450 wells between 1961 and 1991.

Pertamina never published its reports or profits, and its worth was grossly inflated; on 18 February 1975, it defaulted on a US\$ 40 million loan to American banks, and weeks later a US\$ 60 million loan to Canadian conglomerates.⁷⁰ As a result, Bank Indonesia paid US\$ 650 million of its debts and put restrictions on the company's interests. But its debt was discovered as being over US\$ 10 billion, mainly in businesses with no connections to oil such as hotels, an airline, and rice plantations. General Ibnu Sutowo was replaced by another military leader, Major General Piet Haryono, who tried to turn the company around through some degree of transparency.⁷¹

Since the fall of the New Order, Pertamina has been plagued by corruption charges and links with the Suharto family. A 1998 audit stated that US \$4 billion had leaked out via dishonesty, resulting

⁶⁷ An interesting parallel to this section is the American military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq under President Bush. Critiques allege that these battles are between like actors- governments controlled by oil-baron families, as Bush and bin Laden worked together as parts of the Carlyle Group in the 1980s. This subject is addressed in the work of Robert Scheer and John Pilger.

⁶⁸ Dr. Lukman Thaib, *the Roots of the Acehnese Struggle*, 36.

⁶⁹ *Serajah Indonesia*, "the Sukarno Years."

⁷⁰ Harold Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 48, Issue 4 (Winter 1975-76), 525.

⁷¹ Bruce Glassburner, "In the Wake of General Ibnu: Crisis in the Indonesian Oil Industry," *Asian Survey*, Volume 16, Issue 12 (December 1976), 1106.

in half of their projects being cancelled. The state giant has been trying to turn its fortunes around; in 2002, Pertamina signed a twenty five year deal to supply liquid gas from Papua to the People's Republic of China. However, it has not changed its stripes; according to its own website, "PERTAMINA as a state-owned company in doing its activities, consistently pays attention to the interest of the people, *national defense* and the Indonesian archipelago outlook"⁷² (emphasis added). IMF and WTO policies are aimed at transforming this unwieldy state enterprise in the near future, which may actually bring some harmony to its major extraction sites, including Aceh.

The problem here is not only with local corporations, but equally with foreign actors. EXXON-Mobil worked closely with the Suharto family during the 1970s, when it bought exclusive rights to the Aceh fields. Pertamina signed an agreement with Mobil in the 1970s to create PT Arun, a large natural gas plant in Lhokseumawe, Aceh. Now known as EXXON-Mobil, the fuel corporation currently faces charges filed by the Washington-based International Labour Rights Fund on behalf of eleven Acehnese under the *Alien Tort Claims Act*. The lawsuit alleges that EXXON-Mobil purchased military equipment, provided barracks for active military units, and paid the military protection money to TNI Unit 113.⁷³ Company buildings were allegedly used for torture, and their equipment used to dig mass graves. Regardless of the extent of crimes, so long as EXXON-Mobil paid TNI units, it was responsible for their actions; this first suit will be telling, as such actions are not limited to gas companies.

EXXON-Mobil's role in other developing countries provides a character reference. In 1977, *Reavis versus EXXON Corporation* saw the plaintiff bring charges against the corporation for failing to compensate shareholders after the Venezuelan government had settled with EXXON as it nationalized the oil industry. Justice Gellinoff found EXXON liable for shares owing to Reavis, with no guilt on the part of Venezuela, as it operated legally by distributing compensation through the corporation.⁷⁴ In *Hunt versus Mobil*, the plaintiff brought charges of conspiracy against Mobil Oil after the corporation had failed to act on their behalf when Libya nationalized the industry in

⁷² PT Pertamina, "Company Profile," <http://www.pertamina.com/english/>, accessed November 2003.

⁷³ Chris Richards, "Oiling the Military Machine: Exxon Mobil's Part in the Aceh War," *New Internationalist*, Issue 339 (October 2001).

⁷⁴ Alona E. Evans, "Reavis v. EXXON Corporation 396 NYS 2D 744," *the American Journal of International Law*, Volume 72, Issue 2 (April 1978), 410-411.

1973.⁷⁵ In 1987, Mobil versus the Islamic Republic of Iran saw the corporation sue the Republic for breach of contract. The court judged that Mobil was entitled to damages, though an international decision would be necessary in order to enforce it.⁷⁶ What these few cases tell us about Aceh is that EXXON-Mobil has a long history of involvement with repressive governments, one which rarely has positive results. These cases contribute towards understanding the character of the corporation, one with educated political involvement and one that would know the nature of their global contracts.

Today, EXXON-Mobile and Pertamina continue their close relationship through their joint operating body; Pertamina also has smaller joint operations with Caltex, Conoco, BP, and several other corporations. As already detailed, the high-level jobs here have been given mostly to Javanese transmigrants, and the plants have hired and supplied TNI troops. Such policies provoked the GAM to attack TNI guards inside the Arun plant with grenades and machine guns in 2000.⁷⁷ In 2001, the plant closed for the first time since 1977, defaulting on deliveries to Korea and Japan.⁷⁸ The three month closure resulted in some clients refusing to renew their contracts, motivating the GAM to kidnap an employee and two contractors in November 2002 in an attempt to close the plant again.⁷⁹ In 2003, the TNI held its annual command meeting in Aceh, the first time it had been outside of Java, at the EXXON-Mobil facilities in Lhokseumawe. This meeting was held as the TNI and EXXON-Mobil were denying any close relationship between each other to American courts and NGO protestors. Both the GAM and the TNI see the corporation as a source of political and economic power, each ignoring the effects on Aceh.

The environment has been degraded, human rights have been breached, profits have been invisible for the Acehnese people, and the Indonesian military corporatists have become entrenched. The oil economy has “devastated local communities who depend on agriculture and fish farming” through soil erosion, pollution, and explosions.⁸⁰ In 1992, an underground pipeline burst open, flooding the nearby shore, the inhabitants not only angered by the accident, but also unaware the pipeline

⁷⁵ Alona E. Evans, “Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 550F.2D 68,” the American Journal of International Law, Volume 71, Issue 4 (October 1977), 780-782.

⁷⁶ Monroe Leigh, “Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran AWD 311-74/76//81/150-3,” the American Journal of International Law, Volume 82, Issue 1 (January 1988), 136-143.

⁷⁷ McCawley, “On Neutral Ground, Rebels Face Indonesian Government.”

⁷⁸ Murphy, “Intensified Fighting Shuts EXXON-Mobile Gas Plant.”

⁷⁹ Business Week Online, Indonesia Aims at Aceh, Again.”

⁸⁰ Aceh: the Untold Story, 42.

existed.⁸¹ Months later, a second pipeline burst, catching fire and burning down several houses. On 10 July 2001, dozens of Acehnese NGOs organized a petition to EXXON CEO Lee Raymond to be responsible for the abuses at PT Arun and to end its operations.

Simultaneously, the GAM has worked closely with oil corporations; di Tiro states that “I have close business relationship (sic) with top 50 US corporations in the field of petrochemicals.”⁸² Further, GAM leaders have contacted Singaporean leaders “to discuss plans for a gas pipeline...as part of a strategy of founding an independent state on the support of transnational oil companies.”⁸³ The GAM leaders are allied with the same companies which it labels the enemy; di Tiro owns several oil companies, even attending several EXXON fund-raisers in this capacity. The GAM does not oppose the economic system, but instead seeks greater profits from it.

The oil industry in Aceh is representative of the economic whole; based on colonial models, corrupt generals extracted money from their periphery and left the Indonesian citizens with the debt. The system, despite several collapses, has not been altered to a considerable extent. The GAM officially opposes the entire process, meanwhile working alongside the same actors with plans of taking over the role of the Javanese elites. It is understandable that the GAM must look to the future, but it cannot critique the system if it plans on working alongside the very same players. Above all, the GAM does not work towards environmental changes or education for workers, but instead is satisfied with money for purchasing weapons.

Recently, autonomy (NAD) laws have been offered which will give Aceh greater shares of the oil economy. However corporations such as EXXON-Mobil have reacted by not renewing contracts. Further, such overtures are not genuine, as the Republic is aware of the dwindling oil caches in the Aceh region. A slight change in resource flows is a step forward, but must be followed by a systemic change in the centralized military economy.

5) Peace and the Economy

So long as the economic and political structures of the Indonesian State and the GAM remain in place, war will be the result. The history of the region and cultural overtures are used by each side,

⁸¹ Kell, *the Roots of the Acehnese*, 18.

⁸² Hasan di Tiro, *The Price of Freedom: the Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro*, 4.

⁸³ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 76.

though they are only tools, as politics and economics- power- is the key issue. Republican militaries have no desire to end conflicts which both fund and fuel their existence, and the GAM is no better. Years of conflict and violence have demonstrated that though its complaints against Indonesia are more than valid, complaints which win it popular support, it does not conform to its own critiques. For every allegation of human rights abuses, the GAM makes excuses for its own atrocities. For every call for a legitimate Indonesian regime, the GAM appoints itself more powers based solely on a manufactured history and military power. For every outrage of the environmental and economic impacts of the oil industry, GAM leaders act as junior partners with greater ambitions.

Such political and economic problems are not particular to Aceh. The territorial nation-state born out of Westphalia is the root of conflicts throughout the world, as an imagined unit, enclosed by sacred borders, is often contested by smaller imagined units enclosed within a similar skin. Capitalism is the root of several of the economic problems discussed, as the battle between elites for the control of resources, resulting in wars for the common people, is common. Each military sees the other's interests based on creating an artificial state and exploiting the people while using violence to upset a natural order, however neither side can see its own actions in the same light. Each side has a remarkable ability to critique the 'bad guy', the wolf, without self-diagnosis. This is also true for the defenders of each cause, as several actors who oppose the conflict have the remarkable capacity to look the other way when they consider the force to be legitimate.

The economies of both the GAM and the Indonesian security forces are based on force, corruption, extortion, and cash crops. This economy shares a great deal with the Dutch economic system during the colonial era; usually such observations and comparisons are academic exercises, but this similarity has been noticed by Acehnese peasants. In an *Acehkita* interview, a cocoa farmer noted that extortion "conducted by both the military and rebel forces," "is similar to the practices put into force by the Dutch during the 19th century."⁸⁴ Thus, economic history can be a great tool, as each group deplores the Dutch economic system, failing to realize how this very system has informed their current identity.

⁸⁴ Yassir M., "Looking for GAM or Cocoa," *Acehkita* (2 January 2004), 22.

The economic realm gives an opportunity for intervention. As discussed, labour organizations in the United States have brought EXXON-Mobil to court. There are some groups which critique EXXON on environmental grounds with professional media departments which have worked with Acehnese groups.⁸⁵ Another opportunity is the Publish What You Pay campaign, which observes that the “lack of accountability facilitates embezzlement, corruption and revenue misappropriation. In extreme cases, access to resources fuels regional conflict.”⁸⁶ The campaign does not seek to have corporations publish confidential information, but instead to have the same levels of transparency in developing nations as they have in the developed world. This would avoid injustice, allow for citizens and corporations to have greater knowledge, and further the positive aspects of trade liberalization. The IMF, World Bank, and WTO have a myriad of detriments; however they also have the power and indeed the expressed goal, of dismantling the system of corrupt military economies, as discussed in chapter six, international actors.

Thus far we have detailed the structural level; the academic, historical, political, and economic foundations of this horrible war. This text now changes its tone in order to address the results and reactions to the said structures. Human rights and civil society will both be detailed so that some of the structural commentary offered here can be supported by everyday experiences of the Acehnese people. Only then can we continue to examine the role and the nature of international actors and the move onto peace. As has been clear throughout this chapter, peace alone is incomplete without political diversity and economic justice, and as we will see it must come to terms with human rights violations as well if it is to be lasting.

⁸⁵ Please see www.campaignexxonmobil.org/

⁸⁶ Publish What You Pay, “Appeal Document,” www.publishwhatyoupay.org/appeal/, accessed December 2003.

Chapter 4: Human Rights

It is the abuse of human rights which makes our utmost attention to this conflict so very necessary; to believe that attention to discourse of human rights is a diversion is wrong both morally as well as strategically.¹ Ideally, Aceh would not require such grave concern; however the tremendous human toll which has resulted from generations of fighting is one of the greatest disasters of the modern age. This is stated without exaggeration. As a result of such a pressing situation, several gifted authors and advocates have dedicated themselves to documenting and combating such abuse. Their specific backgrounds and goals shall be addressed in the next chapters; for now we must lay out a framework for human rights based on their work. Before we begin looking at examples, it is useful to look at the religious influences, institutional factors, and biased reporting of human rights in Indonesia.

We must keep in mind that human rights are not new to this region, though the precise wording we choose may be. Several Muslim human rights groups have noted the principles stated in the Koran, as “human rights are granted by god, not by kings or legislative assemblies, and therefore they can never be taken away or changed...for any reason.”² This was also accepted by the 1972 Islamic Conference Charter because it is consistent with the third pillar of Islam, *Zakah*, wherein all things belong to god. This is usually interpreted as charity, but in a wider context includes human life, as supported elsewhere in the Koran. There are several major Islamic human rights documents, such as *A Muslim Commentary on the UDHR* by Sultan Hussein Tabandeh, *Human Rights in Islam* by Abul Ala Mawdudi, the *1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights*, as well as several Muslim Constitutions. In her assessment of these documents and human rights law, Ann Elizabeth Mayer finds that although strong in class and racial equality, Muslim human rights are weak in gender and religious equality. This said, such infringements are often self-serving for dictators, as “Islamic heritage is rich in sources and materials that offer a vast array of principles and values relevant for rights...utilized both by Muslims advocating and by those opposing human rights.”³

¹ McCulloch, “Greed: the Silent Force if the Conflict in Aceh.”

² The Religion of Islam, “Human Rights in Islam,” *WAMY Series*, Issue 10. Available online at www.iad.org/PDF/WAMY10.pdf, accessed December 2003.

³ Ann Elizabeth Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991), 211.

Thus, her conclusions regarding what she perceives as the negative aspects of Islam and human rights are not natural parts of Islamic theory. What is important is which heritage is selected; in Aceh, each method has been exercised by various groups.

Several Acehnese groups use a concept called “peaceful action linked with Islamic teachings (*Aksi Damai Yang Islami*)”⁴ especially during times of war. During the Darul Islam Rebellion, human rights abuses by the rebels against the military “caused much dissatisfaction among the many ulamas” because it is wrong for a Muslim to take the life of a fellow believer.⁵ This coincides with the basic belief of Islamic brotherhood and is one of the reasons that Muslim groups generally oppose the conflict in Aceh. The HUDA, a Muslim academic group, condemned human rights violations as “forbidden to Muslims” on 14 September 1999, based on their readings of the Koran.⁶ Though we must question religious and gender discrimination from Muslim intellectual history, we cannot question their adherence to the right to life and their love of humanity.

We also must acknowledge that the very military system of the Republic of Indonesia creates an environment in which human rights will be violated. First, Indonesian Generals are more blatant than most; the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States stated that “the precise rules of humanitarian law just go out the window once the shooting starts.”⁷ The distinction between civilians and combatants is founded in the texts of Grotius, Rousseau, and Montesquieu, then accepted by the United Nations and articulated by the 1978 International Committee of the Red Cross, which stated that all parties must clearly distinguish “between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare civilian population and property.”⁸ This is directly contrasted by the structure of the Indonesian military; General Benny details that “all Indonesians citizens are guardians of the state and parties in all efforts for the defense and security of the state, that is, in time of war or armed conflict.”⁹ President Megawati stated that people must be allowed to defend themselves, and that “the people’s participation is necessary given the lack of security personnel.”¹⁰

⁴ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

⁵ Nazaruiddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 208.

⁶ Reid, “War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh,” 10.

⁷ John Roberts, “New Evidence of Indonesia’s War of Repression in Aceh” *World Socialist Website* (7 January 2004).

⁸ *International Committee of the Red Cross*, “Essentials of Humanitarian Law,” www.icrc.org, accessed November 2003.

⁹ General L. Benny Moerdani, “On Promotion to Defense Minister,” 176.

¹⁰ Fabiola Desy Unidjaja and Tiarna Siboro, “President Endorses Civilian ‘Guards’,” *Jakarta Post*, 2 July 2003.

She specified that the Indonesian Constitution endorses such people's action. Further, this is also ignored by the GAM, though as a guerilla movement such rules are less clear.

The point is that while we can and must seek justice when human rights have been breached, we should also try to prevent such acts and understand their perpetrators by looking to structural factors. Since 1989, the military has relied on what they call civil-military cooperation, *Sishankamrata* (People's Total Defense and Security System). An example of this is the 'Fence of Legs Operation' in 1991, where ordinary Acehnese civilians were forced by the military to sweep through jungles and flush out GAM troops; the ABRI benefited from this strategy because it made the rebels less likely to open fire, and if they did then the GAM could be portrayed as human rights abusers.¹¹ As in East Timor, refusing to join this fence was akin to being a rebel agent. It is such tactics, ones which put civilians in the battlefield, which have made the GAM so popular and made the Indonesian military so despised by human rights advocates.

Involvement of civilians by both armies in this war creates several human rights abuses; the work of civil society to disseminate such actions to a public which embodies the said Muslim human rights ideologies has provoked general disillusionment among Indonesians. As Anthony Reid editorializes,

Lowered expectations from the state are both necessary and possible. If it is not expected to be heroic and united against mysterious enemies, but pragmatically to keep the airports safe and the currency stable...it has a much better chance of surviving.¹²

After the fall of Suharto, the Indonesian military admitted and apologized for its history of human rights abuses, and though human rights groups rarely admit this, there have been some positive changes, although there is a certain logic in ignoring these changes for groups protecting human rights, as praising a mildly bad regime could create further abuses. The military has undergone human rights training, has had low-level trials, and has tried to include social policies alongside fighting. But they still have a long way to go, and have relied to a large extent on civil society for the changes they have made. The hard work of human rights defenders has alone allowed for many changes in Indonesian policy. Painfully, whether this change leads to success or not depends on their continued hard work.

¹¹ Amnesty International, "Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993."

¹² Anthony Reid, "War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh," 9.

Due to inadequate attention to the history, politics, and economics of the conflict, not to mention basic theoretical insight, several well-meaning texts take on political roles in their analysis. Statements such as “the extent of human rights abuses alone would seemingly justify an assertion of Acehese sovereignty”¹³ have no legal or philosophical ground and they assume that all abuses were carried out by Indonesia. The GAM, also guilty of human rights abuses, would be rewarded with statehood based on a smaller scale of the same atrocities.

There is a tendency among human rights groups to pass over, or justify, GAM abuses while rightfully detailing those of the TNI. For example, some commentators persistently state that while the GAM has contributed to human rights abuses, they are insignificant details compared to TNI actions. Such articles admit that GAM is not perfect, but the consistent, and crucially important “however” arises prior to a critique of the government and concludes with a list of GAM demands under the heading ‘Dialogue.’¹⁴ Too often, any description of GAM abuses includes an apparent justification; for example after a TNI convoy was ambushed, the GAM killed its prisoners “in exactly the same way that the military itself had” days prior.¹⁵ Such research is acceptable if one is arguing for the GAM cause, not if one supports human rights or scholarly research. In this example, we are left assuming that the TNI attack was the first event, when actually each military had used this same method for months.

Some groups note that for peace to grow, the TNI must be brought to justice, yet rarely suggest that the GAM requires a similar process. Other authors state that Indonesian security forces invaded Aceh, “killing civilians and feebly trying to blame the separatists.”¹⁶ This is counter to evidence, is supported by no references, and demonstrates the typical support of the lamb; in reality, “everyone...has a story about killings, kidnappings, extortion or violence, at the hands of either the Indonesian security forces or the separatist rebels of the Free Aceh Movement.”¹⁷ When investigating human rights, we must shed such baggage or else we are of little use. This chapter does not deny the fact that the TNI is guilty of more abuses, but does confront those who ignore or downplay GAM violence based on this fact.

¹³ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 132.

¹⁴ Lesley McCulloch, “Aceh Will Not Lie Down: A New Generation of Victim Speaks Out. Will Indonesia Now Negotiate?” *Inside Indonesia* (Spring 2001).

¹⁵ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 59.

¹⁶ Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, 225.

¹⁷ *Economist*, “In Aceh, ‘Indonesian’ is a Synonym for Foreigner,” Volume 364, Issue 8285 (8 August 2002).

The result of such bias is that Indonesian political and security actors have a justified mistrust of human rights defenders, though their responses to this mistrust cannot be justified. A TNI Commander accused humanitarian workers of “promoting double standards because GAM attacks on police and military personnel were not classified as human rights violations.”¹⁸ This statement does have some foundation, especially when contrasted with the unsophisticated statements from the Republic ten years ago; in a letter to Amnesty International, the Indonesian Government stated that human rights abuses in Aceh are “pure inventions and are launched with the intention of discrediting the Republic of Indonesia.”¹⁹ Under Sutarto, there has been increasing admission of abuses, but also a demand that GAM abuses be given equal hearing. In order for human rights groups to be effective, such double standards must be dropped. This would be consistent with Acehnese society; by 2001, “many Acehnese were coming to see GAM as part of the problem.”²⁰ The issue of independence or allegiance must not be part of the humanitarian agenda. Even though the TNI and other forces will no doubt continue to repress balanced groups, namely because the TNI does in fact perpetrate more crimes and thus a balanced report is actually weighted by reality, they will have less motivation and weaker grounds for such stances.

Such political bias regarding the price of human lives is not total; the hard work of groups such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), and the International Crisis Group (ICG), who dutifully separate themselves from politics in order to function as human rights organizations, is notable. HRW makes a point of stating in each report that “both sides have violated human rights with impunity.”²¹ It is on this note that this chapter will expand. Section one will discuss the macro-level of human rights abuses and the problem with such statistics. Section two will look at abuses committed against the Acehnese. Section three will look at abuses committed against the Javanese. Section four will look at other human rights abuses, after which some general conclusions shall be made. This structure is crucial because it does not totally focus on who committed the acts, which would be a political statement, but instead on the identity of the victims, the proper focus of human rights work.

¹⁸ SOLIDAMOUR and FRONTLINE, *Frontline Indonesia: Murders, Death Threats, and Other Forms of Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders* (Jakarta: 2003), 45.

¹⁹ *Amnesty International*, “Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993.”

²⁰ Dan Murphy, “Quagmire,” *New Republic*, Volume 229, Issue 18 (11 March 2003).

²¹ *Human Rights Watch*, “Indonesia: the War in Aceh,” 2.

1) Macro

There are numerous problems with making use of statistics to document human suffering. As stated by Major General Pramono, referring to macro-level statistics in mass graves, “the grave certainly exists, but I don’t think it could have been two hundred bodies. It’s hard to tell with arms and heads all mixed up.”²² However there are also problems with using a micro-level analysis, as the results are emotive, may be exaggerated, and may not be typical of other experiences. This does not mean that such details are unimportant; nothing can be more important than the degradation or destruction of life. When we observe that stories of abuse may be exaggerated, this does not disqualify them, and it tells us a great deal about public opinion if so many persons wish to demonize a particular group. But we must be critical and take these situations alongside the structural forces which create them. This is where macro-level analysis helps us; the strength of macro-level statistics is to prove that such stories are not isolated events, that in Aceh abuse is not an anomaly.

The numbers are debatable. Benedict Anderson asserts that 20,000 Acehnese were killed during Suharto’s reign.²³ Some observers quote that between 1000 and 3000 persons were killed during the DOM Period (1989-1998).²⁴ During this decade, ELSAM (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy) lists 1958 disappearances, 1321 killings, 3430 cases of torture, 209 cases of sexual violence, and 160 robberies- a total of 7078 human rights abuses.²⁵ They add that there were also 3000 widows and 16375 orphans as a result of these abuses.²⁶ The same group found 977 abuses in 1999 alone, with 117,667 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eighteen camps. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS-HAM) has investigated thousands of human rights abuses and puts the total number of IDPs at about 140,000.²⁷ In 2002, the World Food Programme estimated that Indonesia was home to 1,413,708 IDPs, a number essentially agreed to by the Norwegian Refugee Council.²⁸ Within the first two months of Martial Law in 2003, the ANSLF provides statistics detailing that 176 civilians were killed, 101 tortured, and there were several

²² Cited in Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 228.

²³ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

²⁴ Business Week Online, “Indonesia Aims at Aceh, Again.”

²⁵ Cited in Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 442.

²⁶ This statistic has been subject to severe criticism from the Indonesian Government, which asks how 1321 dead persons could leave behind 3000 widows and 16,375 orphans. Their point is that the numbers are unreliable, and they are correct, however they also must understand that it is very difficult to confirm deaths, while widows and orphans are much easier to document.

²⁷ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

²⁸ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2001,” March 2002.

imprisonments and disappearances. The same report lists a TNI statistic of 204 GAM casualties, with 505 public buildings burnt down (mostly schools burned by the GAM) and by June 2003 there were 40,000 new IDPs.²⁹ Amnesty International gives the military figure of between 18,086 and 22,096 IDPs, noting that non-government statistics are far higher, and that the government may relocate 200,000 persons into special camps.³⁰ This pile of statistics, several in direct opposition to one another, should tell the readers that the below stories are not isolated instances, and that several other such stories have been ignored.

We may divide the eras of violence into pre-1989, the DOM Period, the interregnum, and the Martial Law period. The statistics themselves are divided into killings, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and finally the results of these abuses, widow, orphans, and IDPs. It is understood that these categories are not mutually exclusive or complete. Cases such as students who are shot but not killed by the TNI for merely displaying a GAM flag are ignored by such classification despite being important for both intrinsic and political reasons.³¹ This framework also ignores robberies, the loss of political freedoms, and property destruction; this offers nothing more than a rough guide.

2) Abuses Against Acehnese

It is understood that the following stories may be exaggerations, they are generally unverifiable, and the sources are biased. Regarding verification, in a conversation with the author, Major-General Darmono stressed this point, though conceded that under Martial Law, this is unavoidable. It is also understood that the Indonesian Government is seen as the enemy by those reporting; the Republic is “weak in international public relations, and because of that reports by foreign media are often damaging.”³² This is what led them to hire former American Presidential candidate Bob Dole, whose task as of January 2004 is to better the image of the Indonesian state. There is a bias against the Indonesian state, this cannot be denied. Instead of ignoring these tragic stories in reaction to this bias, in order to become somewhat impartial we must balance our analysis with reports from all possible sides. This is one of the goals of this book.

²⁹ “Human Rights,” www.asnlf.net, accessed December 2003.

³⁰ Amnesty International, “Indonesia: Protecting the Protectors- Human Rights Defenders and Humanitarian Workers in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam” (3 June 2003).

³¹ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000,” February 2001.

³² Syamsul Mu’ Arif, Minister of Information and Communications, Republic of Indonesia, cited in the Jakarta Post, “RI Mulls Hiring PR Firm to Counter ‘Damaging’ Aceh Press Coverage,” (29 May 2003).

2.1 Killings

In 1990, the DOM era was at its worst. Their strategy was ‘Shock Therapy’, where killings were as graphic as possible with the intent of scaring the people away from the GAM. The effect, of course, is that the people have a deep hatred of the attackers and their inhuman tactics. Numerous stories attest to the ABRI’s human rights violations; one story describes an elderly woman and her pregnant daughter whose home was invaded by six soldiers who shot the old woman and shot the daughter’s husband in the genitals. Another story, from the same source, is of a widow³³ who was stripped naked in front of her neighbours by the military and beaten with guns until finally shot in the back of the head.³⁴ Corpses were found in 1993 which were bludgeoned in the face, with mutilated genitals, with their feet and knees tied together and ears cut off, and with blindfolds still attached.³⁵ Not only was GAM weak at this point, their strength is in later opposing these acts, so the blame lies with the Indonesian military. The lack of media attention during this era resulted in more severe testimonials, both due to the need for attention and the savagery of the ABRI.

Under the DOM era, mass graves were found, a fact even admitted by the government. On 12 September 1990, fifty six prisoners were massacred by the TNI at Bukit Panglima.³⁶ Another mass grave was found in 1990 at Alue Mira, a grave admitted by Major General Pramono, who disputes only the number of corpses. President Suharto has even defended such brutal policies in his memoirs: “some of the corpses were left [in public places] just like that. This was for the purpose of shock therapy... so that the general public would understand that there was still someone capable of taking action.”³⁷ This admission is supported by Major Generals Pramono and former Vice President Try Sutrisno. The mass graves resulting from the DOM-era are not in dispute, and should inform us to the emotional nature of today’s dialogues.

In May of 1999, just after the end of the DOM-era yet in the interregnum before the COHA, a particularly gruesome incident took place near Lhokseumawe. The ‘Dewantara Massacre’ began

³³ Widows are often seen by each military as suspect; if their husbands are dead, they must have been an enemy. Please see the below section.

³⁴ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 442.

³⁵ Amnesty International, “Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993.”

³⁶ Amnesty International, “Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993.”

³⁷ Suharto, cited in Amnesty International, “Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993” and Dubus et Revise, Armée du Peuple, Armée du Roi, 87.

when a group gathered on 30 April in support of local orphans; a military officer supposedly went missing, resulting in the arrival of scores of troops in the following days. As locals came together to protest the troop's conduct, another group of soldiers arrived, opening fire on the crowd; "residents in the vicinity say that shooting went on intermittently for almost an hour."³⁸ Sixty persons were killed, twenty were missing, and 150 were wounded, most shot when running away from soldiers.³⁹ The Indonesian Military replied that "those who are killed are trouble makers and ganja farmers, but we are still checking."⁴⁰ Several NGOs added that this was the same group of soldiers which killed forty five Acehnese in February 1999.

In July of 1999, a Muslim leader, Teungku Bantaqiah, and his fifty followers were killed by the ABRI. This case was unique, as a civilian / military court was established, which found one civilian and twenty four soldiers guilty of murder in April of 2000. The maximum sentence given to these convicts was ten years, and no high level officers were implicated.⁴¹ The interregnum saw a greater response to abuses than any other period due to the instability of the Indonesian Government, the strength of the GAM, and possibly the good intentions of President Wahid. And these courts have continued, though all share in the lack of high-level officers tried.

Another case occurred in February of 2000; two midwives, accused of being military informers who supplied food to the TNI, were executed by the GAM in a North Aceh village. In 2003, Cut Aca Budi, a female GAM operative who had surrendered to police, was assassinated, sources suggesting that the GAM wanted to send a message to its own ranks.⁴² Medics are not safe either: a medical officer named Iskandar Salim was assassinated by the Indonesian military because he gave medical assistance to wounded GAM members; yet another story is of a young medical student, who was shot in the head on 6 April 2000 by the BRIMOB, who were searching a bus.⁴³ Prominent persons, such as Acehnese Parliament Member Tengku Hashiruddin Daud, have also been found dead "with

³⁸ TAPOL, "Indonesian Troops Slaughter Scores of People in their Latest and Worst Atrocity in Aceh," (7 May 1999), <http://tapol.gn.apc.org>, accessed December 2003.

³⁹ Crow, "Aceh: the 'Special Territory' in North Sumatra."

⁴⁰ International Forum on Aceh Statement (28 July 1999), cited on KONTRAS website, available online at www.desaparecidos.org/kontras/news/ifa.htm, accessed December 2003.

⁴¹ Amnesty International, "Briefing on the Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Aceh" (June 2001).

⁴² Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2003," 25 February 2003.

⁴³ Amnesty International, "Indonesia: the Impact of Impunity on Women in Aceh" (23 November 2000).

indications of torture.”⁴⁴ In November of 2000, Indonesian security forces killed over twenty pro-referendum demonstrators in Banda Aceh, while the more fortunate were severely beaten.⁴⁵

In August 2001, 31 persons were massacred at a palm oil plantation in East Aceh. The Government claims that the workers were killed after responding to GAM extortion, but it seems more likely that it was instead the Indonesian security forces extorting and then shooting the workers.⁴⁶ In the summer of 2002, during the supposed peace time of the interregnum, several incidents occurred. On 7 June, TNI soldiers killed two sleeping farmers and injured five during a search for GAM members. The same series of sweeps killed three women two months later. Not even schools are out of bounds; in September, two high school girls were abducted and killed, and fourteen school teachers were killed in Aceh during 2002.⁴⁷

In May of 2003, the beginning of the Martial Law Period, the TNI and its affiliates were encouraged to end the battle as quickly as possible; this meant using body counts and speed to measure results. The outcome, as may be expected, was brutal. When KOPASSUS found a number of young boys playing, the boys fled from the armed soldiers, soon shot in the back of the head. The boys were between twelve and fourteen years old.⁴⁸ This occurred just east of Bireuen and left the entire village with physical and emotional scars. A villager stated that “they were GAM sympathizers, I don't know if they were members.”⁴⁹ The Indonesian Red Cross recovered eighty two bodies during the first week of the 2003 Martial Law and 151 after three weeks. The TNI reports that after six months of Martial Law, 395 civilians and 1,100 GAM members had been killed, though they claim the GAM killed the civilians.⁵⁰ The TNI states that since in the first ten months of Martial Law, 1300 rebels were killed and 2000 were arrested.⁵¹

Under Martial Law, young males are at the greatest risk. On 27 February 2004, six young men were killed by the TNI, who claim they were GAM; this occurred when the TNI was searching for a

⁴⁴ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000.”

⁴⁵ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000.”

⁴⁶ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000.”

⁴⁷ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2002,” March 2003.

⁴⁸ The Guardian, “Indonesian Troops Accused of Massacre,” (22 May 2003).

⁴⁹ Sydney Morning Herald, “Children Massacred in Military’s Bloody Rampage,” (23 May 2003).

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Aceh Under Martial Law,” 10.

⁵¹ ABC News, “Eight Die in Fighting Between Indonesia’s Army and GAM Rebels in Aceh” (2 March 2004).

group of GAM hostages. Human Rights Watch interviewed several Acehnese refugees in Malaysia in October 2003 (as human rights groups are barred from Aceh); they found that the TNI has infiltrated the village level with new command posts and target the resident male youths. A young man stated that “in Aceh the TNI suspect all young men of being GAM.” Another said that “I am male and so I am suspected of being GAM.”⁵² During the Martial Law Period, the cases of killings will skyrocket; the media blackout can only delay further stories coming to light.

One source is the military itself; up until February 2004, the TNI issued daily press releases of GAM rebels killed. Rights groups were outraged at such grim statistics and there was no proof that the victims were indeed rebels. On 17 February, the TNI announced an end to this policy, offering no reason for the policy shift.⁵³

2.2 Torture

Amnesty International reported in 2000 that “torture and ill-treatment were routine in both police and military custody.”⁵⁴ Their reasoning for this common feature of Indonesian conflicts was first put forth in 1993:

The methods of torture reported in Aceh are consistent with those used elsewhere in the country and in East Timor. While this does not necessarily prove that torture is military or government policy, it does indicate a high degree of shared information within the armed forces and the institutionalization of torture as a *modus operandi* during investigations.⁵⁵

This is supported by testimonies; one such story belongs to a man named Muchsin, who was present during an altercation in a bank which soon involved the police. Muchsin was blindfolded and taken away from town, where the police used pliers to try to force a confession of GAM membership. The officers permanently scarred the man’s body; he woke up in a hospital after passing out during the torture.⁵⁶

Persons are forced to exercise at gunpoint, finger nails are plied off, and people are tied up before being beaten. In response, Major General Bambang Darmono stated to the Associated Press that if “my soldier slugs a suspect across the face. That’s no problem...if it’s gross torture which causes

⁵² Human Rights Watch, “Aceh Under Martial Law,” 16.

⁵³ Ian Timberlake, “Indonesian Military Stops Publicizing Aceh Rebel Deaths,” *Agence Presse France* (18 February 2004).

⁵⁴ Cited in Robert Weissman, “Deadly Drilling in Aceh.”

⁵⁵ Amnesty International, “Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993.”

⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 16.

someone to be incapacitated...that's a no-no."⁵⁷ KONTRAS Aceh tallied 1,472 cases of torture in 2002; one of these cases was on 19 May, when soldiers broke the feet of a woman whose husband they accused of being a GAM member while their children were forced to stand in a pond for hours. Acehese torture victims in 2002 include Rizki Muhammad, who was clubbed and burned by plastic, M. Thaleb, who had the skin on his face peeled off, and Syahrul Gunawan, whose face was deformed.⁵⁸ Other detainees have been abused by electric shock, wood blocks, metal pliers, forced to drink urine, all in order to gain a GAM confession.⁵⁹ Forced labour by the GAM and the TNI is common, as peasants are forced to (de) construct infrastructure at gunpoint.

The abuse of personnel from the World Bank's KDP Programme is demonstrative; prior to Martial Law, the World Bank was operating a local development programme. Seven of its local organizers were abducted by the GAM and beaten. When Bank employees informed GAM leaders, the problem was immediately addressed and the employees let go.⁶⁰ This is not a positive sign, as not only do we see that the GAM commits abuses, but we also see a lack of organization among GAM forces. Though often true, blaming GAM abuses on rogue soldiers is an explanation of GAM abuses, not disagreement, and thus the action must direct our reaction and make us critical of the GAM as a capable representative of the Acehese people.

The Indonesian criminal code, GAM philosophy, Pancasila, the Indonesian Constitution, international convention, and military oaths each forbid torture. The prevalence of such actions speaks to the lack of control of ground troops, the entrenched nature of the conflict, and the fear among the soldiers themselves. Unfortunately, each side flatly denies any allegations, or at any rate qualifies them, demonstrating a shared disrespect not only for human rights, but to their own proclaimed values.

2.3 Sexual Violence

Sexual violence is here limited to actions against women, although several torture methods against men are sexual as well. War, which several noted feminists describe as a symptom of masculine

⁵⁷ Cited in Human Rights Watch, "Aceh Under Martial Law," 27.

⁵⁸ United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2002."

⁵⁹ Amnesty International, "Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993."

⁶⁰ Conversation with Scott Guggenheim, World Bank Social Development Group, 7 April 2004.

culture, consistently results in sexual abuse against women.⁶¹ Male troops in Aceh, as elsewhere, are guilty of the most horrific of acts...rape. Of all crimes, this is perhaps the most likely to go unreported because the “shame associated with rape, fear of reprisals and the absence of institutional mechanisms to investigate and bring the perpetrators to justice all act as deterrents to reporting such violations.”⁶² Indonesian Laws do not encourage justice. For instance, a man and wife are considered a single unit; there is no such thing as marital rape because a unit cannot rape itself.⁶³ Article 285 of the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) defines rape as when a man “forces a woman to have sexual intercourse with him outside a marriage institution”, and has a maximum term of twelve years in jail; this Article has been interpreted by the Court so that rape is limited to penetration by a penis. This brutally backwards Article allows Acehnese (and other) women to be penetrated by bottles, guns, and other objects without any charges of rape possible.

In 1989, Djamilah Abu-Bakar was suspected of being a GAM wife, as her husband was a fisherman and therefore not home for weeks on end. ABRI soldiers forced her to undress, poked her with their weapons, and forced her confess that her husband was GAM. Days later, her house was burned down, and then after fleeing to another village, her family’s houses were also torched. On 24 March 1991, she was abducted; her body was found with a shattered skull and bullet holes in the chest.⁶⁴

The Indonesian Government has recently promoted its gestures towards ending this consistent feature of TNI activities; Major General Bambang Darmono notes that in the summer of 2003, three soldiers were sentenced by a military court for rape.⁶⁵ This is an interesting case; the KOSTRAD soldiers who raped four women near Lhokseumawe, Chief Private Seprianus, First Private Husni Dwila, and First Private Awaluddin, were given sentences ranging from just thirty to forty two months in prison.⁶⁶ On 4 March 2004, the TNI announced that thirty soldiers had committed crimes in Aceh after ten months of Martial Law, their crimes ranging from extortion to rape. Thus, the

⁶¹ Caroline O.N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, editors, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

⁶² Andrew Aeria, “Human Rights Violations in Aceh,” *Aliran Monthly* (2001). Available online at www.malaysia.net/aliran/monthly/2001/7d.html.

⁶³ N. Indrus, “Marriage, Sex, and Violence” *Southeast Asian Women’s Workshop- Monash University*, 30 September 1999.

⁶⁴ *Amnesty International*, “Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993.”

⁶⁵ *Associated Press*, “Military Chief Approves of Beatings,” 22 November 2003.

⁶⁶ *ABC News Online*, “Indonesia Convicts Three Soldiers of Rape in Aceh,” 19 July 2003.

TNI is making some small steps, but the punishment for such acts is nominal and the preventative measures are failing.

Amnesty International notes the story of Sumiati Binti Hamzah; on 16 August 1996, she was raped by an ABRI soldier. Because she was not able to support the child she bore nine months later, she requested financing from the Republic, which put the case to court, where it stagnated until March 2000. The court eventually ruled that she be paid 50,000 Rupiah per month (less than \$7 US).⁶⁷ Nobody has yet been held responsible for the act, despite the court decision that the military owes her support.

This is just one of the DOM-era reports of rape. The Aceh Legal Aid Foundation reports that 625 known cases occurred during this nine year period. One story involved shock therapy and rape by KOPASSUS members, another involved three ABRI soldiers raping a woman in front of her husband until she passed out, and another involved a woman who was burned, raped, deformed, and her entire family executed.⁶⁸ Another case was in Matangkuli, where three women were raped by several soldiers; three investigations took place, with no results. In April 2002, Indonesian policemen arrested a seventeen year old girl, forced alcohol on her, and raped her.⁶⁹ Considering the wealth of such stories, for Major General Darmono to balance these crimes with a total of eight years in jail between the three guilty men of the possible forty in the June 2003 incident is appalling, as such a distinguished officer should treat the issue with far greater humility.

The South Aceh Rape Case is likely the most infamous of all these examples. On 22 September 2000, two women were abducted by BRIMOB and held as 'sex slaves' for two months. After their release, one was pregnant, and the GAM was informed of their story; the rebels held these and other women in special protection and contacted the media and KONTRAS Aceh to become involved in this case. KONTRAS decided to bring these and three other women to Banda to bring forward formal complaints at a press conference. While being driven in a car from an international NGO, the Indonesian Police took the women into custody; after five days of detainment, a police press

⁶⁷ Amnesty International Australia, "Women in Aceh: Victims of Impunity," Amnesty International Australia Newsletter (February 2001).

⁶⁸ James Balowski, "Mass Killing and Rape in Aceh," Green Left Weekly, Issue 338 (12 August 1998).

⁶⁹ United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2002."

conference on 9 March 2001 presented an entirely different case. Now, their story was that the GAM had allegedly kidnapped them because they had BRIMOB boyfriends. Soon after the case, the women supposedly decided to marry BRIMOB soldiers. Most human rights defenders ignored the Indonesian reports, assuming them to be a result of intimidation, but soon it appeared they were wrong; Human Rights Watch soon claimed that three of the women “appear to have been targeted by GAM because they were suspected of having Brimob boyfriends... (and one) never claimed to have been raped.”⁷⁰ The two official stories, as appearing in a now defunct journal and the police reports, will likely never be straightened out. What is obvious is that each side uses women’s bodies in order to attack the other. Thus, the layout for this chapter, which focuses on the victim’s and not the aggressor’s identity, is efficient here. Regardless of who hurt which woman, each army will go to great lengths to use abuse as a weapon.

The GAM is not guilty of the same severe sexual crimes that the TNI is, though to dismiss their involvement with women’s sexuality would be inappropriate. The GAM often abducts and detains young women who they accuse of flirting with Indonesian security forces. Military involvement in women’s personal lives is unacceptable; one seventeen year old girl was warned by a teacher not to pursue a relationship with a BRIMOB serviceman. After BRIMOB questioned this teacher, the GAM kidnapped the girl from her class at gunpoint for two weeks so that the GAM could “give her advice.”⁷¹ This narrative is consistent with some reports of the South Aceh Rape Case; while the GAM is not guilty of rape, they must allow women to have control over their bodies.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women stated that “Indonesian forces in Aceh and other regions of armed conflict have systematically used rape to intimidate and punish women and girls suspected of having links to armed opposition movements.”⁷²

The result of such instances is that women who do step forward are further abused.

The Indonesian Government’s pursuit of defamation cases against accusers, as well as the political objects of the women under both the GAM and Indonesian security forces further limit justice- not only retributive justice, but also preventative, as women are disempowered by all actors.

⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 29.

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 24.

⁷² *Amnesty International Canada*, “Indonesia: Waiting for Justice,” 5 March 2001 www.amnesty.ca/stoptorture/act6.htm, accessed December 2003.

2.4 Abductions

For Acehnese, to be abducted almost inevitably leads to death; several of the above stories began as abductions. Under Article 18 of Indonesia's Criminal Code only the Police have the right to make arrests, which is one reason for the power of the BRIMOB, which is part-police, part-military. Of course, Martial Law is a suspension of this Code anyways; however the military made arrests and will likely continue to do so in the name of national security outside of Martial Law. The GAM also abducts Acehnese for punishment, surveillance, and ransom. The December 2003 Human Rights Watch Report includes an entire section called "Abductions Leading to Death," which describes the TNI abductions of a young fisherman and a young farmer who were both found dead. Further, often the bodies are not found, so what are probable abductions and killings may only be described as disappearances, which KONTRAS provides numbers of over two hundred in 2002. The list of disappearances is indeed long, constantly modified as each day passes and new corpses are found- at which point those disappeared become those murdered.

The TNI will abduct suspected GAM members without due process and hold them without trial. This is often called arrest, as in the 26 June 2002 abduction of seven GAM members in connection to the death of University Professor Dayan Dawood. Similar to other oppressive regimes, security forces will often come in the night and abduct its victims. KONTRAS reports that during the first three months of Martial Law, they had documented seventy eight abductions, several of the above nature. In February 2004, countless human rights activists were abducted, beaten and held without trial. On 9 September 2001, Megawati met with some Acehnese community leaders; after the meeting, the GAM abducted them at gunpoint, holding them for 24 hours. In January 2002, the GAM abducted nine high school students for four months, whom they accused of spying for BRIMOB. The GAM made no effort to offer trials for these students.⁷³ In May 2004, the high-profile negotiations for the release of over one hundred civilian hostages held by the GAM confirmed the regularity of hostage-taking by the GAM.⁷⁴

Each side abducts Acehnese persons in the name of the law. But the law cannot conform to whatever seems expedient; arrest requires due process, legal consultation, and a fair trial. Where security forces fail to observe such protocol, the proper term is abduction. At the same, time, too

⁷³ United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2002."

⁷⁴ Tiarma Siboro, "TNI Agrees to Help Free Fery Santoro," Jakarta Post (11 May 2004).

many abductions end up as murders or remain as disappearances, as this category can offer no firm numbers despite its dire importance.

2.5 Widows and Orphans

This classification runs the risk of portraying women as helpless, as unequal to men. This is not the intent of this text; instead, this special treatment reflects the reality of the Acehnese society and economy, where a widow has far fewer options than does a widower. The women are often oppressed by the husbands, but are further oppressed as widows:

...they have suffered at the hands of the state, having been raped and abused by the Indonesian army... they have faced domestic violence, being beaten and raped by their husbands. Data from the provincial government shows there are no fewer than 460,000 female heads of households, of whom 377,000 are widows.⁷⁵

Further, due to perceived inequality, widows are often seen as minor accomplices to the actions of the husband and are subject to retaliation. This is why special attention must be given to widows, while the special attention to orphans is obvious- they are helpless.

Such problems transcend the eras of violence and will impact peace in the region for decades, as these issues die only with their victims. This is one of the longest-lasting legacies of war. Widows not only have to find a means of survival, but are constantly suspected and detained by Indonesian Security; “apparently as punishment for their husbands’ alleged connections with GAM.”⁷⁶ The Republic recognize the abuse of widows in paper through official relief programmes, but the 1999 legislation providing up to one million Rupiah to widows from the DOM-era has not materialized.

Some excellent work has been done in the international arena in terms of telling the stories and then supporting the widows of war. One project describes Maimunah, whose husband was killed in East Aceh during the DOM era. On 2 March 1991, he was taken away at night by soldiers. The next day, his body was found severely mutilated; she remembers that “weakness overcame me when I saw my husband’s corpse.”⁷⁷ But the widows in Aceh are simultaneously proactive; the Inong Balee, GAM’s women’s division, has several widows who have become active for various reasons,

⁷⁵ Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, “Women and the War in Aceh: these Women Want to Silence all the Guns, Whether Indonesian or Acehnese,” *Inside Indonesia* (Winter 2000). Available online at www.insideindonesia.org/edit64/suraiya1.htm, accessed January 2004.

⁷⁶ *Amnesty International*, “Indonesia: the Impact of Impunity on Women in Aceh.”

⁷⁷ From Flower Aceh and *Inside Indonesia*, available online at the Widows of War Living Memorial, www.warwidows.org, accessed January 2004.

ranging from love for the cause, revenge, and a lack of economic opportunities. The GAM describes its woman's wing as comprised of "DOM widows and daughters of martyrs."⁷⁸ It is for this reason that the TNI has recently made half-hearted attempts to influence Acehese widows; their webpage features an article entitled *Dear God...I Have Betrayed Cut Nyak Dhien's Struggles*, which closes with a message from a widow and former female guerilla to the women of Aceh: "decline to be GAM's mistresses, since we are only made instruments to fulfil (sic) the GAM leaders' sexual needs."⁷⁹ The unsubstantiated statement demonstrates the importance of women and history in the Aceh struggle; Cut Nyak Dien was herself a widow, quoted after the death of her husband at Dutch hands as saying that "as Acehese women, we must not shed tears for anyone who becomes a victim of a holy war."⁸⁰ Thus, we must not see women as only passive objects, though we must also understand the extra load that Acehese women bear in this and other conflicts.

Sometimes the only survivors are the children; "the number of orphans in six districts of Aceh is said to be 4050 and only about 10% of all orphans were being adequately cared for."⁸¹ Not only does such a situation bring poverty to the region, but it will also swell the ranks of military forces, as resentful young persons with no family ties become ideal soldiers. Not only has the GAM accepted child soldiers, but it has actively recruited them; "those who refuse to join are often...accused of being collaborators or informers and are reported to be threatened with death."⁸² In fact, several of GAM's Commanders, including Sofyan Daud, whose father was killed in 1977, were recruited as orphans and become the best fighters.⁸³ The GAM will often state that they know the identity of the TNI soldier who killed an orphan's father in order to gain recruits and perpetuate the violence. This is furthered by the GAM's destruction of schools, as illiterate, jobless young men are also prime actors to join rebel movements.

Not all children are recruited as soldiers; "rebels of the Free Aceh Movement admit they recruit children as young as 13 to pass messages, warn their fighters when government troops are near or

⁷⁸ Cited in Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 16.

⁷⁹ *Indonesian National Military Homepage*, "Dear God...I have Betrayed Cut Nyak Dhien's Struggles."

⁸⁰ Benny Ohorella Zaynab El-Fatah, "Cut Nyak Dien: Queen of Jihad," *One Ummah Library*. Available online at www.1ummah.org/articles/queenofjihad.html, accessed January 2004.

⁸¹ Crow, "Aceh: the 'Special Territory' in North Sumatra."

⁸² *Amnesty International*, "Briefing on the Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Aceh."

⁸³ Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 15.

bring food and coffee to their jungle hide-outs.”⁸⁴ Several groups try to solve this problem, such as the NGOs listed in chapter five, but they face a difficult situation. Children in a large orphanage in Aceh saw its proprietor, Tengku Zakaria, killed by security forces; this institute, now run by Zakaria’s son, takes in children whose parents have been killed in the conflict.⁸⁵

2.6 IDPs

People become displaced for many reasons, namely out of fear and the destruction of their homes. In a guerilla war, where the ‘foreign’ forces have little support, armies often commit the crime of arson in opposition villages; “estimates indicated that close to 140,000 people were internally displaced refugees, with many of their homes ransacked or burnt and looted by military forces.”⁸⁶ One story takes place on 28 February 2001, where the TNI arrived after the GAM allegedly burnt down the police station. The TNI “then proceeded to burn the center of town to the ground, and also torched six surrounding villages...thousands of people were displaced.”⁸⁷ The victims swelled nearby IDP centers and families were separated in the process.

The destruction of villages has been acknowledged, though insufficiently, by the TNI Command. After the 5 May 2001 arson by TNI Infantry 123 of twenty homes, TNI commanders publicly apologized. Then, on 22 May, Major General Zamroni issued a ten point declaration to his troops which forbade them to burn, damage, or loot civilian homes, this in response to a large number civilian targets by his forces.⁸⁸ The attention paid to Javanese IDPs and the inability for civil society to operate in Aceh under Martial Law makes Acehnese IDPs an issue which is largely ignored. The number of civil society groups in Aceh, the pre-Martial Law statistics, and the number of Acehnese in Malaysia project high figures of Acehnese IDPS.

3) Abuses Against Javanese

Just as there exists tremendous bias for GAM by several NGOs who support the lamb, groups closer to the Indonesian (and some conservative foreign governments) dubiously support the wolf.

⁸⁴ Paul Barber, “Aceh Youth Traumatized by Horrors of Separatist War,” 1 December 2003. Available at Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Website, www.peacewomen.org/news/Aceh/Dec03/traumatized.html, accessed January 2004.

⁸⁵ Barber, “Aceh Youth Traumatized by Horrors of Separatist War.”

⁸⁶ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: the War in Aceh, 18.

⁸⁸ David Bouchier, “Combat Zone: Aceh is the Military’s Stepping Stone Back to Power,” Inside Indonesia, Issue 71 (Summer 2002), 26-27.

However bias does not automatically prove inaccuracy, as these stories are as credible as NGO reports, barring proof to the contrary. Further, it is not only conservative groups which critique the GAM, as major human rights groups as well as grassroots Acehese organizations see the same pattern of violence.

3.1 Killings

It is indeed problematic to assess the deaths of active Javanese troops and their agents in such a report. But because ignoring the deaths of these persons, especially in light of the failure to distinguish civilian from military actors in this conflict, would constitute a political act, some mention must be made. It is perhaps best to focus on security personnel killed outside of conflict situations. For instance at a market in January of 2000, a mob killed an off-duty TNI Sergeant, which is a major human rights violation by any definition.⁸⁹ Weeks later, a GAM ambush near Pidie left over 20 vacationing TNI soldiers dead. We may also consider the deaths of uniformed soldiers on patrol; every week there are several TNI troops who are killed by the GAM. But this text will not consider the troops as much as it will the wives and children they leave behind. Another important results of military casualties for civilian human rights is the revenge sought by other troops on the GAM and the Acehese; individual hits on TNI soldiers is a guerilla tactic which is meant to anger an enemy so that they may commit atrocities and to tire out the national public.

During the origins of the DOM period, hundreds of ABRI soldiers were killed; “the government says the killings have been the work of common criminals. But common criminals do not usually attack soldiers. However, some members of the (GAM) do have criminal reputations.”⁹⁰ Economist articles mention that GAM ranks are staffed by former ABRI men who were released for their involvement in the prostitution and drug trades. Such reports are biased and have little credibility. However, one point this source makes has been echoed by other sources; “civilians thought to be helping the security forces have been beheaded.”⁹¹ Whether we label such help as militia, agents, or resistance depends on our political standpoint.⁹²

⁸⁹ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000.”

⁹⁰ Economist, “Death and Faith in Aceh.”

⁹¹ Economist, “Death and Faith in Aceh.”

⁹² The language we use here is interesting; those who label the GAM as traitors will likely label local Javanese as resistance. Groups who call the GAM freedom fighters will dislike what they see as militias. In reality both are inconsistent, because each believe one group must stand up for what they believe and the other group should refrain

The RAND Corporation, a Conservative American think-tank, notes that like other Muslim separatist groups, the GAM has extended “its operational focus beyond military targets, attacking Javanese migrants, suspected Indonesian sympathizers, and perceived symbols of Javanese domination.”⁹³ In 2003, more credible sources continue to question the human rights abuses against Javanese persons in Aceh; the GAM is “a guerilla group that in addition to routine ambushes of Indonesian military and police has engaged in targeted assassinations, hostage-taking, arson, and extortion.”⁹⁴ Some commentators go so far as to assert that “GAM guerrillas are motivated by parochial ethnic hatred. For them the war is about killing Javanese.”⁹⁵ The GAM has ordered all Javanese persons to leave the region in official announcements (see below), so it should be no surprise that Javanese are also victims in Aceh.

On 6 March 2002, GAM forces apprehended, questioned, and killed a Javanese worker at a coffee plantation in Central Aceh, an act to which the GAM has claimed responsibility. Regardless of the previous actions of this victim, an unarmed worker may not be summarily executed. A similar fate exists for several workers in the PT Arun Gas Plant, who are caught in the crossfire or, more often, support the Indonesian state. One of the less studied human rights abuses against Javanese is inter-security force struggle; as mentioned in Chapter Two, these groups are far from united. In 2002, “police and soldiers occasionally clashed, sometimes resulting in the deaths of security force members as well as civilians.”⁹⁶ A strange example is TNI Sergeant Zainuddin, who joined the GAM in 2000, assassinated by the TNI in February 2004. Thus, not only must we consider Javanese security forces killed by the GAM, but also by each other. Finally, in March 2004, two provincial government officials were killed in North Aceh; military spokespersons claimed the Javanese men were killed by the GAM.⁹⁷

from violence. This text opts for a consistent non-violent approach, which is why the term rebel and militias are both used so frequently.

⁹³ Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia,” 255

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, “Aceh: How not to Win Hearts and Minds,” 1.

⁹⁵ Dr. Kirsten E. Schulze, “the Other Side to Aceh’s Rebels,” *Asia Times* (22 July 2003).

⁹⁶ *United States Department of State*, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2002.”

⁹⁷ *Associated Press*, “Three Dead in Latest Indonesia Aceh Province Violence” (9 March 2004).

3.2 Torture

There are few reports of tortured Javanese, as the nature of the GAM struggle is against a force with superior firepower. In a conflict situation, torture requires a certain level of security not enjoyed by resistance movements.

3.3 Sexual Violence

Because so many Javanese in Aceh are men, troops away from their social networks, the number of sexual abuses against Javanese persons is few. As detailed above, the GAM is involved in policing the social lives of local women, and as detailed below, the GAM has abducted several Javanese women, but the nature of such abductions have few, if any, sexual implications. Due to the number of Javanese women, superior GAM discipline, and the existence of social networks, sexual violence against Javanese women is thankfully limited.

3.4 Abductions

Abductions are one of the GAM's primary tactics. The Free Aceh Movement admits that it often abducts and detains suspects in its attempts at policing the territory it controls; "those targeted have included sub-district officials...women and girls accused of flirting with BRIMOB officers; and many others."⁹⁸ The difference between abduction and detention was also contested during the COHA, as it depends solely on legitimacy of the police and justice mechanisms.⁹⁹ The GAM claims to act as any police force does, as the difference between abduction and detainment is legitimacy. This, like taxation, is an acceptable argument for an aspiring government ONLY if it acts in accordance with international norms. The GAM has not managed to do this.

The fear of abduction is great for non-Acehnese in Aceh; every year "dozens of low-level civil servants, police, and military personnel are murdered and abducted."¹⁰⁰ Javanese security forces and workers in the PT Arun LNG Plant are regularly held hostage by the GAM, an act meant to gain heavy ransom and to protest the lack of jobs for local people.¹⁰¹ On 9 May 2001, Mak Pri, the wife of a TNI Commander, sought a traditional healer in a nearby village. After asking suspicious questions, the GAM abducted her, which resulted in a massive TNI search of the area. The next

⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 23.

⁹⁹ General Tanongsuk, *148 Days in Aceh*, 42.

¹⁰⁰ *United States Department of State*, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000."

¹⁰¹ *Business Week Online*, "Indonesia Aims at Aceh, Again."

evening her body was found in a rice field with evidence of torture. This initiated a savage retaliation from the TNI, where several people were slaughtered in what was since dubbed ‘the Swamalanga Killings.’¹⁰² On several occasions, Javanese crewmen have been abducted from boats in the Malacca Straights and held for ransom, as were nine Javanese athletes on 27 June 2002; on 5 July, the GAM released the athletes and a dozen oil rig workers.¹⁰³

In East Aceh, Indonesian journalists Ersi Siregar and Fery Santoro, along with two wives of TNI officers and their driver, were abducted by the GAM in June 2003. A GAM press release noted that “Fery Santoro, the RCTI cameraman who is under our protective custody pending the finding of a safe arrangement for his release is safe and sound and is moving around with our forces.”¹⁰⁴ A GAM Commander told Australian media, broadcasted live, that the abduction was in response to GAM wives being held captive first. Ersi Siregar worked with Honolulu’s East-West Institute, and was the recipient of several awards; in December 2003, Ersi was killed in a gunfight with the GAM.¹⁰⁵ In February 2004, the TNI wives were released, and shortly after the driver escaped. As of May 2004, Fery was still being held hostage by the GAM despite pleas from associated journalists around the world, as well as dedicated work from the Red Cross. Weeks prior to their abduction, Muhammed Jamaluddin, another TVRI employee, disappeared, his body discovered a month later. NGOs suggest that he had lent equipment to the GAM and that the TNI was responsible for his murder.¹⁰⁶

3.5 Widows and Orphans

Again, limiting the terms to widows, and not also widowers, is not meant to impose a sexist ideology, but instead to reflect the masculine nature of the TNI and its affiliates. Widows demonstrate one of the reasons why Indonesian and Acehnese victims must each draw the concern of activists, as even in a wolf / lamb scenario, the aggressor’s family have rarely partaken in the violence yet still suffer its effects. A group called the War Widows International Peace Alliance has helped organize tours of American and Vietnamese widows together, as one group, to

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 12-13.

¹⁰³ Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 29.

¹⁰⁴ GAM Press Release, “Call to the Press to Monitor the Forced Public Rally Organized by the Indonesian Military Rulers in Aceh on the Occasion of the Islamic New Year” (29 February 2004).

¹⁰⁵ *Jakarta Post*, “Military Eyeing Press in Aceh,” 2 December 2003.

¹⁰⁶ *United States Department of State*, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2003.”

remember the Vietnam War.¹⁰⁷ This sort of project is sorely needed in the future of Aceh and Indonesia.

There is a total lack of research on the families of Indonesian security forces killed in Aceh by human rights organizations. Some demonstrations for widows and veterans from campaigns in East Timor were held in Jakarta in May 2002, but they were held in reaction to President Megawati's visit to East Timor.¹⁰⁸ The Army Wives Organization is involved in civil society work in Jakarta and is involved in fund raising for widows. The World Bank plays a similar role, as their *War Widows and Welfare Project* helps "poor widows recover their economic capacities" in Indonesia and East Timor.¹⁰⁹ This project was at one point operational in Aceh as well, cancelled due to security threats. Today, the project offers training, daycare, and counseling in several other provinces. For details, see chapter six.

Because so few women are actively involved in the Indonesian military, there are few Javanese orphans as a result of the Aceh conflict. Instead, single parent Javanese families result from the war, which though unacceptable, are not as tragic as in Aceh itself. We must applaud groups such as the World Bank in its widows programmes, as they will help ensure that the children left behind grow up with some education and are less likely to join the military to seek revenge.

3.6 IDPs

As we began our section on Javanese victims, we made note of the racial nationalism offered by the GAM and the resultant abuses; such chauvinism has forced Javanese families to flee their homes and become IDPs. This has been the issue of greatest concern from NGOs and the international community regarding Javanese victims; Amnesty International notes that "displacement has been caused by GAM's warning to non-Acehnese people...to leave the province."¹¹⁰ Another source asserts that "GAM leaders have repeatedly expressed their intention to remove ethnic Javanese from Aceh, at least as a temporary measure."¹¹¹ This rather soft statement is followed by reports of arson, terrorism, and searches by GAM members. Despite some commentators believing that the

¹⁰⁷ Please see www.warwidows.org.

¹⁰⁸ *Jakarta Post*, "East Timor's Independence Brings Bitter Pain for Veterans," 18 May 2002.

¹⁰⁹ *The World Bank*, "Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction" www.worldbank.org/conflict, accessed January 2004.

¹¹⁰ *Amnesty International*, "Briefing on the Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Aceh."

¹¹¹ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 23.

GAM intentionally created Javanese IDPs in order to draw international attention,¹¹² it is more likely a result of Javanese collaborators and GAM's racial nationalism, evidenced by its "bellicose anti-Javanese rhetoric."¹¹³ It is important to note that Javanese transmigrant families, who are the victims of the GAM, are usually no better off than their Acehese neighbours, while temporary transmigrant workers in industrial and military employment, groups which extract great wealth, are well guarded.¹¹⁴

Independence groups in Aceh claim to be multicultural, yet when questioned about Javanese transmigrants, consistently justify these human rights abuses because they claim that the Javanese are spies. GAM leadership ordered all Javanese to leave Aceh in April 2001; unlike several other incidents, this cannot be denied or blamed on the TNI. Obviously, some are spies, but to expel scores of families in response only mirrors the policies of the TNI. The GAM would do better to ask why some Javanese oppose them, and if abusing them is a solution to the problem. After 2001, such anti-Javanese sentiments grew; "there were raids by GAM guerillas and local sympathizers on Javanese communities in which people were killed, houses looted and burned."¹¹⁵ Today, several Javanese communities forcibly displaced by the GAM are concentrated in North Sumatra where they live with great uncertainty and without proper infrastructure.

The author's experiences in a Javanese IDP camps in North Sumatra in September of 2003 support this; a man named Yatno claims that there was "no animosity between us and the Acehese leading up to the conflict." These transmigrant farmers moved to East Aceh in 1974, planting crops of palm and cocoa in a small village shared with Acehese. In 1999, as the DOM-era ended they were extorted by the GAM biweekly. Soon, persons wearing GAM uniforms gave this community twenty four hours to leave the area. After they left their land, they were told that it was soon divided between locals and the GAM. A man named Darmo notes that the TNI presence is unfortunate, but necessary, and that "the Martial Law came too late." The camp leaders understood that the root of the conflict was the unequal distribution of resources, but contended that transmigrants such as themselves did not benefit from this exploitation. They asked for

¹¹² Cohen, cited in Hugo, "Pengungsi- Indonesia's Internally Displaced Persons," 309.

¹¹³ Robinson, "Rawan is as Rawan Does," 225.

¹¹⁴ Dubus et Revise, *Armée du Peuple, Armée du Roi*, 84.

¹¹⁵ International Crisis Group, "Aceh: A Slim Chance for Peace," *Indonesia Briefing* (1 January 2002), 7.

international involvement in the conflict, as they need legal status, infrastructure, and want the Acehese economy to be changed from military rule.

In this camp, the Indonesian Government has failed to provide land rights at their camp after several years of tenure, which makes the farmers live with great uncertainty. It is likely that the Government realizes that these groups are visible proof that the GAM commits human rights abuses, which I think few writers would deny. But the Indonesian Government must help these persons, as they share some margin of blame for sending transmigrants in the first place. After all, to look only to the GAM for causing Javanese IDPs would be an error, as we must also blame government transmigration policies; this does not mean that transmigration automatically results in IDPs, but in a conflict situation, it is a major factor alongside local actions. The policy does, in fact, predate the Dutch colonial era, but was institutionalized in order to expand commerce and political control in the nineteenth century. Transmigration has been used by each regime in the Republic of Indonesia, where transmigrants Javanese farmers have been sent to Aceh. In December 2000, the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Alhilal Hamdi announced that transmigrants would no longer be sent between islands, and that “henceforth the Government would only support transmigration within the same province.”¹¹⁶ This does little to solve the Aceh problem. We must pressure the Republic to hold these persons and must heavily pressure the racist GAM to fundamentally alter their policies regarding minorities.

4) Other Human Rights Abuses

The number of other groups which have suffered human rights abuses is limited by the restrictions placed on foreigners in Aceh. Official statements of the GAM and the Republic are strikingly similar. For its part, the GAM Deputy Commander Sofyan Daud decreed that “non-Acehnese residents, we ask you to leave the country of our forebears as soon as possible.”¹¹⁷ This racist statement is made against the Javanese, the problem ethnic group for the GAM. The Republic supplies the same answers to its problem groups;¹¹⁸ the most severe example is Presidential Decree Number 43, which states that:

¹¹⁶ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000.”

¹¹⁷ GAM Deputy Commander Sofyan Daud, cited in *Amnesty International*, “Briefing on the Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Aceh” (June 2001).

¹¹⁸ These two statements are obviously extremely different situations and cannot be directly compared. Instead, the reasoning behind them can be compared- how does each groups respond to problem groups? Neither looks to the root and both use force as a solution.

- 1) As long as the Military State of Emergency continues in Aceh Province, foreign citizens are forbidden from tourist visits and may not carry out activities that are incompatible with the implementation of the objectives of the Military State of Emergency...
- 2) Non-governmental organizations, whether foreign or Indonesian are forbidden from carrying out activities that are incompatible...
- 3) Journalism activities (must receive) permission from the Foreign Minister in the name of the President as the Central Military Emergency Administrator.¹¹⁹

The results of this decree have been that fewer abuses have been documented and that few foreigners have been in a position to be hurt. Human Rights Watch notes that:

Both Indonesian security forces and members of GAM have engaged in physical and verbal intimidation of correspondents in the...the Indonesian government and military have effectively barred nearly all independent and impartial observers, as well as international humanitarian aid workers, from the province.¹²⁰

Foreign boats are not allowed in provincial waters, and as of 30 May 2003's *Decree on the Limitation of the Use of Telecommunications Devices*, short wave radios and mobile phones are also banned.¹²¹

The Government of Indonesia asserts that such bans are necessary, as NGOs and the media are biased, ignoring GAM atrocities while seeking to embellish those of the TNI. This Presidential Decree is problematic; it is true that foreign sources are biased, and for this reason we must work hard to remain apolitical. But not only does the Indonesian response result in greater bias, it is also a faulty parallel; the bias nature of these sources does not allow a government to simply dispose of them, the punishment does not match the crime. Barring civil society from helping the victims of war is immoral, illegal, and irrational. We must wonder if a media blackout will persuade the global media to scrutinize the Indonesian Military Operations more, or less.

In 2002, Australian activist Leslie McCulloch and American nurse Joy-Lee Sadler, as well as their guide, were arrested and held by Indonesian police on the grounds of VISA violations. They were held for a number of months before being released in 2003. In June 2003, a German man was killed by the TNI, his wife wounded. They were hiking in Aceh one evening without clearance; their flashlights drew the TNI to come forward and shoot. Major General Adam Damiri responded only

¹¹⁹ Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia in the Capacity of Central Military Emergency Administrator, on "Control of the Activities of Foreign Citizens, Non-Governmental Organizations and Journalists in the Province of Aceh," Number 43, 16 June 2003.

¹²⁰ Jakarta Post, "Muzzling Press in Aceh Shows Wider Clampdown," 28 November 2003.

¹²¹ Endang Suwarya, Decree of the Regional Marshall Law Administrator, on "the Limitation of the Use of Telecommunications Devices," Number 04 / V / PD/P-NAD / 30 May 2003.

be asking “what were they doing there so late at night behind the house, using a flashlight and things?”¹²² Also, two American workers at the PT Arun LNG Plant were abducted and killed by the GAM, as well as several more held hostage.¹²³

Not all non-Javanese or Acehnese groups are foreigners. The Gayo communities also suffer from human rights abuses in Aceh. One particular incident in June 2003 saw the GAM murder more than forty Javanese civilians after a Javanese militia (*Puja Kusuma*) killed both Acehnese and Gayo civilians.¹²⁴ According to the United States Department of State, Indonesia

considers the term “indigenous people” to be a misnomer, because it considers all citizens except ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes the existence of several “isolated communities”...¹²⁵

The Gayo are generally seen to be akin to the Acehnese by the Javanese, yet are also suspect to the Acehnese. The Acehnese Sultanate has a long history of ethnic warfare, as several coastal areas “were almost entirely Malay at the beginning of the eighteenth century, (fighting) to be free of Acehnese control.”¹²⁶ Acehnese historicism places minorities firmly within Acehnese terms, as the GAM tends to “dismiss suggestions that they may have distinct political aspirations from the rest of the Acehnese population.”¹²⁷ Election results speak to the contrary, though a better gauge does not exist because of the lack of political space created by the TNI and the GAM. Thus, the tribes in Aceh lack recognition, as the framework used actually gives priority to Javanese and Acehnese persons. Any just future must reconsider this mindset.

7) Conclusions

The extent of human rights abuses necessitates action. The dire human rights situation in Aceh cannot be left to the Indonesian Government, the GAM, or the TNI. This is why civil society is so important; the grim stories offered above have only been made known because of human rights, media, and other groups. Without such actors, we can only guess what cases will never be made known.

¹²² Associated Press, “Indonesian Troops Kill German in Aceh, Wound his Companion,” 5 June 2003.

¹²³ Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, 225.

¹²⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 11.

¹²⁵ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000.”

¹²⁶ Lee Kam Hing, *the Sultanate of Aceh: Relations with the British 1760-1824*, 129.

¹²⁷ Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity,” 20.

In 2001, the Red Cross began a training programme for the Indonesian Armed Forces on human rights. Although its implementation remains a key issue for planners, this is a positive step and should be regarded as such by human rights organizations, groups which are consistent critics of any small change. What the TNI requires from such groups is helpful advice for more realistic modules and encouragement when necessary. We see that in responding to human rights abuses, civil society groups such as the Red Cross look to preventative actions, though most work is on reactions and documentation.

Civil society is the best force to document the cases in Aceh, though under Martial Law the Indonesian Government has blocked all foreign media and banned NGOs. Media control comes through what is known as 'Embedded Journalism', where the government trains, monitors, and censors journalists in the region. This has been a "largely successful attempt to control information," but has had the effect of limiting reported abuses by the GAM more than it has those of the TNI. In June of 2003, the government made a decree "that foreign NGOs are prohibited from making contact with or in any way assisting GAM or its sympathizers."¹²⁸ This is a problem because it allows the GAM to avoid scrutiny, whereas if the GAM were known to the media, it would lose its support and its mystique.

Like the media, only state-approved NGOs may operate, although in practice not even this has been allowed; one example is the failed promise by the TNI in June 2003 that any party may observe operations in Aceh.¹²⁹ Given its portrayal by most sources, the GAM has been most progressive towards civil society, documented by its 2002 Stavanger Declaration. But this stance is contrasted with its punishment of groups which assign them any blame, at which time they look strikingly similar to their enemy. To combat human rights abuses, one may use NGOs, the media, or government avenues. Several of the possible responses to human rights abuses lie in the field of civil society. The next chapter will document which groups are involved in Aceh and how their mandates help to bring peace.

¹²⁸ Detik, "Foreign NGOs Banned from Aceh, Local NGOs Gagged," 26 June 2003. Available online at www.indonesianetwork.org/aceh/news/ngos_banned.htm, accessed December 2003.

¹²⁹ Human Rights Watch, "Aceh Under Martial Law," 4.

Chapter 5: Civil Society

Indonesia was transformed in the late 1990s due to an interplay of economic, political, and military changes. Countless observers note that the growth of civil society was one of the greatest transformations of this process, as several groups “organized peaceful protests throughout Aceh in the months following the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998. A similar flowering of civil society was happening in other parts of Indonesia.”¹ Aspinall notes that “human rights organizations in Aceh have proliferated since 1998.”² Robinson asserts that political changes in Aceh were caused “by the energetic work of a handful of NGOs, and by some unusually bold domestic media coverage.”³ Government groups, the media, academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other actors were in a position to contribute to participatory democracy, a notion which cannot be limited to voting, but also to free association, peaceful protest, and alternative media sources.⁴

The persons who work in civil society are generally labeled as human rights defenders, defined as any *independent* person or group which consciously devotes her or his time to protecting or publicizing human rights. An HRD is part of an international system and deserves special mention; they are neither civilians nor combatants in the traditional sense. Aceh is a severe test for these actors; Human Rights Watch notes that “it can be more dangerous for human rights monitors to report on GAM abuses than to document violations by Indonesian military personnel.”⁵ There is a current shift for HRDs, who continue to critique several states, but now also look to non-state actors. This change has come as the legitimacy of civil society has been brought into question. At this point, it is useful to touch on this very legitimacy before we move on to describe Indonesian civil society.

¹ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?” 444.

² Aspinall, “Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights,” 18.

³ Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 231.

⁴ For an example of this interplay, please see Appendix VII, the 2003 Joint Appeal for a Cease-Fire during Ramadan, which shows the great variety of groups trying to bring about peace in Aceh.

⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 22.

Several authors note the value of civil society in democracy, from de Tocqueville to several modern writers. This is because in contemporary societies,

...the power of the state needs to be counterbalanced by the organizational strength of civil society to make democracy viable. The state must not be so strong and autonomous from all social forces as to overpower civil society and rule without accountability. (Also) the security forces must be sufficiently under presidential and/or parliamentary control to insure de facto accountability.⁶

In other words, civil society's strength is that it is not accountable to the government, or in many cases, the people. This is why de Tocqueville sees such groups as the balance to a tyrannical government, or in a democracy, a tyrannical public. The lack of accountability is civil society's greatest strength, but it can also be a great weakness. Unlike governments (which are ideally elected) and corporations (which receive a mandate via sales), civil society has little legitimacy aside from claiming to represent the people. They often rely on foreign aid and rarely seek structural change. Marxist groups have been critical of NGOs, seeing them as liberal organizations who receive aid from capitalist powers and seek to help capitalism survive.⁷ Another aspect of this is the structure of NGOs, which not only entrench hierarchy by relying on donors, but use hierarchical systems for their own governance.⁸

There are obviously several faults in such groups. Their strength is that they balance political and market forces, a safety mechanism for minority and other rights. Small groups which do not operate on public support have the ability to defend interests ignored by the majority, such as minorities and the environment, and provide a critique of structures where governments and corporations cannot. In Indonesia, civil society has provided relief for urban and rural poor, encouraged women's empowerment, human rights, criticized environmental damage, and opposed despotic governments. The transformation of the Indonesian State after the fall of Suharto allowed for the growth of civil society across the archipelago.

Changes were evident in Aceh. As the DOM-era ended, Acehnese organizations had greater freedom. This was helped by interest among likeminded Javanese groups as well as the international community, as Indonesia became home to civil society movements which no other

⁶ Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "the Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions," *Comparative Politics*, Volume 29, Issue 3 (April 1997), 326. 323-342.

⁷ Philip J. Eldridge, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 39.

⁸ Hadiwinata, *the Politics of NGOs in Indonesia*, 43.

Muslim nation could parallel.⁹ Civil society, though some groups had existed before 1998, became a new force. Several groups were created “to protest the military atrocities and campaign for justice, and publicity about these atrocities began to flood the increasingly free press.”¹⁰ The conflict in Aceh was irrevocably altered.

Thus, the power of civil society in Indonesia, and in Aceh in particular, cannot be ignored...nor has it been. At the same, time, civil society’s power was acknowledged by Indonesian Generals in another way, as they have recently cited Human Rights Watch and other groups’ reports to prove GAM atrocities, an action which sets an excellent precedent.¹¹ On 16 June 2003, Presidential Decree Number 43 stated that

Non-governmental organizations, whether foreign or Indonesian are forbidden from carrying out activities that are incompatibly with the implementation of the objectives of the Military State of Emergency in Aceh Province. Humanitarian aid that comes from friendly countries, world bodies and non-governmental organizations, whether foreign or national in Aceh province will be coordinated by the State Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare...¹²

This was implemented by Martial Law Authorities in Aceh, as groups such as the SIRA, KONTRAS Aceh, SMUR, FPDRA, FORUM Rakyat, ORPAD, and others were declared illegal by the military. These groups, discussed below, have a power acknowledged by the Indonesian authorities and international donors, one which may have the potential to bring long-term peace to Aceh. At the same time, because they are often in opposition to the Indonesian Government, these groups are challenged to demonstrate that their agendas are different from the GAM.

Commentators note that Acehnese civil society has a vast mandate, the precise reason that the TNI has ignored their freedoms and why groups are “fleeing the province in fear for their lives.”¹³ This chapter will identify the main civil society actors with regards to Aceh. After describing civil society before 1998, a brief mention shall be made of contemporary quasi-governmental bodies. Indonesian civil society actors which are involved in Aceh will be described, then Acehnese groups. Finally, other actors such as the media and unions will be documented, which will lead us to the

⁹ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹⁰ Reid, “War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh,” 10.

¹¹ Aspinall, “Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights,” 21.

¹² *Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia*, on “Control of the Activities of Foreign Citizens, Non-Governmental Organizations and Journalists in the Province of Aceh.”

¹³ Carmel Budiardjo, “What is the TNI’s Agenda? The TNI Wants More Than Just the Defeat of GAM,” *Inside Indonesia*, Issue 76 (Fall 2003), 26.

next chapter's discussion international groups involved in Aceh. This chapter, combined with the next one, will be a foundation for chapter seven, on peace in Aceh.

1) Civil Society under the New Order

Civil Society under the New Order was severely limited, but through the persistence and creativity of its constituents, has managed to create the foundation other groups enjoy today. Most groups began with a fairly apolitical mandate, expanding their role when safe, a defining feature of early Indonesian civil society. As observed by Philip J. Eldridge:

NGOs which began by promoting developmental and policy goals derived from their specific field experience have increasingly sought to articulate democratic and participatory aspirations and values as norms for the conduct of public life.¹⁴

This is agreed to by Bob Hadiwinata, who asserts that groups which wanted fundamental change had to concentrate on poverty relief and environmental issues “in order to gain the government’s recognition and ‘blessing’.”¹⁵ Most groups in this first section, be they in Jakarta or Aceh, have become more political since the fall of Suharto.

To a great extent, civil society operates in response to government policy and control. After the rise of Suharto in the 1960s, several groups were established in response to the ensuing brutality. Political NGOs were immediately crushed, though apolitical groups were tolerated because the government saw in these NGOs, which were technically illegal and received foreign funding, an opportunity to save money in developing their country. However by the 1980s, the New Order sought greater hegemony; in 1985, laws controlling organizations were implemented which increased government control and required allegiance to Pancasila as their sole ideology.¹⁶ From here, Suharto’s regime slowly lost its grip over civil society, as civil society expanded leading up to the economic crisis.

The list of civil society groups offered below is an incomplete survey, as it is limited to larger organizations which have some connections to Aceh. Further, some groups are very closely related through dense networks, though most entities have been separated for this study. They are roughly organized into development, empowerment, academic, legal, and political associations.

¹⁴ Eldridge, Non-Governmental Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia, 1.

¹⁵ Hadiwinata, the Politics of NGOs in Indonesia, 25.

¹⁶ Hadiwinata, the Politics of NGOs in Indonesia, 94.

1.1 Development Groups

Development groups were the most common under the Suharto regime.¹⁷ The largest environmental group is the Jakarta-based WALHI, which has a very political history. Formed in October 1980 as a loose consortium of groups, they focus on rural empowerment, environmental education, land rights, and the political-economy of the environment.¹⁸ WALHI has very close government ties which allow them to influence some legislation, but has also come into conflict with the government on several occasions. Their environmental work has led them to critique state logging and the military economy on several occasions, which has brought the group into the Aceh conflict.

WALHI has been active in the political economy of Aceh's natural resources since 1997, confronting the military and foreign corporations in order to protect the environment of Sumatra.¹⁹ When the US Embassy in Jakarta stated that if PT Arun were closed, Aceh would suffer, WALHI responded that as a "nation in waiting", Aceh should halt oil extraction "so that there will be something left for the future generations of Acehnese."²⁰ WALHI has since been openly critiqued by US Ambassador Gelbard for their hard line stance on the American oil and mining corporations in Aceh. WALHI has also been active in investigating logging corporations; they document that PT Asdal in South Aceh has caused water sources to dry up, meanwhile the company operates with an expired license. In 2000, WALHI rejected a proposal from the Governor of Aceh that offered 30% of logging concessions to the people. WALHI organized a boycott of Indonesian timber in order to pressure the government to end illegal operations in February 2004; the group cites clearcuts in parks and conflict areas as partly responsible for the pending depletion of timber reserves.²¹ Development cannot help but take on political programmes, and the WALHI is not alone in this struggle.

WALHI is a member of the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), a group which takes on issues relating to macro-level development policies and micro-level poverty

¹⁷ Please see Aristides Katoppo, "the Role of Community Groups in the Environment Movement," *Indonesian in Transition*, edited by Chris Manning and Peter van Dierman (London: Zed Books, 2000), 213-219.

¹⁸ Eldridge, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia*, 135.

¹⁹ Dubus et Revise, *Armée du Peuple, Armée du Roi*, 153.

²⁰ "Attacks against Mobil," *Down to Earth*, Issue 45 (May 2000). Available online at <http://dte.gn.apc.org/45brf.htm>, accessed January 2004.

²¹ *Jakarta Post*, "WALHI Seeks Boycott to RI Timber" 19 February 2004.

issues with the Indonesian Government and IFIs. INFID was established in June 1985, then known as INGI, alongside European partner organizations in order to provide input on behalf of civil society to IFI policy-making bodies. Critical of government policies, the INGI and its members were subject to a government crackdown, a major event for international-local civil society relations; from this exchange came INFID, which although still having a few international members, is generally an Indonesian organization. In Aceh, the INFID works with Forum LSM, Koalisi NGO HAM, SAMAK, SAHARA, and FLOWER; though their mandate is economic development, the INFID and its member organizations take on political and human rights issues on a regular basis.

The CCDE (Center for Community Development and Education) was founded on 30 November 1993 in order to promote rural self-sufficiency. Like several development groups, the CCDE's work is often political either directly or in support of other groups; for example, they frequently pledge their support on behalf of organizations under fire from the state and was among the signatories of the July 2003 Appeal for a United Nations Convention to Protect Migrants Worker's and their Family's Rights.²² This is part of their focus on women and development within Aceh, especially on micro-credit programmes. Similarly, the GARDAMADINA was established in 1995 in South Aceh to provide works on vocational training to farmers, develop independent communities, and focus on equality. One of their programmes, alongside YAPPIKA and funded by the UN, focuses on economic development, while other programmes have moved towards human rights and conflict resolution.

Sustainable development has taken on great importance in recent years. The LPLH Aceh (Aceh Environment Defense Institute) was created on 15 June 1992 to educate communities on urban pollution and deforestation. They are a member of the Indonesian Mining Network (JATAM). In 1998, the LPLH Aceh filed a lawsuit against Mobil Oil regarding B3 waste and was also a member of a group of NGOs which issued a joint press release condemning EXXON-Mobil's human rights and environmental violations at PT Arun. They note the dozens of explosions, spills, pipeline leaks, and military connections which have never been addressed by the multinational giant.²³

²² "La Convention sur la Protection des Droits de Tous les Travailleurs Migrants et des Membres de Leur Famille", available online at www.december18.net/f-UNConvention010703.htm, accessed 15 January 2004.

²³ "Mobil Oil and PT Arun Must be Held Accountable for Human Rights Violations in Aceh," Press Release from Concerned NGOs, Banda Aceh, 10 October 1998.

PASe (*Yayasan Pagar Alam Semesta*) was founded on 18 September 1995 in order to expand human resources in environmental protection. Their greatest campaign has been to counteract corrupt logging practices, the same which have destroyed the environment in Kalimantan and entrenched military interests in Aceh. PASe pressures the “government to withdraw all operational licenses for timber concessionaires... and to transfer the management of natural resources to indigenous communities.”²⁴

The YRBI (Rumbai, or Bamboo Thicket Foundation) was created on 2 February 1995 to improve the relationship between the environment, the people, and God through mutual understanding. The YRBI has also been attacked by armed groups; on 31 January 2000, YRBI staff member Sukardi was abducted and brutally killed, which was especially unnerving given the YRBI’s apolitical mandate.²⁵ Sukardi was thirty years of age; he was taken by the district police, his body found with massive welts, several bullet holes, and exposed muscular tissue.²⁶ Following this event, YRBI staff was regularly followed and abused by unknown persons on dozens of occasions. Despite this, the Foundation continues its work in developing Aceh. The above groups are just some of the countless development NGOs in Aceh; others include:

- The CDI (Rural Image Foundation) came together through the efforts of student activists on 2 January 1989. The CDI promotes the 1945 Constitution and the Principles of Pancasila in civil society and the environment, and works solely within Aceh. Their efforts include mangrove development, women’s equality, and community institutions
- The ISEED (Institute for Social Economic and Environmental Development) was founded on 21 January 1992 in order to link Human Rights and Development
- The LPPM Aceh (Community Development Participation Institute) was formed on 25 March 1997 to strengthen people’s socioeconomic roles
- The LP2SM (Institute for Research and Human Resources Development) was founded on 12 November 1989, focusing on improving human welfare in poor areas

²⁴ “Aceh: an Ecological War Zone,” *Down to Earth*, Issue 47, November 2000. Available online at <http://dte.gn.apc.org/47Ach.htm>, accessed January 2004.

²⁵ IMPARSIAL and FRONTLINE, *Frontline Indonesia*, 48.

²⁶ *Amnesty International*, “Indonesia: Human Rights Defenders under Attack.”

- The PUSKAPEMA worked during the Humanitarian Pause on the UNDP project to boost farmer's incomes
- The PUGAR (Center for People's Movements) helps rural, fishers, and peasants
- The SAHARA (*Yayasan Suara Hati Raykat*) was formed on 27 December 1992 to promote grassroots development and protection against business interests
- The SPEF (Study for Population and Environmental Forum) was established on 12 July 1985 to protect Aceh's environment. They have income generating, forest and water management, family planning, and labour programmes
- The TERATAI Foundation has worked since 3 May 1993 to strengthen community power and health
- The YADESA (Rural Community Development Foundation) is run by Nurdin Abdul Rahman and seeks to council torture victims in order to help rehabilitate the Acehnese agricultural sector. Founded on 10 October 1997, YADESA links human rights to development, publishing its newsletter and working with the UNDP on food security issues.
- The YAM (Community Service Foundation) was established on 17 October 1996 to empower the poorest of Aceh's citizens
- The YAPDA (Empowering Circle for Society Movement) works to empower civil society against corporate and government abuse, formed on 29 May 1993
- The YASINDO (Indonesian Foundation for Rural Development) has worked for years extend participation after the New Order's narrow, state-centered vision of development. The YASINDO offers scholarships, training, education, and research for disadvantaged youths
- Yayasan UMMAHAT works to empower local groups in social and economic spheres, as well as their relationship with God. Founded on 4 May 1988, this group includes Pancasila in their education programmes in context with the Koran

Development groups may also include help for families and children. The IPPA Aceh (Indonesia Planned Parenthood Association of Aceh) was founded on 22 December 1957, the same date as its national counterpart, in order to empower women and aid human development. Contraceptive education, an occasional newsletter, and gender programmes are major parts of the IPPA's work. The group runs the Lentera Project, which deals with controversial groups in Indonesia such as homosexuals and AIDS patients.

The KKSP (Child Rights Education and Information Center) was established in 1987, focusing on child rights in North Sumatra, which borders Aceh. One of its three focus groups is children in conflict situations, including orphans and IDPs; “the main approach of the program is alternative education.”²⁷ The KKSP clearly states that both militaries undermine their work, while the “the people are squeezed in between” armed actors.²⁸ The KKSP runs a wide variety of programmes, from helping fisherfolk children,²⁹ to planning sessions with UNICEF,³⁰ to working alongside smaller organizations.

- The CARDS provides food and economic training to families around Pidie
- The IPMG has a similar mandate to the CARDS, helping IDPs and farmers
- The SIA educates children and women in IDP camps in North Aceh
- The SPKPHAM provides assistance to human rights abuse victims, including their UNDP mandate in South Aceh in 2000/01
- The WAHANA provides food to IDPs in West Aceh
- The YAB (National Child Foundation) was formed on 17 July 1995 to protect children’s rights against labour, war, and neglect. They publish a journal, *Suara Anak Bangsa Bulletin*, and are a member of several consortiums
- The YBN works in West Aceh to boost land cultivation
- The YPI helps arson victims resettle across the Pidie region
- The YPSI (Social Concern Foundation of Indonesia) was formed with a similar mandate on 20 August 1992 as an extension of the Save the Children Foundation

1.2 Empowerment Groups

Women’s movements have a rich history in the archipelago, influenced by several female leaders and intellectuals. Early organizations such as GERWANI were branches of the communist party, annihilated by Suharto. State-sponsored groups for the wives of government and the military were organized under the New Order, working alongside the strangely titled Ministry for the Role of

²⁷ ACRA, “Member Organizations: KKSP Foundation,” www.acra.or.id/eng/acra/Members/kksp.html, accessed January 2004.

²⁸ KKSP, “Internally Displaced Children,” <http://www.acra.or.id/eng/kksp/Programs/IDC.html>, accessed January 2004.

²⁹ Hugh Levinson, “the Fisher-Boys of Sumatra,” *BBC News*, August 2001.

³⁰ UNICEF, “Report of the East Asia and the Pacific Regional Consultation for the Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children,” Bangkok, October 2001.

Women, created in 1983. These programmes were critiqued as being paternalist and functionalist, prompting new women's organizations to form; thus, government patriarchy inadvertently helped foster groups such as FLOWER Aceh.

FLOWER Aceh (Women Activities for Rural Progress Aceh) was established on 23 September 1989, one of the first women's groups in Aceh. Its activities include women's education, income generation, and childcare. Their widely read journal, *Kabar dari Flower*, is written for rural communities, and they offer legal aid for village women. According to HIVOS,

Flower Aceh has a strong public presence and has become the organisation where people turn to for information on women in Aceh. It has been among the active initiators of many NGO-coalitions in Aceh and is the engine for the women's networks KKTGA and FOPA.³¹

FLOWER Aceh produces radio public service announcements and talk shows to help educate the Acehnese people on women's rights. Their discussions include Islam and gender, domestic violence, and refugee life for women. Amnesty International Australia notes that FLOWER is "a deceptively delicate name" for a group which "has planted itself between the Indonesian military and the independence movement."³² FLOWER is committed to non-military solutions and empowerment, a strategy which has won them worldwide recognition.

The organization's director and founder, Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, received the 2001 Yap Thiam Hien Award for Human Rights,³³ giving talks at several conferences, including one entitled *the Protection and Promotion of Women's Rights in Aceh* at Hong Kong University in April 2003. Her work is notable because she "has spoken out against violence by both sides in the conflict."³⁴ She has written several articles, including *Women and the War in Aceh* for *Inside Indonesia* in late 2000. In an April 2000 interview, she noted that because there are no religious and few ethnic tensions, militaries disrupt Acehnese society by setting "men against women and even women against women."³⁵ FLOWER Aceh's work is thus linked directly to the conflict, as women's roles in war and peace are fundamental issues.

³¹ HIVOS, "Counterparts Database: Flower," www.hivos.nl/nederlands/partners/zoeken/partner, accessed 15 January 2004.

³² Merryl Smith, "Flower Aceh," *Amnesty International Australia Newsletter* (March 2002).

³³ Please see www.ytha.org/.

³⁴ Amnesty International, "Women Defending Human Rights," www.amnesty.org.au/women/fact-womenhrd.html, accessed January 2004.

³⁵ Carmel Budiardjo, "Defending Women's Rights in Aceh," *TAPOL Bulletin*, Issue 157 (April 2000). Available online at <http://tapol.gn.apc.org/157ndefe.htm>, accessed February 2004.

This organization focuses on the strong historical role for women in Aceh as a basis for continued growth.³⁶ FLOWER works in several thematic forums, such as SOLUH and the NGO Forum for Aceh, sharing ideas and helping smaller groups. One such group is the KKTGA (Working Group on Gender Awareness of Aceh), which was formed on 15 October 1995 to promote gender equality. The KKTGA has a singular focus on this equality, publishing a Gender Education Module and delivering emergency relief to IDP camps.³⁷ Other gender related groups include;

- The LKBHuWK Aceh (Women's Welfare League) was founded on 18 February 1988 by their Jakarta parent organization to protect the welfare of women in law, the economy, and society
- The YPW (Women Development Foundation) came together on 13 June 1994 to address the inequality of women in Acehnese society through economic change
- The RPuK (Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity) also works with women in Aceh, offering rehabilitation for victims of military sexual crimes. The harsh treatment of RPuK members by security forces resulted in Peace Brigades International accepting their case in June 2001, accompanying them in the field as they do their work

1.3 Academic Groups

In the early 1970s, academic groups expanded in power before contracting in the 1980s. The first sort of group was student organizations; Islamic (HMI, PMII), Christian (PMKRI, GMKI), and Nationalist (GMNI) student organizations organized mass anti-Suharto demonstrations, but were short-lived, as membership turnover and strict government control under the *Normalization of Campus Life* laws ended their activism. Student associations survived outside the campus as study groups until the 1990s, when new formal organizations emerged. Unlike earlier groups, the newer organizations look to empowering Indonesia's poor; for instance, the YBA (Community for Farmers and Environmental Development) was the result of one such study group of seven scholars in November 1996 in order to help empower grassroots civil society. Further, several former students became involved in the media, publishing journals which challenged the New Order in new ways.

³⁶ Jacqueline Siapno, the Politics of Gender, Islam, and Nation-State in Aceh, Indonesia: a Historical Analysis of Power, Co-optation, and Resistance (PhD Thesis: University of California, Berkeley, 1997).

³⁷ SMERU Indonesia, "Community Recovery Programme: Interview with Ms. Erna Witoelar," Issue 2 (December 1998).

The most prominent of all academic groups is the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia's foremost think-tank. CSIS was established on 1 September 1971; their mission is "to contribute to improved policy making through policy-oriented research, dialogue, and public debate."³⁸ The CSIS was formed by scholarly groups who were worried at the absence of global concern for events in Indonesia, to this day employing an impressive collection of researchers with a variety of ideologies.

The CSIS currently publishes the English-language *Indonesian Quarterly*, the bimonthly *Analisis CSIS* in Bahasa, several books, articles in the Jakarta Post, and has a massive library open to the public. Its work is divided between Economics (divided into five research areas), Political and Social Change (employing thirteen full-time researchers), and International Relations (strategic and security issues, the political economy of international relations, non-traditional security issues, and area studies). The CSIS has organized several workshops on Aceh, including one on 18 June 2003 with FORUM-ASIA which focused on civil society and peace. The CSIS offers scholarships and fellowships to aspiring youths and holds several open colloquiums throughout the year on a range of issues. In May 2004, CSIS was kind enough to organize a forum based on the themes presented in this very book, a forum attended by representatives from Acehkita, Imparsial, officers from the TNI, the Canadian military, Japanese human rights groups, and the American Embassy. In this way, the CSIS is actively involved in promoting several new ideas and approaches to the Indonesian political community.

Other academic groups include:

- Research associations in political science (AIPI), economics (ISEI), Christianity (PIKI and ISKA) and Islam (ICMI) - the ICMI is the strongest of the groups; organized by former President Habibie, they have their own newspaper (*Republika*) and think-tank (Centre for Information and Development Studies, or CIDES).
- The Democratic Forum, formed in 1991 by a vast array of intellectual interests to promote openness in Indonesian political culture
- The LP3ES (Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information Institute) was founded in 1971, combines grassroots and intellectual interests, but has not been involved in

³⁸ CSIS, "Overview," www.csis.or.id, accessed February 2004.

Aceh aside from critiquing certain strategies such as banning foreign researchers in conflict areas.³⁹ The LP3ES also publishes a useful directory of Indonesian NGOs, including an online listing of Acehnese groups.⁴⁰

- The ELSAM (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy) focuses on legal issues, mainly regarding East Timor.⁴¹

1.4 Legal Groups

Like other groups, lawyers have become involved in the chaos of Indonesian politics and have taken on far more active roles than their counterparts in most other nations. The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (LBH) has helped to form several diverse legal organizations, including the Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutes (YLBHI) in 1971, an umbrella group for a variety of organizations. The YLBHI has long-standing roots in Aceh, with a series of press releases dating back to the 1980s. A 1991 statement accused the government of torture and abduction, one of the first direct statements against the regime.⁴² In a statement which is demonstrative of the difficult working environment for Aceh's lawyers who try to enforce Indonesia's Criminal Code (KUHP), the LBH was told by an ABRI commander in 1991 "you can eat your KUHP. It doesn't apply here."⁴³ In Aceh, regardless of Martial Law, the right to legal defense is suppressed, successful defense lawyers are attacked, and torture is commonly used to extract confessions, creating a wealth of work for humanitarian lawyers associations.

In Aceh, the LBH Banda Aceh (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, Banda Aceh) was created in response to severe Human Rights abuses on 30 November 1996, working in several areas of legal protection for the poor; they are unique among legal aid institutes because of their focus on civil and political rights. In one instance, they filed domestic and international charges on behalf of families affected by fertilizer company pipeline leaks in Aceh from 1988 to 1991. Physical sickness and loss of livelihood were cited as damages caused by Indonesian corporations.⁴⁴ During a campaign against militarism, the LBH Banda Aceh offices were raided by police, as it was when the

³⁹ Kurniawan Hari, "Government under Fire for Ban on Foreign Researchers," *Jakarta Post* (10 January 2003).

⁴⁰ Please see <http://www.lp3es.or.id/>

⁴¹ Please see www.elsam.or.id

⁴² *Reuters*, "Human Rights Group Accuses Indonesia of Abuses in Aceh," (24 July 1991).

⁴³ *Amnesty International*, "Shock Therapy: Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993."

⁴⁴ Kell, *the Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion*, 18.

group held a press conference criticizing the HDC during the Humanitarian Pause. LBH Banda Aceh continues to be a major source of information for human rights defenders, its studies on military violence being credible and detailed. LBH branches have also worked against the opening of Sharia Courts in Aceh, asking the media “how can worshipping be so repressive?”⁴⁵ LBH groups have been very political actors in the Aceh conflict.

The regional office for Koalisi NGO-HAM, PB-HAM has been the target of countless attacks; in March 2001, Sufrin Sulaiman, a member of the South Aceh branch, was executed, as was Tengku M. Yusuf Usman in September 2001. Usman was killed after a disagreement with the GAM, where he had asked the rebels not to pressure civilians to fly the rebel flag near the Indonesian military; it is suspected that the GAM is behind this execution.⁴⁶ On 11 May 2003, a PB-HAM volunteer, Adussalam Muhama Deli, was abducted from a bus and disappeared; on the same day, volunteer Raja Ismail was abducted, his body found two days later.⁴⁷ In such a brutal environment, being an active lawyer usually makes one an HRD.

A loose affiliate of the YLBHI is the Defence of Human Rights (LPHAM), one of several more radical groups, opposing foreign aid and usually recruiting much younger members. Another group is the PBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association), which is based out of Jakarta with deep roots in Aceh, speaking out against military operations regularly. Their cases range from defending Acehnese who vandalized a Megawati poster in August 2002 to petitioning the government on the environmental effects of road construction. The PBHI has represented several Acehnese NGOs, including the SIRA (see below) in 2001 and women’s groups in 2003, receiving death threats from militias during the trials. On 3 June 2003, Amnesty International reported that their offices had been attacked by a youth militia. The PBHI has worked with the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) with IDPs in North Sumatra in recent years. They were a part of the United Nations Committee on Human Rights in 2000, alongside the YLBHI and FLOWER Aceh. The PBHI has also been outspoken against American aid to Indonesia on the grounds of fighting terrorism, as the weapons and training will surely be used against the GAM.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Reuters, “Aceh Opens First Indonesian Islamic Sharia Court,” (4 March 2003).

⁴⁶ IMPARSIAL and FRONTLINE, *Frontline Indonesia*, 57.

⁴⁷ Lawyer’s Rights Watch Canada, “Indonesia Campaigns,” www.lrwc.org/campaign/indonesia.php, accessed February 2004.

⁴⁸ Berni K. Moestafa, “US Military Assistance may Increase Risk of State Terrorism,” *the Jakarta Post* (3 August 2002).

There are several small legal foundations in Indonesia:

- The LBH-PT (Pakattabela Legal Aid Institute) was created on 16 December 1994 in order to provide funding for volunteer lawyers; they focus on labour law as well as legal training
- The KARMA (Indonesia Lawyer's Association) handles several related cases and has signed numerous statements for justice in Aceh
- The Iskandar Muda Legal Aid Institute has documented several massacres in the region, mainly focusing on individual case law

1.5 Political Groups

Few NGOs had an openly political agenda under the New Order. The KIPP (Independent Election Monitoring Committee) is one of the few such groups, created just prior to Suharto's fall to monitor the election process. The KIPP immediately inspired several volunteers, as 8,000 persons monitored 600 polling booths in the last Suharto 'election' of 1997, later outspoken against the rigged results.⁴⁹ The group was critical, but saw no systemic abuses in the 1999 election. Recently, KIPP has been active in its criticisms of the reform process for the all-important 2004 election, on the grounds that changes lack "efforts to narrow the social and economic gap between Java and other islands."⁵⁰ The 2004 elections allowed the author to work very closely with the KIPP, which proved to be a professional, hard-working organization. The KIPP is also active in Aceh. After being barred from Aceh in 1997, the 1999 election was a more open process. They note that the GAM, who organized election boycotts, "threatened those who expressed their wish to vote."⁵¹ It is clear that free elections have several enemies in this conflict, and the KIPP has managed to articulate this on a regular basis.

1.6 Quasi-Governmental Groups

Some mention must be made of organizations which are not entirely independent of the government, but have their own agenda regarding Aceh. Some military affiliates may also be seen as quasi-state actors; for instance KARDA, the Indonesian military journal, has printed several hostile, yet influential, opinion pieces on regional conflicts. But the most credible and important such group is the National Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM).

⁴⁹ Gerry Van Klinken, "Citizens Organize Themselves," *Inside Indonesia*, Issue 51 (Summer 1997).

⁵⁰ *Jakarta Post*, "Seat Allocation Gets Mixed Reactions," 23 August 2003.

⁵¹ *Jakarta Post* (1 May 1999), cited in *United Nations*, "the Political Situation in Indonesia,"

The KOMNAS HAM was established on 7 June 1993 through Presidential Decree Number 50, one week before the Vienna Conference on Human Rights. At the time, few took the government-appointed teams seriously, however the ensuing members and chairperson have been elected independently, as provided in Section Three of the Decree. Until recently, the Commission has lacked enforcement powers, causing it to use fact-finding teams, the media, and moral authority in order to enforce respect for human rights. Despite this lack of power, KOMNAS quickly became recognized as a major actor in Indonesian politics, accepting 5,000 cases in its first 18 months.⁵² Following massive riots in July 1996, KOMNAS HAM filed an aggressive report against government forces.⁵³

Immediately after the fall of Suharto and as the DOM-era ended in Aceh, KOMNAS filed a major report on the decade of violations in Aceh; the Commission concluded that

Gross violations of human rights had been committed by Indonesian government forces, in the form of summary executions, torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, rape and sexual assault, and property destruction.⁵⁴

The 1999 Human Rights Law expanded KOMNAS HAM to thirty five members, who serve five year terms, and extended its formal mandate power. With new power and a more liberal environment, expectations were high for KOMNAS HAM.

However the group has not performed to the expectations of several actors. No action followed the DOM Report, and its statements regarding the 1999 operations in Aceh had little effect. KOMNAS suggested that a Truth and Reconciliation Committee be established, working hard to outline what the project entails, but was ignored by the government. In September 1999, a branch office was opened in Aceh. However as noted by Human Rights Watch, a split was forming within KOMNAS over the Timor conflict which hampered the credibility of the new office. After the RATA killings in December 2000, the Aceh branch was resisted by the central office, which had “appeared to accept the police argument” and was silent over the escaped suspects.⁵⁵ In November 2000, a foreign monitor called the Human Rights Documentation Center (HRDC) released a 63-page report entitled *KOMNAS HAM: the Formative Years*, which critiques the structure and actions of the

⁵² Errol P. Mendes, “KOMNAS HAM: Champions for Human Rights in the Indonesian Context,” Canada Human Rights Research and Education Center, University of Ottawa

⁵³ Debbie A. Lubis, “KOMNAS Pursues May 1998 Rioters,” Jakarta Post (24 December 2002).

⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch, “KOMNAS HAM and Aceh: the Track Record,” Indonesia: Accounting for Human Rights in Aceh, Volume 14, Issue 1 (March 2002).

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, “KOMNAS HAM and Aceh.”

Commission. Sidney Jones of Human Rights Watch stated that “KOMNAS HAM has gone from being the most credible institution in the country to being a real hindrance to human rights progress.”⁵⁶ KOMNAS HAM’s critics appreciate the effort by a core group of members within the Commission, but point to factionalism and a non-cooperative government for its failures.

However we cannot underestimate the opposition to the Commission’s activities; in the 1990s, the government was in a position to accept critiques. As with any actor, greater government insecurity has created a difficult environment for all parties. We must appreciate that although considered weak, its reports have resulted in several attacks on KOMNAS HAM offices by militias throughout the archipelago. In 2000, several groups attacked KOMNAS offices due to the commission’s controversial findings, especially regarding the investigation of the 1984 *Tanjung Priok* killings in Jakarta.

KOMNAS is under pressure from all sides. In 2002, several funders began to reconsider their association, which is a serious issue for the group because the Indonesian Government provides less than 20% of its budget. Groups such as the Asia Foundation, AUSAID, and the Ford Foundation reportedly support the Human Rights Commission, but see factionalism as a source of ineffectiveness.⁵⁷ In May 2003, KOMNAS was critiqued by the radical PRD Party for complicity with the Megawati administration.⁵⁸ The Commission is under pressure from political parties, internal divides, international donors and human rights groups, and in the field. In May 2004, the group was under fire for one of its leaders, Solahudin Wahid, accepting to be General (ret.) Wiranto’s running mate for the Presidential Elections.

But KOMNAS continues its work. In Aceh, a May 2003 report found that gross violations were carried out by the GAM, the TNI, and the police in the interregnum between the DOM and Martial Law eras.⁵⁹ Just prior to Martial Law, KOMNAS had planned on opening smaller branches in two Acehnese towns.⁶⁰ One hundred days after Martial Law was declared, KOMNAS HAM was served a report by the Friends of Aceh (FOA), as KOMNAS is still an important conduit for change in

⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Poor Work From Indonesian Rights Commission on Aceh” (15 March 2002).

⁵⁷ Leanika Tanjung and Dewi Rina Cahyani, “KOMNAS HAM: Their Own Worst Enemy,” TEMPO Magazine, Issue 24 (February 2002).

⁵⁸ People’s Democratic Party Statement, “KOMNAS HAM and the Democratic Opposition’s Contemptible Position on the Genocide in Aceh” (26 May 2003).

⁵⁹ KOMPAS, “KOMNAS HAM Finds Indications of Rights Violations in Aceh” (3 June 2003).

⁶⁰ Jakarta Post, “Rights Body to Set Up Posts in Aceh” (17 July 2003).

Aceh; KOMNAS immediately sent a team headed by M.M. Billah to investigate the cited abuses. The Commission found a mass grave with dozens of bodies, their June 2003 report cited by several global media sources. Soon afterwards, KOMNAS offices were attacked by militias with close ties to the TNI. Death threats and warnings from the military were given because “the commission is also a state institution, which is supposed to support all government policy.”⁶¹ But military leaders such as Sutarto have been more open-minded, insisting that they also critique the GAM rebels but endorsing their investigations.

The recent KOMNAS work in Aceh was cited repeatedly and dubbed an “important contribution to understanding what is happening in Aceh” in the October 2003 Report of the formerly critical Human Rights Watch.⁶² In October 2003, armed POLRI forces stormed a human rights training session held by KOMNAS in Banda Aceh, a session which included Indonesian security forces. This session was part of the monitoring capacity under Martial Law, a mandate lasting from 19 May until 19 November, 2003. Their March 2004 report proved they would not back down, as KOMNAS found numerous serious human rights violations during these six months, mostly committed by the military.⁶³

The National Human Rights Commission remains a vital link between civil society and government, being close to yet independent of each group. This is precisely the goal of having such an organization, whose continued credible work makes this quasi-state organization a valuable part of defending human rights in Aceh and also of a future peace agreement.

Civil society groups under Suharto generally have narrow mandates which expanded when given the opportunity. Most of the above groups continue to grow today, working alongside the groups which have been created since the fall of the New Order, as described below.

2) Post Suharto Civil Society- Indonesia

The 1990s saw a massive increase in civil society groups in Indonesia, namely pro-democracy and human rights NGOs; until 1996, most groups were forced to cooperate with the New Order. As

⁶¹ Jakarta Post, “Threats, Criticism Heaped on Rights Body for Aceh Report” (17 June 2003).

⁶² Human Rights Watch, “Aceh Under Martial Law: Can These Men Be Trusted to Prosecute This War” (October 2003).

⁶³ Jakarta Post, “Rights Body Finds Human Rights Violations in Aceh” (10 March 2004).

Suharto began to lose control, opposition NGOs gained new power, especially in response to the government's attempt to dispose of Megawati from 1996-1998. This caused massive riots and drew serious attention from the international community. As Suharto fell, a new era in Indonesian civil society came to be.

There have been three effects of the new found openness; first, existing Indonesian NGOs had new-found responsibilities and power, as described above. Second, peripheral areas such as Aceh formed mass organizations for the first time, as described below. Third, new organizations in Java were created due to the open environment and the interaction with global actors. Not all groups were honest; a newly-formed group called HIPALAPA was created simply to tap IMF restructuring funds, and then disappeared.⁶⁴ But this is the exception, as the below groups prove the worth of newly-organized civil society movements as they pertain to Aceh.

APACHE (Peace Alliance for Aceh) and FORSOLA (Solidarity Forum for Aceh) are examples of umbrella organizations. Such groups organize in order to protect and amplify the voices of small groups, as in APACHE, or in order to show solidarity between larger organizations, as in FORSOLA. FORSOLA spearheaded a joint release by several NGOs on a July 1999 massacre by the Indonesian military in Aceh.⁶⁵

IMPARSIAL, the Indonesian Human Rights Watch, was created in June 2002 by seventeen HRDs who argued that since political space opened up in 1998, civil society activism had actually become less effective.⁶⁶ They protect the human rights of all persons through policy-making, a standardized documentation system, and legal protection mechanisms. In 2003, IMPARSIAL, along with celebrity-backed human rights group FRONTLINE, produced a detailed report entitled *Frontline Indonesia: Murders, Death Threats, and Other Forms of Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders*. This document offers a concise history of Indonesian NGOs before focusing on abuses towards Acehnese and Papuan human rights defenders, all of which is dedicated to those who have been martyred for their cause.

⁶⁴ Hadiwinata, *the Politics of NGOs in Indonesia*, 114.

⁶⁵ Please see Appendix VI, FORSOLA Statement.

⁶⁶ IMPARSIAL, "About IMPARSIAL," www.imparsial.org, accessed February 2004.

IMPARSIAL has been active in their campaign to end Martial Law in Aceh. Programme Director Rachland Nashidik toured Australian Universities and spoke to the Department of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 2003. Their webpage offers news clippings and reports on regional and thematic campaigns. The Executive Director of IMPARSIAL, Munir, is also the founder of KONTRAS (The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence).

KONTRAS was founded in 1998 to investigate and publicize the abduction of political activists, soon becoming Indonesia's foremost NGO.⁶⁷ KONTRAS' staff has received numerous bomb threats because of their controversial findings; on 27 September 2001, they were attacked and weeks later a bomb was found at Munir's home. Six months later, KONTRAS led a demonstration of military victims in front of General Wiranto's home; days later, two hundred militia members attacked their offices, destroying equipment and injuring employees.⁶⁸ In May 2003 KONTRAS was again attacked in Jakarta, this time by a GOLKAR-affiliated militia who resented the group's activities concerning Aceh; no police managed to arrive during the half hour assault.⁶⁹ In June 2003, KONTRAS activist Muzakkir Abdullah was found butchered in North Aceh, an action which was likely a message from the TNI.⁷⁰ A twenty two year old KONTRAS Aceh employee, Nurai'ni, and her 72 year old father Zakaria disappeared under the 2003 Martial Law, shortly after the decree on NGO workers was issued.

KONTRAS Aceh was formed shortly after its parent organization and was immediately critical of the military excesses during the peace talks and of the atrocities at EXXON-Mobil facilities. Recently, KONTRAS Aceh has been one of the most active groups since the imposition of Martial Law and Embedded Journalism. On 11 May 2003, KONTRAS Aceh was attacked by militias, just days before KOMNAS HAM was as well, as both groups were investigating the abduction and murder of two HRDs. Members of KONTRAS were subject to "threats, intimidation, and acts of violence."⁷¹ In response to the attack in Aceh, General Sutarto stated that "while it may be true that attacking the organization is against the law ... maybe they (KONTRAS) should look at themselves

⁶⁷ Please see www.kontras.org, or <http://www.desaparecidos.org/kontras>.

⁶⁸ IMPARSIAL and FRONTLINE, *Frontline Indonesia*, 39.

⁶⁹ Damar Harsanto, "Mob Attacks KONTRAS over Aceh Stance," *Jakarta Post* (28 May 2003).

⁷⁰ *United States Department of State*, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2003."

⁷¹ *Amnesty International*, "Indonesia: Protecting the Protectors."

in the mirror.”⁷² This as a demonstrative quote of how the Indonesian state views human security, as a public official has no place in giving such editorials.

SOLIDAMOR⁷³ (Solidarity without Borders, formerly Solidarity with East Timor) works mainly with East Timor, suffering massive assaults by militias during the referendum. Recently, their efforts have shifted to Aceh, where they have found that contrary to military reports, most victims are civilians.⁷⁴ SOLIDAMOR is part of the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA), *Front Rakyat Anti Militerisme*, and helps lead the recently formed group, Friends of Aceh, which organizes fact-finding missions and reports to KOMNAS HAM under Martial Law.

SOMAKA (Student Solidarity for Aceh Case) has worked with the PRD, giving political education and speeches at various events.⁷⁵ They support a referendum in Aceh, holding mass demonstrations on 22 March 1999 outside the United Nations building in Jakarta in order to gain international recognition for their cause.

The YAPPIKA (Foundation for Indonesian People’s Participation, Initiative, and Partnership) was formerly known as the ICF. This organization works closely with Canadian partners, such as CIDA, on researching Indonesian politics. In 1999, YAPPIKA and the UNDP signed a partnership with the goal of increasing voter education in Indonesia. The group held a May 2001 seminar examining military organizations and restructuring efforts, which was sponsored by USAID. YAPPIKA has a large programme for community socioeconomic development, and is involved in conferences around the world; in fact, the author first met YAPPIKA during their 2002 tour of Canada. There are few major issues in Indonesia which escape this group’s attention.

YAPPIKA has several programmes within Aceh, from grassroots economic recovery programmes in South Aceh to a structural focus at various seminars. One example is Dr. Otto Syamsuddin Ishak’s presentation the *Conflict in Aceh: the Basis for Reform or Military Reconsolidation* in the autumn of 2002; as the readers will note throughout the rest of the book, Dr. Otto is the foremost

⁷² Asian Human Rights Commission, “KONTRAS Office and Staff Attacked Again by Militias with Military Backing,” *Religious Groups for Human Rights Newsletter*, Volume 5, Issue 22 (2 July 2003).

⁷³ Please see www.solidamor.org/.

⁷⁴ *Aljazeera*, “ASEAN Exploiting Terror War” (7 October 2003).

⁷⁵ Sam King, “PRD Rallies with Masses in Jakarta,” *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 364 (9 June 1999).

activist regarding Aceh. Another example of YAPPIKA's work is their election monitoring programmes; hostile to the idea of democracy under military rule, YAPPIKA works hard to document abuses during campaigns and reports them to media forums, such as a special interview in Metro-TV on 8 April 2004. YAPPIKA has also published several books on Aceh in Bahasa Indonesia, written by Dr. Otto as well as Franz Magnis-Suseno.⁷⁶

3) Post Suharto Civil Society- Aceh

Since the end of the DOM era, Aceh has seen “an impressive flowering of civic organizations and an expansion of the ‘public space’ so long suppressed.”⁷⁷ There are several types of groups in Aceh: groups which focus on children and development, student groups, IDP relief groups, and groups with explicitly political mandates. The first group has had few new additions, but is characterized by an expansion of the previously strong base described above. The second group is the most important, and the most active in local politics. The third group has been a strong reaction, mainly by students, to the travesty of the IDP situation Aceh faces today. The fourth group is the smallest and least likely to grow until some semblance of liberty can be maintained in Aceh.

3.1 Development Groups

Several organizations focus on human development; not only do all wars and poverty hurt children more than others, but this also provides fuel for years of future conflict. There is great urgency for children's rights; Amnesty International notes that the GAM regularly coerces boys and girls, particularly orphans, to work with them. They offer examples of young men “who have been shown a photograph which GAM claims is a picture of the soldier responsible for killing his father.”⁷⁸ Even beyond child soldiers, there exists the problem of poverty, mainly caused by the TNI economy and destruction of infrastructure. The following groups work to build schools, hospitals, and other structures, in so doing allowing for future peace.

The ACRA (Aceh Child Rights Alliance) is a group made up of the YAB, KKSP, KONTRAS, PCC, CORDOVA, and LBH Banda Aceh.⁷⁹ The ACRA runs a gamut of programmes relating to Acehnese children, focusing mainly on refugee health issues and rebuilding schools. Under Martial

⁷⁶ Please see Bibliography.

⁷⁷ Crow, “Aceh: the ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra.”

⁷⁸ Amnesty International, “Indonesia: A Cycle of Violence for Aceh's Children” (23 November 2000).

⁷⁹ Please see www.acra.or.id/eng/.

Law, several schools were burned down and teachers killed or scared away; the TNI and the GAM blamed the other and observers inhabited points in between. Even where schools continue to operate, the ACRA noted in 2002 that drop out rates were 14% for Acehese students because of economic need, a lack of capable teachers, and safety issue.⁸⁰ The organizations of the ACRA have taken action to resurrect the facilities so that the war is not fuelled in future years by young persons with little education and few marketable skills.

The YAB (*Yayasan Anak Bangsa*) works with street children in Aceh, ensuring that they will not be part of a 'Lost Generation'. As in all conflict situations, Acehese youths who grow up in war without access to education or families are the soldiers of tomorrow, not to mention an infringement on the rights of children today. To this end, the YAB conducts programmes to rehabilitate child soldiers and other conflict prevention programmes. The YAB has held workshops helping street children alongside USAID, UNIFEC, Child Workers in Asia, and other major international groups. Despite the nature of the organization's work, on 26 June 2001, YAB offices were ransacked by BRIMOB units who accused the group of political activities.⁸¹

The MISPI (Indonesia Women's True Partners Organization) focuses on including women and Islam in government policy. One of the more interesting Acehese projects, MISPI held a discussion in April 2002 regarding the role of female Ulamas. The group works closely with FLOWER Aceh, PM Aceh (Women's Freedom), and the INFIT women's group. MISPI was vocal regarding the ability of either side to live up to the peace agreements of 2002-03.⁸²

Similarly, ORPAD (Acehese Democratic Women's Organization) is concerned with women and politics. ORPAD spoke up at a 16 July 2002 protest attended by over seven hundred women regarding the fifty billion rupiah development fund allocated for the federal government, which is used by local politicians and does not reach Acehese families.⁸³ The organizers were arrested, with ORPAD's Chairwoman held in jail for half a year for 'attempting to overthrow the government'; the judge believed that "the defendant has disgraced the government's pride."⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Iswanto, "the Crumble of Our School," *ACRA News Analysis*, available at www.acra.or.id/eng/acra/Analisis/TheCrumbleOfOurSchool.htm, accessed February 2004.

⁸¹ *TAPOL Bulletin*, "Aceh Sinks Deeper into War," Issue 162 (August 2001).

⁸² Nani Farida and Tiarna Siboro, "Government and GAM to Meet in Switzerland," *Jakarta Post* (23 April 2003).

⁸³ *Green Left Weekly*, "Free Raihana Diani," Issue 517 (20 November 2002).

⁸⁴ *Jakarta Post*, "Aceh Woman Imprisoned for Insulting Indonesian President" (7 January 2003).

ORPAD has been under tight watch since Martial Law was declared, as Indonesian Generals have openly threatened them in press releases. On 22 February 2004, three ORPAD activists, alongside three other persons, were abducted by BRIMOB for protesting Martial Law, their cases being taken up by the LBH.⁸⁵ Though several of those held were released, ORPAD activist Herlina would be tried for treason, the TNI alleging they helped attack a military convoy.⁸⁶

The YASMA (*Yayasan Karya Bersama*) was organized on 5 November 1997 in reaction to the poverty created by clearcut logging and over fishing. Their aim is youth education through art, religion, culture, and human rights training. The YASMA has been critical of missing food shipments to IDP camps, as very little government aid ever reaches its intended destination. Like too many other groups, YASMA has also suffered from military violence; on 17 November 1999, several volunteers were detained and tortured in South Aceh.⁸⁷

Cordova is a group of scholars against militarization which investigates human rights abuses. Their focus is on women's rights, civil rights, and conflict resolution. Cordova has its own publishing house as well as its own bulletin, *the Cordova Post*, and was appointed to help the HDC monitor violations during the Humanitarian Pause. They have published countless books alongside YAPPIKA, as well as contributing to several collaborations.

Cordova's director is Dr. Otto Syamsuddin, who also chairs the KIPP, works with YAPPIKA, is a University Lecturer, has spoken at several international conferences, and works with the SULO. The SULO (the Information Network and People's Empowerment) works on poverty reduction through the Koalisi NGO network.

Dr. Otto stated in an interview with the Red Cross that to help the peace efforts, "all parties should discard their war gear in the interest of the local community." This is a typical statement of Aceh's development-based civil society, which works to help the victims of the conflict as opposed to their own interests.

⁸⁵ Tiarna Siboro and Nani Farida, "NGOs Slam BRIMOB Over Abductions of Aceh Students," *Jakarta Post* (25 February 2004).

⁸⁶ *Associated Press*, "Police Release Eight Activists in Aceh" (28 February 2004).

⁸⁷ *Amnesty International*, "Indonesia: Activists at Risk" (23 November 2000).

3.2 Student Groups

Student groups are the strongest, most political, and most recent parts of Acehese civil society. These groups have strong connections with independence movements, Islam, and human rights; their structures are often informal, they have several common members, and as they mature they provide new activists to regular civil society actors. Their origins are linked with several dedicated professors; one such teacher was Dayan Dawood, rector of Syiah Kuala University⁸⁸ in Aceh's capital, who was shot dead in September 2001. Days prior to his murder, Dawood had proposed some academic and religious figures aid in a GAM-TNI dialogue. Another professor martyred for his involvement was the State Academy of Islamic Studies (IAIN)⁸⁹ director, who was murdered a year prior. Another example is Dr. Hasbi Abdullah, a former student activist and professor at Syiah Kuala's Faculty of Economics who is the brother of GAM Commander Zaini Abdullah; Hasbi has been arrested several times for years on end without due trial. Professor Safwan Idris was shot in his home by a man reportedly sponsored by the BRIMOB; Idris was "one of Aceh's most prominent intellectuals," critical of "military excesses" and a "popular candidate for the next Governor of Aceh."⁹⁰ Yet another example is Ahmad Dewi, once the head of a Muslim school in Idi Cut, abducted after trying to convince GAM members to stop using violence. The hard work and sacrifices of Aceh's professors have allowed for today's student movement.

Student intelligence networks known as 'Black Cat Brigades' have organized in order to undermine provocateurs; this is just one of several examples of students during the interregnum working towards peace in Aceh. This phenomenon was most obvious during the September 1999 province-wide strike, which lasted two days "in an explicit spirit of Peaceful Protest and Withdrawal of Cooperation based on Islamic principles."⁹¹ Black Cat Brigades are the most informal of all student associations, as they must be in order to monitor random violent attacks.

The HUDA (Congregation of *Dayah* Religious Scholars of Aceh) is an Ulama group which has a membership of teachers from six hundred religious schools and 80,000 of their students.⁹² The HUDA is highly critical of the special autonomy laws offered by the Indonesian Government,

⁸⁸ Please see www.unsyiah.ac.id/.

⁸⁹ Please see <http://ar-raniry.freehosting.net/>.

⁹⁰ Anthony Reid, "War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh," 11.

⁹¹ Crow, "Aceh: the 'Special Territory' in North Sumatra."

⁹² TAPOL Bulletin, "Can Special Autonomy Work?" (December 2001), available at www.tapol.gn.apc.org/164-5ncans.htm, accessed February 2004.

including Islamic law, which some of its members once supported but see it as a nominal issue in a conflict environment. The HUDA has several connections with Muslim student organizations, which makes its clout considerable.

The Muhammadiyah Students Association (IMM) is the second largest national Islamic group in Indonesia, known for massive protests against what they describe as anti-Muslim politics in the United States and Australia. The Aceh branch of the IMM is active in peace movements and study sessions; the IMM hosts an ongoing discussion series on human rights and Islam for Acehese student leaders, and offered to participate in brokering peace between the GAM and TNI with the late Professor Dawood.

The KAGEMPAR (West Aceh Students Movement) has also been a political force in the region, working alongside the SIRA, and was the subject of a serious BRIMOB attack on 3 December 2002 when its coordinator, Musliadi, was abducted after a meeting with the Henry Dunant Center.⁹³ Musliadi's body was found days later in a river, his head penetrated by screwdrivers.⁹⁴ This group worked with the UNDP to deliver assistance to West Aceh in 2001.

Other student groups include:

- The MAPPRA (Acehnese Youth Referendum Struggle)
- The SMIPA (the Concerned Islamic Students Solidarity for Aceh)
- The KMPAN (Committee of Students and Youth of Aceh Nusantara)
- GAMAUR (All Muslim Student Movement for the People)
- The SAMAN (Action Solidarity of Nusantara Aceh Students)
- The KAPPUR (Pidie Unity for People)

Unlike several other groups, the SMUR (Student Solidarity for the People) has proven durability, as "SMUR is now one of the few longer-term university student organisations in Aceh."⁹⁵ It formed during the fall of the New Order, organizing a twelve day strike and federal election boycotts. The SMUR has moved from protesting the New Order to working towards Acehese independence. SMUR has spun off several other groups, including San Francisco SMUR and SPUR (High School

⁹³ SIRA, "Key Acehese Human Rights Activist Found Dead," www.siranews.com/news, accessed January 2004.

⁹⁴ United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2002."

⁹⁵ Pip Hinman, "Aceh is the Next Timor says Visiting Activist," *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 488 (24 April 2002).

Students Solidarity for the People). SMUR has been the target of several police attacks; on 3 January 2000, over a dozen members of the group were detained and beaten after taking part in a remembrance ceremony. In September 1999, several student groups came together in response to a supposed GAM statement in the *Serambi Indonesia* journal which implicated the SMUR in extortion and a GAM partnership.

During the peace talks in 2003, the SMUR stated that “the Peace Agreement is only for the Indonesian Government and for the GAM,” despite the fact that article two, point ‘F’ of the COHA includes civil society in all dialogues.⁹⁶ During the resulting Martial Law, the SMUR has been critical of the effects on rural economies and the possibility of the 2004 elections; as a result, General Suwarya threatened the SMUR, as well as the SIRA, which he labeled GAM sympathizers.

The diverse interests of the SMUR include farmers, victims, tribal, student, and labour organizations. It has worked with the PRD and ASAP to tour the region, gaining support from international leftist groups. In a surprising statement, likely speaking to its Marxist affiliates, the SMUR commented that:

We want the people of Aceh to return to the fold of NKRI (Indonesia) because we are confronting capitalism which requires national unity, but this unity should not be one based on pressure...but a unity which is encouraged through joint voluntarism, sincerity and love for the life of the national and state.⁹⁷

Thus, the SMUR continues to reconsider its views and is not limited to conventional debates. This statement is NOT characteristic of the SMUR, but is of great interest because it shows that they are considering new positions. This view offers a new road to peace and economic development; it should not be forgotten during peace talks...by either side.

The WAKAMPAS (Youth and Student Movement for Democracy) was organized in 1999 by farmers and students concerned about agricultural land rights. In 2001, it matured into the FPDRA, an offshoot of the SMUR. The Acehese Popular Democratic Resistance Front (FPDRA) was formed in 2001, uniting several independence organizations. An Australian interviewer of FPDRA’s Chairman notes that “unlike the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), FPDRA also advocates

⁹⁶ SMUR Press Release, “Calling for Hunger Strike for Civilian Political Freedom and Demilitarization in Aceh” (18 March 2003).

⁹⁷ SMUR and LMND Press Release, “Approaching 100 Days of the Military Emergency in Aceh” (23 August 2003). Available online at www.asia-pacific-action.org/southeastasia/indonesia/indoleft/lmnd-smur_stat-230803.htm.

the fundamental democratisation of Acehese society in the interests of the workers and peasants.”⁹⁸ During this interview, it was emphasized that the FPDRA is aware of the expansion of civil society actors in Aceh, and that these groups must organize with one another, not necessarily on the grounds of independence but of bringing a ceasefire. One of the FPDRA’s foci has been EXXON-Mobil and its operations alongside the TNI. At a 2001 protest, its chairperson Kautsar was arrested for a six month term. Like the SMUR, it was declared illegal under Martial Law and was forced underground.

In December 1998, KARMA (Coalition for Reform Action of Acehese Students) arrived on the scene when they gave President Habibie a list of demands and thirty days to respond to them before a referendum was organized. Their demands included wider autonomy, 80% of resource revenue, investigating Human Rights abuses, effective justice, and the release of political prisoners. Habibie’s failure resulted in several groups coming forward to campaign for a referendum on Aceh’s independence.

FARMIDIA (Aceh Student Action Front for Reform) is one of several University-based pro-referenda groups which are also involved in human rights cases and direct aid to impoverished families.⁹⁹ One of their five principles is anti-violence, which is their directive in a series of protests against military atrocities. Their relationship with police forces has been tedious; in January 1999, hundreds of the group’s activists marched on police headquarters, delivering speeches and prayers before meeting with police leaders regarding abuses.¹⁰⁰ On 6 March and 27 July 2000 several FARMIDIA members were detained by BRIMOB, and in February 2003 the TNI issued a warrant for FARMIDIA’s leaders’ arrest. Group leaders have also drawn attention due to their stance on EXXON-Mobil, with its Secretary General actually traveling to the annual EXXON-Mobil Annual Meeting in Texas on 30 May 2001 to speak to board members, asking “why not demand that the troops it hires not commit serious and widespread human rights violations? With power comes responsibility.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ John Gauci, “Aceh: Freedom Movement Demands Independence Referendum,” *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 492 (15 May 2002).

⁹⁹ Please see <http://farmidia.cjb.net/>.

¹⁰⁰ *KOMPAS*, “Amien Rais: that is Genocide” (13 January 1999).

¹⁰¹ Radhi Darmansyah, “EXXON’s Responsibility for Atrocities in Aceh,” speech given at EXXON-Mobil Annual Meeting (30 May 2001).

The SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Center) was created during the KOMPAS (Worldwide Acehnese Students and Youth Congress) on 4 February 1999 after a series of pro-referendum rallies throughout Aceh, themselves fuelled by President Habibie's promise for an East Timor vote. An expatriate activist summarizes that SIRA is

The largest organization leading the fight for a referendum, larger than GAM... (SIRA) has more than 100 member organizations. SIRA is the biggest challenge to the government, not only because we have such widespread support, but also because of the reasonableness of our demands.¹⁰²

The SIRA condemns human rights violations and supports the intervention of the United Nations to bring about a popular vote through their newspaper SUWA, conferences, and rallies. On 8 November 1999, the SIRA organized the Open Conference of Community Fighters for Freedom. In November 1999 and 2000, the SIRA helped bring together mass rallies for their cause in the streets of Banda Aceh. On 17 August 2000 (Indonesia's National Day), they organized a protest, flying United Nations flags and calling for separation.



The group is in fact pro-independence, as the result of a referendum at this point would be a foregone conclusion; the SIRA praised the peace talks in 2000 because it is the “first step towards a referendum on independence for Aceh.”¹⁰³ But this may not have been the case at first; Aspinall states that in mid-1999, such students “viewed the referendum as a bargaining chip to pressure the government to take action on human rights violations.”¹⁰⁴ He argues that the violent response of the Indonesian state transformed this tactic into “a genuine demand.”

Human Rights Watch notes that “SIRA had no known links to GAM when it began’ indeed, it went contrary to GAM’s philosophy to offer people a choice rather than to accept independence as the only alternative...” not to mention the SIRA’s opposition to violence.¹⁰⁵ This is an important

¹⁰² *News & Letters Newspaper*, “Struggle Continues Against Bloodshed in Aceh,” (June 2001).

¹⁰³ Bronwyn Curran, “the Humanitarian Pause,” *Voice of America* (12 May 2000).

¹⁰⁴ Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity: Indonesian and Acehnese Nationalism in Conflict,” 13.

¹⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 9.

argument because the Indonesian Security Forces see them as kin; Brigadier General Chairul Rasjid told Human Rights Watch that “GAM and SIRA are like Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta” (the East Timor ‘rebel’ and Nobel Laureate, respectively).¹⁰⁶

There are some sympathies to be found between the GAM and the SIRA; for instance, after the death of a GAM leader in January 2002, SIRA issued a memorial statement.¹⁰⁷ But personal relationships hardly prove collusion, let alone justify a violent response. Allegations that the SIRA and GAM share equipment must also be questioned, as such equipment is in high demand and either group may have little choice; again, if true, it does not prove unity by any means. The SIRA is tolerated by the GAM, but linking the organizations has *no* foundation. In September 2000, two of its leaders were abducted by the BRIMOB and severely beaten. Two months later, the police raided the SIRA offices without a warrant. On 20 November 2000, SIRA Chairperson Mohammad Nazar was arrested for ‘spreading hatred’, eventually sentenced to ten months in prison (released 9 October 2001). Subsequently, in May 2001 the police accused the SIRA of planning attacks at universities and raided its offices, as SIRA seemed to be the military’s number one enemy. Nazar was also arrested in early 2003, Nazar was arrested for not informing the government of a rally, this despite the COHA freedoms which existed on paper. In February 2004, Mohammad Nazar was arrested and beaten, not given access to legal council, and as a result was the focus of an American Government press release condemning the Indonesian Government.

The SIRA’s Jakarta office was also raided, its leaders jailed, after an 8 November 2000 rally in front of UN headquarters, but its Banda Aceh office has been the largest target. On 15 May 2001, it was vandalized by twenty four masked men with such terms as “Communist Party headquarters,” “Jewish funds,” and “eating the money of the people” painted on their walls.¹⁰⁸ The Indonesian Government accused the SIRA of bombing several locations in Jakarta, which caused countless groups to rally behind them in response. In January 2002, SIRA activist Junaidi was abducted by the TNI, and in February 2003, SIRA activist Abdullah was taken into police custody and detained without trial or consultation.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 19.

¹⁰⁷ *News & Letters Newspaper*, “Resistance Leader Murdered in Aceh,” (March 2002).

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 21.

¹⁰⁹ *Amnesty International*, “AI Index ASA 21/004/2003,” 10 February 2003.

The SIRA's second principle is that its methods "are peaceful and democratic. It has no arms and does not use any violent approaches."¹¹⁰ Whether or not the Indonesian Government agrees with the SIRA, it does great harm by not recognizing their antipathy towards violence, a neglect which gives no reason for the GAM to consider a non-violent position. An October 2002 NGO conference in Bangkok specified in their Final Declaration that the signed support "civil society organizations like Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA) and others to continue their struggle to defend and to promote peaceful solution to end the decades long conflict of Aceh."¹¹¹ Although they refuse to oppose the GAM, SIRA's non-violent methods and tremendous popularity make it a promising group in a post-war Aceh.

3.3 IDP Relief Groups

A constant critique of student groups is that their concerns are elite, as university graduates are future leaders with goals separate from the people. However in Aceh, several groups which have grown to give emergency assistance to IDPs have been students, who work alongside the impoverished. Student IDP relief groups were first established in North Aceh, where the military had pushed several thousand families into a remote village; here students began to organize for their rights. These activists set up similar organizations across Aceh, leading to the creation of permanent organizations which distributed food, supplies, and counseling to rural areas. Military brutality resulted in an expanded mandate for these groups, which began to investigate missing persons and killings in the camps and then the villages.

The FP HAM (Care Human Rights Forum) was established in July of 1998, using student volunteers to document human rights abuses as well as provide training for smaller organizations. FP HAM noted that it was after the DOM-era ended that abuses became known, a fact which urged the creation of several NGOs. On 7 February 1999, an FP HAM activist was abducted after investigating a massacre by the TNI. A similar fate befell a SEFA activist on 5 September 2000. The Save Emergency for Aceh (SEFA) works with refugees, combating the high mortality rates in the makeshift homes. In the summer of 2000, a volunteer for Save Emergency was severely beaten by security forces.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ SIRA Website, "An Overview of SIRA," www.siranews.com/overview.html, accessed January 2004.

¹¹¹ Forum-Asia, "Recommendation of Asian Civil Society on Aceh," 25 October 2002.

¹¹² United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2000."

The PCC (People's Crisis Center) was formed by students in 1998 to help IDPs, its Aceh branch being formed on 6 January 1999. A member of the ACRA, their website contains a detailed list of IDPs in Aceh up to the Martial Law period.¹¹³ Their reliable work won them a contract with the UNDP during the Humanitarian Pause, creating the Returnee Community Rehabilitation Program with over three million Rupiah in funding.¹¹⁴ The PCC has come into conflict with POLRI and BRIMOB forces on several occasions, as they work in conflict areas offering emergency aid to victims of displacement; on 19 January 2000, several members were beaten when the police raided their office. Further arrests have come due to the PCC's involvement with pro-independence rallies. Like PEMRAKA and RATA below, the PCC has slowly grown more political as they have seen a need to help IDPs in a variety of ways.

The PEMRAKA (Concerned Aceh Student's and People's Headquarters) was organized for IDP relief near conflict areas. Since 10 April 1999, the PEMRAKA begun by accompanying IDPs to new sites, but soon took on a greater role, providing food and medical supplies. They have come into conflict with BRIMOB units on several occasions, as the nature of their work is in the midst of conflict areas. On 6 January 2000, a volunteer was abducted while assisting injured civilians.

The RATA (Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims) works with several international groups to heal the physical and psychological wounds of military violence. The RATA is unfortunately known for the tragedy which occurred on 6 December 2000; on this date, several of its staff members were executed. The lone survivor of this attack, Nazaruddin A. Gani, identified the four civilians and four officers who killed his colleagues; this case was chosen by KOMNAS HAM to be the first prosecuted under its special Human Rights Court provided by Law Number 26. The assailants were jailed, but were allowed to escape by guards as the trial stalled, the case later falling apart. As a result, the RATA closed for several months and several employees left the group; this

¹¹³ Please see www.acra.or.id/eng/pcc/index.html.

¹¹⁴ United Nations Development Programme, "Humanitarian Assistance in Aceh: Final Report" (Jakarta: Fall 2001).

experience showed the necessity of traveling with international partners.¹¹⁵ Nazaruddin was later granted asylum by the United States.¹¹⁶

RATA continues though, expanding its work with the help of new funders. Its 2002 programmes included blood banks, student essay contests, and translating UN documents in addition to its regular counseling. The RATA still managed to carry out its UNDP Programme with the help of the Red Cross during the Humanitarian Pause. Their ability to deal with tragedy has gained the group international recognition; in 2003, Time Magazine cited RATA activist Cut Syamsurniati as one of its Asian Heroes.¹¹⁷ Group founder Nurdin Abdul Rahman, himself a victim of torture during his eight years under arrest, lectures in English studies in Aceh and gave an Australian lecture tour in March 2003. He emphasizes the need to heal, not to blame; this is the RATA's core philosophy, which is necessary for peace as well as its continued operation.¹¹⁸

3.4 Political Groups

Some groups do not work for development or students, but instead have a political nature. Given the environment in Aceh, these groups are few. Some human rights groups can be categorized as such, specifically umbrella groups such as Aceh's NGO Coalition for Human Rights (Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh) and Forum LSM Aceh. Each of these collaborative groups has suffered severe police actions for their human rights messages which, in a military environment, are political by nature. In October 2001, Peace Brigades International accepted the request from Koalisi NGO HAM to accompany them to the field, as Koalisi volunteers had been targeted by TNI forces in several occasions.

As has the Forum Rakyat (People's Forum), whose chairperson was arrested at a peace march in November 2002; the Forum was targeted by Martial Law authorities in 2003, a staff member arrested on 8 June 2003. This police action was likely linked to the Forum's statements to foreign

¹¹⁵ Patrick McInnis, "Aceh: New PBI Team Mapping Security," *Peace Brigades International* (May 2002).

¹¹⁶ Testimony of Nazaruddin A. Gani before the Congressional Human Rights Congress, "Aceh- an Update of the human rights Situation," *Congressional Human Rights Caucus* (23 July 2003), available online at www.house.gov/lantos/caucus/TestimonyGani072303.htm.

¹¹⁷ Please see http://affiliate.timeincmags.com/time/asia/2003/heroes/cut_syamsurniati.html.

¹¹⁸ Lee Kim Chew, "Alienation in Aceh," *the Straights Times* (23 February 2000).

media that militias backed by security forces are responsible for burning down local schools.¹¹⁹ Forum Rakyat investigates reported atrocities committed by security forces against civilians, a mandate which places them in confrontation with armed groups regularly. This group has been extremely vocal about the absence of civilian voices in the peace process, as have several other groups.

The SAMAK (People's Solidarity against Corruption) is a political NGO which works to pressure and monitor provincial and regional governments. They have been outspoken regarding central government aid,¹²⁰ working with the INFID to examine military spending,¹²¹ and receiving equipment and training from USAID in 2002.¹²² SAMAK Aceh has fought the corruption of local politicians, citing that over a trillion rupiah in humanitarian aid has been siphoned off by the provincial government in 2001.¹²³ In 2004, their campaign against Governor Puteh made major progress, as his corruption has been proven and his removal seems likely.

The FDPRA (Acehnese Peoples Democratic Resistance Front) is a leftist political party which works with sympathetic groups in Australia and other countries, as well as the PRD in Jakarta. Formed in 2001 by the founders of the SMUR and other radical student organizations, they oppose the GAM by promoting fundamental freedoms and equality, operating in urban areas, with the workers. Here, the FDPRA has potential where the GAM, run by elite rulers with feudal titles, has little credibility. Kautsar, its founder, has been arrested and beaten several times for such stances, considered by Amnesty International to be a prisoner of conscience.¹²⁴ Under Martial Law, the FDPRA has gone underground or fled abroad after a wave of arrests and trials.

We must work with these Acehnese groups, though also continue to challenge them. They are the key to development in Aceh, though we must realize that NGOs are often seen as elite, or as

¹¹⁹ James Balowski, "Aceh: Civilians, Rights Activists Targeted in Terror War," *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 540 (4 June 2003).

¹²⁰ Nani Farida, "Acehnese Ask Government to Reject Aid," *Jakarta Post* (23 January 2003).

¹²¹ INFID, "Aceh Briefing Paper," <http://infid.be/>, accessed February 2004.

¹²² USAID: Office of Transition Initiatives, "Field Report: Indonesia," March 2002.

¹²³ Cited in Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, "the Conflict in Aceh: the Basis for Reform or Military Reconsolidation," paper given at the INFID Conference: *Creating Alternatives for Indonesia* (October 2002), 10.

¹²⁴ Amnesty International New Zealand, "Let's Not Repeat the Mistakes of the Past: Human Rights in Aceh, Indonesia," available online at <http://amnesty.org.nz>.

detached by the rural Acehnese people. Acehnese NGOs are often urban, educated groups which speak across the world on behalf of the Acehnese people. The more such groups travel and attend conferences, as they must do, the less they can represent local voices. So we must be weary of creating a new intellectual elite by challenging these expatriates and focusing on groups which help rural, illiterate Acehnese voices be heard at such meetings and conferences. Given the quality and variety of Acehnese civil society, this does not appear to be an impossible objective.

4) Other Civil Society

Civil society cannot be limited to NGOs, as academics, the media, and unions are strong actors which, though often conflicting with NGOs, are fundamental to a functional democracy. Already described has been the unusual role of legal aid groups in Indonesia as well as student and academic groups. This brief section will look at the media and labour-related actors in the Aceh conflict.

4.1 Media

There are several Indonesian media groups which offer different interpretations of the Aceh conflict. Antara is Indonesia's national news agency, founded on 13 December 1937.¹²⁵ It has several provincial offices, and because it supports the Indonesian Government, it is a valuable source of the Republic's views and events regarding Aceh. The TVRI is the state-owned television channel;¹²⁶ receiving no outside revenue, this station was the only Indonesian television station for decades. It usually offers coverage which is hostile to the GAM, which has resulted in several violent reactions against TVRI employees by the rebels. Recent private TV stations, mostly founded by Suharto associates, include the TPI, SCTV, and RCTI. Indonesia's TV news channel, MetroTV¹²⁷, broadcasted a thirty episode special, *Aceh Forges a New Path*, which detailed various aspects of the conflict. It aired from 16 November to 16 December in 2001, its stories- described by a leading Indonesian NGO as "alternative media"- received voluminous feedback, both positive and negative, from viewers.¹²⁸ MetroTV also publishes newspaper with similar views, though its circulation is small compared to the national services.

¹²⁵ Please see www.antara.co.id.

¹²⁶ Please see <http://tvri.co.id/>.

¹²⁷ Please see www.metrotvnews.com/.

¹²⁸ Rachland Nashdik, "Aceh Forges New Path," *TIFA Foundation Human Rights Column*, available online at www.tifafoundation.org/english/news/c200201.asp, accessed February 2004.

The first English language newspaper in the country was the Indonesian Observer, but this journal was displaced twenty years ago by what is now the largest English newspaper in Indonesia, the Jakarta Post. Created from a merger on 25 April 1983, the newspaper has a circulation of over 40,000, several foreign distribution centers, several awards (i.e. 1994 Best Newspaper with fewer than 50,000 in circulation) as well as an online version.¹²⁹ The paper, though far from radical, has managed to be impartial in its coverage of Aceh, citing NGO as well as government sources. Field reporters such as Nani Farida produce several feature stories on the Aceh conflict, critical looks at government policy, and interviews with activists. Such reporting makes Jakarta Post the primary conduit for news on Aceh.

An associate of the Jakarta Post, KOMPAS is the largest Bahasa language daily newspaper, as well as a large multimedia corporation. This Bahasa language publication is joined by the Koran Tempo, Republika, and Waspada as the domestic major media sources. Koran Tempo first published on 2 April 2001, a spin-off of the widely popular Tempo Magazine.¹³⁰ Tempo Magazine began publishing in March of 1971, the first media group with no political affiliation; banned in 1982 and 1994, Tempo has earned a large circulation since its return in 1998. Tempo also began publishing an English version on 12 September 2000. Tempo Interaktif is the online version of the journal, available in several languages. The Tempo group is popular among youths, working for freedom of information and remaining critical of military operations.

Republika is an Islamic newspaper, run by former President Habibie, its views on Aceh being generally conservative. Waspada is a smaller daily, based out of Medan, which manages to cover Aceh in a professional manner; their website offers a special section on Aceh with frequent updates.¹³¹ They have been critical of Indonesian forces, including a 1999 feature exposé on their treatment of IDPs. In July 2003, Waspada reporter Idrus Jeumpa's family was assaulted, his wife killed, after by what he suspects were GAM soldiers.¹³² Waspada, along with *Serambi Indonesia*,

¹²⁹ Please see www.thejakartapost.com. For their special section on Aceh, please see www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_07.asp.

¹³⁰ Please see www.tempo.co.id/.

¹³¹ Please see <http://www.waspada.co.id/>.

¹³² *Associated Press*, "Suspected Rebels Kill Journalist's Wife in Aceh" (21 July 2003).

alleged that the GAM had resorted to violence when reporters refused to pay taxes to the soldiers.¹³³ Academics describe Waspada, alongside *Serambi*, as the best coverage on Aceh.¹³⁴

Serambi Indonesia has operated sporadically for several years as a small, independent political journal in Aceh.¹³⁵ Throughout the DOM-era, *Serambi*'s activism caused members such as Dr. Adnan Beuransyah to be arrested for several years. The journal refuses to quote GAM press releases, blames the GAM for murders, attends GAM meetings, and takes pictures of TNI victims. As a result, *Serambi* was attacked by the GAM on several occasions, as well as by BRIMOB and the TNI. These attacks caused the paper to close on 20 June 2001, prompting several international media groups to protest the GAM leadership in Sweden and the Indonesian Armed Forces.¹³⁶ The journal had returned when the COHA began; typical of their work, a *Serambi* editorial praised the peace, which allowed development and healing in "the real lives of Acehnese society", which the writer felt was at odds with all military forces.¹³⁷ When Martial Law was declared, the journal became semi-operational, harassed continually by TNI and BRIMOB forces.

Some media do not actually report news as much as they do collect it and distribute it on global networks. One such actor is www.achehtimes.com, which mixes global sources with field reports and editorials, the latter being highly critical of the Indonesian state and its military forces. A simpler, more accessible format, www.acheh-eye.org features a detailed media database with an emphasis on civil society and access to statements from the Indonesian Government, the GAM, and other groups. Perhaps its greatest strength is its regularly updated field reports from all six districts of Aceh.

Another website is www.acehkita.com, its greatest strength being its testimonials and field reports which hope to bring light to the every day lives of civilians in Aceh. Acehkita.com publishes Acehkita Magazine, a glossy journal which elaborates on its website content with the goal of

¹³³ Agence France-Presse, "Aceh Rebels Kill Woman, Wound Husband and Daughter" (21 July 2003).

¹³⁴ Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia on the Net: Resources on Two Troubled Regions," *Inside Indonesia*, Issue 60 (Winter 1999).

¹³⁵ Please see www.indomedia.com/serambi/.

¹³⁶ International Federation of Journalists, "Journalists' Safety in Aceh" (22 June 2001), available online at <http://www.alliance.org.au/leadstory/2001/ifj2.htm>, accessed February 2004.

¹³⁷ BBC News, "Peace Monitors Arrive in Aceh" (10 December 2002).

supporting the peace process through Bahasa and English editions. They rely on independent reporters whose stories do not advocate violence which is “perpetrated by any of the warring factions.”¹³⁸ An excellent example of their stories, which are often soaked in black humor, describes a group of farmers who were forced by the GAM at gunpoint to dig holes in a road in order to disrupt transportation. The next week, the TNI forced them at gunpoint to fill the holes in; this is a process which repeats itself while the farmers are abused by both and their crops are wasted.¹³⁹ Acehkita.com is a member of several media organizations, namely the below Alliance.

Most of the aforementioned diversity in the Indonesian media is the result of the organizations which fought hard to create such space. One such group is the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), formed in 1994 after three journals were banned by Suharto’s Government. Working against government sponsored media through its journal, *Independen*, the AJI won the 1997 International Press Institute Free Pioneer Award.¹⁴⁰ Officially unrecognized until 1998, several of its members were jailed for defamation. Another aspect of the Alliance’s work is advocating higher wages for Indonesia’s reporters, working alongside press unions throughout Indonesia. But their main issue is press freedom, which in Aceh brings them into confrontations with all armies.

The AJI has been active regarding the restriction of press freedoms under Martial Law in Aceh. The process of ‘embedded journalism’, learned from American wartime experiences, allows only government-approved groups to document the conflict, which the AJI believes forces them to be biased in favour of the TNI.¹⁴¹ Instead of this, the Alliance supports peace journalism. The group criticizes propaganda under Martial Law, such as the boot camp for journalists going into Aceh, a process highlighted by Australian television in 2003. The group was invited by the Red Cross to work towards the release of media personnel abducted by the GAM, namely journalist Ersi Siregar and cameraman Ferry Santoro. The GAM and the TNI have each been critiqued for intimidating journalists; one writer felt that “if our coverage were too sympathetic to the TNI, we would be

¹³⁸ “About Acehkita,” *Acehkita Magazine* (found in each issue of the publication).

¹³⁹ Azhar, “Dig and Cover: It’s Not a Game,” *Acehkita* (15 November 2003), 14.

¹⁴⁰ *Reporters Sans Frontières*, “Journalist Held Hostage for Six Months Killed in Clash at Aceh” 30 December 2002.

¹⁴¹ A. Lin Neumann, “Out of Sight: Borrowing a Page from the US Playbook, the Indonesian Military is Restricting and Controlling Coverage of their War in the Restive Province of Aceh,” *Committee to Protect Journalists* (16 July 2003).

targeted by GAM.”¹⁴² This is why the AJI is so important, as it protects those in the field and expands readership on issues related to Aceh in smaller member newspapers, such as *Suara Pembaruan*,¹⁴³ which is marked by the same balanced approach as the AJI in its heavy Aceh content.

The Alliance has been remarkably impartial regarding the Aceh conflict. In numerous conversations with its members, this author has been informed of the dire need for journalists in Aceh to balance GAM and TNI pressure both to ensure high standards and to survive. Their 1998-2002 report acknowledges the high rate of violence from the GAM, which was responsible for one quarter of abuses against the military during this period; targets included *Serambi Indonesia*, *Waspada*, *Forum Keadilan*, and *TVRI Aceh*. Indonesian Security Forces are held to blame for the other three quarters, with attacks on *RCTI*, *Reuters*, *Serambi Indonesia*, *APTM*, *Analisa*,¹⁴⁴ *Asia Press Agency*, *Aceh Ekspres*, *Waspada*, *Cypa Press*, and *Forum Keadilan*.¹⁴⁵ They report that in 2002, 118 writers were assaulted or threatened by Indonesian forces in Aceh. Thus, the AJI is simultaneously an NGO, a media organization, and a labour organization for those in the industry of reporting.

4.2 Labour

Trade unions are too often ignored as civil society actors, especially NGOs and academics, despite their obvious importance at the grassroots level. In fact, several NGOs are hostile to unions, which will have to be overcome if civil society is to participate in a peace dialogue. Under the New Order, labour groups suffered tremendously; they assert that the 1965 purge of Communists and other leftists “cemented the military and its proxies at the centre of political and economic life.”¹⁴⁶ Some groups managed to persevere though. The YLBHI worked with various unions, including the state-run All-Indonesian Worker’s Union (FBSI / SPSI) by using legal loopholes to create trade associations. In the 1990s, unions such as the PPBI (Center for Indonesian Working Class Struggle) grew tremendously, joining with student groups in several waves of protest. Several of

¹⁴² Aan Suryana, “War of Words: Journalists Covering the Conflict in Aceh were Embedded in a Fierce Propaganda War,” *Inside Indonesia* (January 2004), 10.

¹⁴³ Please see www.suarapembaruan.com.

¹⁴⁴ Please see www.analisadaily.com.

¹⁴⁵ Alliance of Independent Journalists, cited in IMPARSIAL and FRONTLINE, *Frontline Indonesia*, 72-76.

¹⁴⁶ Jasper Gross, “Where to the Workers after Gus Dur?” *Worker’s Online*, Issue 104 (27 July 2001).

these demonstrations came in May of 1993 after a woman labour activist was raped and murdered. This brought together trade unions, students, farmers, and human rights organizations, which blamed the military after investigations by the YLBHI.¹⁴⁷ This led to the formation of even more labour groups.

These groups have taken on increasingly political mandates, including speaking out on conflict zones. An Indonesian worker's confederation, the Indonesian National Front for Work Struggle (FNPBI), includes peace in Aceh alongside its general campaign of worker's rights.¹⁴⁸ Dita Sari, the FNPBI President, states that "as part of the democracy movement, the FNPBI believes that workers should support an end to all violence and oppression."¹⁴⁹ Ms. Sari also spoke to the Trade Union Congress in England, urging them to pressure the government to end arms sales to Indonesia, as such weapons are used in Aceh to kill workers, students, and the urban poor.¹⁵⁰

The People's Democratic Party (PRD), of which Sari is a leading member, supports a referendum in Aceh, asserting that "solving the political and economic problems in Aceh cannot take place in the framework of Indonesian capitalism."¹⁵¹ The PRD was created on 22 July 1996, organizing radical workers and students, and has been active regarding the Aceh issue. Opening branches in fourteen provinces in 1996, the PRD was immediately raided, its leaders sentenced to harsh jail terms. In 1998, the PRD became a political party; regarding the 2004 elections under Martial Law, the PRD asserts that "until a process of self-determination is implemented, an election has no democratic basis what so ever."¹⁵² The group works closely with student groups and unions. Aceh's largest general strikes were organized by the SMUR; a March 1999 demonstration brought the majority of Acehnese workers to the streets in a single event.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ IMPARSIAL and FRONTLINE, *Frontline Indonesia*, 17.

¹⁴⁸ Pip Hinman, "Indonesian Trade Union Leaders to Tour," *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 370 (4 August 1999).

¹⁴⁹ Dita Sari, "Invitation to Visit Indonesian for May Day 2000," *Worker's Online*, Issue 41 (26 November 1999).

¹⁵⁰ Trade Union Congress, "International," General Report for 15 September 1999. Available online at www.tuc.org.uk/congress, accessed January 2004.

¹⁵¹ Sam Wainwright, "Dita Sari: 'Allow the People of Aceh and West Papua to Choose'," *Green Left Weekly* (15 May 2002).

¹⁵² KOMPAS, "PRD Rejects General Elections in Aceh," 31 July 2003.

¹⁵³ *Workers Online*, "Aceh Activist in Sydney," Issue 84 (16 February 2001).

Unions within Aceh had a short window to organize during peace negotiations, however their rapid growth in the small opening demonstrates the strength of existing informal networks. On 12 August 2000, the PERTISA (All-Aceh Three Wheeler's Union) was formed to organize pedicab operators. Their goal was to limit the number of operators and to increase its members' welfare; it was formed during the HDC peace talks, but with Martial Law, it has been temporarily disbanded. The PERMATA (Aceh Peasant Union) is a farmer's organization which generally supports the GAM and operates in most rural areas in Aceh. Other groups include an unofficial bus driver's union (Labi-Labi), regional truck driver's guilds, and rubber plantation organizations.

Some unions are predominantly comprised of Javanese workers. At PT Arun, EXXON-Mobil is often at odds with its strong union; the unions held a one thousand person rally to demand contract extensions while the company cited decreased productivity after forced closures as reason for downsizing.¹⁵⁴ The closure also caused layoffs at the ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer Plant (AAF) Iskandar Muda Fertilizer Plant, and Kraft Paper Plant. These companies, which are horrible polluters and generally only hire transmigrants, are not homogeneous actors, made up largely of working class persons who are Javanese and Acehnese. There exist definite networks of workers between these corporations.

Unions are crucial in Aceh if we hope to reduce poverty and unemployment, as both militaries in Aceh use unemployment to swell their ranks. The lack of economic security forces workers abroad, which does not stop the GAM; the movement actively recruits from among the Acehnese labour diaspora in Malaysia and other countries, which increases the pressure of deportation from the Malaysian Government.¹⁵⁵ In this way, labour and international politics are closely linked. If workers are to have a strong role in peace-time Aceh, it would be beneficial for Acehnese unions to interact with other groups, such as South African unions, groups which have experience moving from underground to open political environments.

Several international unions have pledged their support for Indonesia's workers for reasons ranging from human rights to protectionism. Groups such as the International Labour Organization (ILO)

¹⁵⁴ Associated Press, "Hundreds Rally in Aceh Gasfield to Demand Extension of Contracts" (25 June 2003).

¹⁵⁵ Diana Wong and Teuku Afrisal, "Political Violence and Migration: Recent Acehnese Migration to Malaysia," Ford Foundation Conference on Indonesia and Displacement (June 2002), 60.

have worked with the Indonesian Government to develop their own resources and help reduce poverty among their constituents.¹⁵⁶ American labour groups have been instrumental in bringing EXXON-Mobil to court for its abuses in Aceh. Australian labour groups have provided forums and funding for Acehnese activists, their journals being a major source of information on Acehnese civil society. The next chapter looks at international actors, be they labour groups, governments, NGOs, or academics.

5) Conclusions

It is obvious that not only is civil society a crucial part of a just political system, but also that Aceh has a particularly strong civil society. NGOs in Aceh work under severe conditions; as noted by Harvard University's Conflict Prevention Initiative, "pressure from both GAM and the government limits the ability of NGOs to criticize actions and to reveal human rights abuses." The report continues that the "dialogue between GAM and the government did not involve civil society, thereby frustrating the attempts of the NGO community to play a role as peacemakers."¹⁵⁷ The absence of civil society from the talks was immediately noticed by various groups, from grassroots Acehnese to international agencies.¹⁵⁸ The peace accord must include a wide definition of civil society though, not only NGOs or academics; it must include "businessmen, trade unions, journalists, scientists, ulamas, peace and human right activists, women's associations, farmers, and fishermen...the entire population and not only the political elites."¹⁵⁹

Despite the importance of civil society in Aceh, such groups are consistently barred from peace talks, which is ironic in negotiations brought together by a European NGO, the HDC. Even Indonesian negotiator S. Wiryono critiqued the COHA's lack of transparency, stating that "parliament was not consulted on this matter, nor was there any discussion in the press or anywhere else in which experts and academics could have contributed."¹⁶⁰ Despite being shut out, local civil

¹⁵⁶ M. Taufiqurrahman, "Uphill Battle to Uphold Worker's Rights to Association," *Jakarta Post* (20 February 2003).

¹⁵⁷ Conflict Prevention Programme, Harvard University, "the Role of NGOs," *Addressing the Causes of Insecurity in Indonesia: Conference Report*, 2001. Available online at www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/report.php, accessed February 2004.

¹⁵⁸ *Down to Earth*, "Factsheet Indonesia: Post-Conflict Aceh," Issue 29 (May 2003).

¹⁵⁹ Azhari Idris, "Devolution of Power in Aceh: the Military's Role and Its Impact on Peace Building," European Parliament Workshop, *Indonesia: Between Regional Autonomy and Military Rule* (25 April 2002).

¹⁶⁰ S. Wiryono, "the Aceh Conflict: the Long Road to Peace," *the Indonesian Quarterly*, Volume 31, Issue 3 (Third Quarter 2003), 270.

society groups worked hard on the COHA peace efforts in their own community talks, as Acehese civil society groups were openly critical of the Agreement. In one example, a meeting facilitated by the Civil Society Task Force in Banda Aceh on 16 December 2002 aimed to provide a forum for civilians to express their views on how peace should be implemented.¹⁶¹ However, in order for local organizations to be effective, they must work with international groups; this is necessary for funding, pressure on the Indonesian Government, and logistical support.

¹⁶¹ Kautsar, "How to Make Peace: Civilians Demand a Part in Aceh's Peace Process," Inside Indonesia, Issue 74 (Spring 2003), 28.

Chapter 6: International Actors

Walking a tightrope between politics and human rights, international groups have played an important role in Aceh. This tightrope exists because a policy of overt interference would damage relations with the Indonesian state and weaken foreigners' ability to act—thus diplomacy is necessary. International organizations usually work with grassroots affiliates or have regional offices; to protect their partners and employees, they must “sign basic agreements with relevant ministries and agencies.”¹ There are several groups which have failed to walk this line; from 1985-1992, ‘the Brussels Incident’ saw the Suharto government expel Dutch NGOs which were working in an Indonesian NGO Forum (INGI, now known as INFID). The New Order punished the domestic actors in the INGI harshly, a warning for future international groups of the vulnerability of their partners.²

Notwithstanding such pressures, groups continue to work in Indonesia for reasons ranging from humanitarianism to profit-seeking. It is wrong to claim that due to international neglect and hostility, there exists an “international debt of responsibility to Aceh.”³ However, political collusion cannot be forgotten, especially when we court potential actors for a peace dialogue. We have already touched on historic and economic interactions between Aceh, Indonesia, and other regions; now we will look into external political pressures as they pertain to human rights and civil society. This section will be divided into foreign governments, Acehnese expatriate communities, which are generally students working alongside the next group, academics, who publish several journals. The fourth group described will be the media, which will bring us to international financial organizations (IFIs). Finally, the largest section will be non-governmental organizations. Though each group is important, our focus on NGOs will be more detailed because they have greater contact with local civil society, the focus of this text for bringing peace to Aceh.

1) Foreign Governments

The GAM actively courts Western intervention, though their reasoning is weak:

¹ Eldridge, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia*, 47.

² Hadiwinata, *the Politics of NGOs in Indonesia*, 98.

³ *Aceh: the Untold Story*, 76.

The Western colonial powers responsible for setting up 'Indonesia' in the first place, have a moral, political, and legal obligations to effect an internationally supervised election there for (sic) the peoples to vote for their own forms of governance!⁴

Though this statement is problematic, as international attention is necessary for reasons of humanitarianism, not guilt,⁵ it does point to the strategy of making this conflict an international issue. International involvement is of great importance to all actors; even the Indonesian Government relies on Malaysia to return refugees and western allies for military assistance. This subsection will look into the role of embassies, international diplomacy, and to the example set by the 'War on Terror'.

1.1 Embassies

Foreign embassies have been a site for diplomatic pressure, protests, and intrigue. In January 2003, the Ambassadors of Japan, the USA, and Italy (representing the European Union) visited Aceh in support of the peace talks. Several embassies have been home to protests and still more to campaigns by civil society groups. In 1998, the American Embassy in Malaysia temporarily housed Acehnese refugees who had illegally entered the building in search of asylum.⁶ In April 1998, human rights groups condemned the French, Swiss, and Brunei Embassies in Kuala Lumpur for handing over Acehnese asylum seekers to the Indonesian authorities. Embassies can have unusual political roles; in August of 2003, the GAM claimed that they, on behalf of Aceh, opened their first Embassy in Vanuatu, though the Vanuatu Government claimed to have never known of such an office, stating that "if a GAM representative office was opened there, it must be illegal."⁷ As of May 2004, the GAM still claims it has an office in the island nation on their website, with no clarification or retraction over its false claim. These are some of the politics surrounding embassies.

⁴ Hasan di Tiro, "Denominated Indonesians."

⁵ Several points are crucial: first, the actions of the Dutch government hundreds of years ago do not correlate into wholesale western responsibility today. Second if the Dutch did create Indonesia, it is not responsible for specific crimes within it. Third, creating Indonesia was also an act of local agents, as the Dutch tried to fragment the Republic in 1947. Fourth, this undermines the GAM's claim that the Javanese are colonizers. Fifth, if foreign governments invaded Indonesia to end colonialism, the problem would hardly be solved; in fact, any direct action would be continued colonialism which dissatisfied elites in the new states would hate the west for. Sixth, the Dutch took sovereignty, and was forced to return it- the Dutch never took democracy from the region, and can hardly be guilted into forcing democracy today.

⁶ Economist, "All About the Acehnese," Volume 346, Issue 8064 (18 April 1998).

⁷ Listi Fitria, "Vanuatu Knows Nothing about GAM Representative Office," Tempo Interactive (22 August 2003).

1.2 Diplomacy

Some governments are involved in a positive fashion, such as in the COHA peace plans. The COHA involved “Thailand and Philippines contingent together with government representatives from Sweden and Norway.”⁸ Along with Japan, these governments also worked closely to continue peace efforts as talks broke down. After the Japanese Ambassador visited the JSC in Aceh, he hosted a dinner forum, inviting NGOs and academics to voice their concerns to JSC leaders.⁹ Countries such as Denmark and Canada have recently accepted several waves of Acehnese activists, despite the protest from the Indonesian Government.

The United States Judiciary has processed Alien Tort Claims against EXXON-Mobil, although the American Government has pressured judges to drop the case. On 6 March 2004, the United States issued a strongly worded press release along with its annual country report, condemning the arrests of leading HRDs under Martial Law.¹⁰ The Indonesian Government criticized the report, citing the American record in Iraq as proof that the USA lacks credibility in such issues. The GAM took careful note of the interaction:

The Acehnese and the international community are very much aware of these shameless tactics of carrying out atrocities against the civil population and then blame them on GAM/TNA in their cheap propaganda. In fact, the Indonesian leadership in Jakarta are very angry at present over the reports issued by the US State Department condemning (sic) the Indonesian military for their gross violations of human rights in Aceh, that include murder, abduction and rape.¹¹

The GAM fails to note that the same report indicts the GAM extorting the public and killing scores of civilians and hiding the bodies in mass graves. This US State Department report notes that “GAM members killed many soldiers, police, civil servants and civilians. In many cases, the victims were killed for allegedly collaborating with the security forces, while in other cases the motive appeared to be purely criminal.”¹² In producing such aggressive reports, the United State Government is very influential in Aceh.

⁸ Tanongsuk, *148 Days in Aceh: A Diary of the Implementation of the (COHA)*, xxii.

⁹ General Tanongsuk, *148 Days in Aceh*, 51.

¹⁰ *Jakarta Post*, “US Expresses Concern over Indonesian Arrests” (6 March 2004).

¹¹ *GAM Press Release*, “Call to the Press to Monitor the Forced Public Rally Organized by the Indonesian Military Rulers in Aceh on the Occasion of the Islamic New Year.”

¹² Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, *United States Department of State*, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 2003,” February 2004.

Some governments have offered development grants to conflict areas and local civil society, while others have made official announcements condemning the Indonesian state. But few nations manage to contribute to the Aceh conflict in a positive sense; most do not comment at all, which is a form of support for the TNI; “most western and Asian governments maintained a deliberate silence even though they had credible information about what was happening.”¹³ Part of the rationale for non-interference is the colonial legacy, as most western countries fear intervention into a developing country because they wish to avoid charges of neocolonialism. This legacy is not helped by the negative actions of several governments.

States such as the United States, Australia, and Britain have a long history of weapons sales and training for the TNI. In February 2004, Indonesia and Poland signed a major weapons deal in light of embargoes from the US, as Poland has sold US\$ 335 million in arms to Indonesia in the last two years. In March 2003, Indonesia purchased several aircraft from Russia. Dozens of states import goods from Aceh, specifically Korea and Japan, who continue their contracts with PT Arun. Regional linkages exist with from sources in Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand, which are all major sources of GAM weapons.¹⁴ The East Timorese Government has refused to make statements regarding Aceh outside of their condemnation of the GAM and the TNI. The politics within GAM in Southeast Asia have already been described, as various splinter groups have assassinated each other in Malaysia and Singapore, as well as planned offensives for within Aceh; “leaders of Aceh Merdeka regularly moved between Malaysia and Aceh to supervise and...mastermind the movement.”¹⁵ The Malaysian Government has only looked to poor immigrants, not corporate links, in its involvement in the conflict.

The Malaysian police have been responsible for arresting asylum seekers outside of the UNHCR, as the Malaysian Government is supportive of their Indonesian counterparts. This is the greatest negative contribution to the conflict in regional politics. On 11 October 1991, Malaysia repatriated two hundred refugees to Aceh, despite the international standard of non-refoulment. This action prompted the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to become slightly more

¹³ Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 233.

¹⁴ Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia,” 256.

¹⁵ Aceh: the Untold Story, 42.

proactive in June of 1992, when it protected forty three persons.¹⁶ In 1998, at the request of the government in Jakarta, Prime Minister Mahathir repatriated 545 Acehnese refugees; some human rights groups allege that three were dragged behind the boat on the voyage and that one died as a result.¹⁷ Deportation continued at roughly the same rates until May of 2003, when Martial Law was declared the numbers increased.

As several Acehnese asylum seekers tried to enter the UNHCR Office in order to start legal proceedings in 2003, the Malaysian police arrested them and erected barricades in front of the UN Office. This outraged the UNHCR, as some 2,500 refugees were held by Malaysia; though Malaysia is not bound by the UN Convention on Refugees, international convention was clearly broken. Malaysia justified its actions on 'slippery slope' arguments, fearing that if some stay others will flood Kuala Lumpur, as well as stating that they are not refugees but instead economic migrants; this is a troubling stance, as the famine and poverty from war creates persons who are both.¹⁸ It is more likely that the Malaysian Government does not fear such migrants, who fuel sectors of its economy, but instead are doing political favours for Jakarta. The historical connections between Malaysia and Aceh have been severed by the government's unprecedented actions.

The Swedish Government is of course deeply involved in the conflict, as it has been home to the leadership of the GAM for almost thirty years. After the Swedish Government continued to state that the presence of the di Tiro administration was not political support for an Acehnese state but instead their legal rights to political activity as Swedish citizens, the Indonesian Government began legal action within Swedish Law. In February 2004, the Swedish Government launched investigations into fifty of the exiles' involvement in human rights abuses after Special Envoy Ali Alatas presented a dossier alleging to prove their involvement in terrorism.¹⁹ A report in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* stated that "over the past three years some 200 political refugees have come from Aceh and opted to settle in Norway, say GAM officials," namely because they fear

¹⁶ The Straights Times, cited in Dr. Lukman Thaib, the Roots of the Acehnese Conflict, 58.

¹⁷ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Indonesia 1998," February 1999.

¹⁸ Baradan Kuppusamy, "Malaysia Walks Tightrope on Acehnese Refugees," Asia Times (9 September 2003).

¹⁹ Jakarta Post, "Swedish Prosecutor to Start Investigation Aceh Rebel Leadership" (17 February 2004).

pending human rights trials in Sweden.²⁰ In response, the Norwegian Government issued a strong warning to di Tiro and started its own investigation.²¹

This will be an interesting case for armed groups around the world. As Swedish citizens, Indonesian hopes for being handed the GAM leadership are illusory; the GAM will be tried for crimes committed in Sweden, namely coordinating human rights abuses elsewhere. What will be interesting is if Sweden acts according to law and does not take into account the crimes of the TNI in Indonesia, or if it will act politically, as the GAM commits far fewer crimes than the TNI, and allow the GAM to continue. The expatriate community of GAM leaders in Sweden will be forced to prove they have no responsibility for human rights abuses in Aceh; as Human Rights Watch put it, GAM's ground forces "are not always as disciplined as its commanders would have liked."²² This will be the precise opposite argument to which they presented the HDC as the peace process began, where they insisted that they have effective control over Aceh and can speak on behalf of the Acehnese. The GAM leaders' defense will be based on one of two stances: either the GAM does not commit human rights abuses or that they have no control over those who do. To state that the GAM does not abuse people is fiction, as we have discussed. The meaning of the latter would be monumental, robbing the GAM of their credibility.

1.3 Terror by Example

One of the greatest influences on the Aceh conflict has been the United States; despite seeking peace in Aceh, the Americans launched impressive invasions elsewhere in 2003 and, in search of support from Muslim allies, is hesitant to critique the Republic. The domestic popularity of President Bush from "waging a spectacular and highly unequal war in front of TV cameras" was certainly a major factor in declaring Martial Law.²³ American militarism makes it difficult to critique the TNI; in response to the American State Department's 2003 Human Rights Report, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "a country has to be very confident of its own conduct on human rights issues before assuming for itself the role of judging other countries'

²⁰ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "Norway Attracts Edgy Aceh Exiles" (19 February 2004).

²¹ *Jakarta Post*, "Norway Vows to Look into Influx of GAM Members" (25 February 2004).

²² Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: the War in Aceh*, 7.

²³ Reid, "War, Peace, and the Burden of History in Aceh," 14.

performance.”²⁴ Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda continued that “what we are doing or will do in Aceh is much less than the American power that was deployed in Iraq.”²⁵ Although we must resist assertions that the US invasion of Iraq caused talks to end, it cannot be denied that it did influence the end of the HDC negotiations in Aceh.

Global opinion turned against Indonesia due to the media’s ‘discovery’ of East Timor; which influenced US Congress regarding military assistance to Indonesia. This was an issue in the mainstream media, understood by readers of both conservative and dissident publications.²⁶ A report from US Congress stated that after East Timor’s vote, the US Government’s policy has been to support Indonesia’s borders, its democracy, and its military; September 11th “did not conflict with the three existing policy goals but instead reinforced them.”²⁷ The Congressional Report continues that the war on terrorism makes Indonesia a crucial ally, and supports continuing military training programmes. As military aid to Suharto once came under the guise of anti- communism, a new wave of military aid came under the guise of anti-terrorism; “the US will send 22 high-level military advisers to help coordinate intelligence sharing and provide counterterrorism training and provide some equipment.”²⁸ Indonesia, as under the New Order, has been a clever player in this aid.

Indonesia certainly has problems with terrorism, claiming al-Qaeda links in the wake of bombings in Bali and Jakarta. The link between global terror and Acehnese separatism is not apparent; the GAM immediately sent condolences and support to the United States Embassy in Jakarta after September 11. However, the GAM’s history in Libya contributes to criticisms; ill-informed conservative media sources report that “the GAM may be an al-Qaeda affiliate,” and their goal is “to turn the world’s most populous Muslim country into an extremist state.”²⁹ The GAM has also been linked to terrorists in Southern Thailand by conservative American groups, who accuse them of uniting with the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Pattani Liberation Front

²⁴ Associated Press, “Indonesia Hits Back at US Report Alleging Human Rights Violations” (26 February 2004).

²⁵ Leah C. Wells, “Aceh: in the Shadow of Iraq,” www.commondreams.org (28 May 2003).

²⁶ Noam Chomsky, “East Timor is Not Yesterday’s Story,” Z-Net (23 October 1999).

²⁷ Larry Nicksch, “Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh,” CRS Report for Congress (26 September 2002), 5.

²⁸ Dan Murphy, “US Pushes Southeast Asian States on Islamic Radicals,” Christian Science Monitor, Volume 93, Issue 223 (10 December 2001), 9.

²⁹ Daniel Pipes and Jonathan Schanzer, “Militant Islam’s New Stronghold,” Human Events, Volume 58, Issue 42 (11 November 2002).

(PLF).³⁰ The government of Singapore asserts that GAM members were trained by the MILF in the Philippines, where they established close ties with Muslim terrorist organizations.³¹ President Bush lobbied Congress, in spite of East Timor, to continue military aid on the grounds that “Indonesia’s military has improved and that the country could become an al-Qaeda haven.”³² Officially, the United States opposes the declaration of Martial Law in May 2003, and supported the last ditch effort to save the COHA in Japan.³³ However, its actions and need for allies points in a contrasting direction.

The United States government wavers on its support of the TNI; after two Americans were killed by the TNI in Papua and an American journalist was jailed in Aceh, Congress halted military training. Colorado’s Republican Congressman Joel Hefley stated that “until the Indonesian government cooperates with U.S. investigators and provides credible and honest answers about the attack, the U.S. will withhold all IMET funds.”³⁴ This motion was supported by Congresspersons Lowey (D-NY), Walden (R-OR), Kucinich (D-OH), and Kolbe (R-AZ). Congresswoman Lowey’s response was notable; she condemned the “horrific military crack down in Aceh which has resulted in hundreds of civilians killed, executions, rape, numerous schools burned, and thousands forced into military camps...the shutting out of foreign journalists and human rights organizations from Aceh,” and “efforts by the Indonesian Army to slow or hinder U.S. anti-terrorism assistance for the Indonesian police.”³⁵ This demonstrates both the fragmented nature of Indonesian forces and the conservative tone of US pressure. TAPOL has documented the use of American arms such as the OV-10 Bronco and C-130 Hercules planes, British Hawk aircraft and Scorpion tanks, and several other nations’ equipment by the Indonesian military, responding with boycott campaigns which implicate foreign contractors and governments in human rights abuses.

³⁰ Samantha F. Ravich, “Eyeing Indonesia Through the Lens of Aceh,” *Washington Quarterly*, Volume 23, Issue 3 (Summer 2000), 13.

³¹ Cited in Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 21.

³² Murphy, “Military Reasserts Power, Casualties Mount in Aceh.”

³³ George W. Bush, “Statement on the Indonesia-Free Aceh Movement Agreement to Resume Discussions on Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,” *Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Volume 39, Issue 20 (5 October 2003).

³⁴ ETAN, “Hefley Eliminates \$600,000 for Indonesian Military Training Funds,” June 2003. Available online at <http://etan.org/news/2003a/07iforop.htm>, accessed December 2003.

³⁵ United States of America House of Representatives, “IMET Floor Debate,” 23 July 2003. Available online at <http://etan.org/news/2003a/07iforop.htm>, accessed December 2003.

Britain is closely allied with American military campaigns and has also been a major supporter of the TNI, asking only that their tanks and planes be used for defense.³⁶ British equipment was deployed in Aceh in May 2003, with Commander Sutarto commenting that “in order to cover the whole region and complete the job, I am going to use what I have. After all, I have paid already.”³⁷ TAPOL notes that the British ‘strategic exports’ to Indonesia increased twenty fold between 2000 and 2002. When we consider what can be done to limit human rights abuses, we can look to our own governments and corporations as a start.

The ‘War on Terror’ does not just give military aid to the Republic, but also context. The outcry against the ABRI in East Timor occurred at a time of relative peace; however with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is much easier to take military action against groups regarded as fundamentalist. The incentive for peaceful dialogue is diminished when groups supporting the peace talks are invading other nations.³⁸

2) Expatriate Communities

Not all foreign Acehnese are GAM, as other expatriate Acehnese, generally sympathetic to independence, created various organizations around the world. These persons are sometimes political actors, sometimes not, yet even those who are political do not assert themselves to be appendages of an Acehnese government. Thus, most expatriate Acehnese are civil society actors. Even in Northern Europe, where the GAM is highly influential for expatriates, scores of Acehnese have no connection to the GAM, including many families and students. Denmark has accepted several political refugees in recent years, as have Canada and Australia.

Student groups in Southeast Asia who are connected to Aceh are numerous. The Association of Acehnese in Malaysia works to support the large community of Acehnese workers and refugees while also lobbying foreign governments. According to Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, “the presence of Acehnese in Malaysia has nothing to do with the military operation in Aceh”, a statement which cannot explain the formation of strong lobbying groups in these areas or

³⁶ TAPOL, “Call for an International Military Embargo against Indonesia,” 23 June 2003. Available online at www.tapol.gn.apc.org/st030623.htm, accessed December 2003.

³⁷ *The Guardian*, cited in TAPOL, “the Use of British Military Equipment in Aceh,” 2 July 2003.

³⁸ *Business Week Online*, “Indonesia Aims at Aceh, Again.”

GAM recruitment campaigns.³⁹ Some Acehnese groups in Malaysia, as well as Thailand, help fund and arm the GAM, while others simply look for work. The Acehnese Refugee Committee of Malaysia (ARCM) is continually threatened by the Malaysian Government, alleged to work closely with the GAM.

Japan is home to an Acehnese Student Association which is supportive of the GAM; they have organized several protests and fund-raising activities, as have students in several Muslim countries.⁴⁰ Acehnese youths in Egypt have a long history of political activity; early Muslim political groups such as Masyumi organized in Cairo, as have current Ulama leaders such as Muslim Ibrahim, who graduated in 1984.⁴¹ The Cairo Acehnese Student Association has been vocal regarding the role of foreign embassies in Indonesia.

Acehnese groups in Australia have been the most vocal in their protests. AUSAID offers several scholarships for Acehnese students, as several Australian universities have developed an interest in the conflict. The main pull factor for Acehnese is the proximity of Australia, which has a large expatriate community and several organizations, including the left wing Acehnese Community of Australia (ACA). This group helps bring to Australia several Acehnese civil society actors to speak to their own and other communities. In the United States, the Aceh Center has a similar function, made up of a group of Acehnese activists who organize several protests and meetings. Their February 2004 press release, alongside some radical Papuan and Moluccan groups, was promoted by the GAM, their final message being that the “Indonesian Colonial Government must return immediately the Sovereignty of Acehnese, Moluccas and West Papua according to the Self Determination Rights.”⁴²

Generally though, American groups tend to be more academic. The International Forum for Aceh (IFA) has a United States office, and there are student coalitions in New York, Philadelphia,⁴³ San

³⁹ Associated Press, “Malaysia and Indonesia Agree to Step Up Cooperation on Terrorism” (28 August 2003).

⁴⁰ Gunaratna, “the Structure and Nature of GAM.”

⁴¹ For more information, please see Mona Abaza, *Indonesian Students in Cairo: Perception and Exchanges in Islamic Education* (Paris: Association Archipel, 2001).

⁴² “Joint Statement Between Acehnese and Moluccas in the USA,” available at www.asnlf.net/asnlf_int/frame_ges_int/frame_int.htm, accessed March 2004.

⁴³ Please see www.acehcenter.com.

Francisco, Virginia, and Connecticut. Unlike Australia, the United States has a small Acehnese population, however most are students at major universities. Many of these students were organized by the late Jafar Hamzah, who was one of the first Acehnese activists to work with the American Government. The largest concentration of Acehnese activism in the United States is Cornell University, where balanced views on the conflict are presented by several students, who are in turn guided by activist professors.

3) Academics

Cornell university in New York has a long history with Aceh studies.⁴⁴ Emeritus Professor of Government Benedict Anderson edited the journal *Indonesia* for almost twenty years, during which time he also directed the *Modern Indonesia Project*; he has been a critic of Indonesia's human rights record for thirty years, even before the arrival of the modern Aceh conflict. Also at Cornell, Professor Loren Ryder has been involved in Indonesian activism, graduating from the University of Washington under the supervision of another leading scholar, Daniel Lev. The pillar of Aceh Studies at Cornell is James Siegel, an anthropology professor specializing in the effect of the wars on Acehnese identity. Professor Siegel has edited *Indonesia* and *Archipel*, as well as supervising several students' studies on the Aceh conflict. Another major figure linked to Cornell is Tim Kell, whose book *the Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992* was published at Cornell in 1995. On 10 November 2003, Cornell organized a conference on civil-military relations, human rights, and peace in Aceh, one of several discussions involving various civil society actors.

The most prominent western historian regarding Aceh is Anthony Reid, who has written countless books on the region's economic and political history, as well as recent pieces on the current conflict. His description of power struggles in the 1950s and 60s, *the Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra*, is an excellent source on Aceh and its political past. Reid continues his work at the Institute of Asian Research at the National University of Singapore,⁴⁵ which in May 2004 held a seminar on the *Historical Background of the Aceh Problem*. Also in Singapore, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies carries out excellent research on Indonesian politics, including publications on Acehnese history by Sjamsuddin

⁴⁴ Please see www.einaudi.cornell.edu/SoutheastAsia.

⁴⁵ Please see www.ari.nus.edu.sg.

Nazaruddin, who now teaches at the University of Indonesia and heads the Indonesia Election Commission (KPU).

Australia also offers academic expertise; Berkeley graduate Jacqueline Siapno teaches at the University of Melbourne, writing extensively on women's rights in Aceh and other conflict areas. Siapno also co-founded the IFA with Jafar Hamzah. Ed Aspinall, who teaches at the University of Sydney, writes frequently for *Inside Indonesia* and other journals. Aspinall is likely the leading western scholar on the peace process in Aceh, offering a fair account of all actors in the conflict. Another Australian professor is Harold Crouch, who lectures at Australia National University and provides research for the International Crisis Group, looking at security issues and human rights in Aceh.

These scholars help coordinate several academic journals, likely the best source for in-depth and current information on the conflict. *Asian Survey*, published by the University of California Press on a bimonthly basis, includes a rich selection of book reviews and articles. Founded in the 1920s, the interdisciplinary journal *Pacific Affairs* publishes from Vancouver with a similar academic focus. *Critical Asian Studies* (formerly *Bulletin for Concerned Asian Scholars*) is a journal which focuses on feminist, environmentalist, and other critical schools in order "to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia."⁴⁶ The *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* (RIMA) is produced out of the University of Sydney with an emphasis on anthropology and linguistics alongside political and historical analysis. *The Journal of Asian Studies* (formerly the *Far Eastern Quarterly*) is a bimonthly journal with a rich history; though its focus is generally on East Asia, it does have some articles on Aceh. Finally, *Modern Asian Studies* is a quarterly journal which focuses on literature reviews and longer format articles, though again looking mostly at East Asia.

What each of these academics, journals, and institutions have in common is that they are professional and impartial. They provide credible analysis, using reliable sources and producing books, lectures, supervision, and journal articles. Such work is needed in order to provide some depth to reports which make their way into more mainstream sources.

⁴⁶ *Critical Asian Studies*, "BCAS Aim and Scope," www.bcasnet.org/about-us.htm, accessed February 2004.

4) Media

Several global media providers cover Aceh with regularity. Most stories originated from the aforementioned Jakarta Post and other Indonesian sources, with others coming from NGOs and field reporters. The *Christian Science Monitor* provides consistent reports on human rights in the region through correspondents such as Dan Murphy; it does not rely on “wire services like AP and Reuters,” instead using its own field reporters.⁴⁷ Such wire services do, however, provide most of the world’s Aceh stories; Reuters, Agency Presse France, and the Associated Press give an occasional glimpse into the region. These reports are created by independent field reporters such as American journalist William Nessen, who spent months with the GAM in 2003, during which time he was threatened by the TNI for undermining their military efforts. Nessen surrendered in August 2003. Another American journalist concerned with Aceh is Jane Perlez, who interviewed General Tanongsuk during the COHA and whose articles in the New York Times have critiqued the TNI.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) carries frequent stories on Aceh; in February 2004, their *Hard Talk* programme pushed the Aceh issue to former American Presidential candidate Bob Dole. Dole began working with the Indonesian Government regarding their image in western nations in 2003; the interviewer stated that the best method to bring peace would be to end massacres in Aceh, to which Dole replied “you’ve got that journalist’s limited view of that country.”⁴⁸ Here, the British media is similar to Australia’s in its confrontational position taken in news talk shows.

Australian media sources tend to pursue Aceh with the greatest interest, likely due to geographic proximity and previous involvement in East Timor. There are several Australian political journals which cover Aceh. The quarterly *Inside Indonesia* is the most prominent, with scores of information on Aceh in each edition. Founded in 1983 by the Indonesian Resources and Information Programme in Australia, the journal looks at human rights, politics, economics, and the environment. *Inside Indonesia* is critical of military solutions and undemocratic governance; their mission is to get “behind the soundbite and the official propaganda.”⁴⁹ Besides its own writing staff, this journal regularly features academics, activists, and indigenous writers.

⁴⁷ *Christian Science Monitor*, “About Us,” www.csmonitor.com/aboutus, accessed February 2004.

⁴⁸ Hard Talk, “Interview with Bob Dole,” *BBC World* (13 February 2004).

⁴⁹ *Inside Indonesia*, “About Us,” www.insideindonesia.org, accessed February 2004.

Dateline Australia has broadcasted several reports, including an excellent video exposé on embedded journalism in Aceh that aired during prime time on 2 July 2003, *In Bed with the TNI*.⁵⁰ The thirty-minute story was compiled by David O'Shea, one of few foreign journalists to go through Indonesia's journalist boot camp. The piece is slightly biased against the Indonesian military, largely a result of the TNI's own clumsy efforts at manipulating the media which in this story alone included silencing civilians, showing dead GAM bodies, and coaching an anonymous man to denounce his former GAM allegiance. O'Shea travels with Indonesian journalists guided by the TNI, and includes communications with William Nessen and reporter Ersu Siregar. Siregar was later kidnapped by the GAM, as described in O'Shea's follow-up piece which aired one week later. The follow-up features an interview with GAM Commander Sofyan Daud, who admits to the abduction but justifies it because Siregar was biased, this being six months prior to Ersu's murder on 29 December 2003. The GAM leader also admits to abducting the wives of TNI commanders, which he justifies because Indonesia holds GAM wives in jail (the TNI abducted Daud's own wife, Cut Rosina). Dateline's coverage, though very critical of the TNI, manages to be well-informed and reaches a wide audience.

Dateline is produced for the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), a multilanguage media corporation. The much larger Australian Broadcasting Corporation has operated since 1932, with coverage on Aceh since the East Timor clashes in 1997. The Sydney Morning Herald is likely the most active of Australia's major dailies; it has operated since 1831, with a growing international focus which seemed to find Aceh in the late 1990s. In 2003 / 04, the Herald published approximately three articles on Aceh per week. It is common that when American or East Asian media does manage to cover Aceh, it is well after Australia. Even Australia's independent filmmakers, such as Actively Radical Television, have made films on Aceh.

Several economic journals offer unique coverage as well. *The Economist* affords Aceh little attention, its occasional articles offering a realist interpretation, where Indonesia is the next Yugoslavia or describing the European led peace talks. *Business Week Online* offers coverage which is sympathetic to the Indonesian State and American business interests, with attention to peace accords and regional economic growth. Similarly, *the Far Eastern Economic Review* looks at

⁵⁰ For show information and complete transcripts of all stories relating to Aceh, please see www.sbs.com.au/dateline/.

Indonesian and global corporate interests, though again peace is a large part of economic growth. The Review has been critiqued by several groups, including TAPOL, for supporting the New Order in the past and being critical of human rights activists.⁵¹ After East Timor became a popular issue, the journal was forced to change its stance somewhat; today, the Review will update readers in Aceh every two months or so, often noting the continued corruption which fuels the conflict. This recent corporate viewpoint is notable, as it is shared by several western governments as well as global financial institutions.

5) International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

Civil society and government groups working for peace in Aceh have a justified antipathy towards corporate and financial institutions. Such groups should be critical, as loans to Suharto, corporations such as EXXON-Mobil, military aid, IMF reform packages, and countless other actions have done a great deal to perpetuate the war. The greatest grudge concerns the New Order; IFI assistance helped the Suharto regime remain in power into the 1990s, an era which helped create the problems in Aceh and one which Indonesian taxpayers will be paying for some time to come. IFIs cannot be considered humanitarian allies. In a joint statement on 9 April 2003, governments and IFIs emphasized the need to respect “the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and do not support attempts to challenge Indonesia’s present borders.”⁵² Total support for or against independence is not sound; such stances should be based on which is the best actor for social and economic development, as the IFIs show a political nature in this statement. Few international actors are idealists, nor are the GAM or the Indonesian state; all pursue their agenda in Aceh for economic gain or political advantage.

If our goal is peace, we must not be militant towards groups we disagree with. We must still ensure a holistic peace, not simply a lack of military but a lack of exploitation- but we must also do what is necessary to promote human rights today. At a time when protestors pressure IFIs, civil society actors have an opportunity to use such regimes for structural change and peace-building in Aceh in exchange for good publicity. There is a trade-off between moving towards peace and protesting global finance; the former is a human rights concern, the latter view of protest over people is purely

⁵¹ TAPOL, “TAPOL 25 Years and Still Going Strong,” <http://tapol.gn.apc.org/>.

⁵² Joint Statement by Japan, the European Union, the United States, and the World Bank, “the Present Situation in Aceh,” 9 April 2003.

political. An October 2000 SCHRA letter pressured the Bank to use its leverage to support human rights, as did a Japanese NGO conglomerate. A British NGO, *Down to Earth*, publishes regular reports in IFIs, which can be found on their website.⁵³ Environmental groups such as the WALHI have targeted the World Bank to change infrastructural development programmes in light of their own impact assessments. Several NGOs, international and otherwise, use IFIs as intermediaries, targets, and authorities according to the situation.

This use of IFIs, as a tool to end the military economy, is a heated issue; in a conversation with the author, the Executive Secretary of INFID made a strong critique of this approach. She questions what the results of such an approach would be, as we would create a precedent of IFI involvement in the Indonesian political-economy which could lead to negative policies and would minimally signify a loss of sovereignty. This ‘slippery slope’ argument must be considered, though the author maintains a human rights approach, and suggests that groups such as INFID act as watchdogs in order to limit groups such as the IMF. It is acknowledged, however, that this is no small task, and INFID’s position on this issue is strong.

What several humanitarian groups practice, and what this text proposes, is pragmatism in dealing with IFIs. We are even beginning to see some IFIs make changes, defining development in a broad sense, specifically the World Bank. The December Tokyo 2002 Report by the Bank and other IFIs, *Developing Peaceful Development in Aceh*, is an interesting document. It opens with a cold observation that seems to guide their actions, as “the investment climate in Aceh has greatly deteriorated as a result of the conflict.”⁵⁴ The report sees short-term peace, medium term economic planning, and long-term implementation as the best course for sustained growth. Revenue from increasingly depleted natural resources should fund this, though we must also conserve natural resources, as reports regarding the value of oil and forestry resources are exaggerated.

5.1 The World Bank

The World Bank notes that a poor investment climate is the largest issue for improving living standards, as it is impossible for transportation, corporate law, and banks to operate in the

⁵³ Please see www.dte.gn.apc.org.

⁵⁴ *The World Bank: Social Development Group*, “Promoting Peaceful Development in Aceh: An Informal Background Paper Prepared for the Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh” (3 December 2002), 1.

militarized society. While NGOs tend to ignore the Indonesian State as the source of investment which allows for Aceh's oil revenue, as they focus on gross and net not profits to support arguments of exploitation, the World Bank provides figures for investment. What the Bank and NGOs agree on is where the profits end up, as profits do not remain in Aceh.

The Tokyo Report asserts that despite being a resource-rich province, conflict has produced poverty among the Acehnese people.⁵⁵ Here, World Bank researchers seem to mix cause and effect to some extent; though accurate in terms of Aceh's most disadvantaged groups such as IDPs, unequal distribution of resources is a *source* of the conflict. Further, though the report takes into consideration class differences in poverty cohorts, it fails to look at ethnic groups, as the Javanese are predominantly employed in the richest industries, a fundamental complaint of almost every civil society actor. The Tokyo Report fails regarding the neutrality of provincial and district governments, assuming that growing provincial economic authority translates into decentralization, as if geography were the only measure. Aside from this, the conclusion of the report is excellent, that funds must be channeled to community groups for development to be effective. This 2002 report is an encouraging example of IFI developmental policies; though what they do not say requires hard work from other actors to correct, what the reports do say are credible, intelligent aspects of peace and growth in conflict areas.

The World Bank has been the most active of the IFIs, using the peace process to implement rural development through large grants directly to local leaders. As far back as 1996, the Bank expanded junior secondary schooling in five Sumatran provinces, providing teacher training, textbooks, and scholarships; their report predicated that in ten years, over 13,000 Acehnese students would benefit from their project.⁵⁶ Their representatives accompanied the January 2003 Ambassadorial envoy to Aceh, committing the Bank to an eight million dollar assistance package which they expected to double shortly after. But on 28 May 2003, the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs ended the programme, agreeing with Bank officials that the region was not safe.⁵⁷ The Bank was worried for the safety of its personnel, a threat it credited mostly to the GAM.

⁵⁵ The World Bank, "Promoting Peaceful Development in Aceh," 4.

⁵⁶ The World Bank: Social Development Group, "Junior Secondary Education Project," (16 August 1996), Report Number 15728-IND.

⁵⁷ Deutsche Presse Agentur, "World Bank Suspends 7.5 Million Dollar Aid Project in Aceh," (28 May 2003), available online at www.reliefweb.int.

In conversations with World Bank authorities, the author has been told that the World Bank realizes its inability to rebuild Aceh, that it needs village and civil society leadership- this is a healthy attitude, one formally alien to IFIs. In this fashion, the World Bank's greatest success has been its *Kecamatan Development Plans* (KDPs), which provide funding for development in *Kecamatans* (around twenty villages per unit in Aceh) across Indonesia, a project guided by informed social theories. These theories have pushed the Bank away from mega-projects in order to focus on environmental and rural development, which creates sustainable growth, although with fewer obvious results. Its foremost organizer has used Robert Putnam's concept of social capital in order to allow for a wider definition of development.⁵⁸ A small pilot project in 1997, by 2002 KDPs operated in thirty percent of all Indonesian villages. The programme funds development by giving grants to local councils for anything that villagers consider 'development'; local councils must include women, and are given proposals by each village. One of the major reasons for success of the KDP Plans is that it relies on competition among villages to secure funding, creating motivation not always found in other aid programmes. At first, no local government involvement was allowed, but this has slowly changed, the success of which "would not have been possible without the deep involvement of previously constrained NGOs."⁵⁹ Supply sources must be read aloud to all involved to avoid contracting out to friends or embezzling, with NGOs such as the AJI given 'blind contracts' to publish the results. Recently, KDPs have expanded to legal aid and post-conflict development for women.

A recent report from the World Bank focused specifically on the problem of women's low participation rates in KDP programmes in some areas. The report looked at regions with low and high female participation, and instituted a rule that meetings would be cancelled if at least 30% of attendees were not women. Further, some all-woman meetings were created in order to overcome the intimidation some women felt that speaking against powerful local men, while other meetings were facilitated by women. Better systems for informing women of KDP meetings as well as transportation and childcare systems were recommended by the report to increase female voices in the KDPs. These initiatives were the major changes in KDP II, initiated in March 2003, with the

⁵⁸ Please see Robert Putnam, *Democracies in Flux: the Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁵⁹ Scott Guggenheim, Tatag Wiranto, and Susan Wong, "Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Programme: A Large-Scale Use of Community Development to Reduce Poverty," *World Bank: Social Development Group Briefing*.

new programme working closely alongside another programme, PeKKA, which focuses on empowering widows and creating social bonds between them.

In Aceh, KDPs have a slightly different structure based on their use of *Mukims*, which are based on customary laws, as opposed to *Kecamatans*, to organize villages. Just prior to Martial Law, the World Bank, the KDP Programme, *Mukim* leaders, and the NGO Forum had formed a working group to identify challenges and opportunities for development under Special Autonomy. In 2002, KDP Coordinator Scott Guggenheim visited Aceh to ensure that the programme could be accepted by GAM and TNI forces. As Martial Law was declared, the programme was put on hold; a recent World Bank reports notes that success for its programmes require that civil society can operate freely, and that “barring conflict zones such as Aceh, space has opened up for political protest.”⁶⁰

The World Bank is also involved in creating change outside of Aceh which impacts the conflict. Again, the Bank is partly responsible for helping the corrupt New Order maintain power, but has since been critical in the Republic’s insufficient steps to transparency. Their 2001 report on biodiversity in Indonesia made some small changes in Indonesia which will help save Aceh’s trees and wildlife, though the Bank admits there is much more to do. They cite illegal logging in Sumatra as the largest danger to the nation’s environment.⁶¹ Civil society forums have been chaired by groups such as IMPARSIAL, which have touched on subjects from state security to poverty alleviation.

Perhaps the most impressive programme is *Widows, War, and Welfare*; the Aceh component of this programme was cancelled by the Government, but continues throughout Indonesia. The success of this programme across Indonesia contributes towards peace in Aceh. Javanese war widows are a subject which human rights groups have ignored, as viewing the TNI as the wolf obscures the difficult lives of the families left behind by fallen TNI soldiers. The attitude of several NGOs mirrors how the Indonesian Government responds to GAM widows; as noted by the World Bank and academics, “the Indonesian government had provided no support to the widows of Aceh, many

⁶⁰ Andrea Woodhouse, Village Corruption in Indonesia: Fighting Corruption in the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Programme (Jakarta: World Bank, June 2002).

⁶¹ Please see www.worldbank.org/biodiversity.

of whom were considered part of the enemy forces.”⁶² Working with the National Commission on Violence against Women, the World Bank has funded several programmes for education and welfare since 1999.

In sum, the World Bank is obviously critical of the GAM, but this does not mean their critiques are not well-founded. For instance, a May 2003 release stated that

Once oil was discovered, (the GAM) began to say that they could be as rich as Brunei. In fact, this was not true; it was a massive exaggeration. However, this is the sort of thing secessionist groups will do.⁶³

Their fault, likely a result of political reality, is that the Bank is not openly critical of Indonesian security forces, groups responsible for most human rights abuses, corruption, and their own exaggeration. The closest they seem to come to criticizing the Republic is in their statement regarding illegal tolls and taxes, “the GAM has no monopoly on these practices.”⁶⁴ The World Bank remains committed to “the territorial integrity of Indonesia.”⁶⁵ This is likely so due to political constraints, but this excuse does not belie the fact that World Bank statements are incomplete, it simply explains why they are. Still the Bank is the greatest engine for peace and growth of all the IFIs.

5.2 Other IFIs

The World Trade Organization (WTO) does not focus on development, though it can be a major actor in ending the Aceh conflict. As suggested in chapter three, the military’s involvement in the economy, as well as several other forms of corruption, is an appropriate issue for WTO reforms. In 2003, the WTO noted the success of its pressure to have security forces lose their seats in the Indonesian Parliament (MPR),⁶⁶ though has somehow failed to pursue their economic involvement. The WTO’s Trade Policy Review in 2003 promoted resource sharing with Aceh and increased infrastructure such as rail systems with the goal of economic recovery. This said, in 2000 the WTO also pursued copyright law cases in Banda Aceh Courts, displacing other potential cases for the

⁶² Sharon Bessell, “Social Cohesion and Conflict Management: Rethinking the Issues Using a Gender-Sensitive Lens,” *Conflict Prevention and Post Conflict Reconstruction*, the World Bank (9 June 1999), 189.

⁶³ Paul Collier, “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,” *World Bank Press Conference* (14 May 2003).

⁶⁴ *The World Bank*, “Promoting Peaceful Development in Aceh,” 3

⁶⁵ *The World Bank*, “Delivering a Peace Dividend for Aceh” (27 March 2003).

⁶⁶ World Trade Organization, “Report by Secretariat,” *Trade Policy Review* (28 May 2003).

overworked staff.⁶⁷ Their interests seem to exist only within a narrow definition of the term development.

Regarding the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it is commonly protested that the IMF extends control over developing countries through conditional loans. Several groups correctly condemn IFIs such as the IMF for endorsing privatization in developing countries despite the benefits of state corporations.⁶⁸ But when corporations are run by the military, trade liberalization policies become positive forces for minimal human rights standards to be met. The bloated power of the IMF in poor countries should be protested, but we also must recognize that they have the power of bring institutional changes which, though only aiming at economic growth, can help the exploited classes.

The IMF does not involve itself with Aceh directly; looking at the IMF website, no documents have been released with any mention of Aceh in the last four years. However their indirect involvement is important; the 1999 Fiscal Balance Law demands that resources be shared because “oil and gas revenue concentrate in a small number of provinces and districts.”⁶⁹ IMF reports scrutinized Indonesia over Aceh’s share of resource revenue, a partial factor in recent restructuring. But in all, the IMF is not deeply involved in Aceh, its interest being on capitalist growth, not on human rights or conflict resolution.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is also more focused on economics than it is on meaningful development; its 2003 country review of Indonesia states that the violence and abuses in Aceh are “powerful reminders that security is fragile and remains a serious concern to economic development.”⁷⁰ This is a demonstrative statement of the ADB, as most commentators would first consider the effects of war on human development. This said, the ADB managed urban development programmes worth US \$122 million in 2000, though the plans were put on hold due to increasing hostilities. These programmes looked to health care, water, sanitation, and road construction, while another programme focused on generating electricity in rural areas. In a 2003

⁶⁷ World Trade Organization, “Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,” Review of Indonesian Legislation (8 April 2000).

⁶⁸ Please see <http://whirledbank.org/development/private.html>

⁶⁹ Ehtisham Ahmad and Ali Mansoor, “Indonesia: Managing Decentralization,” IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (20 November 2000), 19.

⁷⁰ Asian Development Bank, “Country Report: Indonesia 2003,” Section 35.

report, the ADB states that in order to continue these programmes, not only must there be peace, but also that they also require “stronger governance at the local level.”⁷¹ We are left to wonder what is meant by the term ‘stronger’ in this statement, as Martial Law would fit their vague demand for order.

If IFIs are to be of any use in a holistic development in Aceh, they must end the failed strategy of looking to strong governments and instead look to non-government actors. At the January 2003 Consultative Meeting for IFIs in Bali, the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security, General Susilo Bambang Yudhonyono (SBY), insisted that the challenge in Aceh is “to develop democracy and safeguard human rights while maintaining law and order and provide security in the province.”⁷² YBR, who is a 2004 presidential candidate, seemingly fails to understand the concepts he wishes to promote; democracy and human rights cannot thrive under Martial Law. The term ‘while’ does nothing less than negate his statement. The views of most IFIs are not to challenge the state, but only to boost economic growth for loan repayment; they resist the security actors insofar as they restrict economic growth. Their support for Suharto’s government for twenty years has not changed under Megawati. This said, they are still major actors who must not be ignored; if the World Bank’s recent changes are any indication, IFIs could be instrumental in bringing economic AND social development to Aceh.

The IFIs are part of the greater structure of the United Nations, which is the most complicated of the international actors in Aceh; the institutions of the UN do not fit other categories in this chapter, as they are certainly not NGOs or students, so will be considered here.⁷³ The WTO is a Related Organization of the UN, whereas the IMF and World Bank, along with the International Labour Organization (ILO), are Specialized UN Agencies. The ILO has been involved in Aceh by tangent, supporting unions and safe working conditions, as well as helping Acehnese workers in Malaysia. Another Related Organization is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In Aceh, the UNESCO works with the media, including capacity-

⁷¹ David Jay Green, “Statement by the Asian Development Bank on Assistance to Bali and Aceh,” Asian Development Bank (22-23 January 2003).

⁷² Asian Development Bank, “Report on the Twelfth Consultative Meeting on Indonesia” (February 2003).

⁷³ Please see Appendix VIII, Anatomy of the United Nations.

building for four independent Acehnese radio stations and issuing press releases (such as condemning the GAM for killing Ersi Siregar).⁷⁴

Invited by the Indonesian Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was active during the Humanitarian Pause, from June 2000 to September 2001. Their *Humanitarian Assistance Programme* in Aceh struggled to find funders among such uncertainty though, eventually funding only fourteen projects. The UNDP placed an advertisement in Serambi to find local partners, receiving two hundred responses and eventually choosing fourteen, two of which were international groups, twelve were Acehnese. The PCC, KAGEMPAR, YADESA, RATA, and FLOWER were among the coordinating groups. Eventually, the project ended after numerous security threats to RATA employees and their friends as OXFAM. The UNDP was also a major trainer and funder during the 2004 Indonesian elections.

Several other UN Programmes operate within Aceh. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) condemned the destruction of schools and the subsequent lack of teachers in May 2003, asking "the warring factions to ensure that education facilities are deemed zones of peace."⁷⁵ UNICEF reacted by airlifting twenty tonnes of emergency education and health kits, supporting Islamic education with the help of Non-Violence International. UNICEF's greatest contribution has been the Peace Education Programme (PPD); from October 2000, the PPD has focused on Acehnese culture and peace education, by December 2003 operating in over half the districts in Aceh. This programme is seen as a major success by all involved, continuing to operate under Martial Law.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has no mandate for IDPs, as its focus is based on the nation-state as the distinguishing factor for defining a refugee. However it has been active with Acehnese in Malaysia. As described, the Malaysian police have arrested several Acehnese asylum seekers at the UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur on dozens of occasions, with the beleaguered UNHCR able only to pressure Malaysia to respect the principle of non-refoulment. The UNHCR continues to sort through the forty or so Acehnese asylum seekers it gets each week

⁷⁴ Please see www.unesco.org.

⁷⁵ UNICEF, "Humanitarian Aid Needed for Children in Aceh" (23 May 2003).

under Martial Law.⁷⁶ Other UN Programmes working in Aceh include the World Food Programme and World Health Organization. The United Nations is an interesting bridge between government, the economy, and human rights. It relies heavily on NGOs both in Aceh as well as international actors. The final major actors, international NGOs are described below.

6) Non-Governmental Organizations

This section will document human rights, humanitarian, protest, and other civil society groups which focus on Aceh from abroad. It is divided into groups which focus on Aceh, on Indonesia, on Asia, and groups with a global focus. These actors work in a variety of ways, from supporting local groups, to advocating, to pressuring governments.

6.1 Aceh-Specific Groups

Australian groups in Indonesia have been controversial, consistently supporting independence. In one case, Union Aid Abroad (UAA) was accused of funding political change in Indonesia with Australian taxpayer funds by a local anti-NGO watchdog.⁷⁷ Citing humanitarian reasons, several leftist Australian groups do show a certain bias against the Indonesian state, one which we must keep in mind as we detail them within the next few sections. This is because of their experience with East Timor, helped by a GAM which ensures that “the international sympathy for East Timor can be transferred to Aceh.”⁷⁸ In fact, di Tiro actively courted Timorese leaders for an alliance; though turned down, his group did learn how to use humanitarian vocabulary to find international attention.⁷⁹ Attention to Aceh because of Timor is true around the world, but is more so in Australia; each country seems to have themes, as American groups are academic, European and Canadian groups are generally humanitarian, Asian groups are generally economic, while Oceanic groups are generally political.

Aceh Australia Association (AAA) is a left-wing group which organizes forums, protests, movies, and lectures on Aceh in association with ASAP (see below). Similar groups include Australians for a Free Aceh and Eye on Aceh, each collecting resources and organizing large protests along with

⁷⁶ Associated Press, “Malaysia: Time Not Right to Deport Indonesian Aceh Asylum Seekers- UN Refugee Agency” (22 October 2003).

⁷⁷ Janaki Kremmer, “Australia Scrutinizes Influence of Nongovernmental Groups,” Christian Science Monitor (5 September 2003).

⁷⁸ Schulze, the Free Aceh Movement, 41.

⁷⁹ Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 219.

expatriate communities. Another group is the IFA Australia, which coordinates with its parent group, the IFA (International Forum for Aceh).

The American IFA is notable for tragic reasons. Its founder and leading activist Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, was the victim of the high-profile, brutal slaying described previously. While working for Legal Aid teams in North Sumatra, he founded the first ever Acehese language newspaper in 1996 as well as founding the SCHRA. Jafar was a regular media spokesman who was scathingly critical of the Indonesian Government; when President Wahid dismissed General Wiranto for human rights abuses in 2000, Jafar commented that “the situation is very deceiving...(it) has the international community now believing that human rights is a central concern of the new Indonesian government. Meanwhile, the atrocities continue day after day.”⁸⁰ This statement is problematic, as the claim is non-falsifiable, so distrustful of the state that no steps forward are acknowledged. The experiences of persons such as Jafar give just cause for such deep suspicion, experiences which pushed him to continue his activism in New York. Here, Jafar worked for years, founding the IFA, testifying to Congress, and becoming a prominent activist. He returned to Aceh to continue his work when he was killed in Medan on 5 August 2000. The United States Congress called for an autopsy and investigation into his murder in 2001, though the results have been slowed by Indonesian diplomatic pressure.

Based out of New York, the IFA continued its work, including lobbying for an investigation into Jafar’s murder. The International Forum for Aceh was founded by Jafar and Dr. Jacqueline Siapno in New York in 1998. The IFA does research, lobbies governments, holds protests, publishes reports, and holds meetings. Its research on EXXON-Mobil has been instrumental, as its office is located in the United States, allowing it to pressure the corporation. On 29 May 2002, the IFA testified to the Board of Directors of EXXON-Mobil regarding the human rights abuses at their plant. The IFA also investigates human rights abuses, presenting its findings to Congress on several occasions.

The IFA has organized numerous conferences, including *Years of Living Dangerously: the Struggle for Justice in Aceh, Indonesia beyond Suharto* in New York on 12 December 1998, *the Future*

⁸⁰ Lilianne Fan, “Freedom Movement Strengthens as Aceh Crisis Deepens,” Journal of Marxist Humanism (March 2000).

Integration of Indonesia: Focus on Aceh in Washington on 3 April 1999, *the Asian Conference on Aceh* in Bangkok on 24 July 1999, *Post Dialogue of Joint Understanding on the Humanitarian Pause* in Washington on 18 May 2001, and *Brotherly Dialogue for Peace amongst Acehnese* in Washington on 9 October 2001. The Forum has worked with a diverse group of actors at these conferences, producing detailed reports and international networks.

6.2 Indonesia-Specific Groups

The IHRN (Indonesia Human Rights Network) is an organization based out of California which aims to lobby governments, educate the public, and support democracy and the rule of law in Indonesia. Its areas of focus are West Papua, Maluku, West Timor, and Aceh.⁸¹ A good example of the IHRN's efforts is their May 2003 campaign which aimed at ending American support for the TNI through contacting members of Congress and protesting at various embassies. They also focus on EXXON-Mobil, the peace process, and press freedom; regarding the latter, the IHRN campaigned on behalf of American journalist William Nessen, working with Senators and press groups to ensure his safe return from Aceh.⁸² The IHRN has been tremendously successful in working alongside humanitarian groups not normally associated with Indonesia. The Robert F. Kennedy Center, Global Witness, and several church groups have all signed onto campaigns to end arms sales and investigate human rights abuses across the archipelago, helping to bring the subjects of Indonesia and Aceh into the mainstream vocabulary.

Moving to European groups, Watch Indonesia! is a German NGO founded in 1991 to promote democracy in the archipelago.⁸³ They have investigated the sale of East German Naval equipment to Indonesia in 1991, with their focus being generally on Timor, Papua, and Jakarta. They have worked with Acehnese groups in Germany, and have translated several Acehnese articles into German for domestic release. The Consortium for Assisting the Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) was formed in 2001 by Norwegian, Danish, American, and German refugee agencies. The CARDI works across Indonesia to develop the economies of uprooted populations, but only recently arrived in Aceh when Martial Law was declared.

⁸¹ Please see www.indonesianetwork.org.

⁸² Indonesian Human Rights Network, "Indonesian Atrocities in Aceh- US Journalist in Danger," Press Release (20 June 2003).

⁸³ Please see <http://home.snafu.de/watchin>.

The Indonesia Human Rights Committee (IHRC) is based out of New Zealand, working with other leftist groups to pressure their government regarding issues such as Aceh, as well as demanding that Suharto-regime assets in New Zealand be frozen and military sanctions be brought. One IHRC project operates by asking local politicians to sign a pledge of support for self-determination for Indonesian separatists, shaming major figures if they fail to follow through. The Committee receives grants from the New Zealand government to bring democracy activists from Aceh to speak to local audiences. In December 2003, the IHRN joined the Support Committee on Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA), a coalition of activists which is led by Tapol.

Tapol, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, looks into human rights violations in Timor, Papua, and Aceh. Founded in June 1973, this London-based group was comprised of activists, academics, and Members of Parliament- its focus was to pressure western governments and IFIs to end their support of the murderous, antidemocratic Suharto regime. Its name is a contraction of the Indonesian words for ‘political prisoner’, its ranks soon included a former *tapol*, Carmel Budiardjo, and it soon began to see success. As political prisoners were released, Tapol focused its attention on Papua and East Timor, as well as England’s military support to the New Order. In 1996, Tapol successfully halted a training course for KOPASSUS units in London. *The Tapol Bulletin* is available online, offering several reports on Aceh in each edition, as do its occasional papers.⁸⁴ Tapol has also published several books, including *Partners in Repression: the Reality of British Aid to Indonesia* as well as texts on natural resources and political freedom.

Tapol spawned the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia (ICEJI), whose magazine *Down to Earth*, in cooperation with *the Ecologist*, was first printed in 1987. As described above, this group monitors IFIs closely, as well as working with indigenous groups and natural resource usage. Thus, Tapol’s work is multifaceted, with the ICEJI working with environmentalists, SCHRA working with human rights organizations, and the Tapol working with political groups, linking US Congress and Westminster to EXXON to grassroots organizations in Aceh.

Another member of the SCHRA is the NINDJA (Indonesian Alternative Information), focusing on Indonesia and Aceh. NINDJA offers scholarships, workshops, and Japanese language reports on

⁸⁴ Please see <http://tapol.gn.apc.org/>.

Aceh in its attempts to increase local awareness.⁸⁵ NINDJA is also a member of the Japanese NGO Network in Indonesia (JANNI), as together the groups have been outspoken against Martial Law and abuses against human rights defenders. They were also very active during the Tokyo talks, critical mainly of the Indonesian Government; they assert that the “GoI forced GAM to make political choices”, referring to independence or special autonomy.⁸⁶ The NINDJA has focused its efforts on increasing Japan’s political role in Asia, as a rights-oriented government outside of the western world would likely have greater diplomatic power in areas such as Aceh. Finally, NINDJA has spearheaded the SCHRA’s World Bank and IFI initiatives, securing funding to support continued peace dialogues.⁸⁷

6.3 Regional Campaign Groups

As described, the SCHRA is comprised of several organizations; already described are Tapol, the IFA, the IHRC, NINDJA, and several Indonesian and Acehnese organizations.⁸⁸ The SCHRA was formed shortly after the *Asian Conference on Aceh: Looking at over Fifty Years of Aceh in Indonesia* as an association of NGOs of all varieties who share a common vision of a just peace in Aceh. The 24 July 1999 conference in Bangkok cemented the structure of the SCHRA, delegating responsibilities to each member according to specialization. Their first declaration concluded that

As supporters of human rights in Aceh, we call on the media and the international community to take responsibility in exposing the truth of the situation in Aceh. Too much blood of the Acehnese has been spilt already. The people of Aceh need and deserve a peaceful resolution after decades of suffering.⁸⁹

The SCHRA has made notable efforts towards interacting with the GAM and creating a dialogue within the region, however has also been criticized for being too close to the rebel group. This said, the SCHRA has also invited to these dialogues Indonesian Government officials such as judges and international actors such as Lord Avebury, a central figure for decades in English humanitarian politics and the peace process in Aceh.

⁸⁵ Please see www.nindja.com.

⁸⁶ NINDJA, “Japanese Citizens’ Statement Regarding the Collapse of the Joint Council Meeting and the Application of Martial Law in Aceh” (16 June 2003).

⁸⁷ *The Japan Times*, “Indonesian Aid Talks Open up in Tokyo amid Protest” (18 October 2000).

⁸⁸ These organizations and their level of participation fluctuate, but consistently include FARMIDIA, FLOWER Aceh, legal aid groups, YAPPIKA, and the AJI.

⁸⁹ SCHRA, “Exposing the Silent Tragedy of Aceh,” Joint Statement (Bangkok: Forum-Asia, 1999).

Another SCHRA member is the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), a Bangkok-based human rights organization, working in a variety of fields across Asia, from the International Criminal Court, to free and fair elections, to police training, and country campaigns.⁹⁰ In this way, Forum-Asia touches on Aceh in many areas. Organizing several conferences, releasing several books, working within the ASEAN for a human rights mechanism, and supporting Acehnese civil society are just a few of our projects. In recent campaigns, Forum-Asia attempts to critique that “leaders of Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia have repeatedly assumed that military action is the only way to solve the conflict peacefully.”⁹¹ We look to non-military actors, pressuring regional governments to take a similar stance and support refugees, NGOs, and other groups to bring about peace. The coordinator of Forum-Asia’s Aceh Programme, Chalida Tajaroensuk, maintains dialogues with Jakarta CSIS, governments, and most of all student organizations. Major General Tanongsuk Tuvinun of the Royal Thai Military, who chaired the JSC during the COHA, notes that Ms. Chalida and Forum-Asia supplied him with country reports and a background on Aceh which helped him learn some of the issues prior to his appointment.⁹²

In April 1999 meetings, Forum-Asia was the first group to bring together representatives from both major parties. In a May 2002 meeting between Thai, Acehnese, and Indonesian officials in Bangkok, Forum-Asia had a clear strategy; their goal was “to advance the peace process by pushing for the inclusion of NGOs in what would become a three-way dialogue.”⁹³ Forum-Asia supported former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan to act as a mediator, which led the way to Thailand’s heavy involvement in the COHA. Surin believes strongly that Thailand should take a leadership role, as he worked to include an ASEAN component to the HDC talks in Geneva. As the COHA failed and Martial Law was implemented, Forum-Asia lobbied on behalf of several student leaders and presented the situation to United Nations officials.

Also a member of the SCHRA, SUARAM is a Malaysian group which, though generally focusing on abolishing Malaysia’s ISA Laws, has also campaigned on Aceh.⁹⁴ The arrest of Acehnese asylum seekers throughout the peninsula has been a major issue for the group; working with the

⁹⁰ Please see www.forumasia.org.

⁹¹ Forum-Asia, “Statement on Aceh” (8 May 2003).

⁹² Major General Tanongsuk Tuvinun, *148 Days in Aceh*, 176.

⁹³ Anuraj Manibhandu, “Surin Acts as Wise Man in Peace Talks, ASEAN Approach to Problem Favoured,” *the Bangkok Post* (17 May 2002).

⁹⁴ Please see www.suaram.org.

Penang Support Groups for Human Rights in Aceh, SUARAM has documented several illegal arrests and has worked with refugees seeking UN status. On 22 February 2004, they investigated the arrest of ten Acehnese workers in Penang, also noting the sentencing of migrants and GAM negotiators to nearby prison islands.

Other groups in Malaysia with a similar focus include ALIRAN and Malaysiakini. ALIRAN formed in 1977 in Penang, publishing ALIRAN Monthly since 2000. Its involvement with Aceh comes through articles, press statements, and work with asylum seekers. ALIRAN is critical of the Republic and the GAM, citing murders and threats by both militaries on civil society actors on several occasions.⁹⁵ Malaysiakini is a political newspaper which has covered Aceh with frequency, especially asylum seekers. The journal has noted that although several Malaysians rallied in support of Muslims being killed by Americans, its people are silent regarding their closest neighbour, Aceh. As Malaysia is extremely close to Aceh, most human rights and media organizations have great interest in Aceh, a situation akin to the Philippines and Australia, who also have an obvious interest in Indonesian issues.

In the Philippines, the Initiative for International Dialogue (IID) has made several statements and acts of solidarity with Aceh as it works towards peace in Mindanao. The IID promotes embargoes on Indonesia, both in trade and in arms, working largely with Australian groups such as ASAP.

Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific (ASAP) is an Australian group which once worked primarily for the independence of East Timor, then known as Action Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor (ASIET). Today, they work in trouble spots across the Asia-Pacific region and opposing the Australian Government, supporting what the ASAP dubs “progressive and radical movements” in Indonesia (PRD), Aceh (FPDRA), and other nations.⁹⁶ They also oppose ‘neo-liberal’ policies by IFIs, support organizations in countries ‘targeted’ by the United States and Australia, and support lecture tours from likeminded Acehnese groups. ASAP has been described in relation to several other NGOs in Indonesia and abroad, as they work closely within a left-wing network with an impressive gamut of resources.

⁹⁵ Aeria, “Human Rights Violations in Aceh.”

⁹⁶ ASAP, “What is ASAP?” www.asia-pacific-action.org/.

The ASAP Chairperson is Max Lane, noted for his tremendous success in translating the works of Pramodya Ananta Toer. Action Solidarity works closely with unions and NGOs, however also associates itself with the “progressive wing of the Acehnese national liberation movement.”⁹⁷ Their news digest on Indonesia has been published since 1997, while they also produce their own pamphlets and media, working closely with the Green Left Weekly. Acehnese expatriate groups work closely with the ASAP as well; Australia is home to a number of leftist groups, with ASAP taking somewhat of a lead role. Countless public forums and independent films educate the public on the Aceh issue.

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) promotes human rights by investigating and publicizing abuses; they have published a monthly magazine, *Human Rights Solidarity*, since 1991, operate several websites, and operate a human rights education school. Based in Hong Kong, the AHRC advocates for human rights defenders in Aceh on a constant basis; its media campaigns after the death of a PB HAM volunteer brought NGO freedoms to the public’s attention in East Asia. The AHRC’s largest project, the Asian Human Rights Charter, explains that the right to peace is necessary, as

Both the state and civil society have in many countries become heavily militarized in which all scores are settled by force and citizens have no protection against the intimidation and terror of state or private armies.⁹⁸

With this, we will continue to global organizations involved in the Aceh conflict.

6.4 Global Campaign Groups

Amnesty International (AI) is likely the single most influential human rights organization in the world, with 1.5 million members. Since 1961, AI has campaigned on behalf of prisoners of conscience and against the death penalty in almost every country; they state their mandate as follows:

(AI) opposes abuses by opposition groups, including hostage-taking, torture, and killings of prisoners and other deliberate and arbitrary killings; assists asylum-seekers who are at risk of being returned to a country where they will be at risk of violations of basic and fundamental human rights; cooperates with other non-governmental organizations (NGOS), with the United Nations (UN), and with regional intergovernmental organizations; campaigns for

⁹⁷ ASAP, “What is ASAP?” www.asia-pacific-action.org/.

⁹⁸ AHRC, “Right to Peace,” *Asian Charter*, Section 4.1. Available online at www.ahrchk.net/charter.

increasing accountability in international military, security, and police organizations; organizes human rights education and awareness-raising programmes.⁹⁹

Recently, the first of their described foci, holding opposition groups accountable, became entrenched. For years, international NGOs looked only to governments, but a major shift occurred in the early 1990s, part of a wider trend which looks past the nation-state as the only available unit of measure. Their 1993 report on Shock Therapy under the DOM was the first major document to attempt to implement this aim, though its condemnation was still not balanced; their suggestions concluded that responsibility rests with the Government of Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the international community, which must pressure the Republic, not the GAM. Though claiming that they equally condemn the rebels, their criticisms of the GAM in early reports were limited to a few pages, a window dressing of balanced reporting which by 1996 would become a solid foundation for a new concept of human rights. AI was one of three major actors in this change, and has since been a leader in providing humanitarian critiques of opposition groups. They now fully recognize that criticism of an opposition group does not imply support for a government; indeed, *it implies they are treated equally*.

AI has released numerous press reports about the danger the TNI and the GAM bring to HRDs; they have written over twenty press releases in support of particular human rights defenders attacked by Indonesian security forces and the GAM. AI has used its political clout to pressure the ASEAN, which shirks any responsibilities outside of economics, stating that “if this Forum is to be effective, officials have to be prepared to address the difficult issues - and that includes dealing with human rights violations in Aceh.”¹⁰⁰ They release an influential annual report, one which offers country and regional summaries.

AI has strong country programmes as well. Amnesty International Australia has focused on the plight of Acehnese women, working with FLOWER Aceh to offer forums and publications to global audiences. AI New Zealand coordinated a postcard campaign to their Indonesian Embassy for peace in Aceh. AI Malaysia has focused on the plight of refugees, while AI Netherlands detailed the collapse of the COHA, interpreting the arrests of prominent activists as the end of the

⁹⁹ Amnesty International, “Facts and Figures: the Work of Amnesty International,” <http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-facts-eng>, accessed March 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Amnesty International, “Indonesia: ASEAN Regional Forum Members Must Address Mounting Violations in Aceh,” *AI Index* (17 May 2001).

HDC-led talks. Each of AI's national branches focus on the Aceh crisis in a different context, allowing for detailed action from their parent organization.

Along with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has shifted its focus to state and non-state actors which violate human rights. They began as Helsinki Watch in 1978, monitoring Eastern Europe, then as Americas Watch monitored events in Latin America. Today, it is the largest American human rights organization. Their mantra, that "international standards of human rights apply to all people equally," is consistently applied in their work in Aceh.¹⁰¹ In each of their reports, they include a section on GAM abuses, one smaller than TNI abuses but of critical importance; reports on Aceh include: *Aceh under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War* (December 2003), *Aceh under Martial Law: Muzzling the Messengers* (November 2003), *Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Aceh* (March 2002), and *Indonesia: the War in Aceh* (August 2001). They have also published approximately forty articles on Aceh in various journals and newspapers, acting as the premier American human rights organization.

Its earliest reports on Indonesia made little mention of Aceh, and when they did, they described only abuses by the TNI. This changed slightly in 1999, as HRW noted the return of the GAM following the economic crisis, a group which kidnapped and killed off-duty soldiers.¹⁰² In a 1999 statement, HRW stated that "GAM abuses are real, and no one should romanticize the movement. But those abuses pale beside Indonesian army and police excesses."¹⁰³ Its 2000 report stated that "while army, police, and GAM were all responsible for abuses, including extrajudicial executions of civilians, the violations were disproportionately on the government side."¹⁰⁴ This philosophy has continued; along with AI, HRW has been an example of clear thought in Aceh.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) bases its work on field research, publishing a monthly bulletin called *Crisis Watch* and sending briefings to governments and other political actors. Their work in Aceh has been very good, as they place a degree of blame on all parties for abuses and for the failure of peace talks, their major focus being to demonstrate that the Indonesian state is failing to gain any popularity in the province in its offences, a crucial fact which is hardly controversial.

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, "About HRW," www.hrw.org/about, accessed March 2004.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia and East Timor" 1999 Country Report.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch, "Why Aceh is Exploding," Press Backgrounder (27 August 1999).

¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia" 2000 Country Report.

Their July 2003 report, *How Not to Win Hearts and Minds*, speaks more towards the impact of military strategies on popular support than on territory or kill rates. The ICG also notes that in addition to the state's catastrophic failings, the "GAM appears to be losing popular support because of its own abuses."¹⁰⁵ The ICG is strong in almost every respect, though fails in its belief that the GAM and the Republic have "diametrically opposed political visions"¹⁰⁶, as their quests for power and violent tactics show little dissimilarity.

This aside, its commentaries from Sidney Jones and Harold Crouch, plus their ability to reach major actors, cannot be ignored. US Secretary of Defense Colin Powell noted that the ICG "helped shape U.S. policy in advance of the Tokyo Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh."¹⁰⁷ The ICG has proven reach and a clear understanding of the issue, following the examples of AI and HRW in its balanced reporting but adding a strategic element, seeing abuses in ways that may speak to governments.

Its balanced approach is so consistent that it explains moments of bias; its December 2003 report disclaimed that "GAM has a long record of abusive behavior in Aceh. But, because Human Rights Watch did not have access to Aceh, this report contains no such information."¹⁰⁸ This clear understanding of their skewed sample of interviews in Malaysia places the blame ignorance of GAM abuses on the Indonesian state. A TNI Commander responded furiously that "it is too arrogant to accuse us of violating human rights just because they do not have any access to go to Aceh."¹⁰⁹ This statement ignores that the HRW made no such comments; their report included stories from others with few editorials, their samples distorted by the lack of access.

Another American group is the Asia Foundation, which has operated for over fifty years, promoting fair elections, animal rights, legal infrastructure, and gauging the role of the United States in the region. After recent hostilities, the Foundation ended its programmes in Aceh, as the group diplomatic ties and operates at the structural level. As opposed to advocacy or grassroots action, the Foundation looks to long-term education and partnerships, previously looking to three areas in

¹⁰⁵ Sidney Jones, "Indonesia's War that Just Won't Go Away," Observer Online (4 August 2002).

¹⁰⁶ ICG, "Why the Military Option Still Won't Work."

¹⁰⁷ Colin Powell, "Speech on ICG," delivered at the International Crisis Group Reception in Washington DC (10 October 2003).

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch, "Aceh under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War," 6-7.

¹⁰⁹ Jakarta Post, "RI Rebukes Human Rights Watchdog over Aceh" (20 September 2003).

Aceh: women's rights, Islamic rights, and legal development. For years, they funded KOMNAS HAM in Aceh, FLOWER Aceh, and the Islamic student groups, IMM and PM Aceh.¹¹⁰ The Asia Foundation continues working in its Jakarta branch, with hopes that its Aceh programmes may be restarted in the near future.

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC, formerly Henry Dunant Centre) was launched in 1999, its focus on creating the space for armed groups to discuss issues and for civil society to participate. In January 2000, the HDC began to facilitate talks between the Republic and the GAM, leading to a Humanitarian Pause signed in May 2000. This Pause would, in turn, lead to the COHA; each of these processes will be described in the next chapter. The HDC focused on finding common ground, though it used wording which created false pretenses for each side, such as Special Autonomy Laws labeled as a 'first step'.

Shifting to apolitical groups, Peace Brigades International (PBI) is an interesting case. Founded in 1981, their mandate is to accompany high-risk human rights defenders into the field when invited to do so, as militaries generally avoid violence in front of international monitors. They offer no advice or financial support, and thus have a mandate which is less obtrusive than other groups. In Aceh, PBI has worked with embattled groups such as LBH Banda Aceh, RATA, and FLOWER Aceh. In May 2003, a member of a PBI partner group, Abdussalam Muhamad Deli, was abducted. Deli, who also worked for the Indonesian Red Cross, was taken off a bus by men in plain clothes and has not been seen since. An associate, Raja Ismail, was also abducted on this day, his body was found on 13 May.¹¹¹ Ismail's body was reported to have had knife wounds and bruises and showed signs of strangulation.¹¹² Under Martial Law, the PBI was forced to open an office just south of the Aceh border to keep communications open in some small way, though they continue to apply for work permits.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also has a unique mandate, avoiding political statements in order to focus on its seven principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. This has made the Red Cross the largest

¹¹⁰ Please see www.asiafoundation.org.

¹¹¹ [Peace Brigades International](http://www.peacebrigades.org), "Urgent Appeal- Indonesian Human Rights Activists Abducted and Killed," (27 May 2003), available online at www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2003/450/.

¹¹² [Amnesty International](http://www.amnesty.org), "Indonesia: Protecting the Protectors."

humanitarian group in history. In Aceh, the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) has rebuilt schools and provided funding for teachers as well as relief from landslides and other natural disasters. It was among the first organizations operating in Aceh in July 1991. The PMI has blood banks, hospitals, rice distribution, and temporary housing programmes. The Red Cross has not escaped the violence though; in October 2001, PMI employee Jafar Syehdo was found dead, an event which shocked NGOs, who see the PMI as truly apolitical. The Red Cross has offered to act as intermediaries between the groups, including during the GAM hostage-taking of media personnel, a suggestion rejected by the GAM.

Under Martial Law, the ICRC was the only group which was allowed to continue its work until it was shut down in August, then restarted in December. Its lone existence for several months resulted in countless organizations funneling their materials through the PMI into Aceh; the PMI refused many of these supplies, remaining impartial by not working with other organizations.¹¹³ Because of its neutrality, the PMI is a primary source for statistics on casualties, documenting cases in hospitals across the province. After investigating mass killings in North Aceh, the PMI stated to inquisitive Australian reporters that “it was not the PMI's job to try to determine whether they were civilians or GAM rebels.”¹¹⁴ Their medical training programmes, including a May 2002 forum for doctors and armed forces medics, have done a great deal to lessen the pain of combatants and bystanders in Aceh.

Medicines Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders, MSF) has a similar mandate, working in emergency areas with government health agencies to provide humanitarian relief. The difference is that MSF is more likely to confront political groups using international pressure after the emergency has subsided. In Aceh, its work with IDPs has resulted in criticism for the GAM and the Republic. Since 1999, MSF has helped develop the medical infrastructure in the province alongside the government, also providing mobile medical facilities.

OXFAM is an anti-poverty NGO which has six country-based affiliates working in Indonesia. In Aceh, OXFAM works with RPuk and several other trauma relief groups on IDPs, conflict victims, and natural disaster victims.¹¹⁵ OXFAM worked through the UNDP during the Humanitarian Pause

¹¹³ Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, “PMI Ready to Channel Aid from NGOs,” *Jakarta Post* (31 May 2003).

¹¹⁴ *ABC News Online*, “Panel Examines Aceh ‘Civilian’ Deaths” (25 May 2003).

¹¹⁵ Please see www.oxfamgb.org/eastasia/indonesia/.

to provide for IDPs and returnees across Aceh. In 2002, they began to develop an income-generating project for textile workers. OXFAM paused their programmes several times due to security problems- the worst was on 27 August 2000, when three OXFAM staff members in South Aceh were tortured by BRIMOB officers.¹¹⁶ OXFAM was forced to close its offices during Martial Law.

There are several other aid organizations which operate through local partners in Aceh; each of these groups worked in the province during the window between 2000 and 2003:

- The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) was founded in 1951 to protect the rights of IDPs, refugees, and migrants.¹¹⁷ In Aceh, the ICMC works with women's groups to improve the welfare of disadvantaged women who have been displaced by the conflict. They provide education, counseling, and agricultural equipment to local women, a mandate put on hold by Martial Law in the summer of 2003.
- Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) has been active regarding Aceh by extending their mandate to include IDPs. Their work in North Sumatra and, when possible, Aceh has provided several crucial services to poor families. Their 2003 book, *Anywhere but War*, is a helpful collection of such testimonies.
- Save the Children USA was founded in 1932 to promote the rights of impoverished and orphaned children.¹¹⁸ In Aceh, they work with government and NGOs to rebuild health care systems and to help ease the trauma of war on youths.
- *Terre Des Hommes* works to end trafficked and indentured children. Their Acehnese NGO partners include the KKSP, the PCC, the YAB, CORDOVA, and SULOH; *des Hommes* works to bring education, health services, and community development to the poorest of Aceh's children.

7) Conclusions

The previous two analytical chapters have attempted to highlight the vast importance and the quantity of actors involved in the Aceh conflict. In an age of globalized finance, communication,

¹¹⁶ SCHRA, "Letter to World Bank President, Calling on World Bank to Postpone CGI Meeting Due to Worsening Human Rights in Aceh," 2 October 2000. Available online at <http://tapol.gn.apc.org/1001002aceh.htm>, accessed December 2003.

¹¹⁷ Please see www.icmc.net.

¹¹⁸ Please see www.savethechildren.org.

and politics, such complicated an overlapping relationships should be expected. But considering the hundreds of groups which are dedicated to bringing a just peace and development for all the persons of Aceh, the peace talks have been unique. In her study on the peace process, Elizabeth Drexler points out that “in order to oppose the central government, one had to identify as GAM; there were no other positions available on the committees.”¹¹⁹ A dichotomy was created- the only two forces given legitimacy by participating in peace dialogues were the TNI and the GAM. These are also the only armed groups, rewarded for violence with political legitimacy. Besides being only two of several actors in the conflict, they are themselves fragmented. The very groups excluded from peace talks are the women and men whom the militaries pretend to support. With this said, we will now look at peace in Aceh.

¹¹⁹ Drexler, Paranoid Transparencies, 261.

Chapter 7: Peace

Thus far, we have looked at the history, politics, economics, human rights, civil society, and international involvement in the Aceh conflict. By now, the reader understands the complexity of the actors, the importance of peace, and the tremendous cost of war. At this point, we shall consider what we have discussed thus far and look towards peace. First, we will look at the HDC Peace Dialogues, the *Humanitarian Pause* and the *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement* (COHA). Second, we shall look at other conflicts and the theories they have spawned, as it is important to learn from other experiences while not being limited by them. The goal of these comparisons and theories is not to move into great detail, as comparisons to other conflicts and conflict theory require their own books, not sections in a chapter. Instead, we shall simply point future studies in a suitable direction. Third, we will explore necessary future peace agreements, moving us to some suggestions for peace in Aceh.

The goal of this chapter is not to offer any concrete conclusions, as this is best left to the individual actors from the grassroots to government chambers and all points of Indonesian politics in between. The hopeful aim of this text is one of the ideal actions of NGOs, providing information and testimonies they feel are not always known, and presenting them to the public, to activists, and to policy makers. The aims of this book are to summarize various issues regarding the Aceh conflict, provide a collection of resources, and to look at the conflict through a human rights point of view, one which has the ability to shed an automatic support for the weaker party and focus on critiquing groups which use violence to meet their goals.

With this, we return to our metaphor which we have not touched upon for some time, the lamb and the wolf. Obviously, this metaphor must be discarded; the wolf and lamb do not consider history, they consider hunger and instinct. The wolf and lamb are single actors, not subject to factions or economic exploitation. The lamb will never abuse the rights of the wolf; meanwhile abuses by the wolf are natural and cannot be condemned. Other actors, either in the peaceful field or along its fences, do not impact the hunt. The exchange is short, brutal, and swift- peace only comes when the wolf is fed. Peace in Aceh requires justice, time, creativity, and a fair approach which is not limited to seeing two actors, with one good and one evil side.

Still, we see several groups suggesting that the GAM has no choice but to kill,¹ its actions are considered by many to be purely reactive while the Republican forces act not in reaction but simply to hurt, as if the TNI Commanders were trying to hurt people. After all, although we are critical of these military figures, we must acknowledge that they feel their approach is best for the people and engage them on such terms. We see commentators ignoring the nationalism, disrespect for minorities, and elite rule of the GAM, romanticizing Acehese history, culture, and other rebellions. We see other groups suggesting that the unity of the Indonesian state gives them no choice but to commit brutal human rights abuses, as if their borders are natural or that the country would fall apart if Aceh were independent. We see an Indonesian Government which treats any disagreement with violence, not distinguishing between the violent GAM and the non-violent student groups. We see Indonesian authorities rejecting humanitarian assistance in order to avoid foreign interference, an act which helps contribute to seeing the conflict as between two actors.

There are many common mistakes which have hopefully been addressed in this text. Acehese independence is not justified solely because of human rights abuses or cultural difference. Neither Aceh nor Indonesia are natural entities, both have been created by expansion of military forces. Each is run by violent business elites who stand to lose a great deal of power by a just peace. Like any conflict, each military believes that it is correct, that it is fighting for good; however governments, civil society, and other actors have a responsibility to challenge even the groups whom they support and to consider the opinion of those whom they oppose. We define this as diplomacy, and diplomacy is the direction of peace.

1) The HDC Peace Dialogues

1.1 After the New Order

After the DOM-era ended with the fall of the New Order, the GAM seemed defeated; but as mass graves were found, atrocities became known through a newly free media, and the ABRI decided to remain in Aceh after a suspicious attack on departing soldiers, the war continued. We shall see this

¹ For such comments, several inconsistencies may be found. This relies on the non-verifiable claim that violence will guarantee a greater future, and creates a precedent where violence is allowable when it meets one's political objectives. This belief can also be used by one's enemies; in fact, this is how wars are created. Many successful modern rebellions have been passive and in Aceh there certainly exists support for passive action. Finally, the GAM's actions have been far outside any need for survival, carrying out executions and intimidation when it suits their personal and political objectives. Any commentator which dismisses or makes excuses for violence against one group loses credibility for condemning such actions against other actors.

history repeat itself after the June 2004 conclusion to Martial Law. These are the negative aspects of the GAM's growth, as the brutality of the Indonesian military created massive support for any group in opposition. But there were positive reasons as well; the GAM's currency reserves were in foreign funds, thus their power grew with the Asian Economic Crisis. The Indonesian state weakened, GAM leaders returned from abroad with new training and equipment. Many of these leaders, including Ishak Daud, were released from Indonesian jails as an amnesty was declared after the fall of Suharto. General Wiranto and President Habibie, and later Presidents Wahid and Megawati, publicly apologized for human rights abuses in Aceh. In 1998, the power in Aceh shifted considerably, as fighting erupted anew.

With Wahid in office, preliminary negotiations began; for this to be productive, some diplomacy came from both sides. For its part, the GAM looked weak to its supporters by even speaking with its enemy; the trade-off was that the GAM gained international recognition and some political clout. The Republic sacrificed more; not only did it anger its military, it gave a great deal of power to one faction of the GAM, undermining the advantages of a fractured movement; for the "Hasan di Tiro-led GAM, [the HDC Dialogues] will strengthen its position *vis à vis* other GAM factions and push them to unite."² The government also lost the fiction that the GAM are mere jungle rebels, allowing their political wing to gain legitimacy. The Republic of Indonesia made the bold step of recognizing the Free Aceh Movement- this is one of the few acts of trust one may draw on for future agreements.

The negotiations had another interesting result, one not picked up on by many observers. While the GAM gained political legitimacy, they also gained the baggage that goes with it. A poorly organized rebel group is not scrutinized as much as one which has an organized political apparatus. Once a group decides to speak on behalf of others at the negotiating table, they gain responsibility. Indeed, this is the time when critiques of the GAM were first voiced; as described below, non-state groups seeking political legitimacy are prone to critiques for their actions, whereas mere terrorists cannot be pressured very easily to comply with humanitarian standards. This relates to the Spring 2004 trial of GAM leaders in Sweden, as they are trying to prove they have no linkages to GAM ground forces, the opposite contention which they had at the peace talks.

² Aboeprijadi Santoso, "Aceh: More Challenges from Geneva," Jakarta Post (17 May 2000).

Facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), these preliminary talks relied on patience; at this point, no ‘big bang’ solution was possible. Any dialogue between the militaries, never mind the subject matter, was a step forward. Under the cover of silent diplomacy, GAM and the Republic held talks in Geneva for a number of months. Smaller-scale talks were also held by NGOs such as Forum-Asia in Bangkok. The HDC, which had experience in North Ireland and whose staff had served in countless groups such as the UN, assessed the conflict in late 1999, with talks starting in January 2000. Indonesia’s UN Ambassador Hassan Wirajuda had positive sessions with Hasan di Tiro on 27 January, each conceding the existence of a stalemate. President Wahid traveled to Geneva in February 2000 to encourage the HDC, whose goal was not a solution, but instead to find common ground for future solutions. The first payoff came on 12 May 2000 in Geneva, when the *Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause in Aceh* was signed.³

Several members of the Indonesian Parliament such as Amien Rais were angered at the document, asserting that this meant the internationalization of Indonesia’s domestic problems, nothing less than a loss of sovereignty. GAM hardliners were just as angry, as they dismissed “Wahid’s overtures as meaningless”; indeed, di Tiro refused to sign the Pause.⁴ Days later, twenty four soldiers were convicted for the slaughter of fifty six students and their teacher in a massacre in June of 1999, violence which further demonstrated the need for the talks. The Humanitarian Pause began amidst major controversy.

1.2 The Humanitarian Pause

The Pause rested on the well-being of the Acehnese, the common ground between the GAM and Indonesia. As editorialized in the Jakarta Post:

It was the pressing needs of humanitarian aid for refugees and other victims of violence and the Acehnese people’s quest for a lasting peace that pushed Jakarta and GAM to put their differences aside and sign a Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause.⁵

The objectives of the Pause were to deliver humanitarian assistance, to reduce tension, and to build confidence. Praise from Kofi Annan, several governments and NGOs, as well as substantial funding, provided optimism. Its primary body was the Joint Forum, a body limited to the two militaries and the HDC, its lifespan limited to three months. The Joint Forum had each side select a

³ Please see Appendix IX, the Humanitarian Pause.

⁴ Chalk, “Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia,” 257.

⁵ Aboeprijadi Santoso, “Aceh: More Challenges from Geneva.”

representative for two other bodies: the Joint Committee for Security Modalities (JCSM) and the Joint Committee for Humanitarian Action (JCHA). Thus, organization, security, and humanitarian aid were addressed, however political issues were avoided.

The single greatest factor in this and subsequent agreements was that of independence; wisely, the Humanitarian Pause ignored this question, as any progress would have surely been halted by this fundamental point. The HDC can be credited with avoiding this question, though they have also been relentlessly critiqued for not addressing it. For now, we should note that this abeyance is reasonable if your aim is simply to open talks, though it can also bring talks to a quick end and hurt the process in the long run.

Condemnation was rampant, a common feature of the Pause and, years later, the COHA. Civil society groups were angered at the snail's pace of the changes, a pace unacceptable so long as people were still dying. There were several armed clashes during the Pause, which was not a ceasefire, with the GAM and the TNI accusing the other of violating the spirit of the Agreement and consolidating their forces. Academics critiqued the semantics of the HDC; they asserted that the term 'Humanitarian Pause' was in response to Indonesia's "refusal to accept the Aceh conflict as a battle between two equal military forces," an unfortunate statement, as military deadlock is different from having equal forces.⁶ Media groups wanted quick results and viewed the talks as not being worthwhile; as the Jakarta Post persistently pondered, "how long the two sides can keep up with this waiting game is anybody's guess."⁷ The Indonesian Government pushed to end the agreement as well, favouring a military solution. Civil society, the media, GAM leaders, and Republican officials were all critical of the Humanitarian Pause.

In Washington, the IFA held a conference, *Post Dialogue of Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause*, attended by GAM representatives, Acehnese NGOs, the HDC, and others. The conference concluded with specific messages to the USA, the GAM, and the Republic of Indonesia; the GAM was asked to respect human rights, while the Republic was asked to remove troops, establish a dialogue, and allow a referendum. The greatest strength of the forum though was that it allowed

⁶ Kira Kay, "the New Humanitarianism: the Henry Dunant Center and the Aceh Peace Negotiations," *WWS Case Studies* (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University: February 2003).

⁷ *Jakarta Post*, "After Truce, What?" (5 September 2000).

Acehnese NGOs to organize and to establish a plan of action: record abuses, work with students, and work to establish a human rights tribunal. Human rights groups were active during the Pause, also coming together in September 2000 in Medan through Nonviolence International to share their experiences and draft a joint statement to all concerned.

Expiring on 31 August 2000, the Pause was extended numerous times, renamed to *Provision of Understanding, Moratorium on Violence, and Peace through Dialogue*, though following the same structure of the Humanitarian Pause and subsumed under its name in this text. The goal of these cosmetic changes was simply to continue talks. During the origins of the Pause, clashes had dissipated; those which did occur were generally begun by BRIMOB units conducting their *Love the Mosque* sweeps. But by late 2000, violence had returned to pre-Pause levels, eventually monitored by teams of the two militaries and NGOs such as Cordova. In September, Professor Idris was assassinated, with the GAM and the TNI both denying responsibility. On 24 October, GAM headquarters was attacked by the TNI and several people were killed. In November, the GAM attacked over a dozen government buildings. In December 2000, fifteen persons died in a major clash in central Aceh and the infamous RATA executions took place at the hands of Republican forces. Civilians, military, and human rights defenders were all targets of both militaries, as violence exploded to new levels under the Humanitarian Pause.

The peace negotiations were said to have “occurred in a vacuum, disconnected from the daily killings in the province by both sides.”⁸ As the violence increased, a critical media alleged that the Humanitarian Pause was “neither humanitarian nor a pause.”⁹ GAM members pushed for heavy international monitoring, agreeing with civil society but angering an Indonesian state which feared another East Timor intervention. As the talks began to crumble, President Wahid visited Aceh on 19 December 2000, himself under siege in the MPR for his soft line approach. In January 2001, Wahid was pressed to increase the number of soldiers in Aceh despite the spirit of the Pause; “by early 2001, the military situation was said to be equal to the DOM-era.”¹⁰

⁸ Murphy, “Aceh Caught in the Middle.”

⁹ Lee Kim Chew, “Both Sides have made a Farce of Aceh Truce,” *the Straights Times* (13 October 2000).

¹⁰ Dubus et Revise, *Armée du Peuple, Armée du Roi*, 90.

The Pause continued through its February 2001 Joint Council meetings, the second phase of which was held in June. On 9 March 2001, Indonesia launched new military operations as EXXON-Mobil was closed due to GAM reprisals. On 28 March 2001, Parliament voted in support of ending the peace process, favouring a military solution in Aceh. President Wahid, who managed to resist pressure for a full military campaign, finally responded on 11 April 2001 with Presidential Instruction Number Four. The Instruction, though worded to be a comprehensive approach to peace, simply replaced many military leaders seen as too soft on the GAM and expanded military mandates into social realms. Soon, GAM supporters were rounded up and jailed. June 2001 saw the most violence, when the GAM massacred several militia members who had killed a villager, and then the TNI killed the rebels and more villagers in response.¹¹ As Indonesia had no de facto President, this era was when most of the described human rights violations took place, as the violence was at Martial Law levels but international observers were frequent due to the ongoing negotiations.

In June 2001, the Joint Council met again, at which time the monitoring bodies were dismantled and the Pause came to an end, with GAM negotiators arrested. The next day President Wahid was unanimously removed from power, and on 23 July Megawati became the President of Indonesia. Megawati visited Aceh on 9 September 2001; the student groups she met with were later abducted by the GAM. Though the Humanitarian Pause had ended, there was some optimism for future talks, as Megawati popular, her apology and subsequent promise to not allow any more bloodshed in Aceh appeared sincere. But Megawati cancelled future extensions of the Pause, demanding that *Special Autonomy (NAD) Law* be accepted by the GAM. Megawati also depended on military support for her victory, her policies being inconsistent aside from her virulent nationalism; of her six point plan, the first priority was territorial integrity.

In the end, the Humanitarian Pause was crucial because it provided a foundation for the COHA, and hopefully for future agreements and dialogues. Reports of atrocities were made known, Aceh gained publicity, and international negotiators had gained some trust from both sides.

¹¹ Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: the War in Aceh," 11.

Detail 7.0 **Special Autonomy (NAD) Law**

Passed on 19 July 2001 during the transition from President Wahid to Megawati, who labeled it “the main pillar for conflict resolution.” NAD Law is an extension of the decentralizing *Regional Government Act* in 1999.

NAD Law is Indonesia’s solution to the Aceh problem, an attempt to change the political-economic relationship between Jakarta and Banda. Aceh was renamed to the Acehnese term for the province, *Nangroe Aceh Darussalam* (NAD). The Law gives 80% of resource revenue to the Provincial Government, as well as promising that future governors will be directly elected in Aceh. The recruitment of police forces will be guided by the elected Governor, the recruitment being consistent with local custom. Aceh is to be given a ceremonial head of state, a Sultan-like figurehead with the same title as Hasan di Tiro refers to himself, as well as a cultural council.

The Special Autonomy Law had to be accepted by the GAM if the Indonesian Government were to work towards the COHA. The GAM accepted the Law, interpreting their action as a first step to full independence. But the wording of the preamble to the NAD Law vows to uphold the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state- a safeguard against the election of separatist parties. The Law also states that elected representatives must have never been involved in violent actions or be foreign citizens (including Sweden). Finally, NAD Law makes no mention of local political parties, so that direct elections will still be limited to outside candidates.

The greatest shortcoming of the Law is that although it does try to address some of the root problems, it ignores justice. It is one thing to address the root, but another to ignore the results of one’s actions. Without trials, some form of Truth and Reconciliation Committee, the Special Autonomy Law is doomed to fail.

1.3 The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)

1.31 Origins

In February 2002, a new round of talks began in Geneva. The HDC deserves a great deal of credit for this, as when the Pause broke off, they ensured that each side affirmed their commitment to continue dialogue. The HDC brought together a group of *Wise Men* in July 2001 and acknowledged that Megawati’s new cabinet appointments and popularity were good signs. The GAM agreed to include the Wise Men in dialogues as of September 2001; the GAM also issued a public statement “which for the first time, acknowledged that the new framework agreed in January would focus on ‘interim solutions’.”¹²

The COHA was almost stillborn, as TNI soldiers attacked and killed a GAM Commander and his family using reports gathered from peace talks. The TNI, and to a lesser extent the GAM, continued military operations during the negotiations. But the HDC continued to work with civil society groups and contact both militaries, which agreed to February 2002 talks. In May 2002, the GAM and Republic agreed that NAD Law would be a starting point for future peace, yet days later

¹² Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), “Indonesia, Aceh,” www.hdcentre.org/Programmes/aceh.htm, accessed March 2004.

the GAM stated that it “will never accept NAD or any other form of settlement that is not compatible with the aspirations of the Acehnese people.”¹³ The TNI gave the GAM an ultimatum to sign the COHA immediately or go to war and the HDC brought civil society leaders to pressure GAM to accept the plan; IMM students pointed out that the Acehnese *people* will lose the most if the talks fail. The GAM signed onto the COHA. They clarified that NAD could be a starting point, though towards what was left an ominous abeyance.

Detail 7.1 The Wise Men

Brought together by the HDC in July 2002 to promote a renewed peace dialogue; the group was agreed to by both militaries and helped bring new momentum to the talks. The Wise Men monitored and coordinated closed-door talks with both sides, resulting in the GAM accepting NAD Law and the Republic accepting international monitors. These men acted as private actors, though much of their influence came from their personal connections to world leaders.

The Wise Men were composed of:

- Anthony Zinni, a Retired Marine who worked closely with the Vietnamese people during the Second Indochina War, recently acting as special envoy to the Middle East. Zinni’s friendship with President Bush added political clout to his negotiating abilities.
- Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, a Thai Muslim with vast experiences in ASEAN conflict resolution. Surin taught at Thammasat University in the 1970s, has been a member of Thai parliament since 1986, was Foreign Minister from 1999 until 2001, and is a member of the Commission on Human Security.
- Former Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar. Loncar was the Ambassador to Indonesia under the Socialist-friendly Sukarno, as well as a friend of Megawati. He is also an advisor to the World Council of Religious Scholars.
- Also included were Sweden’s Bengt Soderberg and England’s Lord Eric Avebury (British House of Lords, chairperson of Human Rights Committee).

On 3 December 2002, the *Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh* was held in Tokyo. Here, various governments and IFIs pledged financial support for a major agreement. The GAM was pressured by a hardened Indonesian Government, by international actors, and by

¹³ Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 29.

Acehnese groups, to move forward. On 9 December 2002, the *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement* was signed.¹⁴

1.32 The Agreement

The COHA was a genuine ceasefire and was much clearer than previous agreements, planning future elections and enacting the NAD Law. The COHA was administered by the Joint Security Council (JSC), chaired by Thailand's General Tanongsuk and attended by five GAM members, five Indonesian representatives, two Thai officers, a Filipino officer, and a Norwegian officer. The role of the HDC would be to recommend disciplinary measures to each side after a reported incident took place. Tripartite monitoring teams were created from 24 GAM, 24 TNI, 18 Thai, and 6 Filipino personnel, acknowledging the regularity of violence under the Pause. The Thai and Filipino forces were not representatives of their countries, but of the HDC.

The COHA also specified that peace zones would be created, humanitarian assistance stepped up, and weapons would be stored in agreed to sites; GAM weapons would be stored in designated bins, with keys held by GAM and international representatives. The precise definition of 'peace zones' was interesting; like several other issues, the specific wording was ignored, with General Tanongsuk citing the word love, which everybody knows but none can define.¹⁵ This method of avoiding potential conflicts both allowed the COHA to continue while also creating different interpretations from all sides.

The Republic agreed to change the role of BRIMOB forces, the main culprits of recent attacks, to regular police forces through new training modules- a pledge not taken seriously by a terrified population. The COHA relied on a similar strategy to the Pause but with greater monitoring and disciplinary powers. The HDC focused on commonalities between the GAM and Indonesia, largely ignoring points of contention in order to build confidence. The bigger issues were to be discussed in a future *All-Inclusive Dialogue*, which neither side seemed ready to begin. The COHA also specified, as in the Pause, that all elements of the talk be publicized through the Public Information Unit (PIU) internationally and domestically.

¹⁴ Please see Appendix X, the COHA.

¹⁵ General Tanongsuk, *148 Days in Aceh*, 42.

From the very beginning of the COHA, protest was rampant from a variety of actors. On 23 December, a demonstration was held which questioned the neutrality of the six man Philippine military contingent given their history in Mindanao. Forum Rakyat organized a 20 January 2003 protest of the COHA, demanding a referendum as a solution to the violence.¹⁶ On 28 January, students demonstrated in front of the JSC headquarters, demanding a verdict against the TNI for a recent attack. Demonstrations were so frequent that the HDC, GAM, and TNI came together to agree on a policy for handling the “Expression of Views in Public.” On 17 March, thousands of IDPs protested at JSC headquarters, leaving a list of demands for the consideration of the HDC. Further protests were held in late March regarding the disappearance of two students and the US invasion of Iraq. On 1 April, a demonstration was held supporting the COHA.

From December 2002 until April 2003, violent clashes were reduced significantly. On 25 January, Indrapuri was declared the first Peace Zone, where no arms or military movement would be permitted, with several more such zones created in the coming weeks. COHA leaders took to heart criticisms leveled in the Jakarta Post regarding the plight of IDPs, the paper demonstrating a justified impatience with the peace process; General Tanongsuk deciding their “achievements on this particular issue would be an excellent indication” of JSC success.¹⁷ Tanongsuk was a skilled mediator, avoiding confrontation during an on-air interview with local media on 22 January, and on 28 January closing a meeting early simply because all sides had made several jokes and he wanted to end on a high note. These are excellent examples of slow confidence building.

The HDC had several strategies during the talks. The first point of the COHA is that the Agreement will “lead to the election of a democratic government in Aceh, Indonesia.”¹⁸ The HDC website rephrases this, citing that the GAM and the Republic agreed to “the establishment of a democratic autonomous government in 2004.”¹⁹ This was the main goal of the HDC, to bring each party to the point that elections could put the GAM in a position of power as a Provincial Government, where separatism could be waged by politicians, not soldiers. The HDC pushed the GAM to become a political party, going so far as to fly them to Washington to meet American opposition leaders.

¹⁶ Agence France-Presse, “Indonesia Urges Aceh Truce Monitors to Probe Violations” (20 January 2003).

¹⁷ General Tanongsuk, *148 Days in Aceh*, 44.

¹⁸ *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement*, Preamble, Point 1.

¹⁹ HDC, “Indonesia, Aceh,” www.hdcentre.org/Programmes/aceh.htm.

The HDC, pressured by the TNI, publicly stated that the COHA “does not discuss independence and it does not discuss a referendum.”²⁰ The Republic expected that the 2004 elections would be to decide regular political representatives, perhaps including some rebels, while the GAM would not budge from its independence stance. In an absolutely crucial quote, one which demonstrates the problems with the HDC strategy of having GAM in elections, Wiryono states that if the COHA progressed, “preparations could then be made for general elections in Aceh to enable GAM followers to participate.”²¹ This is a clear statement of why the GAM did not accept running in the 2004 elections, as a series of qualifiers follow the seemingly open-minded NAD law; that its followers, and not its members were to be included, is telling. The wording of the NAD Law, the starting point for future elections, was never clarified, thus whenever the GAM discussed independence, Indonesia would claim they were violating the NAD and by extension the COHA.

1.33 The Failure

By February 2003, the GAM was found guilty of one very serious violation of the Agreement, while the Indonesian military was guilty of two very serious and one serious abrogation. Indonesia protested and ignored two of the decisions, and the GAM followed by ignoring their own guilt. Both sides returned to the pattern of violence which ended the Humanitarian Pause. On 3 March, a pro-Republic mob attacked GAM and JSC monitors and their equipment, with further attacks throughout the month leading to an HDC office being burned down in April. The mob, certainly organized by Javanese militias, protested that the GAM is double-taxing the people despite receiving funds from the HDC which were supposed to suffice; when the HDC formally asked the GAM to change this policy on 27 March 2003, the response was negative. These violent groups have definite links to the TNI; even the right-wing Economist pondered that the militias “shouted suspiciously similar slogans at opposite ends of the province and made identical demands: that the monitors should stop protecting GAM or leave.”²² The violent clashes forced the JSC to recall its monitoring teams, with TNI negotiators simultaneously proclaiming their pride for such support of the Republic and their disappointment for the COHA. The TNI and the GAM resumed fighting in April of 2003.

²⁰ David Gorman, cited in Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 37.

²¹ S. Wiryono, “the Aceh Conflict: the Long Road to Peace,” 279.

²² Economist, “A Ceasefire Without Monitors.”

The COHA all but ended, a Joint Council meeting was called for 17 May in Tokyo, where several governments and funders lobbied for patience.²³ The GAM, pushing for peace, announced that it would end its armed struggle, but added that it would do so only “with reciprocal measures by the Republic of Indonesia.”²⁴ Not trusting the GAM, Indonesia responded that NAD Law must be fully accepted; the GAM must end its call of independence and disband its army. In honesty, Indonesia had already begun military operations, the talks being merely a formality.

The talks collapsed on 18 May and Martial Law was declared hours later.²⁵ We have already documented the results of Martial Law for human rights and civil society. Martial Law was supposed to last for six months, but it was renewed in early November 2003 for another term because “results of the joint operations in this province are not maximally achieved yet.”²⁶ Commander Sutarto noted that ending this conflict could take decades, despite also saying it would take months.²⁷ The World Bank, HDC, United States, European Union, Japan, and several other groups have each publicly affirmed their desire for a peaceful solution, although none fail to mention they want it solved “peacefully under the unitary territory of Indonesia.”²⁸

Under Martial Law, the media and NGOs have been barred from Aceh, and Acehnese have been subject to great violence, restricted by ID card systems, and forced to endure flag ceremonies demonstrating their love for Indonesia. The Indonesian Government has made some progress in its attempts to rebuild Aceh, but its abuse of civil society actors demonstrates its reliance on old methods of control. Civil society, the governments from the Tokyo Conferences, and the HDC have continued to promote dialogues, specifically during Ramadan in December. The Indonesian Government has continued its belligerent stance, ignoring talks in favour of violence. Foreign governments have focused on the failings of the GAM, civil society on the failings of the Indonesian state.

²³ Please see Appendix XI, Tokyo Statement.

²⁴ HDC and GAM Statement, cited in Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 44.

²⁵ Please see Appendix XII, Declaration of Martial Law.

²⁶ Indonesian National Military Homepage, “On Prolonging the Martial Law Operation in NAD,” Socialization of President Decision, www.tni.mil.id, accessed December 2003.

²⁷ Rita Smith Kipp, “Indonesia in 2003,” *Asian Survey*, Volume 54, Issue 1 (January 2004), 69.

²⁸ Takeuchi, “Press Conference.”

1.34 Laying Blame?

GAM leader Malik Mahmood stated that “the Government of the State of Aceh places the responsibility of this failure totally on the Indonesian government.”²⁹ GAM also stated that the failure of talks “is purely caused by the maneuvers carried out by the Indonesian government.”³⁰ These are unfortunate statements by a group which would gain more by admitting their own faults, as they are certainly fewer than their opponent’s in this case. The GAM contributed to the failure of the COHA; they failed to shift from its stance on independence, compromise being the defining feature of diplomacy; this refusal to run in elections also fares poorly on a group with no proven support from the people. The GAM continued to collect taxes from the Acehnese people despite the funding provided by the Tokyo Conference, going so far as to take as much as 30% of some UNDP funded budgets from local NGOs.³¹

During the ceasefire, the GAM held a ceremony to inaugurate its new military commander in Pidie, a provocation to the TNI and the peace process. Even on the first day of monitoring missions, the GAM, previously agreeing to wear HDC uniforms, refused to wear neutral uniforms with the same design as the HDC and TNI.³² On 12 January, GAM negotiator Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba told the media that the Filipino monitor could not be trusted, the GAM leadership agreeing to correct the matter only after it made several headlines.³³ On 5 February, Sofyan made similar comments to the JSC, creating tension against the Filipino team led by Brigadier General Nagamora Lomodag.

GAM military operations did not fully abate. On 14 January 2003, GAM units laid minor ambushes for the TNI on three occasions, one of which resulting in two injured soldiers.³⁴ The GAM continued building its arms and recruiting during this time, receiving less critiques than the TNI’s expansion of forces due to relatively formal and transparent TNI records. Any recruitment by the GAM will, by its nature, be undocumented. Estimates have alleged that in the district of

²⁹ Malik Mahmood, “Indonesia has Declared War on Aceh,” Official Statement on the Failure of the Joint Council Meeting of the COHA, (20 May 2003).

³⁰ Schulze, the Free Aceh Movement, 48.

³¹ Schulze, the Free Aceh Movement, 25.

³² General Tanongsuk, 148 Days in Aceh, 14.

³³ General Tanongsuk, 148 Days in Aceh, 50 and S. Wiryo, “the Aceh Conflict: the Long Road to Peace,” 276.

³⁴ General Tanongsuk, 148 Days in Aceh, 52.

Pidie, recruitment was highest, as GAM ranks quadrupled here during the COHA.³⁵ The GAM also deserves scorn for its manipulation of the meeting dates as the COHA fell apart, though the Indonesian Government should not have cancelled the talks as a result.

As in the Humanitarian Pause, the GAM signed the COHA “to secure greater international recognition and to take advantage of the opportunity that a cease-fire would provide to broaden GAM’s support base and consolidate its military forces.”³⁶ We must also consider that the GAM wanted the COHA in order to allow for humanitarian assistance to the people of Aceh, as well as for a future peace. We cannot be too cold in our interpretation of the GAM’s strategy. The GAM also made some compromises; for example, understanding the position of the HDC when Indonesia refused to respect its judgments over TNI attacks and agreeing to continue talks when the COHA crumbled.

Precisely as the GAM sees that only Indonesia at fault, the lead negotiator for Indonesia believes that his government took “all pains to be flexible,” and that the GAM “displayed a streak of obstructionism and disdain for the Government’s demonstration of good-will.”³⁷ But the Republic of Indonesia contributed to the failure of the COHA as well; the entire COHA process was a result of violent threats to the GAM in December 2002. It responded to calls for referenda by forcing the HDC to dismiss this option and in arresting activists such as Muhammad Nazar of the SIRA. The TNI was also guilty of far more military assaults, as well as non-military, with the GAM generally responding to attacks. After the JSC found TNI members guilty of abuses, the Indonesian Government protested the decision, prompting General Tanongsuk to see that Indonesia failed to “take the blame for their actions”, as the JSC leader felt “rather disappointed with the RI behavior.”³⁸

As the United States invaded Iraq, the TNI repeated its previous strategy of negotiating while boosting troop levels- despite Article Two, Point D of the Agreement: “both sides agree that they will not increase their military strength, which includes re-deployment of forces, increase in

³⁵ Schulze, *the Free Aceh Movement*, 18.

³⁶ Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 4.

³⁷ S. Wiryo, “the Aceh Conflict: the Long Road to Peace,” 279.

³⁸ General Tanongsuk, *148 Days in Aceh*, 104.

military personnel or military equipment into Aceh.” The TNI was not only guilty of recruitment and attacks, but also used derogatory terms for the GAM in its reports, which violated the terms of the COHA. On 29 March 2003, TNI units stopped and searched HDC units, as they did to GAM units a week later and to the JSC on 25 April.

Indonesia was also at fault when Megawati called for military operations before the COHA collapsed, with her negotiator demanding that the GAM accept the NAD Law as a final solution and that the GAM disarm completely. The HDC teams were told to prepare for their departure because military actions were beginning. The Indonesian Government stopped attending HDC meetings and made aggressive demands of the GAM. The COHA stated that either party must give thirty days notice to end the process, which Indonesia failed to do. Finally, the arrest of GAM negotiators before the last-minute Tokyo Conference is solely the fault of Indonesia, as the GAM cannot in any way take blame for this dishonesty.

Conservative commentators note that “neither side ever lived up to the earlier peace pact.”³⁹ Human rights monitors agree; as stated by the International Crisis Group, “both the GAM and the TNI are to blame for the collapse. Both were quick to disseminate their own interpretations of the agreement that were at odds with the truth.”⁴⁰ This is an excellent point; in order to satisfy their supporters, neither side admitted it had in any way compromised in negotiations, which made it much tougher to negotiate. As regarding human rights abuses, Indonesia seems to shoulder more guilt, but nonetheless both are at fault. Before we look at future peace agreements, it would be helpful to look at some other conflicts as well as conflict theories, a comparative look at other experiences which may be helpful to Aceh.

2) Conflict Theory

This section entails a limited look at comparisons to other conflicts as well as some international relations theories which are useful to Aceh. These brief looks, which are far from exhaustive, are meant to accomplish two goals: first, to point future studies in a constructive direction and second, to provide a minimal framework for some simple conclusions regarding Aceh. First we will look at other conflicts, both local and foreign, before we look at some of the effects of war.

³⁹ Business Week, “Indonesia Aims at Aceh, Again.”

⁴⁰ ICG, “Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won’t Work,” 2.

2.1 Comparisons

2.11 Local Precedent

First, let us look at the end of the Java War. In 1824, Prince Diponegoro expected that he would be promoted due to the suggestions of Raffles and the British administration. When the Dutch returned, they ignored his claim and after a series of clashes a war had begun. After almost six years of fighting, Diponegoro's uncle and advisor had been captured, and the people were tired of war. The Prince finally agreed to negotiate a peace settlement in March of 1830 in Magelang. The Dutch were very receptive, receiving him as Sultan Diponegoro and scheduling talks in Djokjakarta. But at this meeting, the Dutch made new demands, which forced the Prince to pause and consider the situation. The Dutch attacked him at the negotiations, surrounding his forces and arresting him. General de Kock, the Dutch commander, "forced Diponegoro to accept his demands and place himself in custody."⁴¹ This dishonorable act has been a source of deep Indonesian distrust, as well as patriotism, ever since; the Jakarta Museum and the Presidential Hall each display a stylized portrait of this event.

On 9 May 2003, the Indonesian Government arrested the GAM negotiating team just prior to their departure to Japan, as they were scheduled to attend the Tokyo meetings, the failure of which resulted in Martial Law. These negotiators were partly responsible for the 9 December 2002 COHA, and were convicted of terrorism shortly after their arrest. Even the HDC was moved to critique this act, worried about "the potential negative implications this may have for opportunities for dialogue in Aceh and elsewhere."⁴² They fail to observe that this was not an isolated act; on 20 July 2001, the Humanitarian Pause was ended when six GAM negotiators were arrested and charged with treason, their lawyer, an executive with LBH Aceh, outraged at the breach of the Geneva Agreement.⁴³ That both peace negotiations ended in the arrest of GAM negotiators is a major wound for Indonesia's honour. As of March 2004, it appeared that the GAM negotiators would be sent to Nusakambangan, a notorious prison which was, ironically, built by the Dutch.

⁴¹ Justus M. van der Kroef, "Prince Diponegoro: Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism," 448.

⁴² Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), "Press Release" (Geneva: 21 October 2003).

⁴³ Jakarta Post, "Detention Period Extended for GAM Negotiators" (28 August 2001).

Thus, history is a crucial lesson for us. Relating the feelings of the actors then to those today is an interesting exercise. We can learn from these experiences, citing Diponegoro as the reason for granting immunity to negotiators, as citing the arrest of GAM members will likely have less weight and provoke confrontation with the Indonesian Government.

Another example is the independence of Indonesia itself; the Dutch would not leave their former colony, instigating *Police Actions* and abusing Indonesian leaders. The international community intervened diplomatically against the Dutch, who were forced by this and by Indonesian resistance to leave Indonesia and sign the Linggarjati Agreement. It is not secession which we should invoke today, but instead that the international community has a precedent of doing the right thing, a memory which Indonesians may appreciate.

The end of the Darul Islam Rebellion is also helpful for tomorrow's negotiations. After becoming independent, Indonesia incorporated Aceh, which had been an integral part of its victory against the Dutch, into the Province of North Sumatra. Besides this political slight, the government "did not have any plans for the development of Aceh" either.⁴⁴ The third reason for the Rebellion was the character of the new state, as Islamic thought was not made central to the Republic, which was based on Pancasila. When the rebels rose up across Indonesia, Aceh once again found itself at war.

Aceh was led by Daud Beureueh, a well-financed general with tremendous support. But as the war waged, he found his support waning. The government immediately responded to the uprising, allotting greater budgetary power and promising to "develop the region's economy once security was restored."⁴⁵ Daud lost support because "the Acehnese could see that some development really did occur."⁴⁶ The government made what the public considered to be important concessions; on 9 April 1957, Aceh regained provincial status. On 14 May 1959, Daud was abandoned by his supporters- who were tired of the war- and a peace agreement was signed. A weak Daud continued to fight after an alliance with the communists, his fight slowly waning throughout the 1960s.

This scenario cannot apply directly to Aceh; in fact, one could make a strong argument that because the government no longer has credibility in the eyes of Acehnese people, trust is impossible. But

⁴⁴ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 322.

⁴⁵ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 132.

⁴⁶ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *the Republican Revolt*, 306.

the model is interesting, as the public can abandon a violent group of rebels if they do not know when to negotiate, and the rebels can divide in light of public opinion. The lessons here are for the people of Aceh who support the GAM solely because they oppose the Indonesian Government; village organizations and civil society may remind the GAM of this precedent, ensuring that the Republic is sincere in its efforts to develop the region and the GAM is serious about doing what is best for the people. These two lessons, along with the recent peace negotiations, must be remembered as we attempt to rekindle talks.

2.12 Case Studies

China has several Muslim populations; Hui Muslims live throughout the country, while several groups, namely the Uighurs, live in Xinjiang, China's Northwest region. Xinjiang was formerly independent as East Turkistan, but now is a Chinese Special Autonomous Region subject to transmigration, economic exploitation, and disadvantaged local groups. As Aceh has been overshadowed by East Timor, Xinjiang is overshadowed by Xizhang (Tibet). But this comparison is poor, as Tibet obscures Xinjiang, whereas East Timor brought attention to Aceh. Xinjiang has no single organization or ethnic minority, with several tribal councils vying for power, not unlike Burma. Xinjiang now has a Chinese majority population through corporate ventures such as the XPCC, with the military economy strictly controlled by the state.⁴⁷ Aceh has far fewer Javanese migrants and the state has little control in the region. Xinjiang offers us few lessons, as it is ignored in global politics and at this rate will cease to be an issue shortly⁴⁸. We cannot be led astray; just because there is a disadvantaged Muslim minority it does not mean that they are similar.

Several commentators, from the ICG to the Economist, have put Indonesia's strategies into the terms of the American military's experiences in Indochina. This is likely of greater use in introducing the Aceh conflict to the American public, as the similarities are few. Today, some American writers believe, as President Johnson thought if Vietnam fell then Asia would fall like dominoes, that if Aceh collapses, then Indonesia will, and so will the rest of Asia. They exaggerate that Republic of Indonesia is the key to Asian stability, and "Aceh holds the key to whether the

⁴⁷ Donald H. MacMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

⁴⁸ Nader Hasan, "China's Forgotten Dissenters," Harvard International Review, Volume 22, Issue 3 (Fall 2000).

republic will remain united.”⁴⁹ There is a real danger in using stale analogies which were poor even during their prime, as an independent Aceh does not mean the end of Asia by any stretch and should not be put in alien terms.

The United States was fighting a sovereign nation with no common border to itself, the war being a proxy for a global contest. In Aceh, it is not clear that Indonesia is fighting another state, and Indonesia does have some claim to the territory. The Aceh conflict has fewer global implications than did the Indochina war. The only commonality between the two exists wherever a standing army fights guerillas. The GAM cannot be identified among the Acehnese population, which is good for the GAM because it shows support and allows them to hide, but is also horrible because they fail to divide civilians from combatants. One question arises from Vietnam which is applicable to Aceh: how does a military measure progress? Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (later of the World Bank) resorted to body counts in Vietnam,⁵⁰ as does the TNI in Aceh. But aside from the problems of fighting a guerilla war, there are no helpful comparisons to be had here. Only one very specific part of the Indochina War is relevant.

A comparison to Québécois politics is at once more detached and more helpful. Canada is an affluent country, and aside from the FLQ Crisis, Québec separatists have not used violent means. Their struggle has been waged through politics, electing French candidates at the Provincial and Federal levels and seeking Constitutional status. In 1980, a referendum for separation failed by a two to one margin. After two failed constitutional amendments which sought to recognize its ‘Distinct Society’, Québec again sought a referendum to separate from Canada in 1995. The results were that less than 51% wished to stay in Canada. The lessons for Aceh are solely along the specific idea of the referendum, a subject detailed below. What Québec changed is that it brought greater multiculturalism to Canada, a shift which opened the doors for First Nations, Chinese, Indian, African, and other proud Canadian ethnic groups to assert their distinction.⁵¹ Because of concessions to Québec for cultural rights, other groups received the same benefits and Canada learned several lessons about diversity. Even in Québec, minority groups such as First Nations, Vietnamese and Caribbean groups, and Anglophones protested the injustice of the referendum;

⁴⁹ Ravich, “Eyeing Indonesia Through the Lens of Aceh,” 9.

⁵⁰ Please see Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect: the Lessons Taught in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).

⁵¹ Please see Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).

referendum leader, Premier Parizeau, bitterly reacted to a loss he saw was the result of “the ethnic vote.”⁵² As we shall later see, this is a specific, pertinent lesson for Aceh.

Comparative studies are of crucial importance. We must deal with other events in Acehnese history in a comparative fashion, as the environment has changed greatly since past struggles. When we look around the world, we must be careful with comparisons. East Timor has little in common with Aceh despite both fighting Indonesia; in fact, on several occasions, East Timorese President Gusmao has stated, regarding Aceh, that while his country understands human rights violations, “we respect the sovereignty and integrity of Indonesia.”⁵³ Regarding Indochina, specific guerilla warfare tactics are useful. In Canada, multicultural and referendum theories are useful. Any comparison between Aceh and other conflicts must be clear and focused; any general comparison based solely on cosmetic similarities will put Aceh in alien terms.

We have only looked at a small number of Indonesian and global examples in order to demonstrate this point. Lessons for Aceh can also be found in Papua, Mindanao, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Chiapas, Ireland, Georgia, Southern Thailand, the Basque region, and Eritrea. Such studies will be helpful only if specific; Sri Lanka can teach us about global economic networks, Chiapas about knowing when to stop fighting, and Ireland about the role of economic growth. The European Union will also have much to share, as its *Committee of the Regions* may serve as a model for ASEAN.

The Committee of the Regions was formed in 1992 in response to the dominance of national governments; the very nature of the EU defied national sovereignty to some extent, so it makes sense to look at groups which are not national governments. The Committee is an advisory body to the EU which allows for communities to voice their concerns directly. It was not created solely for, but includes, ethnic groups across the EU and some such as the Basques which straddle borders. Though the Committee is weak as of now, its growth provides an interesting model. An equivalent body in Southeast Asia could partially reestablish historical ties between Aceh and West Malaysia

⁵² Harold D. Clarke and Alan Kornberg, “Choosing Canada? The 1995 Quebec Sovereignty Referendum,” PS: Political Science and Politics, Volume 29, Issue 4 (December 1996), 681. 676-682

⁵³ Associated Press, “Gusmao Says Free East Timor will not be Base for Indonesian Separatists” (10 August 1999).

and could give Aceh partial sovereignty, a power outside of the Indonesian national government, without wholesale secession from Indonesia.

2.2 The Effects of War

In her critique of war and masculinity, Virginia Woolf stated:

I become steadily more feminist, owing to the Times, which I read at breakfast and wonder how this preposterous masculine fiction the war keeps going a day longer – with some vigorous woman pulling us together and marching through it.⁵⁴

Looking at the effects of war is also a form of comparative studies, as we look to common elements observed in other instances. Here, we will briefly look at the effects of war on women, children, society, and the economy before looking in some detail at non-state armed groups in international relations.

Women suffer the brunt of war and endure its more of its effects than do men.⁵⁵ Granted, in Aceh the Indonesian military attacks any young man, assuming them to be members of the GAM, as reported by Human Rights Watch from Malaysian camps. But the fact that these interviewed men have left Aceh is telling; women do not have great mobility during times of war because of their double burden of personal and family survival, though they constitute 53% of the Acehnese population. Even in IDP camps, women exist as second-class citizens: “men make all decisions in the camps. Women, many of them war widows...are deprived of information and other facilities.”⁵⁶

Young women are also far greater in numbers compared to men, so marriage opportunities are few and many are forced to live alone or become a second or third wife. We saw in our chapter on human rights that Acehnese women have been the victims of sexual violence, and we also noted that both sides used the South Aceh Rape Case in order to slander their enemy. We also saw that when the GAM kidnapped Indonesian journalists Ersa and Fery, they also kidnapped the wives of two TNI officials. In an interview on Australian television, the GAM commander stated that his actions were in retaliation to the GAM wives held by the Republic; in response, an article in *Acehkita* noted that “the wives of both Indonesian soldiers and the rebels have been taken hostage

⁵⁴ Virginia Woolf, *the Three Guineas* (London: Hogarth Press, 1938).

⁵⁵ Please see Meredith Turshen, Sheila Meintjes, and Anu Pillay, *the Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation* (London: Zed Books, 2002).

⁵⁶ Suraiya Kamaruzzman, “Women and the War in Aceh.”

by the two warring factions.”⁵⁷ These instances demonstrate the disrespect for women by both militaries, speaking volumes to support Virginia Woolf’s claim.

Amnesty International notes that “in addition to being directly targeted for rape and other violations, women in Aceh have also found themselves inadvertently caught up in the violence.”⁵⁸ This is not an empowering statement; some women are actively involved in fighting- such as the women’s wing of the GAM, *Inong Balee*- while even more are actively involved in peace. We noted the history of strong women in Aceh, from Sultans to military leaders, to NGOs today. We know that RATA activist Cut Syamsurniati has been honoured as a hero by Time Magazine. Groups such as FLOWER Aceh are the best agents to counteract some of the violence done to women in the Aceh conflict, and deserve financial, diplomatic, and moral support from all readers of this text. FLOWER Aceh’s founder notes that women suffer rape from the TNI, abuse from the GAM, a patriarchal culture, abuse by husbands, and have to raise their children.⁵⁹ The World Bank’s programme for war widows has been described; their KDP Programme has recently shifted its attention to empowering women in the decision-making process by having quotas, child care, transportation, and woman-only meetings. A diverse array of actors is needed in order to lessen the double-burden and empower women to help end this conflict and take their rightful role as equals.

Nothing can take the place of a lasting peace in aiding the women of this conflict. Before peace comes, there is much that can be done, from relief packages, to education, to birth control, to supporting women’s organizations. One segment of the female population which is hit the hardest is widows; this group is assumed to once have GAM husbands by the TNI and must raise their children at the same time. Countless widows must act as single mothers, raising their children and providing for themselves in a dismal economy. This is true across Indonesia.

The effects of such poverty on their children, as well as on orphans, ensure the conflict will reach into the next generation in Aceh. As described by Kingsbury,

[The] old men were also happy, knowing that their fight against the invaders was being carried forward by the next generation, as they had done for the generation before them, and

⁵⁷ Nanee and Dandhy, “Sorrow of the Rebel Wives,” *Acehkita* (2 January 2004), 12.

⁵⁸ *Amnesty International*, “the Impact of Impunity on Women in Aceh.”

⁵⁹ Suraiya Kamaruzzman, “Women and the War in Aceh.”

as had the generation before that, and even before that. A 10-year old boy stood nearby, self-consciously part of this group of hardened men.⁶⁰

There are humanitarian and utilitarian reasons for focusing on the results of wars, as healthy development is a right and a precondition of a lasting peace.

In the aftermath of all conflicts, orphans can rekindle war if not provided for and taught to provide for themselves.⁶¹ It has already been documented that the GAM preys on such youths, promising to help find the TNI soldier who killed their own parents. This is why the Acehnese media speak of “a generation of the vengeful.”⁶² Most militaries are guilty of some form of this, realizing that desperate, poor youths make ideal soldiers; this is true around the world, as even the United States focuses recruitment campaigns on youths in lower-income areas. The TNI is aided by the collapse of the Indonesian economy in this sense, as the urban poor in Jakarta, along with families of fallen soldiers, will join the military. However poor the Indonesian economy is, Aceh’s is worse, home to far more orphans and widows, as well as damaged infrastructure.

Aside from individual persons left behind by war, violence also becomes embedded in society. The first effect of this is on persons still involved in conflict; negotiators, fighters, and even observers who have lost so much to war that they also lose the ability to end the conflict. Several writers note that “making peace among rival factions that are struggling for power, driven by hatred, and poisoned by the inertia of prolonged killing that has become a way of life, is difficult.”⁶³ This is precisely the reason that groups such as the HDC and the Royal Thai Military were integral in the window of peace created by the COHA- they didn’t carry the ghosts of previous actions from either party. In the same way that court judges must have no involvement in cases in order to be effective, outside mediators are the only sources of fair deliberation.

The second aspect is that even under peace, violence is perpetuated. Societies require repair, and this includes “much more than just repairing infrastructure.”⁶⁴ Soldiers are often unemployed or

⁶⁰ Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, 226.

⁶¹ Please see Alan Raymond, *Children in War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

⁶² Aspinall, “Anti-Insurgency Logic in Aceh,” 24.

⁶³ Kegley and Wittkopf, cited in Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia.”

⁶⁴ *United Nations Committee on Human Development and Civil Society*, “Countries Emerging from Conflict: Lessons on Partnership in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration” (May 2003).

crippled, looking back on their fight with romance if they do not have meaningful employment in peace; in Indonesia alone, several groups long to return to the New Order. Post-conflict societies struggle to find a balance between remembering the conflict out of respect for its sacrifices and glorifying old wars, bringing previously buried emotions to the surface. Such societies require a legitimate government, which is difficult due to a lack of trust from various parties; therefore such governments require a variety of input mechanisms in order to achieve a greater degree of transparency and legitimacy. Societies can be rehabilitated, but there are several preconditions. An active civil society is crucial, with groups such as RATA in Aceh working to counsel victims back into active society. Civil society can also be involved in *Track II* negotiations, where warring parties can discuss their grievances in low-level, community meetings. Time is needed, as animosity can only diminish as new generations are born with new experiences and new aspirations. Perhaps of the greatest importance, economic development must occur in order to provide new avenues to direct patriotism, energy, and pride.

This requires stable post-conflict development. When the Soviet Union fell, immediate privatization of state industries alongside massive poverty allowed for rich criminals to buy public corporations at low cost. In Aceh, the military economy must be ended; “not only does it institutionalize corruption and crime, and subvert legitimate business activities that might otherwise aid development, it...no longer requires the security of the state as its justification.”⁶⁵ When military control has ended, and it will, civil society must be involved in the distribution of military properties. As in Moscow, Banda will have its share of elites looking for personal profit, be they GAM, Ulambaang, or Javanese. IFIs must not be trusted to learn from prior cases. Just as election monitors are necessary to critique political hegemony, economic watchdogs such as Tapol, student groups, and the SAMAK must watch corruption and economic growth.

Moving from a corrupt military economy into a normal system will not be easy. In order to build trust (and by extension credit systems), in order to build confidence levels to encourage small business ownership, and to return the confidence of outside investors, several steps are required. One of these steps is to keep the GAM, as an organization, out of the economy. Armed groups cannot bring the needed changes, as our goal is to end all military involvement in the economy.

⁶⁵ Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, 221.

2.3 Non-State Armed Groups

There has been a recent change in HRDs and academics, now focusing on abuses by non-state, as well as state, actors. Pablo Policzer notes that “some of the most serious human rights violations today are not committed by states but by non-state armed groups.”⁶⁶ This understanding is consistent between groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the International Crisis Group; this approach does not imply allegiance to the state, but instead a respect for human life. The Armed Groups Project at the University of British Columbia notes that in recent years, “Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have changed their definition of what constitutes a human rights violation, to include acts committed by non-state groups as well as states.”⁶⁷ These actors, like this book, have focus which is more consistent with human rights by looking past the nation-state as only unit of measure for human life, one benefit of globalization being looking past the nation-state.

After all, there are several difficulties in persuading non-state groups to conform to humanitarian norms; states- for all their shortcomings- are part of an international system with certain punitive measures available when abuses do occur. The level of accountability will vary by armed group; we require a general shift in thought, from an adversarial, good versus bad, wolf versus lamb model to a more complicated and more realistic interpretation which includes civil society and international organizations. The Armed Groups Project suggests that many systems for influencing states can be used with non-state groups, particularly concerning those rebels groups which seek political legitimacy; these include economic sanctions, naming and shaming, and conflict resolution organizations (such as the HDC).

By criticizing non-state groups for human rights violations, we are indeed respecting their existence by treating them with the same standards as states. We must account for the different nature of non-state groups: their sources of funding, recruitment campaigns, reliance on foreign sympathy, low degree of centralized leadership, and the negative reasoning for membership- namely hatred of an enemy- vary by degree with states. In the early 1990s, human rights groups began critiquing non-state groups; there is a direct relationship where the more political legitimacy a rebel group seeks,

⁶⁶ Pablo Policzer, “Human Rights and Armed Groups: Toward a New Policy Architecture,” *Armed Groups Project*, UBC Centre for International Relations (July 2002), 2. www.armedgroups.org.

⁶⁷ David Capie and Pablo Policzer, “Keeping the Promise of Protection: Holding Armed Groups to the Same Standards as States,” *the Armed Groups Project* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 15 January 2004), 1.

the more it can be condemned for its failings. The lamb is made to be less innocent because it is interpreted realistically.

Part of this trend acknowledges that non-state armed groups engineer their image as the lamb. Alan Kuperman studies the *Moral Hazard* Phenomenon, in which human rights defenders create human rights violations. He theorizes that several non-state groups instigate conflicts with states, exchanging civilian life for international intervention or publicity. HRDs who wish to intervene wherever there is violence actually encourage rebel groups to instigate attacks against civilians. A suitable metaphor is insurance fraud, where one damages their own property in exchange for a larger payoff. Therefore, “if a group chooses to sacrifice its own civilians, it is not obvious that the international community automatically has a responsibility” to intervene.⁶⁸ After all, if a group is assured that intervention will come, it simply has to engineer a crisis and act the part of the lamb.

Whether the GAM is guilty of exploiting the Moral Hazard is unknown; it is doubtful that the TNI’s abuses have been engineered, however a smaller scale- where the GAM instigates or exaggerates single battles for media attention- is likely. Dr. Kirsten Schulze posits that

The higher the profile of the targets such as ExxonMobil and the higher the civilian death toll, the greater the prospect of foreign intervention. GAM guerrilla tactics of striking from and retreating to residential areas thus served two purposes: to provide the ultimate cover and to ensure that the casualties of Indonesian retaliation were civilian.⁶⁹

Schulze writes further that GAM knew “by consciously carrying out attacks in highly populated areas, that a security response became unavoidable.”⁷⁰ The ICG also suspects this, stating that GAM may have destroyed some schools in order to destabilize IDPs “so that the humanitarian problem got more international attention.”⁷¹ The GAM’s efforts to internationalize the conflict have relied on the attention of human rights defenders, attention which only comes if abuses continue and if they are publicized. Press freedom is a good example: the GAM works with several media groups, seeming quite liberal and willing to provide information; but when groups such as *Serambi* and several others are critical of these statements, violence erupts. Because in the Aceh conflict the GAM and the TNI are intelligent actors which see in their enemy’s ruthlessness a

⁶⁸ Alan J. Kuperman, “Moral Hazard: How and Why Humanitarian Intervention Promotes Armed Rebellion,” paper given at Curbing Human Rights Violations by Armed Groups at the University of British Columbia, November 2003.

⁶⁹ Schulze, “the Other Side to Aceh’s Rebels.”

⁷⁰ Schulze, the Free Aceh Movement, 41.

⁷¹ ICG, “Aceh: How not to Win Hearts and Minds,” 1.

source of their own legitimacy, the militaries, namely the GAM, regularly create an environment conducive to aggression in order to gain attention. This does not mean we should ignore the results, as the TNI is still guilty of violence even when it is engineered- as a crime is still a crime. But we must be critical of a group with political aspirations which is seeking global support when it comes to acting the part of the lamb.

Some writers see non-state armed groups not as political or economic forces, but as ethnic divisions. Andrew Tan asserts insists that armed separatism must be defined as either an ethnic group trying to gain control of a state or an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw from a larger state. Here, ethnic groups view themselves as natural organization; it is assumed that separatism requires “the lack of a close fit between nation and state.”⁷² But as described, this is no ethnic conflict except that which has been recently engineered; the Javanese in Aceh lived in peace with the Acehnese for decades. There are several ethnic groups across Indonesia and the world which do not require a homogeneous environment- indeed, only the most backward do. We have described Aceh’s multicultural history; as a trading center, every possible group inhabited Banda. Conflicts predate Javanese arrival, and times of peace have existed with Javanese and Acehnese friendship. Aceh is still home to several minorities, ethnic, gender, economic, and others. If a group is fighting for independence based on ethnic difference, as indeed the GAM demonstrates in their Javanese policies, then they fail to establish a legitimate claim for a state- the respect for minority rights.

2.4 Referenda

As foreseen, Québec offers Aceh excellent lessons regarding the specific lessons of referenda. The referendum is seen in Aceh as the sole vehicle for democratic change by several civil society actors. Groups such as the SOMAKA, MAPPRA, KARMA, FARMIDIA, SMUR, and SIRA have organized massive rallies, education programmes, and petitions to support such a process in Aceh; the SIRA even labeled the Humanitarian Pause as the “first step towards a referendum on independence for Aceh.”⁷³ During 1999 and 2000, the SIRA held two mock referendums in Banda Aceh which, as one would expect, confirmed their predictions. SIRA’s coordinator states that

⁷² Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia.”

⁷³ Bronwyn Curran, “the Humanitarian Pause,” Voice of America (12 May 2000).

peace can “only be achieved via the implementation of a referendum.”⁷⁴ The fuel for the referendum question comes from East Timor and from Wahid’s confused comments directly after this; further support comes from the fact that the referendum would certainly vote for independence, thus the referendum is a tool for pro-independence groups. Several Indonesian military leaders, including Regional Military Commander, Major General Abdul Rahman Gaffar, publicly stated that the Acehnese people would vote for independence if given the opportunity.⁷⁵ This text offer full support for civil society, including groups such as the SIRA, though it does not agree with what they say, it fights for their right to say it. What are the problems with a referendum?

We can easily recognize that the majority of Indonesians oppose the GAM. TNI spokesperson Major General Sudradjat believes that if there were a referendum, all of Indonesia should be involved because “Aceh is the property of the entire Indonesian nation.”⁷⁶ This statement is absolutely crucial. His belief that Aceh is property is fundamentally wrong, as in any Republic, relationships should be horizontal, not hierarchical. The term property is indicative of the political and economic relationships which have caused the conflict. But he does have a strong point when he wishes to involved the Indonesian population.

In Québec, the referendum was difficult. French speaking persons outside of the province worried about their future. English speakers in Québec would obviously be disadvantaged if it passed; the same is true of ethnic minorities within Québec, some of which have their own territorial claims and wished to stay in Canada. If Québec did separate, strips of First Nations territory would have been removed, Québec’s share of the public debt would have been dealt, and Québec would have a lesser economy of scale in negotiations with the English-speaking United States. Further, the rest of Canada have built their identities and economies to include Québec and its culture; should they not have any say in the process, though their say may not be equal to those in Québec?

Also in Canada, the British Columbia Liberals wished to give the appearance of democracy through a referendum to end settlements with First Nations Tribes in 2002. This was disgraceful; it singled out one ethnic minority in a majority rules situation. Politics cannot be specific, and where it

⁷⁴ Aspinall, “Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights,” 20.

⁷⁵ Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 9.

⁷⁶ Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 9.

regards ethnic minorities, a referendum is a weapon. What it comes down to is if democracy simply means the tyranny of the majority, or if it means justice for all- majority rules with minority rights. With First Nations, there is a larger issue of justice which should preempt the obvious fact that the ethnic majority does not want to give a minority privileges. The majority is not always correct, and has no right to rule over the minority or to decide the future based on a single question.⁷⁷

Aceh's only Catholic Priest, Father Fernando, opposes the referendum; he believes that since GAM propaganda is so strong, "it is hard to know the real feeling of the people."⁷⁸ Student groups in Aceh have failed to study the results of the referendum on minorities; those who initiate a referendum have nothing to lose and may choose the timing of the event according to public opinion, but those who oppose it will see their lives turned upside down if it passes. This is one factor, the largest being the inaction of Wiranto, in the post-referendum riots in Timor, as the minority who lost the vote had great uncertainty and fear for their future. As stated by Québec's minorities, the GAM and student groups strongly oppose the suggestion from Aceh's minorities that if Aceh passed a referendum, the non-ethnic Acehnese areas would have the right to hold their own referendum and "break away from Aceh and form one or two separate provinces."⁷⁹ This opposition undermines independence claims tremendously, as groups which support the principle of self-determination when it suits them but oppose it when they would lose power cannot be taken seriously.

That student groups have not explored this question demonstrates that they are acting only in opposition to an enemy. This does not mean that Aceh should not be independent; what it means is that independence must be a slow process, done in stages, which begins with a strong regional government and allowing the voices of minorities to be heard. Acehnese independence requires a government which is able to ensure a better political system, something which Aceh lacks. Civil society generally supports a referendum, though other groups may not; civil society is strong because it allows diverse, conflicting views to be voiced to the government, the world, the people, and each other.

⁷⁷ For instance, nobody wants to pay taxes, go to work, or save the environment. But it is obvious that what we want is not the same as what we need. In some instances, we need a governing body and an active civil society to act as the voice of reason. How many times in history have majority groups wanted to exterminate minorities? The safety and happiness of minority groups is a facet of a just political system.

⁷⁸ England, "Breaking Away."

⁷⁹ Aspinall, "Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights," 17.

2.5 Civil Society

This text has made great efforts to support the involvement of civil society in several realms. Rehabilitation, women's empowerment, monitoring, research, the environment, and peace negotiations can all benefit from a plurality of voices. In Aceh, there exists a hurting stalemate, where neither side can defeat the other; the TNI is too powerful to defeat with arms, but opposition is made popular by this same military power. In a such a situation, third party mediation may arise. Foreign governments and civil society have an opportunity to help themselves by helping both militaries.

The United Nations lists the following duties of civil society during peace negotiations:

...channeling and dissemination of information; advocating norms, values, and standards; encouraging power-sharing among competing interest; contributing to good governance; providing the means for interaction and confidence-building across the lines that divide parties in conflict; and encouraging and participating in socio-economic activities aimed at mitigating disparities.⁸⁰

We know that Aceh and Indonesia have strong NGO, academic, and religious groups. We know the media is diverse and that there exist factions in each political and military body. We know that there is fertile ground for trade unions. Therefore, we must avoid at all costs limiting dialogues to two actors. This fiction will have no correlation to reality; indeed, this was a repeatedly cited critique of the HDC processes. It is alleged that such involvement would be time-consuming, but peace must be time-consuming. In the previous dialogues, it was groups which should have been involved that showed the greatest impatience.

In May 2003, KOMNAS HAM called for “an end to hostilities between the two opposing parties and for the reopening of negotiations and the involvement of civil society” in the final agreement.⁸¹ An activist with the Aceh People's Forum suggested that future meetings should discuss the role of civilians, noting that any “attempt to involve Acehnese civilians in the peace process is considered a provocation.”⁸² Civil society can pressure the groups from below, such as when IMM students were brought by the HDC to convince the GAM to sign the COHA.

⁸⁰ United Nations, “Countries Emerging from Conflict.”

⁸¹ KOMPAS, “KOMNAS HAM Finds Indications of Rights Violations in Aceh” (3 June 2003).

⁸² Nani Farida, “Megawati Dismisses Speculation on Military Operation in Aceh,” Jakarta Post (21 April 2003).

The HDC met with civil society as their talks began, but “with the approval of the GAM figureheads secured, the community dialogue was abruptly cancelled.”⁸³ Several groups, such as religious leaders, felt betrayed by this change and were soured to the entire process. Because the GAM wished to gain political legitimacy by speaking on behalf of Aceh, they “opposed the participation of other actors, such as leaders of Acehnese civil society, in the negotiation process.”⁸⁴ As civil society was critical of the atrocities of the Indonesian state, the Republic opposed civil society involvement even more than the GAM opposed them. The involvement of civil society is the primary suggestion of this text for a just peace in Aceh which this book has to offer.

3) Future Peace

3.1 Changes since the HDC

The first changes in the conflict since the HDC Dialogues are those resulting from the Dialogues themselves. The work done by the HDC may have only been possible once, and to some extent have ruined future talks by putting an end to the naivety which came with previous talks; “far from building trust, the process served ultimately to entrench the positions of the two sides and deepen the division between them.”⁸⁵ S. Wiryoono believed going into the COHA that “if the peace process failed, the letdown could be very severe.”⁸⁶ On the other hand, ending naïve hopes of an instant peace will result in healthy expectations of a long, slow process. Each side will be able to foresee the approaches of the other and as a result may peacefully preempt such actions. Future talks will come with pessimism, which may allow for realistic expectations from all actors.

Second, there is now a precedent for future talks. Although the Indonesian Government can always argue that it tried to negotiate, that dialogue failed them and force is necessary, this is not likely to be the final decision because the obvious counterpoint is the failure of force. For every time the Indonesian Government cites their failed peace talks, one may respond with the countless failed military missions. The Indonesian Government will see several military campaigns fail as it realizes that a guerilla war cannot be defeated by force. The greatest hurdle, of recognizing the GAM, has already been met so that the risk for future governments in dialogue will be considerably

⁸³ Drexler, *Paranoid Transparencies*, 259.

⁸⁴ Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” 12.

⁸⁵ Aspinall and Crouch, “the Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” x.

⁸⁶ S. Wiryoono, “the Aceh Conflict: the Long Road to Peace,” 277.

less. The original outrage felt by several conservative Indonesian forces under the HDC Dialogues will lessen with successive talks, one small yet significant aspect of more realistic future dialogues.

Third, there is a further precedent regarding the interest in Aceh from the global community. The weak stances of the European Union, United States, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Norway, and the World Bank will bode well in the eyes of the Indonesian Government for future talks, although the same weakness will no doubt water-down the fruits of such efforts. Aceh is now part of a global vocabulary, one of the very goals the GAM had in entering the process in the first place. But the GAM must also realize that not all international actors will support them, and that they must not ignore such opinions; particularly on humanitarian grounds, the GAM must prove able to withstand diverse international opinions to their actions if they hope to build credibility. For its part, the TNI has a horrible reputation in the global community; this will haunt Indonesia for several years, with the only escape being some sort of tribunal. Far from worsening this reputation, the possibility of tribunals of atrocities committed by the TNI (as well as by the GAM) in Aceh is one of few gestures which can demonstrate that the TNI can be a responsible actor. The final aspect of greater international involvement is from everyday people; this impact will not be felt in government chambers, but instead in protests around the world against continued savagery from the TNI and other security forces. Any government working with the TNI must expect protest, and now more than ever will understand why the protests must occur.

Fourth, the 'War of Terror' has allowed a dangerous precedent as well as widespread anti-Muslim sentiment. This simultaneously makes the USA crave Indonesian as an ally in order to appear as impartial, allows Aceh to be portrayed as a province of fundamentalist terrorists, and makes the use of violence difficult to condemn by governments in America, England, and Australia. Continued military action and occupations will allow the Indonesian Government to rightfully dismiss foreign governments' credibility when they are pressured for peace. This is doubly true since these same foreign governments are so hostile to criticism of their own wars. As a result, the 2004 American Elections will be felt in Aceh in a very small way, as a rejection of the militant Republicans for the less militant Democrats (or the non-militant Greens) will be, fractionally, a rejection of war.

Moving from changes resulting from the HDC Dialogues and international changes, we move to changes in the players in this conflict; the fifth factor is that the power of the Indonesian military

has shifted. First of all, in some ways it has lessened; the 1997 Economic Crisis, the same phenomenon which weakened the ABRI in the first place, has resulted in the end of guaranteed military representation in the government as of 2004. The TNI is also weaker in its international image, namely its human rights record and its involvement in the Indonesian economy. IFI programmes and global pressure will result in a weakened TNI economy, as investments will dwindle considerably unless transparency and free trade are possible. Again, trade liberalization has several fundamental flaws, the only redeeming quality being its opposition to military economies. In these ways, the Indonesian military is weaker than it was in 1999.

This said, the military has lessened factionalism, has power over the President, and has overcome its immediate economic problems. Just prior to the end of Wahid's presidency, the TNI successfully pressured him to change his stance in the April 2001 Presidential Instruction Number Four. This was the first sign of a more powerful military. Since then, the TNI-backed Megawati has ended dialogues in favour of outright military control under Martial Law. Meanwhile, powerful military leaders have joined or formed political parties. This is why the 2004 election will be so crucial, as we will see below, because the degree to which Indonesians support their military will directly shape the future of Aceh. As IFIs begin to lessen the TNI's grip on the economy, the refusal of Indonesian voters to allow the TNI political power will dictate the possibility of peace talks.

Sixth, the GAM's power has changed. The HDC Dialogues immediately lessened the factionalism and gave the ANSLF GAM great power. Martial Law has certainly lessened their military capabilities, though also increasing their ability to recruit for future battles. But perhaps most of all, the GAM is beginning to be critiqued by human rights groups around the world. This may create a more trusting Indonesian Government towards foreign involvement, it may create a more credible GAM, or it may empower a local civil society. None of these would harm the peace process in Aceh.

There have been several changes since the HDC Dialogues, in the possibility for future talks, international involvement, and within each actor in the conflict. What each of these changes has in common is that the effects can be taken either way. These changes are still unfolding, and will depend to a great extent on government, voter, and civil society pressure from around the world.

3.2 Suggestions

Peace in Aceh requires several preconditions and efforts, ranging from minor aspects such as spelling, all the way to fundamental human rights strategies. Several commentators assert that peace plans have stalled “pending changes in leadership in one or both the two sides.”⁸⁷ This is not true, as leadership in this conflict is limited by the foundations they stand upon. Any leader who advocates sudden change will be replaced, therefore we must look at slow structural changes. The Aceh conflict has its origins in the tyranny of a centralized state, therefore a more open government is necessary; a less militaristic state “could bring a swift end to the unsettled conditions that have plagued Aceh”, or at least lessen them.⁸⁸

Our challenge for now is to help the people on the ground and prepare the structure for future peace talks and future leaders.

3.21 Approach

- All groups, from militaries to civil society, must be willing to admit mistakes. Unwillingness to sincerely admit failure and correct future problems reduces all groups in the eyes of the international community and other actors- this is particularly true for the GAM, whose track record is slightly better than the TNI and has much to gain from honesty.
- All groups must decide on a common spelling for the term ‘Aceh’, as well as for GAM groups. Agreed to names will allow for easier research and will provide clarity for the general public.
- All groups must refrain from exaggeration; the GAM flag is not thousands of years old and the TNI cannot end the conflict forever after six months of Martial Law. Each side loses credibility when they make such preposterous claims.
- All groups must respect the media; this speaks generally to the Indonesian Government, whose moves to censor Aceh from global news groups will only further their interest and create biased reporting. It is in Indonesia’s best interest to encourage reporting; the best way to undermine negative coverage is to stop doing negative things. GAM must accept a critical media, as its actions against Serambi mirror their enemy’s actions against foreigners. We can look to NGOs such as AJI to monitor this aspect.

⁸⁷ ICG, “Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won’t Work,” 4.

⁸⁸ Robinson, “Rawan is as Rawan Does,” 214.

- All militaries must fundamentally change their approaches regarding human rights, including civilian and combatant status, their roles in the economy, and their relationship with critical humanitarian and media organizations. The TNI is including human rights training, and it is suggested that the GAM begin similar programmes.
- Student groups must explore the referendum in a fair and balanced manner. A referendum is not a legitimate way to gain independence. For that matter, independence itself, while being an understandable goal after years of exploitation, means nothing without justice and multiculturalism. The referendum process excludes these crucial qualities.

3.22 Future Peace Dialogues

- All groups must admit that a military solution is impossible, an admission which would suggest further talks are necessary.
- The Indonesian authorities must focus less on breaking the GAM; the GAM gains its support from negative identification, so the more they are attacked, the greater will be the resistance. If the GAM is broken, captured, or gives up, future groups are certain to continue this conflict in the place.
- All groups must have patience for peace dialogues to succeed; a delayed settlement approach is the best, as no magical, one day solution is possible. The HDC strategy of confidence building can work, but militaries, as well as NGOs and the media, have a duty to show patience for this process. It is much easier to gain political leverage and sell newspapers if headlines are sensational and critical, but this has negative effects. It is important to be critical of the peace process, especially regarding particular actions, but groups should also be reasonable.
- All groups must involve their leaders in some way, especially GAM leaders in Sweden. This is necessary in order to provide legitimacy for both the negotiations and for the leaders themselves.
- In order for peace to come, Martial Law and other military operations must end. This involves creating an exit strategy and putting the negotiations in terms favourable to hard-liners.
- This leads to the question of immunity; all negotiators must be granted immunity in well-documented statements from all sides, namely the Indonesian Government.

3.23 Justice

- All groups must be subject to a future human rights tribunal, including militias and those who organize them. Foreign governments and corporations must be implicated for supplying arms used in abuses. High-level authorities must be implicated, as low-level soldiers are guilty, but on a smaller scale than their leaders.
- Both militaries must reconsider their stances on economic justice, as they each seek economic power and disrupt the economic activities of the Acehnese people. For instance, though each side claims their need and their right to operate tolls, Aceh has the highest transportation costs in Indonesia, a fact which undermines economic growth.
- The GAM must cooperate with Swedish prosecutors. It is likely that the rebels will be convicted of some small charge and be monitored closely from that point on. Indonesia must not use this opportunity for more violence, but instead capitalize on the momentary bad publicity for the GAM by serving the Acehnese people.

Finally, civil society must have a strong role in new approaches, in peace talks, and in justice. As Martial Law was declared, Jakarta CSIS and Forum-Asia held a conference to highlight the subject to attendees from the Indonesian Government negotiating team. Here, NGO activists caught the ear of these officials, where they

Highlighted the urgency of bringing both the Indonesian government and GAM representatives back to the negotiating table. This will require the participation of a wide range of Acehnese public representatives, including NGOs, students, scholars, local religious and civil society figures, rather than treating GAM as the sole representation of Aceh.⁸⁹

The diversity and power of civil society has been described. It is our responsibility to support such groups and allow them to function properly. Years of centralized state and military control have not brought peace or development to Aceh, so we must look to civil society.

Professor James Tully writes that political systems are used by rulers to create ‘Empires of Uniformity’. For Tully, the single most important question in politics today is whether or not a political system can accommodate diversity and respect people’s rights; secession and assimilation avoid these fundamental aspects of democracy. Whether Indonesia clings to Aceh or Aceh becomes an independent state is not the primary concern of this text and should not be the primary

⁸⁹ CSIS and Forum-Asia, “Human Rights Network Highlights Humanitarian Needs in Aceh” (19 June 2003).

concern of human rights defenders. Instead, justice, diversity, minority rights, freedoms, and human rights in either scenario deserve our fullest attention. If Acehese groups try to assert independence through violence, or for that matter in a way which threatens minority rights, it must be opposed. If the Republic of Indonesia tries to control such sentiments through violence, assimilation, or exploitation, it must be opposed. Clearly, the Indonesia state shoulders more blame than the GAM or any other group for several forms of violence. But we must resist allowing a strikingly similar group to create its own state in response to such acts. We must support progressive forces in Aceh, Indonesia, and the world and leave wolves and lambs in their fields.

3.3 What the Reader Can Do

- Support, volunteer for, or join major humanitarian groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or several others. Election monitors, editors, funders, interns, and other volunteers are always needed.
- Support smaller organizations in Aceh and nearby through financial contributions, supporting lecture tours, or purchasing their publications.
- Support judicial changes in Indonesia so that definitions for rape and other crimes can imprison soldier and bring justice to the Acehese people.
- Become active in specific campaigns to bring slow structural change and transparency, such as ‘Publish What You Pay’ and ‘Stop EXXON-Mobil’.⁹⁰
- Boycott corporations guilty of perpetuating the conflict and exploiting the Acehese people, such as EXXON-Mobil and Indonesian timber products.
- Work with groups such as Tapol and the ETAN to pressure your government to oppose military aid to Indonesia, to support and fund peace efforts, and to provide homes for Javanese IDPs and Acehese refugees.⁹¹
- Make Aceh a known issue; write letters to media, read available sources, discuss with friends, and debate with academics.
- Be critical of International Financial Institutions, but support programmes such as the KDP, War Widows, and other efforts to end the involvement of militaries in the economy.
- Vote for candidates who oppose war in your domestic elections.

⁹⁰ Please see www.publishwhatyoupay.org/appeal/, www.campaignexxonmobil.org/

⁹¹ For a list of articles regarding American military assistance to Indonesia, please see <http://www.etan.org/action/issues/miltie.htm>.

Postscript: The 2004 Elections

The 2004 elections will offer us some clues regarding the future of Aceh. This chapter was written between the 5 April Parliamentary Elections and the 5 July Presidential Elections during my time as an election monitor. It is meant as an afterthought to this book; based more on current events than on the conflict itself and will become dated very quickly. The first section will describe some background to the elections, while the second section will look at some of the controversy regarding the actual process. After writing a diary of sorts from my own experiences during the elections, we will discuss the coming Presidential vote and the future of Aceh.

1) Background

1.1 Previous Elections

Indonesia broke free of Dutch colonialism with great potential to become a leading democracy. Under Sukarno, genuine elections took place on two occasions, but as the problems of post-colonial politics and economics grew, as well as the logistics of governing such a large, impoverished state, this democracy waned. After years of Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy', General Suharto took power, ruling as dictator for over thirty years. But the New Order began to fall apart in the 1990s, as GOLKAR could not withstand Indonesia's economic collapse. After a series of dramatic events, Indonesia once again had meaningful elections in 1999.

As the elections arrived, the Indonesian Government was eager to show the world its new identity. As such, several election monitoring groups were invited to Indonesia, including the Carter Center, the EU, foreign governments, local groups such as the CETRO, and the KIPP, which worked alongside the Asian Network for Free and Fair Elections (ANFREL) to monitor the results. ANFREL sent an 82-member mission throughout Indonesia, and compiled the results in its publication, *Democratization in Indonesia: Report of the 1999 Election Observation Mission*. ANFREL met with several imprisoned leaders on this trip and noted several severe shortcomings in the preparation and delivery of the ballots. Their conclusion was that Indonesian democracy was pointing in the right direction though, noting its shortcomings by international standards while also stressing the quick progress made compared to previous efforts.

In Aceh, this election had a drastically low turnout, as registration was kept around 30% due to hatred of the Indonesian system and, perhaps more importantly, “due to fear of reprisals by the Free Aceh Movement.”¹ Thus, even though the 1999 elections were fair in comparison to previous efforts, there was much work to be done regarding democracy in conflict areas. In this way, the 2004 elections are a huge step backwards, as political and social freedoms have been restricted even more in Aceh. Each of these elections are obviously lacking in major freedoms. 2004 will see a more blatant version of this than did the 1999 ballot.

1.2 The Institutions

On 10 March 1999, the National Election Commission (KPU) was formed. The KPU’s role is to organize the elections, register parties, distribute equipment, count ballots, and allot seats through the General Elections Institute (LPU).² As the 2004 elections were organized, the KPU was headed by Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, who was elected as KPU Commissioner in 2001; comfortable with an international presence, he stated that election monitors “will promote transparency and strengthen the image of the 2004 elections in the eyes of the people.”³ Sjdamsuddin is a professor of politics at the University of Indonesia, and has written several excellent texts on the Aceh conflict. Regarding the elections Aceh, Nazaruddin stated that “the KPU agrees that foreign observers should be allowed to enter Aceh during the polls but only to watch the general elections and nothing else.”⁴ Trying desperately to improve its image, the KPU has tried to learn from its mistakes in 1999, banning unscheduled mass rallies from major parties across the archipelago in order to avoid intimidation for voters. Rallies were allowed on specified days, but had to end three days prior to the vote. In all, the KPU has been a relatively powerless actor though, as its statements have been contradicted by a far more powerful military.



Another electoral body is Panwaslu (the Election Supervisory Committee); a model for other governments, this group is seen as credible and fair by most observers. Its job is to monitor the

¹ ANFREL and Forum-Asia, *Democratization in Indonesia*, 54.

² Please see <http://kpu.go.id/>.

³ *Jakarta Post*, “KPU to Bring Forward 2004 Election Results” (8 October 2003).

⁴ *Antara*, “KPU Agrees to Allow Foreigners to Observe Polls in Aceh” (19 December 2003).

KPU and political parties, receiving complaints after elections in order to bring about reform and avoid violent reactions. Panwaslu has had a strong role since 1999, when it overruled the KPU on a number of complaints cases. In 2004, its greatest efforts have been disciplining the KPU and investigating money politics.

The MPR has traditionally been the supreme legislative body in Indonesia, though as of 2004 its powers as a group have been reduced. The MPR is inclusive of the 128-member Regional Representative's Council (DPD), which gives four seats per province, and the 550-member People's Representative Council (DPR), each being national bodies. DPR seats are allocated according to population, which gives Java nearly half the seats, though per person the island is under-represented. The DPRD-1 is the Provincial Council, while the DPRD-2 is the City/Village Council.⁵ The DPR and DPRD are elected through a proportional representation list system,⁶ whereas the DPDs use the first past the post system.

Regarding the July Presidential Election, the specific procedure was subject to heated debate. Each party wanted specific restrictions to hurt their rivals; the PDI-P wanted all candidates to have no criminal record, which would disqualify GOLKAR leaders, while GOLKAR wanted all candidates to have university degrees, which would disqualify President Megawati. Medical requirements were aimed to disqualify President Wahid, while a proposed DPR vote for President in the case of a second round would have helped placed the PDI-P or GOLKAR in power.⁷ In the end, all parties were pressured to drop such restrictions, agreeing to a second round of voting in September if the July vote was not clear.

1.3 Leading to 2004

The unwieldy 2004 elections include several ballots, dates, and constituencies. Megawati led early Presidential polls but was soon a distant second to SBY, while her PDI-P has dropped its power to GOLKAR after the April DPR vote. It is apparent that the 2004 vote will not return a majority

⁵ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), "Legislative Framework for the Indonesian General Elections 2004 (Jakarta: 5 March 2004).

⁶ Known as the Hare System, the number of votes is divided by the number of seats. This number is the threshold, so any party attaining this number or multiples of it win the corresponding seats. The remainders are listed in order, with the highest numbers selected to fill empty seats after the first divide.

⁷ International Crisis Group, "A Guide to the 2004 Elections," *Indonesia Backgrounder* (18 December 2003), 3-4.

government; SBY, Megawati, and GOLKAR are the three main actors, with Gus Dur, Hamzah Haz, and Amien Rais also commanding serious support. Other sources of power include the Islamic vote, Megawati's siblings, and parties led by retired military leaders.⁸

As expected, leading up to the 2004 ballots, major problems exist. First, several parties are playing on voter ethnicity, a new phenomenon in Indonesian politics after years of forced unity under Suharto. It should be mentioned that there still exists a ban on leftist political parties, a forty-year old law which is supported by Muslim groups and prominent leaders such as Amien Rais, though it was challenged in 2002 by Gus Solah, Wahid's brother and Wiranto's running mate. Here, the KPU has failed to make changes to the old system of Suharto, as previous authoritarian streaks haunt the Indonesian electoral system. Regarding Suharto, who was recently named the most corrupt leader in the world by Transparency International,⁹ his daughter Tut-Tut has put her resources behind GOLKAR military leaders, using her family's vast wealth to restore their power.

Corruption is still endemic to Indonesian democracy. Election supervisory committees condemned the three major parties for using money politics, including Megawati's Party, which gave out free food to the poor of Jakarta for their support.¹⁰ Throughout Indonesia, the weeks before the elections were site to free shirts, flags, posters, stickers, television advertisements, and rallies; several food carts had a dozen different parties represented, as each group pays for the space. Our monitors even came across Amien Rais brand water being given out in several areas across Indonesia, while the author was served several drinks in Hamzah Haz cups. On 3 April, it was reported that the GOLKAR and PKPB were caught buying votes in several areas. The Indonesian Human Rights Watch, Imparsial, anticipated such practices in their March 2004 study. Their report named individual leaders and their parties, the list divided into Human Rights violators, corruptors, violence against women, and environmental offenders. Imparsial printed over 300,000 copies and launched a website to help their campaign, isolating corrupt nominees just before the ballot.¹¹ Corruption is one of countless controversies going into the election, a process plagued by problems from several sources.

⁸ For a list of official parties, please see Appendix XIV, the 2004 Elections.

⁹ Please see www.transparency.org.

¹⁰ *Jakarta Post*, "Three Parties Rebuked for Money Politics" (29 March 2004).

¹¹ Please see www.antipolitisibusuk.org.

2) Controversies

The controversies surrounding the 2004 election can be divided into preparation, military power, and conflict areas. The KPU is the target of critique regarding the preparation, while the military is at fault in places such as Aceh. Regarding military parties, there is no clear actor which could have prevented this; if such leaders gain support, Indonesian democracy can alone be held accountable.

2.1 Preparation

The election will be a tremendously complex process, as two thousand different contests will be held across 17,000 islands, with four levels of elections being carried out simultaneously (national, provincial, city, and district).¹² There were problems from the very beginning of the election process; only four provincial KPU offices made the 27 November 2003 deadline for verification of political parties. In the days leading up to the 5 April elections, several election monitors foresaw mass confusion and countless invalid ballots resulting from this four in one election. EU Parliamentarian and head of the EU monitoring delegation Glyn Ford stated that “it’s probably the biggest and most complex election the world has ever seen.”¹³ The complicated nature of the number of elections, vast geography, and number of parties has resulted in an ineffective process by the overworked KPU.

Critics have charged that the KPU has been unable to plan the elections with enough time to ensure a proper process. First, voters were not educated to a satisfactory level in order to overcome this confusion. An ANFREL Press Release noted that they “observed Indonesian voters’ prevalent confusion in the new open list electoral system”, and was worried that this would interfere with decision-making.¹⁴ Indeed, confusion was the only significant complaint from Indonesian voters. The voter education that was carried out was manipulated by big-money politics, with food, clothing, and other staples given out during massive rallies by major leaders. Voter’s minds were inevitably shaped, “besieged from all sides by a blitz of party slogans.”¹⁵ A lack of power from the KPU and a surplus of campaign funds severely undermined the free vote.

¹² Scott Bobb, “Indonesia’s Election Campaign Enters Final Phase as Some Worry About Preparations,” Voice of America (26 March 2004).

¹³ Jakarta Post, “Thee Minute Parties Wind Up Campaign Season” (2 April 2004).

¹⁴ ANFREL, “ANFREL calls for Better Management of Indonesia’s Upcoming Elections by all Parties” (29 March 2004).

¹⁵ Stevie Emilia, “Decisions, Decisions: Making my Mind up about who to Vote for,” Jakarta Post (4 April 2004).

Second, the ballots themselves were poorly made. Several ballots were reported as damaged, incomplete, or containing errors when the first batches arrived in Jakarta in early March. In a memo dated 26 March 2004, the KPU clarified that ballots arriving with holes, spelling errors, discolouration, torn edges, or different sizes are all to be considered as legal forms. This memo was not received in areas visited by the author, as several permissible papers were destroyed. Several areas received ballots for the wrong area, which was not noticed until votes were counted. Amazingly, the KPU decided that though votes for particular candidates would not be counted, votes for the parties they represented would stand.

Third, the voter cards were not properly distributed; a few Australian, Filipino, and Finnish citizens received voter cards, while infants received them in place of their parents in some instances. Such errors were blamed by the KPU on the Central Statistics Agency (BPS). Several voters did not receive registration in time, resulting in liberal election officials who did not require cards in several instances. The inability was especially evident regarding overseas workers and expatriates, millions of whom had no way of voting.

Fourth, several of the ballots did not arrive on time; the KPU had a contract dispute with its printers which delayed their arrival, threatening to breach the delivery deadline which is ten days before the election date. As the election approached, in several rural areas such as Papua, the ballots did not arrive by the ten day deadline, and in West Sumatra, only eight percent of local ballots had been printed by the deadline. Some areas used photocopiers for ballot papers to avoid postponement. The KPU responded to this pressing situation by firing their local printers for their tardy production.¹⁶ The day before the elections, forty percent of ballots had failed to reach Riau Province. Megawati issued a Presidential Decree only on the eve of the election to allow for the vote to be postponed in several outlying areas, a decision which could have been foreseen and unrest avoided had the KPU realized its own shortcomings sooner. After the Presidential Decree, smaller parties threatened to boycott the entire process because delayed voters would be influenced by partial results.

¹⁶ Jakarta Post, "KPU Axes More Firms for Missing Ballot Quota" (23 March 2004).

Government critics noted that “the election may not fail, but it might not take place as scheduled.”¹⁷ Former President Wahid demanded the resignation of Sjamsuddin immediately. Non-governmental groups such as the KIPP staged protests, demanding the dissolution of the KPU for failing to deliver materials by the legal deadline. On 3 April, the KPU was protested by several leftist groups for their selection methods and their failings; many groups notes that for the first time, the only problems with the elections lie with the organizers. And after the DPR vote, Panwaslu has begun several investigations of the KPU. Due to a multiplicity of problems, the validity of the 5 April vote is in question. Such issues must be corrected by 5 July.

2.2 Military Power

Throughout the New Order and shortly afterwards, the military had officially mandated political power; it is this key military vote which helped remove Wahid and appoint Megawati in his place. But the 1999 elections were the last time the military had guaranteed representation; thirty eight seats in the DPR and 10% of the regional seats were granted to the TNI, a system which has been eliminated for the 2004 vote. This was a result of a Constitutional Amendment by the MPR in 2001. In response, military leaders have swelled party ranks in order to avoid losing their political power. Only retired personnel are eligible for the elections, though with the effects of the Dwifungsi doctrine and their resulting economic power, military generals will have unfair advantages through their networks which are created by state regulations.

Such retired generals include Edi Sudrajat, who leads the popular Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKP), Suwarno Adiwijoyo of Amien Rais’ PAN, Sasmito Dirdjo of the Patriot of Pancasila Party, and HR Hartono- who claims he is the protector of Suharto’s legacy- of the Concern for National Function Party (PKPB). In a chilling statement regarding Aceh, the PKPB states that one of its goals is to maintain national borders in every inch of the country, “with all of its consequences.”¹⁸ The Reform Star Party alone has three chairmen from the military, each retired Generals: H. Cholid Ghazali, H.A. Djalal Bachtiar, and Syamsu Djalal. They assert that their goal is to make the TNI “a military force to be reckoned with that is capable to deter any threat from anywhere either domestic or external under the framework of maintaining territorial integrity.”¹⁹ In

¹⁷ Moch N. Kurniawan, “Elections Prep in Crisis: Lemhannas,” *Jakarta Post* (8 March 2004).

¹⁸ KPU, “Political Parties Contesting the 2004 General Election: their History and Profiles” (December 2003), 25.

¹⁹ KPU, “Political Parties Contesting the 2004 General Election,” 27.

May, Hamzah Haz named retired General Agum Gumelar, whose career included directing the BAIS intelligence service and commanding KOPASSUS units, as his running mate. The 2004 elections are witness to a new era of military politicians.

A more prominent example is retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who created the Democratic Party and is regarded as one of the most intelligent of the military candidates. His father also a famous General, Yudhoyono acted as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs under Megawati, deeply involved in ending the peace talks in Aceh both after the Humanitarian Pause and the COHA. He accompanied the delegation of embassies to Aceh in January 2003, and is an outspoken critic of the Swedish government and the legal standing of GAM leaders.

A presidential poll conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute in October 2003 placed SBY just behind Megawati in popularity, seen by the group as support to return to the system of Suharto.²⁰ The General supported Megawati for years, but in 2004 critiqued her openly, prompting the President's husband to label him as 'childish'. The General responded by drafting an aggressive letter to Megawati on 10 March which accused her of taking over his duties; SBY left her Cabinet a day later. The General was immediately courted by several major parties looking for Vice Presidential Candidates, though he declined the offers and announced his candidacy on 14 March 2004 with his Democratic Party. Leading up to the election, he had received several threats, hiring a large team of anti-terrorist experts as part of his campaign group. He chose Jusuf Kalla, a former Social Welfare Minister, as his running mate in late April. Polls in April and May saw SBY and Kalla garner 44% support, as the duo looks strong as July approaches.

In these elections, the leader of the GOLKAR is none other than retired General Wiranto, a man who was rejected as Habibie's Vice President in 1998, who has been convicted for crimes against humanity by several small tribunals for not controlling his troops and their militias in the Timor Massacres, was fired for this brutality by President Wahid, and who promised in 2003 that the GAM would be exterminated within six months, urging his men to use body counts and end the

²⁰ Laksamana.net, "the Rise of Bambang Yudhonyono" (7 October 2003).

resistance quickly. Unlike SBY, Wiranto is deeply implicated in Suharto-era massacres, constantly haunted by human rights tribunals regarding East Timor. In February 2000, Wiranto was indicted by the state-backed Commission of Human Rights Abuses in Timor, in 2003 he was indicted by the UN-sponsored Serious Crimes Unit, in January 2004 he was placed on a US State Department watch list of indicted war criminals,²¹ and in May 2003 a Timorese court issued a warrant for his arrest (though the Timor Government rejected the motion). The day that Wiranto was nominated for the Presidential vote, CNN stated that GOLKAR “chose a former general indicted for rights abuses in East Timor as its presidential candidate.”²² Days before the election, student protesters in Surabaya chased off Wiranto, their concerns for his indictment and presidential candidacy being well-warranted. One of GOLKAR’s stated goals is to increase “the role of the TNI in empowering the people through a process of democratization.”²³ Another rising GOLKAR leader is Suharto’s son in law, General Prabowo Subianto, who lost the contest for GOLKAR’s leadership in April; Subianto was KOSTRAD Commander in Aceh during the worst of the DOM killings. Another GOLKAR figure is Akbar Tanjung, who was sentenced to three years in jail for corruption but is free as his final appeal was approved.

Even former militias are involved in the elections; leaders of the Pancasila Youth, a former pro-Suharto militia, have formed the Pancasila Patriot Party in Jakarta. When asked if the Patriots were involved in past violence against other parties, their leaders stated that attacks “might be done by certain members of our group, but they certainly had no clear instructions from our boss.”²⁴ The PKS Party hired a militia called the Justice Task Force for its security detail; the GOLKAR’s Youth Wing, the PDI-P’s Task Force, the PPP’s Youth Movement, the PAN’s Youth Force, and the PKB’s National Guard carry out similar tasks for their employers. In Aceh, Martial Law Commanders hired the BERANTAS (Aceh Separatists Resistance Front) to monitor the polls near GAM strongholds. The results of a democratically elected military in Indonesia would have obvious dire results for areas such as Aceh, areas currently under the political power of the TNI and which demonstrate the results of TNI control.

²¹ Sydney Morning Herald, “Megawati Poll Rival Put On US Watch List” (17 January 2004).

²² CNN, “Former General Wiranto Runs for President” (21 April 2004).

²³ KPU, “Political Parties Contesting the 2004 General Election,” 31.

²⁴ Tiarna Siboro, “Party Fights to Erase Hoodlum Image,” Jakarta Post (29 March 2004).

2.3 Conflict Areas

In Aceh, the Indonesian Government has been notable for its indecision on whether or not elections under Martial Law are possible and if foreign monitors would be allowed. General Sutarto claims that monitors are welcome in Aceh, as he wants “to prove that elections can be democratic even under martial laws.”²⁵ KPU Commissioner Sjamsuddin disagrees, stating that “democracy is like water and martial law is like oil, how can be water and oil united?”²⁶ Major General Endang Suwarya stated that as foreign monitors arrive, the TNI Commanders “do not trust them at all...they mustn’t stir up trouble here.”²⁷ For their part, the GAM and student groups have urged Acehnese to boycott the elections, based on both the above reasoning, intimidation from the GAM, and their general hostility towards Indonesian democracy.

Aceh’s Governor Puteh has insisted that elections in Aceh will be ordinary, but General Yudhoyono has repeatedly refuted this, saying that such a vote will be awkward but necessary. The military alone can hold gatherings, distribute food, monitor communications, confiscate any materials, or arrest anybody. A small Acehnese journal, *Beudoh*, was banned by the TNI Command after it ran an article which rejected the elections, an act far from conducive to a free vote. It cannot be stressed enough that the very definition of Martial Law is the suspension of rights under military rule, a suspension which should obviously draw reaction from groups and persons concerned with freedom of expression in Aceh. The Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO) stated on 2 April that Martial Law is “against the election principles of free, fair, and transparent.”²⁸ IMPARSIAL leaders noted that being forced to vote at gunpoint cannot be regarded as humane, let alone free.

KONTRAS published a report on Martial Law and Aceh’s elections in January 2004. Their aim was to persuade the government to end Martial Law, allow free elections, and to inform the public about human rights abuses in Aceh. The NGO describes a December 2003 meeting with NGOs and government, where CETRO, CSIS, and KONTRAS made clear suggestions to the government, but none were implemented. They note that elections under Martial Law have one positive aspect, as they will prevent large-scale violence from the GAM, but the negative aspects are too great, namely

²⁵ Associated Press, “Election Monitors Welcome in Aceh” (26 February 2004).

²⁶ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, cited in KONTRAS, Considering General Elections under Martial Law (Jakarta: January 2004).

²⁷ James Balowski, “Aceh: Military Tightens Grip in Run-up to Elections,” Green Left Weekly (31 March 2004).

²⁸ Nani Farida and Muniggar Sri Saraswati, “Minister Says Aceh Ready for Elections Despite Martial Law,” Jakarta Post (2 April 2004).

the very nature of Martial Law which makes the entire exercise pointless. KONTRAS highlights that such a vote has few precedents, noting that only three states have ever held elections under Martial Law: Zimbabwe, Pakistan, and Burma. They feel that the Indonesian voter can help in several ways, including offering support for Acehese organizations.

Acehnese groups also reject the elections under Martial Law. The SMUR asserts that “the 2004 elections in Aceh must be rejected because the requirements (for the elections) have not been fulfilled,” as the people cannot “vote comfortably, happily or freely while under the threat of the muzzle of a gun, even more so while the people are in the grip of fear.”²⁹ This claim is *entirely* true; Martial Law is by definition a suspension of freedom under military rule. By its very nature, Martial Law is the opposite of free elections. Without Martial Law, one could criticize the GAM, suggesting that boycotts are not necessary, that instead the GAM or some other organization should prove its appeal and run as a political party or that minimally the people should vote against Jakarta. But under Martial Law, such votes would bring great danger to the people. Further, Indonesia would likely dismiss the results as GAM interference. The Indonesian military has once again undermined possible points of contention against the GAM through its reliance on force and abuse.

The SIRA agrees, stating that “the basic principle of Martial Law is the suppression of all civil rights, liberties, and democratic principles, while election is the embodiment of these very rights and principles.”³⁰ They note that from December until March, the military increased its forces and trained militias to monitor the elections. On voting day, police went door to door and brought citizens to the voting sites, accusing those who did not wish to vote of being GAM. They cite examples of abduction, rape, extortion, and killings by security forces carrying out election-related operations in Acehese villages; SIRA pleads with the GAM and the TNI to end violence and allow for a meaningful democratic solution to the conflict.

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak has written several articles and given even more interviews about these elections. He looks at pro-democracy groups and their assertion that free votes can transform the conflict in Aceh; he suggests that this is only true given ideal circumstances. In Aceh, the military controls society tightly, setting the agenda for political thought; the Acehese people are forced to

²⁹ SMUR and LMND Press Release, “Approaching 100 Days of the Military Emergency in Aceh.”

³⁰ SIRA, “the Indonesian 2004 Elections in Aceh: Betrayal of Principles of Democracy and Rule of Law” (December 2003).

“participate in a pledge-of-allegiance ceremony, followed later by a protest demonstration against peace, a demand for militaristic life and a rally to get everyone fired up to hunt for separatists.”³¹ He notes that during the DOM-era elections, a similar phenomenon occurred where Muslim leaders, the Republic, and the GAM each held demonstrations, creating an environment where one was forced to join such factions. For the 2004 elections, things are worse, and for this reason the elections meaningless exercises.

And for most individuals in Aceh, their sentiments are the same. Rumours are that anybody who does not vote in the elections will be labeled a GAM sympathizer, in reference to the rebels’ boycott campaigns. In a real election, non-voting is part of democracy, rejecting the process or candidates, or for that matter not caring, is itself an important indicator. In Aceh, alienated voters believe that “we’ll just punch the ballot papers. We’ll be considered GAM supporters if we don’t vote.”³² It is under such fear that free elections were held in Indonesia in 2004.

Days prior to the DPR vote, former GAM members were commissioned to build a monument to national unity. Aceh will receive fewer than ten international monitors, all of whom are limited to mandated areas with military escorts, are from governmental bodies so are restrained by diplomatic ties, have strict curfews, and must leave immediately afterwards. In the twenty five areas considered to be under GAM control, citizens are expected to travel to TNI bases and vote. In other areas, the military will monitor the process. As described, in North Aceh the election will be monitored by anti-GAM militias such as the BERANTAS and LINMAS. Any suggestion that the elections in Aceh are meaningful must be resisted entirely.

3) The Elections

This section will be a sort of diary of the author’s experiences in the 5 April elections in Java. It was my intention to monitor elections in Aceh, but with Martial Law in place, monitoring alongside a military escort would only offer legitimacy to the process. The EU planned to send four persons to Aceh, while the International Republican Institute (IRI) planned to send two, as did the Governments of Japan and the United States. Across Indonesia, over a dozen organizations sent almost 450 persons to monitor the 5 April vote.

³¹ Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, “Why National Elections Will Not Be Democratic in Aceh,” [Jakarta Post](#) (16 February 2004)

³² Nani Farida, “Acehnese Indifferent to General Elections,” [Jakarta Post](#) (26 March 2004).

I arrived in Jakarta on Thursday, 1 April, noticing the vast number of party signs, flags, and rallies on my way into town. Television channels from MTV to TVRI were filled with flashy advertisements which highlighted the number of each party on ballot cards. Newspapers were filled with little content outside of Monday's elections, mainly pictures of the massive rallies which ended on Friday, critiques of the KPU, and information on restrictions in Aceh.

On Friday, 2 April, I reviewed old newspapers, photographed some of the more blatant billboards, and made contact with local monitors. I noted a protest outside of the KPU headquarters by the Jakarta student unions, which demanded that the elections be held simultaneously, as partial results would alter voting trends in outlying areas. They also condemned possible support for New Order figures such as General Wiranto and Tut-Tut Suharto. After a visit to KIPP headquarters, where I was given a wealth of information, I was invited to join their mobile units on Election Day. The advantages of working for such a popular, grassroots organization were that I was able to see a different viewpoint than would diplomatic envoys.

On Saturday, 3 April, I visited the International Observer Resource Center (IORC), an office supported by the UNDP, the Asia Foundation, and USAID which offers free internet, coffee, and materials for observers from any organization. Observer education, a conference room, regular workshops, observer coordination, and other resources were incredibly helpful for all groups. Among the several materials produced were lists of monitors from each major organization, overviews of electoral rules, and other resources. I then found some books on Aceh by local academics at a small book store as I left to visit the KIPP to comment on some reports. On the way, there was a large traffic jam caused by another protest outside of the KPU.

The protest was organized by a conglomeration of Socialist Parties and unions from the PRD, WALHI, the FNBI, and the PBSD (the Social Democratic Labour Party³³). In conversations with protestors, the criticisms were similar. As stated by PBSD candidate Semeul Eli Jusuf Mintje, "the entire Indonesian system must be changed, it is one where the workers have no rights and the military controls the economy."³⁴ Dita Sari, leader of the FNBI, described the need for the political system to become more transparent, namely in military affairs. Sari also critiqued the stringent

³³ Please see www.pbsd.or.id.

³⁴ Conversation with Chairperson Mintje.

rules for becoming a party, an exercise which allows for only well-financed parties to run. Several protesters carried placards in support of Aceh; one read 'bring democratic justice to Aceh.' Later in the day, I was informed that the four EU monitors arrived in Aceh today, scheduled to stay a full week in areas designated as safe by the TNI.

On Sunday, the Jakarta Post listed a tally of violations by political parties during the past three weeks. As one may expect, the major parties committed more infractions, but the numbers are staggering; the PDI-P committed 431 violations, fifty of which were criminal. The GOLKAR stood at 353 violations, with fifty criminal acts, and the other parties hovered between one and two hundred violations. The elections are tomorrow, a day which has been declared a national holiday. Serious problems exist, as noted above, with thousands of voters unable to cast their ballots.

On 5 April, I woke up at 3:00am and walked to the KIPP office to meet my colleagues. We met early so that we may investigate any reports of early vote buying, as such acts were prominent during the 1999 campaign. No reports came in to us; as one observer remarked, "this year, the violations seem to come from the KPU, not the parties." At 6:30 I joined a small mobile team in East Jakarta via motorcycle. Along the way, we saw countless TPS (polling stations), as well as several leftover party advertisements. The staff at each TPS was clearly marked in bright orange uniforms, with impartial volunteer observers and security also clearly marked. At 7am, we attended the opening ceremony of a poll in a nearby school. Impressed by their enthusiasm and organization, we watched the elections begin.

The polls were set up as follows; outside there were sheets with each candidate and their number, with locals gathering around to discuss the issues. The voters then gave their card to the front desk and sat down until they were called. The voters were given ballots to punch with a nail, placed their votes in the respective ballot boxes, and finally their finger was dyed with indelible ink to avoid repeat voting. We continued to several TPS, ranging from schools, which were the best facilities, to courtyards, to empty lots, to the road side. Several violations were observed, such as improper cover for voters, party shirts and stickers around the stations, volunteers helping the voters punch the ballots, and in one instance the polling station was located in a district government yard.

We traveled to the shanty-towns of East Jakarta, where we found TPS, but voters complained that nobody was able to register because they have no citizenship or voting cards. Indeed, this problem is part of a far bigger issue. At the prison, we were told that only 1/3 of prisoners were allowed to vote, and reports from other observers were that no voting was carried out in retirement homes. There were several major shortcomings in the voting process which must be corrected by the Presidential Elections, but at the same time there were also success stories. At the hospital, we found that the process was excellent, with mobile units set up for some patients. At 13:00, the polls were closed and the counting began. This was another fantastic part of these elections, as the entire community came to the TPS stations during a flash monsoon for a transparent, jovial atmosphere of counting votes among cheers and boos for each party. This aspect of the 5 April vote was an uplifting sight to say the least- the Indonesian people should be very proud.

We continued observing counting and then met up with other monitors to share information. In West Jakarta, the wrong ballots were delivered which caused major problems among residents, while in the Eastern Islands vote buying was apparently usual. By 21:30 we visited a large TPS in Menteng which was just finishing its count, with voters, observers, and volunteers getting some much needed rest immediately afterwards. The process was excellent in Jakarta, though the administrative end as well as the voting in peripheral areas was far less inspiring.

The aftermath of the vote was also interesting. The EU held a large press conference which was very favourable to Indonesia in its assessments, provoking local NGOs to hold their own press conference to refute the EU. Later, fourteen student groups demonstrated against the election headquarters in Jakarta. The EU was openly critiqued by former President Wahid and several political parties for their premature assessment.³⁵ ANFREL and INTERBAND held a more critical press conference based on its observations across the country, our team including volunteers from Afghanistan, Canada, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. We gave the Indonesian people great praise in some respects, such as the enthusiasm, the general lack of violence, the success of bodies such as the Panwaslu, , and the vote-counting media center. These are excellent examples for other Asian countries

³⁵ M. Taufiqurrahman, "EU Praises RI Election, Local Observers Irked," Jakarta Post (10 April 2004).

But we also asked for change; the ballot papers arrived in poor condition, the voting lists were inaccurate, the voters were not taught how to use the complicated ballots, the nail system caused several spoiled votes, and the limited definition of money politics must be expanded. Two types of voting had to be run after 5 April: delayed voting in isolated regions and re-voting in areas with incorrect or tampered ballots. Several smaller parties complained that delayed voting would be influenced by incoming elections results. And of course, intimidation in conflict areas was another systemic problem in the 5 April vote.

In Aceh, the results were predictable. In East Aceh, a grenade injured several children at a local TPS. Local polling monitors were shot in several areas; as always, areas considered loyal to the Republic and the GAM were both subject to violence and voting infractions. Aceh NGO Forum noted that GOLKAR militias guarded South Aceh TPS, a site which returned 100% support for GOLKAR.³⁶ Other areas saw the party giving out food, kerosene, and several aid packages, while Muslim parties used their religious ties to garner votes in other areas. The mission was headed by YAPPIKA leaders, with 406 volunteers stationed across the region.

The European Union mission asserted that because of Martial Law, “it is not possible on this occasion to draw any conclusions as to the validity or otherwise of the overall conduct of the elections in this one province.”³⁷ As a matter of fact, Martial Law is itself a conclusion regarding the validity of a free vote; the military organized elections were subject to intimidation, violence, and were not supported by the population. GAM boycotts and violence, TNI intimidation and forced voting, the employment of militias, and several other brutal infractions immediately reported by local monitors were somehow missed by the EU team. TAPOL discovered British tanks were being used at polling stations, which hardly justifies Europe’s inability to draw conclusions. In the EU’s final recommendations for future elections, the end of Martial Law was not once mentioned, as if military rule were consistent with the ideals of the Union. Diplomatic constraints are one thing, but if no condemnation of such obvious problems is possible, then one must ask why they went in the first place and if a more humanitarian approach may have been to not monitor in Aceh at all.

³⁶ Tiarna Siboro, “Grave Violations Reported During Elections in Aceh,” *Jakarta Post* (7 April 2004).

³⁷ European Union Election Observation Mission to Indonesia General Elections 2004, “Preliminary Statement” (8 April 2004).

4) A Look Forward

The 5 April Elections resulted in GOLKAR edging out the PDI-P by 2%, with each party winning about 1/5 of votes but GOLKAR winning twenty one more seats. The PDI-P greatest losses in the vote, but the GOLKAR can hardly be considered victorious. The PKB, PPP, Democratic Party, PKS, and PAN followed the two major parties, with the Democrats, PKS, and PAN coming out the greatest winners. The fallout from these elections will be felt in coming weeks, as alliances form in order to find a governing coalition in the DPR.

The Presidential Elections will be a first for Indonesia, with a 5 July vote and a likely 5 September run-off if no candidate wins over fifty percent of the overall vote and at least twenty percent in half of the provinces (a rule which demonstrates Indonesia's concern for regions outside of Java). There will be six teams contesting the elections:

- Megawati will seek reelection under the PDI-P banner, with Hasyim Muzadi as her running mate. Muzadi was recently Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in the country.
- Wiranto will represent GOLKAR, with Salahuddin Wahid as his running mate. Wahid is Gus Dur's younger brother and is Deputy Chairman of the NU and KOMNAS HAM, once investigating Wiranto for military excesses.
- SBY will represent his Democratic Party, with Jusuf Kalla as his running mate. Kallah was the Social Welfare Minister in Megawati's Cabinet.
- Hamzah Haz will try to move from Vice President to President alongside retired General Agum Gumelar. Gumelar's military career focused on intelligence gathering.
- Gus Dur will seek a second term with Marwah Daud Ibrahim as his running mate. A member of GOLKAR, Ibrahim has an extensive education and teaching experience, earning her PhD in Communications in Washington.
- Amien Rais will represent his PAN, with Siswono Yudohusodo as his running mate. Yudohusodo is the head of Indonesia's Farmer's Association, serving in two Suharto governments but noted for honesty.

Polls in April and May place retired General SBY far ahead of Megawati, gaining twice as many answers from respondents; GOLKAR's Wiranto gained less than 2% support in April, but rallied to 10% by May based on GOLKAR's small plurality from the April vote. The only certainty is that no

party will gain 50% and thus a run-off election will be necessary. However, it appears that SBY has the greatest chance of winning; despite having a small political party, the Presidential vote will be based on personal popularity, which Wiranto and Mega each lack.

The DPR elections in Aceh, though being mere formalities, returned a slight victory for the Hamzah Haz and his Islamic PPP over GOLKAR, with the PAN coming in at third and Wahid's PKS in fourth. Two seats were won by GOLKAR, two by PAN, the Democratic Party, the PPP, the PKS, and the PBR, and one seat for the Crescent Star Party. Megawati's PDI-P earned less than 5% of Acehnese support and did not manage to win a single seat. In the Provincial Legislative vote, the results were the same, with GOLKAR edged out by 10,000 votes by the PPP. The turnout for the election was 1,130,000, with strong pockets of support in the South for GOLKAR and overwhelming support for the PPP in districts such as Pidie. Again, the results show only that there is a great deal of diversity in the way that Acehnese respond to forced voting, not whom they support.

As this text goes to print, the Indonesian Government has just announced that it will end Martial Law before June and implement a state of civil emergency, where integrated military operations will continue where deemed necessary. The government press release did not elaborate on the status of human rights NGOs or end travel restrictions to the region; we can only hope that there exists an atmosphere which allows civil society to help the people. The statement only mentioned that the Red Cross would continue its work with the endorsement of the local government. Human rights activists immediately critiqued the government for failing to state whether Martial Law had made any achievements, for failing to relieve the corrupt Governor Puteh and allow autonomous local elections, and for continuing large-scale military operations without defining their goals or defining the role of other political actors. The military operations have no definitions or goals which have been stated, a fact which opens the door for continued abuses and exploitation.

Meanwhile, GAM leaders continue to dodge the twenty three Swedish prosecutors who are managing the ongoing trial. The Indonesian police have supplied the team with a GAM laptop which allegedly contains military records, including strategic planning between di Tiro and GAM Commanders in Aceh. This trial will have major ramifications for the conflict and the credibility of the rebel leaders.

The second stage of a reeducation camp has just finished, releasing 660 former GAM members; these GAM members are not die-hard supporters, but instead casual members who joined due to peer pressure, on impulse, or to make money. Unfortunately, what could be a realistic programme for educating poor peasants in these three camps is instead an exercise of blatant nationalism seeking to rebuild loyalty to the unitary Republic of Indonesia. This is eerily similar to previous failed efforts of allegiance during the Cold War and during the DOM, where civilians were forced to attend pro-Republic rallies and denounce some mysterious enemy. In each of the past cases, reformed prisoners were soon used as militia members to fight rebels, the reoccurrence of which HRDs must prepare for. As has been a theme throughout this book, because changes have been insufficient, history is repeating.

GAM field commanders make excuses for hostage-taking, postponing the release of over one hundred civilian hostages, including Fery, every few days. The violence continues; on 23 April 2004, a bomb exploded in a small East Aceh town which killed ten persons and injured fifty. On 1 May 2004, KOMNAS HAM released a major update of its ongoing report of human rights abuses under Martial Law, one which will take the approach of critiquing the GAM as well as the TNI as is central focus. In response to this report, General Sutarto made the following statement:

We welcome Komnas HAM to investigate rights abuses allegedly committed by my troops while carrying out their duties (in Aceh), but the investigation should not have a political motive. It should also record violations committed by rebels.³⁸

Although we have ample reason to doubt that the General will support investigations which implicate ranking officers or the military structure, we cannot disagree with his request; this is the prime suggestion of this text, as General Sutarto's admission of some 511 human rights abuses by his troops should be balanced by investigations against the GAM. Our objections must be constructive, namely that any failure to expose the GAM is based on the inability for groups to observe Aceh under Martial Law. Meanwhile, civil society continues its campaigns, but Indonesian, GAM, and international politics are not ready for change. Aceh is not about to go away any time soon, regardless of who is elected President by the end of 2004.

³⁸ Tiarna Siboro and Nani Farida, "TNI Admits to Wrongdoings in Aceh," Jakarta Post (6 May 2004).

Appendix I- Sumatra Treaty of 2 November 1871 between Great Britain and the Netherlands

ARTICLE I

Her Britannic Majesty desists from all objections against the extension of the Netherland Dominion in any part of the island of Sumatra, and consequently from the reserve in that respect contained in the notes exchanged by the Netherland and British Plenipotentiaries at the conclusion of the treaty of 17 March 1824.

ARTICLE II

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands declares, that in the Kingdom of Siac Srie Indrapoora and its dependencies as it is defined in the compact concluded by the Netherland Indian Government with that Kingdom on the 1st of February 1858, the trade of British subjects and the British navigation shall continue to enjoy all the rights and advantages that are or may be granted there to the trade of Netherland subjects and to the Netherland navigation, and further that the same assimilation shall be granted to the trade of British subjects and to the British navigation in any other native State of the Island of Sumatra that may here after become dependent on the Crown of the Netherlands, provided always that British subjects conform themselves to the laws and regulations of the Netherland Government.

ARTICLE III

The stipulations of the preceding article shall not interfere with the distinction established by the Netherland Indian laws and regulations between individuals of Western and individuals of Eastern extraction, nor with the application of the stipulations of the convention of 27 March 1851.

ARTICLE IV

The present convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall remain without force or effect until it has received, as far as shall be required, the approval of the States-General. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. Done at The Hague the second day of November in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one.

(signed) L. Gericke Van Bosse E. A. J. Harris

Appendix II- the Sultans of Aceh¹

1.	Ali Mughayat Shah	(1500-1530)
2.	Salahuddin	(1530-1537)
3.	Alauddin Riayat Shah al Kahbar	(1537-1571)
4.	Ali Riayat Shah	(1571-1579)
5.	Sultan Muda	(1579)
6.	Sultan Sri Alam	(1579)
7.	Zainul Abidin	(1579)
8.	Alauddin Mansur Shah	(1579-1586)
9.	Ali Riayat Shah	(1586-1588)
10.	Alauddin Riayat Shah	(1588-1604)
11.	Ali Riayat Shah	(1604-1607)
12.	Iskandar Muda	(1607-1636)
13.	Iskandar Thani	(1636-1641)
14.	Tadjud Alam Safiatuddin	(1641-1675)
15.	Nurul Alam Nakiyatuddin	(1675-1678)
16.	Inayat Shah Zakiyatuddin	(1678-1688)
17.	Kamalat Shah	(1688-1699)
18.	Badr al-Alam Sjarif Hasjem Djamaluddin	(1699-1702)
19.	Perkasa Alam Sjarif Lamtui b. Sjarif Ibrahim	(1702-1703)
20.	Djamalul Alam Badrul Munir	(1703-1726)
21.	Djawhar Alam Amaluddin Shah	(only a few days)
22.	Sjamsul Alam or Wan di Teubeng	(only a few days)
23.	Alauddin Ahmad Shah or Maharadja Lela Melayu	(1727-1735)
24.	Alauddin Djohan Shah	(1735-1760)
25.	Mahmud Shah or Tuanku Radja	(1760-1764)
26.	Badruddin	(1764-1773)
27.	Sulaiman Shah or Radja Udahna Lela	(1773-1781)
28.	Alauddin Muhammad Shah	(1781-1795)
29.	Alauddin Djauhar Alam Shah	(1795-1824)
30.	Muhammad Shah	(1824-1836)
31.	Mansur Shah	(1836-1870)
32.	Mahmud Shah	(1870-1874)
33.	Muhammad Dawud Shah	(1874)

¹ Courtesy of the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, available online at www.asnlf.net/asnlf_int/frame_ges_int/frame_int.htm.

34.	Muhammad Saman di Tiro	(1874-1891)
35.	Muhammad Amin di Tiro	(1891-1896)
36.	Ubaidullah di Tiro	(1896-1899)
37.	Sulaiman di Tiro or Tengku Lambada	(1899-1904)
38.	Muhammad Ali Zainul Abidin di Tiro	(1904-1910)
39.	Mahyeddin di Tiro	(1910)
40.	Maát di Tiro	(1911)
41.	Hasan di Tiro	(1976-)

*A note from the author- this lineage portrays previous Sultans as related to Hasan, when in fact his family has never held such positions, his father being a rebel fighter. The use of this tree to suggest that di Tiro is related to the previous Sultans is part of the GAM's attempt at legitimacy.

Appendix III- Statement of Acehnese Ulama to fight Against Dutch Return, 1945

"The very destructive second World War has just ended. Now, in the West and in the East, four big kingdoms are managing everlasting world peace for the safety of Allah's creatures. And Indonesia, our homeland, has declared its independence to all the world, and the Republic of Indonesia has been established under the leadership of our respected, great leader Ir. SOEKARNO.

"The Dutch is one small, poor country, a country smaller than Atjeh (Aceh), and has been destroyed. They are committing crimes against our nation, the independent Indonesia, attempting again to colonize us.

"If they are successful, they will again exploit all of our people, seize all of the wealth of the state and also of the people, and all the wealth that we have collected will disappear altogether. They will make Indonesians their slaves again, and make efforts to abolish our noble religion of Islam and to crush or inhibit Indonesians' nobility and welfare.

"In Java, the Dutch and their henchmen have committed aggression against the freedom of the Republic of Indonesia, leading to wars in a number of areas that eventually were won by us. Even so, they have not yet repented.

"All of our people have united, standing behind the great leader Ir. SOEKARNO to await orders as to what they must do.

"According to our belief, this struggle is a noble struggle that is called *SABIL WAR*.

"Therefore, believe, all our people, that this struggle is a continuation of the previous struggle in Atjeh led by the late Tgk. Tjhi' di Tiro and other national heroes.

"That is why all our people must stand up, unite shoulder to shoulder, move forward and follow the steps and struggles of our ancestors. Heed with respect all the orders from our leaders for the safety of our Homeland, Religion and Nation."

Appendix IV- Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra (4 December 1976)

To The peoples Of The World:

We, the people of Aceh, Sumatra, exercising our right of self-determination, and protecting our historic right of eminent domain to our fatherland, do hereby declare ourselves free and independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java.

Our fatherland, Aceh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent sovereign State since the world begun. Holland was the first foreign power to attempt to colonize us when it declared war against the sovereign State of Aceh, on March 26, 1873, and on the same day invaded our territory, aided by Javanese mercenaries. The aftermath of this invasion was duly recorded on the front pages of contemporary newspapers all over the world. The London, TIMES, on April 22, 1873, wrote: "A remarkable incident in modern colonial history is reported from East Indian Archipelago. A considerable force of Europeans has been defeated and held in check by the army of native state...the State of Aceh. The Acehnese have gained a decisive victory. Their enemy is not only defeated, but compelled to withdraw." THE NEW YORK TIMES, on May 6th, 1873, wrote: "A sanguinary battle has taken place in Aceh, a native Kingdom occupying the Northern portion of the island of Sumatra. The Dutch delivered a general assault and now we have details of the result. The attack was repulsed with great slaughter. The Dutch general was killed, and his army put to disastrous flight. It appears, indeed, to have been literally decimated." This event had attracted powerful world-wide attention. President Ulysses S. Grant of the United States issued his famous Proclamation of impartial Neutrality in this war between Holland and Aceh.

On Christmas day, 1873, the Dutch invaded Aceh for the second time, and thus begun what HARPER'S MAGAZINE had called "A Hundred Years War of Today", one of the bloodiest, and longest colonial war in human history, during which one-half of our people had laid down their lives defending our sovereign State. It was being fought right up to the beginning of world war II. Eight immediate forefathers of the signer of this Declaration died in the battlefields of that long war, defending our sovereign nation, all as successive rulers and supreme commanders of the forces of the sovereign and independent State of Aceh, Sumatra.

However, when, after World War II, the Dutch East Indies was supposed to have been liquidated, - an empire is not liquidated if its territorial integrity is preserved, - our fatherland, Aceh, Sumatra, was not returned to us. Instead, our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese - their ex-mercenaries, - by hasty fiat of former colonial powers. The Javanese are alien and foreign people to us Acehnese Sumatrans. We have no historic, political, cultural, economic or geographic relationship with them. When the fruits of Dutch conquests are preserved, intact, and then bequeathed, as it were, to the Javanese, the result is inevitable that a Javanese colonial empire would be established in place of that of the Dutch over our fatherland, Aceh, Sumatra. But, colonialism, either by white, Dutch, Europeans or by brown Javanese, Asians, is not acceptable to the people of Aceh, Sumatra.

This illegal transfer of sovereignty over our fatherland by the old, Dutch, colonialists to the new, Javanese colonialists, was done in the most appalling political fraud of the century: the Dutch colonialist was supposed to have turned over sovereignty over our fatherland to a "new nation" called "indonesia". But "indonesia" was a fraud: a cloak to cover up Javanese colonialism. Since the world begun, there never was a people, much less a nation, in our part of the world by that name. No such people existed in the Malay Archipelago by definition of ethnology, philology, cultural anthropology, sociology, or by any other scientific findings. "Indonesia" is merely a new label, in a totally foreign nomenclature, which has nothing to do with our own history, language, culture, or interests; it was a new label considered useful by the Dutch to replace the despicable "Dutch East Indies", in an attempt to unite administration of their ill-gotten, far-flung colonies; and the Javanese neo-colonialists knew its usefulness to gain fraudulent recognition from the unsuspecting

world, ignorant of the history of the Malay Archipelago. If Dutch colonialism was wrong, then Javanese colonialism which was squarely based on it cannot be right. The most fundamental principle of international Law states: *Ex injuria jus non oritur*. Right cannot originate from wrong!

The Javanese, nevertheless, are attempting to perpetuate colonialism which all the Western colonial powers had abandoned and all the world had condemned. During these last thirty years the people of Aceh, Sumatra, have witnessed how our fatherland has been exploited and driven into ruinous conditions by the Javanese neo-colonialists: they have stolen our properties; they have robbed us from our livelihood; they have abused the education of our children; they have exiled our leaders; they have put our people in chains of tyranny, poverty, and neglect: the life-expectancy of our people is 34 years and is decreasing - compare this to the world's standard of 70 years and is increasing! While Aceh, Sumatra, has been producing a revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese neo-colonialists, which they used totally for the benefit of Java and the Javanese.

We, the people of Aceh, Sumatra, would have no quarrel with the Javanese, if they had stayed in their own country, and if they had not tried to lord it over us. From now on, we intend to be the masters in our own house: the only way life is worth living; to make our own laws: as we see fit; to become the guarantor of our own freedom and independence: for which we are capable; to become equal with all the peoples of the world: as our forefathers had always been. In short, to become sovereign in our own fatherland!


Our cause is just! Our land is endowed by the Almighty with plenty and bounty. We covet no foreign territory. We intend to be a worthy contributor to human welfare the world over. We extend the hands of friendship to all peoples and to all governments from the four corners of the earth.

In the name of the sovereign people of Aceh, Sumatra.

Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro
Chairman, National Liberation Front of Aceh, Sumatra, and Head of State.

Aceh, Sumatra, December 4, 1976

Appendix V- Anatomy of the Indonesian Military²



² Available online at www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia.

Appendix VI- Statement of the Solidarity Forum for Aceh

FORSOLA Strongly Condemns the Brutality of the Troops of the Armed Forces Slaughtering the People of Aceh in Beutong Ateuh and Blang Meurandeh

We have received news of the unbelievable massacre by Armed Forces troops of at least 39 inhabitants of Beutong Ateuh and Blang Meurandah villages in Beutong Regency, West Aceh on July 23 1999. News of this incident broke only on July 26.

We wholly condemn the brutal and barbaric action again taken by the Armed Forces apparatus against the people of Aceh. The Armed Forces have once again proved that they themselves have sparked the bloody unrest and violence that has occurred by shooting innocent civilians on the pretext of military operations against the free Aceh movement. This pretext is unacceptable and is merely an excuse to allow the Armed Forces to continue military operations in Aceh and to defend the presence of the military on Achenese soil.

The Armed Forces must be fully aware that their presence is not accepted by the people of Aceh. Repeated brutality and violence by the Armed Forces has only served to strengthen the reaction of the people to fight for their independence. In fact it is the Armed Forces who have sparked the fight for independence and partition from Indonesia. It is the Armed Forces who are principally responsible for the spread of the opposition movement in Aceh.

Therefore, we:

1. Demand that the Armed Forces takes responsibility for this incident and demand that those perpetrating this brutal action and violation of human rights be brought before the courts and given the maximum penalty under the law.
2. We ask that the President of the Republic of Indonesia immediately withdraw all military troops and non-local troops from Aceh and revoke all Armed Forces territorial institutions in Aceh.
3. We ask that all the people of Aceh remain calm and press charges and also ask that the government and the Armed Forces carry out their responsibilities peacefully and without violence.
4. We ask that political parties immediately get involved and show their concern and interest in problems in Aceh, and begin lobbying and urging the government and the military to resolve the situation.
5. To facilitate the rapid implementation of measures to resolve the Aceh problem parties concerned should be involved, and negotiations made with the Free Aceh Movement

towards a final, comprehensive and fair resolution based on the demands of the people of Aceh.

We are certain that a complete resolution of the Aceh problem is possible only if it is approached using peaceful, non-violent channels, through negotiation with the parties involved, and in particular through negotiation with the Free Aceh Movement. Only with pure and peaceful hearts and minds can the Aceh problem be resolved without loss of life and prolonging the suffering of the Acehnese people.

The problems in Aceh can be resolved only through peaceful measures and negotiation, and not using a military approach. In this way a fundamental resolution can be sought that is in line with the demand for justice and the conscience of the people of Aceh.

Jakarta, July 27 1999

FORSOLA

Members:

Kalyanamitra
YASPPUK
PPSW
TRUK
INFID
KPT/Justice and Peace
YAKOMA
ISJ
WALHI
PIJARSOMAKA
KBUI

Solidaritas Perempuan (SP)
Tjoet Nya' Dien Yogyakarta
LBH-APIK
LILIPUT
ELSAM
LPPS LSPP
JKLPK
JEJAK
YAPPIKA
PBHI
SMUR-Aceh
KPI-KD

Appendix VII- Joint Appeal for Cease-Fire during Ramadan

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises out of our concern at deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Aceh, where martial law was declared on May 19, 2003, after a historic peace deal between the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement collapsed. Since then, many Indonesian soldiers have been killed and injured while implementing the military operation against rebel forces. The operation has also resulted in the death, detention, and persecution of many Acehnese guerrillas who continue their resistance and aspirations for independence. In the absence of independent monitoring, civilians have once again fallen victim to the conflict, with many being killed, maimed, traumatized, deprived of their property, and forced to flee their homes.

During the four months of the current military operation, over 1,000 people, both civilians and guerrillas, have been killed. Over 600 schools have been burned, depriving more than 40,000 children of an education. More than 100,000 people have been internally displaced and are forced to survive on insufficient basic needs. The escalation of the crisis has also resulted in an increase in human rights violations in Aceh, including extrajudicial executions, detention without trial, forced disappearances, violence against women and children, and confiscation of property. The humanitarian tragedy is clearly a consequence of the decision to resolve the conflict by military means.

The tragedy in Aceh today is not just humanitarian; it is also a tragedy for democracy. Under the martial law there has been much discrepancy between information released to the public and realities on the ground. This is in part due to restrictions placed on journalists in gaining access to and reporting from the field. Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS-HAM) and independent monitoring teams have also not been allowed to investigate and verify human rights violations. Many social activities are not being carried out as usual as a result of new regulations and operations targeting activists and community leaders.

Thus, since Indonesia annulled the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) and declared martial law, the people of Aceh have been forced to live once again under conditions of severe repression. In general, the conflict has prevented Acehnese from fully engaging in social, economic and political life, and has instead forced them to live with little freedom to express their humanity and humanitarian values. These conditions occur at a time when Acehnese prepare to enter the month of Ramadan, the holy month full of blessings and forgiveness.

CEASE-FIRE DURING THE FASTING MONTH

At the end of October 2003, Muslims around the world will begin the ibadah (divine duty) of fasting for the period of one month. The fast is a sacred practice that restrains Muslims from hawa nafsu (desire) and is conducted at a time when Muslims increase the performance of divine work to bring themselves closer to their God. With the current increase in violence in Aceh, it is certain that Acehnese, more than 95% of whom are Muslim, will not be allowed to carry out these ibadah peacefully.

On behalf of the right of the Muslim ummah in Aceh to carry out their divine duties in peace and with respect to humanity, we, the undersigned, appeal to both conflicting parties, the Indonesian

Government in Jakarta and the leadership of the Free Aceh Movement in Sweden, to cease warring activities during the holy month. As the majority of members of both the Indonesian Government and GAM are Muslim, we call upon both political institutions to take the opportunity of the holy month to end the conflict and return to the negotiation table. This is also in accordance with the teachings of Islam by which fasting is a discipline for Muslims to restrain from anger and rivalry.

We hope that Ramadan will provide the spirit to both sides to strengthen their commitment to bring peace to Aceh. In this spirit we urge both sides to restrain their opposition and cease armed violence throughout the fasting month. Such a gesture would forge the mechanism for a cease-fire mediated by a neutral party accepted by both sides. The determination of a third party and logistics of the mechanism for the cease-fire should ensure that a commitment to peace does not collapse again.

REOPEN THE ROAD TO PEACE

The proposed cease-fire does not merely seek to put an end to the armed violence during the month of Ramadan. We hope that this step will reopen the road to bring both sides back to the negotiating table. We understand that it will be difficult for both parties to return to negotiations after the earlier agreement between them failed. Goodwill on the part of both sides to adjust their positions and interests is essential to facilitate a return to dialogue.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which was signed on December 9, 2002 in Geneva can serve as the basis for the formulation of a new peace process, with the addition of an impartial third party with the capacity to influence both conflicting parties. Further, the active involvement in the negotiations of all sectors of Acehnese civil society is an aspect that must be considered for the goal of achieving positive peace in Aceh. This is because throughout the conflict civil society has remain the actor most committed to finding a peaceful resolution.

Finally, we urge both parties to prioritize above all other interests the right of the Acehnese people to rebuild their lives with dignity. To international organizations and community, we hope for a more committed involvement in ensuring a resumption of negotiations to effectively replace the cycle of violence with sustainable peace in Aceh.

October 22, 2003

Initiators:

1. Student Coalition for Aceh, USA
2. Penang Support Group for Aceh, Malaysia
3. AcehKita Humanitarian Info Website and Magazine, Indonesia

Organisation Endorsers:

1. Eye on Aceh, Australia -- Dr Lesley Mc Culloh
2. Indonesia House, Amsterdam -- Reza Muharam
3. International Forum for Aceh, USA -- Suraiya IT
4. Student Coalition for Aceh New York, USA --Joshua Howard
5. Network in Solidarity with the People of the Philippines (NISPOP), USA -- David Pugh
6. Radio Free Maine, USA -- Roger Leisner
7. Angkatan Darussalam Baru, USA -- Saiful Mahdi
8. Muslim Educational and Cultural Association (MECA) Cornell University, USA--Yusif Akhund,
9. Student Coalition for Aceh Philadelphia, USA --Yusri F Yusuf
10. Kodemo, the Netherlands -- S.L. Liem
11. TAPOL, United Kingdom
12. Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)


13. Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN), Malaysia
14. Solidarity for Aceh, Malaysia
15. Persatuan Sahabat Wanita Selangor, Malaysia
16. Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM)
17. Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM)
18. Pergerakan Penyelidikan dan Pembangunan Komuniti (KOMUNITI), Malaysia
19. Teras Pengupayaan Melayu (TERAS), Malaysia
20. National Moslem Scholar Association Penang Chapter (PUM PP), Malaysia
21. Community Development Center (CDC), Malaysia
22. Women's Development Collective (WDC), Malaysia
23. Save OurSelves (SOS), Malaysia
24. Malaysian Local Democracy Initiative (MALODI), Malaysia
25. Penang Anti-ISA Network (PAIN), Malaysia
26. Kumpulan Kemajuan Masyarakat (KKM), Malaysia
27. Malaysian Youth and Student Democracy Movement (DEMA), Malaysia
28. Indigenous Peoples Development Center, Bintulu, Sarawak, Malaysia
29. Campus Ministry Office of Penang Diocese, Malaysia
30. Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall Civil Rights Committee, Malaysia
31. Persatuan Ulama Cawangan Pulau Pinang, Malaysia
32. Food Not Bombs Kuala Lumpur (FNBKL)
33. Citizens International, Malaysia
34. Universiti Bangsar Utama (UBU), Malaysia
35. Center for Orang Asli Concerns, Malaysia--Colin Nicholas
36. Research Academica for Humanism and Jai Prithvi (RAFHAJ), Nepal
37. Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Jakarta — Hendaridi
38. Kontras -- Usman Hamid
39. PIRD-Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Jakarta — Ikhravany
40. Eksekutif Nasional Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI)-- Longgena Ginting
41. Human Right Watch Group, Jakarta -- Soni and Rafendi
42. Imparsial, Jakarta -- Otto Pratama
43. SOLIDAMOR, Jakarta -- Yenni Rosa Damayanti
44. Sahabat Aceh, Jakarta -- Bonar Tigor Naipospos
45. Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD)-- Yusuf Lakaseng
46. Solidaritas Gerakan untuk Rakyat Aceh (SEGERA)-- Herman H
47. Voice of Human Right, Jakarta -- Andhy Panca and Avan
48. Elsam, Jakarta -- Agung Yudha and Wahyu
49. aringan Advokasi Tambang (JATAM), Jakarta — Chalid Muhammad
50. DEMOS, Jakarta -- Antonio and Agung Wijaya
51. SHMI, Jakarta -- Ade Rostina
52. Institut Titian Perdamaian, Jakarta -- Ichsan Malik
53. Dewan Masyarakat Adat Koteka (DEMMAK), Papua-- Hans Gebze
54. Aliansi Masyarakat Papua (AMP)--P Rehul Kagoya
55. Organisasi Rakyat Independen, ORI-SUMATRA -- Usin Abdisyah
56. Tapak Ambon -- Zairin Salampessy
57. Forum Rakyat, Aceh -- Surya Angkasa
58. Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Banda Aceh -- Afridal Darmi
59. Himpunan Aktivis Anti Militer (HANTAM), Aceh -- Asmara Diah Syahputra
60. Forum Akademisi Aceh
61. Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh — Faisal Hadi
62. Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI), Aceh — M. Zul Prima Putra
63. Lembaga Pemberdayaan Sosial Ekonomi dan Lingkungan Hidup (LPSELH), Aceh—Wildansyah
64. Suara Hati Rakyat (SAHARA) Aceh
65. Flower Aceh — Nurlela

66. Kelompok Kerja Transformasi Gender Aceh (KKTGA) -- Seri Rahayu
 67. Yayasan Flora Fauna Aceh (YFFA) — Anshari
 68. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Walhi) Aceh — Muhammad Ibrahim
 69. Lembaga Rakyat Marginal (L-eREM), Aceh -- T.M. Zulfikar
 70. Jaringan Kerja Masyarakat Adat (JKMA) Aceh -- Debby Fitrika
 71. Persatuan Masyarakat Tani Aceh (PERMATA) -- Amru Alba Abqa
 72. JARI Aceh -- Khairul Hasni
 73. Kontras Aceh -- T. Samsul Bahri
 74. Judicial Monitoring Team For Aceh (JMTA) — Ruffriadi
 75. Human Right Monitoring Team For Aceh (HRMTA) -- Hendra Budian
 76. Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (SIRA) — Nasruddin Abubakar
 77. Yayasan Anak Bangsa (YAB), Aceh -- J. Halim Bangun
 78. Organisasi Perempuan untuk Demokrasi (ORPAD), Aceh -- Raihana Diani
 79. Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN), Jakarta -- Emil Kleden
 80. Pergerakan Demokratik Rakyat Miskin (PDRM) Aceh
 81. Front Aksi Reformasi Mahasiswa Islam Aceh (FARMIDIA) -- T. Riza Fahmi
 82. The Indonesian Society For Transparency, Jakarta -- Mahmuddin Muslim
 83. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Watch, Jakarta--Yan Aryanto
 84. Jeumpa Mirah, Aceh--Faisal Ridha
 85. Front Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Aceh-Jakarta (KMPAN)--Robby Syahputra
 86. CeSAR Aceh—Banta
 87. Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran HAM Aceh (SPKP HAM Aceh)-- Zulkifli Ibrahim
 88. Perempuan Merdeka, Aceh--Bungong Fitrah
 89. Forum Kutaradja, Aceh—Muhammad
 90. IKAPA-Bandung--Sayed Fadhil
 91. Komite Sentral Organisasi-Solidaritas Mahasiswa untuk Rakyat (KSO-SMUR)--Thamren Ananda
 92. LAMPUAN, Aceh--Asmawita Fitri
 93. Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (SAMAK), Aceh-- J Kamal Farza
- Individual Endorsers:
1. Prof James Siegel, Cornell University, USA
 2. Robert Jereski, USA
 3. Patricia A. Hawk, California, USA
 4. Sylvia Tiwon, Berkeley, California, USA
 5. Nyan W. Lett, Knowledge Kingdom, USA
 6. Jessica Rucell, San Francisco, USA
 7. Anne Jaclard, News and Letters, USA
 8. Anna Sinelnikova, USA
 9. Adriana Garriga Lopez, New York, USA
 10. Jerise Fogel, Huntington, WV, Marshall University, USA
 11. Sergio Munoz-Sarmiento, Cornell Law School, USA
 12. Dian Rubianty, USA
 13. Christine Meisenheimer, West Salem, USA
 14. Will George, West Salem, USA
 15. Deborah Buffton, La Crosse, WI USA
 16. Sasha S. Welland, New Haven, CT
 17. Aidul Amri Krueng, Student Coalition for Aceh Philadelphia, USA
 18. Michel Kervyn, New School University, USA
 19. A. Made Tony Supriatma, Individu (Cornell University)
 20. Nida Chaudhary, Cornell University, USA
 21. Zahra Aziz, Cornell University, USA
 22. Fizzah Idrees, Cornell University, USA
 23. Bahram Sami, Cornell University, USA
 24. Aneela Haider, Cornell University, USA

25. Ali Akhtar, Cornell University, USA
26. Aboeprijadi Santoso, Amsterdam
27. Aderito De Jesus, East Timor
28. Dr. Toh Kin Woon, Malaysia
29. Yin Shao Loong, Malaysia
30. Damian M Denis, Malaysia
31. Ong Ooi Heng, Malaysia
32. Chai Lee Choo, Malaysia
33. Julayda Md. Hashim, Malaysia
34. Nik Shazlin Mohd. Zainal Rashid, Malaysia
35. Nur Akmar Ahmad Nazari, Malaysia
36. Norazrina bt MD Jabarullah, Malaysia
37. Amanda O'Brien, London UK
38. Pdraig Mac an Baird, Madrid, Spain
39. Mahfudh Marzuki, Nederland
40. Erwanto, Amsterdam
41. Mark Griffin, Dublin Ireland
42. Oisin Martin, Dublin Ireland
43. Frank O'Broinn, Ballycastle Ireland
44. Darragh Greene, Dublin Ireland
45. Stephen Walsh, Dublin Ireland
46. Simon Finnegan, Dublin Ireland
47. Brian Griffin, Dublin Ireland
48. Aaron Doolin, Dublin Ireland
49. David Lodge, Dublin Ireland
50. Dandhy Dwi Laksono, AcehKita Humanitarian InfoWebsite and Magazine
51. Sita Aripurnami, Aktivis Perempuan, Jakarta
52. Natalia, ICMC, Jakarta
53. Bhava, ICMC, Jakarta
54. Michoclo Mandof, Jakarta
55. Raffles, Jakarta
56. Nining Nurhaya, Jakarta
57. Husni Arifin, Jakarta
58. Janes Nanulaita, Jakarta
59. Surip Widodo, Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh
60. Erlita, Kelompok Kerja Transformasi Gender Aceh
61. Evi Zain, aktivis perempuan, Aceh
62. Azhari, Jakarta
63. Taufik Mubarak, HANTAM, Aceh
64. Dendy Montgomery, Jakarta
65. Dewi Mutia, Jakarta
66. Nursafri, Jakarta
67. Wahyu Syukri, Jakarta
68. Andi Firdaus, Forum Rakyat, Aceh
69. Yuswardi, Aceh
70. Nona Bahari, Individu, Jakarta
71. Evi, Bengkulu
72. Natalia Hera, Jakarta
73. Zulkifli Ibrahim, Jakarta
74. Dina Chrystiane Lumbantobing, North Sumatra, Indonesia
75. Devi Diana, Aceh
76. Islamuddin, Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh
77. Nasir, Pergerakan Demokratik Rakyat Miskin (PDRM), Aceh

78. Andi F, Forum Rakyat, Aceh
79. Rian, Forum Rakyat, Aceh
80. Yari Waga: Alians Masyarakat Papua (AMP)
81. Darius Kagoya, Alians Masyarakat Papua (AMP)
82. Jimmy, Alians Masyarakat Papua (AMP)
83. Alfred S, Eksekutif Nasional WALHI, Jakarta
84. Nur Hidayadi, Eksekutif Nasional WALHI, Jakarta
85. Isna Hertati, Eksekutif Nasional WALHI, Jakarta
86. Andy Armansyah, Eksekutif Nasional WALHI, Jakarta
87. Andi Rizal, KONTRAS Aceh
88. Muslem Amiren, Australia
89. Fadilah, Perempuan Merdeka, Aceh
90. Upik Djalins, Cornell University, USA
91. Audrey Kahin, Cornell University, USA
92. Antonius Made Tony Supriatma, Cornell University, USA
93. Yusmin Y. Alim, Cornell University

Appendix VIII- The United Nations System³



³ United Nations, "the United Nations System," available online at www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html.

Appendix IX- The Humanitarian Pause

JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON HUMANITARIAN PAUSE FOR ACEH

Whereas the Parties to this Joint Understanding believe in the basic tenets of humanitarian principles and values;

Whereas the Parties to this Joint Understanding agree on the imperative to reduce tension and suffering of the population and a Humanitarian Pause can become an effective instrument for that purpose;

Whereas the Parties to this Joint Understanding agree that Humanitarian Pause constitutes a means to promote confidence of the people and parties to this Joint Understanding in their common endeavour towards achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict situation,

We, the undersigned,

Amb. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and
Dr. Zaini Abdullah for the Leadership of the Free Aceh Movement

Hereby agree on the following:

Article 1 Objectives of the Humanitarian Pause

The Objectives of the Humanitarian Pause are:

- A. delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Aceh affected by the conflict situation;
- B. provision of security modalities with a view to supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to reducing tension and violence which may cause further suffering;
- C. promotion of confidence-building measures towards a peaceful solution to the conflict situation in Aceh.

Article 2 Components

The Humanitarian Pause comprises two components:

- A. humanitarian action;
- B. security modalities.

Article 3 Organisational Structure

The organisational structure for the Humanitarian Pause consists of following bodies:

A. Joint Forum

The Joint Forum is the highest organ of the Humanitarian Pause, and as such. It is entrusted with the following tasks:

- a. to formulate and oversee basic policy;
- b. to review the progress of the Humanitarian Pause; and
- c. to generate the necessary support for a successful implementation of the Humanitarian Pause.

The Joint Forum in Switzerland, will consist of representatives of the Government of Indonesia and of the Free Aceh Movement. The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) acts as the facilitator.

B. Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action (JCHA)

The Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action is the body which carries out the policy of the Joint Forum and which coordinates humanitarian assistance.

Its tasks include:

- a. needs assessment, the setting of priorities, resource mobilisation and planning;
- b. the delivery of humanitarian assistance in a way which ensures the full participation of and benefit to the people of Aceh; and
- c. ensuring the unhindered access for the delivery of the humanitarian assistance, and in this context, coordinates closely with the Joint Committee on Security Modalities.

Membership of this Committee consists of maximum of ten members comprising of 5 each appointed by the Parties to this Understanding. The members of the Committee will elect a Chairperson from among them.

The Committee will be facilitated by the HDC.

The HDC will in addition facilitate the process of fundraising for humanitarian assistance.

A Monitoring Team will be established whose tasks are:

- to assess the implementation of the humanitarian action;
- to report their findings to the Joint Forum.

Its membership will consists of 5 persons of high integrity as agreed by the two Parties.

Both Parties take note of the Humanitarian Plan attached.

C. Joint Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM)

The Joint Committee on Security Modalities is the body which deals with the following tasks:

- a. to ensure the reduction of tension and cessation of violence;
- b. to prepare ground rules of activities pertaining to the Humanitarian pause;
- c. to guarantee the absence of offensive military actions by armed forces of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and by the Free Aceh Movement;
- d. to facilitate legitimate or non-offensive presence and movements of armed forces;
- e. to ensure the continuing of normal police function for the enforcement of law and the maintenance of public order, including riot control, prohibition of the movement of civilian with arms; and
- f. to assist in the elimination of offensive actions by armed elements which do not belong to the Parties to this Joint Understanding.

Membership of this Committee will consist of 10 members, 5 each appointed by the Parties to this Joint Understanding.

A Monitoring Team will be established whose tasks are:

- to assess the implementation of the security modalities of the Humanitarian Pause;
- to investigate infringements and report their findings to the Joint Forum.

Its membership will consist of 5 members of high integrity as agreed by the two Parties.

The site of the Committees and the Monitoring Teams are in Banda Aceh.

Article 4
Time Frame

A. The first phase of the Humanitarian Pause covers a period of 3 months commencing 3 weeks from the signing of this Joint Understanding. It will be reviewed 15 days prior to the end of first phase for its renewal.

B. Prior to any unilateral withdrawal from the joint Understanding, the Parties agree to hold consultations in the Joint Forum in Switzerland.

Article 5
Transition

During the period between the signing of the Joint Understanding and its entry into force, both parties will exercise utmost restraint not to do anything contrary to the purpose and intention of this Joint Understanding.

Article 6
Public Communication

Both Parties agree to launch this initiative through the media and through any other means in order to encourage support for the Humanitarian Pause.

Done at Bavois, on 12 May 2000

For the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia

sgd.

Amb. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda

For the Leadership of
the Free Aceh Movement

sgd.

Dr. Zaini Abdullah

Appendix X- The COHA

Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement Between Government of the Republic of Indonesia And the Free Aceh Movement

Preamble

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) have been engaged in a process of dialogue since January 2000 and concur that the priority in Aceh is the security and welfare of the people and therefore agree on the need for finding an immediate peaceful solution to the conflict in Aceh. On 10 May 2002, the GOI and GAM issued a Joint Statement set out below:

1. On the basis of the acceptance of the NAD Law as a starting point, as discussed on 2-3 February 2002, to a democratic all-inclusive dialogue involving all elements of Acehese society that will be facilitated by HDC in Aceh. This process will seek to review elements of the NAD Law through the expression of the views of the Acehese people in a free and safe manner. This will lead to the election of a democratic government in Aceh, Indonesia.
2. To enable this process to take place both parties agree to work with all speed on an agreement on cessation of hostilities with an adequate mechanism for accountability of the parties to such an agreement. This will also provide the opportunity and environment for much needed socio-economic and humanitarian assistance to the people of Aceh.

The GOI and GAM share the common objective to meet the aspirations of the people of Aceh to live in security with dignity, peace, prosperity, and justice. In order to meet the aspirations of the people of Aceh and permit them to administer themselves freely and democratically, the GOI and GAM agree to a process which leads to an election in 2004 and the subsequent establishment of a democratically elected government in Aceh, Indonesia, in accordance with the review of the NAD Law, as provided for in point 1 of the 10 May 2002 Joint Statement.

To this end, the GOI will ensure and GAM will support the development of a free and fair electoral process in Aceh, which will be designed to ensure the broadest participation of all elements of Acehese society.

In light of the delicate nature of the confidence building process, the GOI and GAM further appeal for the support of all elements of society and request that no party undertake any action which is inconsistent with this Agreement and may jeopardize the future security and welfare of the people of Aceh.

The immediate requirement is to ensure the cessation of hostilities and all acts of violence, including, intimidation, destruction of property and any offensive and criminal action. Offensive and criminal action is deemed to include violent actions such as attacking, shooting, engaging in torture, killing, abducting, bombing, burning, robbing, extorting, threatening, terrorising, harassing, illegally arresting people, raping, and conducting illegal searches.

Throughout the peace process the maintenance of law and order in Aceh will continue to be the responsibility of the Indonesian Police (Polri). In this context, the mandate and mission of Brimob

will be reformulated to strictly conform to regular police activities and as such will no longer initiate offensive actions against members of GAM not in contravention of the Agreement.

The JSC will be the point of reference for all complaints regarding police functions and action that are deemed to be in contravention of the spirit and letter of the Cessation of Hostilities (COH) Agreement. As such, the JSC will be responsible for defining, identifying and investigating when and if the police have breached their mandate.

With this general understanding, and to bring the peace process forward to the next phase, both parties hereby agree on the following:

Article 1: Objectives of the Cessation of Hostilities and All Acts of Violence

a) Since both sides have thus agreed that, from now on, enmity between them should be considered a thing of the past, the peace process, which is continued by an agreement on this phase, will proceed by building further confidence and both sides will prove to each other that they are serious about achieving this ultimate common objective.

b) The objectives of the cessation of hostilities and all acts of violence between both parties are (i) to proceed to the next phase of the peace process, as mutually agreed on 10 May 2002 in Switzerland; (ii) to continue the confidence building process with a view to eliminating all suspicions and creating a positive and co-operative atmosphere which will bring the conflict in Aceh to a peaceful conclusion; and, (iii) to enable, provided hostilities and all acts of violence cease, for the peace process to proceed to the next phases, i.e. the delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

Article 2: Commitment by Both Sides to Cease Hostilities and All Acts of Violence

a) Both sides explicitly express their commitment to meet the terms of this Agreement to cease hostilities and all forms of violence toward each other and toward the people in Aceh, by implementing the steps stipulated in this Agreement. In expressing such commitment, both sides guarantee that they are in full control of, respectively, TNI/Polri and GAM forces on the ground. GOI and GAM commit to control those groups that do not share their objectives but claim to be part of their forces.

b) Both sides further commit themselves to immediately after the signing of this Agreement to thoroughly inform their respective forces on the ground of the terms of this Agreement, and to instruct them to cease hostilities immediately.

c) Both sides agree that, should there be other parties taking advantage of the situation and disturbing the peaceful atmosphere, they will endeavour to take joint action against them to restore the peace.

d) During this confidence-building period, both sides agree that they will not increase their military strength, which includes re-deployment of forces, increase in military personnel or military equipment into Aceh.

e) HDC is requested to strictly facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.

f) Both parties will allow civil society to express without hindrance their democratic rights.

Article 3: Joint Security Committee (JSC)

a) The senior leadership in charge of security from each side will meet, in order to establish the initial contact and understanding between both sides. They should also (i) reactivate the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which was established during the implementation of the Humanitarian Pause, and (ii) commence discussion, in order to reach agreement expeditiously, on a plan of action for the JSC in discharging its duties.

b) The functions of JSC are: (i) to formulate the process of implementation of this Agreement; (ii) to monitor the security situation in Aceh; (iii) to undertake full investigation of any security violations; (iv) in such cases, to take appropriate action to restore the security situation and to agree beforehand on the sanctions to be applied, should any party violate this Agreement; (v) to publish weekly reports on the security situation in Aceh; (vi) to ensure that no new paramilitary force is created to assume previous functions of Brimob, and (vii) to design and implement a mutually agreed upon process of demilitarisation. Regarding this last task, the JSC will designate what will be called Peace Zones (see Art. 4(a)). After peace zones have been identified, the GAM will designate placement sites for its weapons. Two months after the signing of the COH and as confidence grows, GAM will begin the phased placement of its weapons, arms and ordinance in the designated sites. The JSC will also decide on a simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces which will reformulate their mandate from a strike force to a defensive force. The GOI has the right to request HDC to undertake no-notice verification of the designated sites. With the growth in confidence of both parties in the process the phased placement of GAM weapons will be completed within a period of five months (see attached note).

c) The composition of JSC will be senior officials appointed as representatives of the GOI and the GAM and a senior third party personality of high standing agreed upon by both sides. Each senior official from the three parties are to be accompanied by up to four persons as members. The heads of delegations from both sides have to be senior and have the authority to be able to take decisions on the spot.

The third party (HDC) personality needs to be able to command the respect and high regard of both sides in order to be able to assist in resolving problems, as they arise.

d) In order to perform these functions, the JSC is to be assisted by a monitoring team or monitoring teams, which would be provided security guarantees by both sides in monitoring the security situation and in investigating any violation.

e) The composition of each of the monitoring teams are appointed officials as representatives of the High Command of the security forces of the GOI and the High Command of the forces of the GAM in Aceh and a senior third party military officer agreed upon by both sides reporting to the senior third party personality of high standing in the JSC.

f) JSC and the monitoring team(s) would be provided with the necessary technical and administrative staff and logistical support. The HDC is requested to facilitate the establishment of these bodies by providing the necessary funds, logistical and administrative facilities.

g) It is agreed upon that the JSC and the monitoring team(s) will be established and be operational within one month of the signing of this Agreement. Civil society has the right to provide inputs to the JSC.

Article 4: Establishment of "Peace Zones"

a) Following the signing of the COH Agreement, the JSC, with the direct participation of the senior leadership for security from both sides, will immediately identify and prepare locations of conflict to be designated as "Peace Zones". This would facilitate considerably the work of the JSC since it could focus its attention on these areas in establishing and maintaining security, and these zones, provided peace could be established, will be the focus of the initial humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

b) For the first two months after the signing, both parties will relocate to defensive positions as agreed upon by the JSC. Adjustments to these locations could be made by the JSC in order to separate the forces of both parties with sufficient distance to avoid contact or confrontation. Forces of both parties will refrain from operations, movements, activities or any provocative acts that could lead to contact or confrontation with each other.

c) In order to build trust and confidence during these crucial months, these zones and surroundings will be monitored by the tripartite monitoring teams. The JSC will be informed by both parties of any significant movements or activities in these areas.

d) POLRI will be able to investigate criminal activities in these areas in consultation with the JSC.

e) The designation of identified areas of demilitarised zones such as schools, mosques, health institutions and public places, bazaars, Acehnesse meunasahs, market-places, foodstalls, communication centres including bus-terminals, taxi-stations, ferry-terminals, public roads, river transportation services, and fishing ports.

Article 5: Time Frames

a) Both sides agree that hostilities and all acts of violence by both sides should cease forever in Aceh.

b) Both sides also agree that hostilities and all acts of violence during the first three months from the time when the JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational are very crucial as indicator of the seriousness of the commitment from both sides. If indeed hostilities and all acts of violence could decrease dramatically, or even cease altogether, during this first three month period, the Acehnesse and other Indonesian people, and the international community, would consider that the peace process would most likely succeed.

c) During the period between the signing of this Agreement and the time when the JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational, both signatories to this Agreement commit themselves to exercise the utmost restraint by not making any public statement that would inflame the feeling and sentiment of the other side, including the people, and by ensuring that their forces will not initiate any hostile act toward the other.

Article 6: All-Inclusive Dialogue

The parties agree to support the process of All-Inclusive Dialogue in Aceh as provided for in the Joint Statement of 10 May 2002. The parties agree to ensure, through this Agreement, the necessary security and freedom of movement for all participants in the All-Inclusive Dialogue to enable the process to be conducted in a safe and fair manner, reflecting the views of all elements of Acehese society. The parties reconfirm their agreement that the process of All-Inclusive Dialogue be facilitated by HDC.

Article 7: Public Information and Communications

- a) To ensure national and international support for the peace process in Aceh, the Agreement of 10 May 2002, and this Agreement and its implementation have to be publicised as widely as possible within one month of the signing of this Agreement. The process of implementation has to be as transparent as possible and the people have to be regularly informed of the progress made and difficulties encountered.
- b) Communications to the public will be given priority, especially through the print and electronic media. Television and radio programmes have to be devised to enable obtaining inputs from the general public provided that they are conducted in a fair and balanced manner. The JSC remains the final reference on this matter.
- c) Other media, such as community meetings, seminars, flyers, bumper stickers, T-shirts, and others could also be considered, as appropriate.
- d) The HDC is requested to look for sources of funding these public information and communication activities.

Article 8: Joint Council

A Joint Council will be established, composed of the most senior representatives of the GOI and the GAM, and of the third party (HDC). The function of this Joint Council will be to resolve all issues or disputes arising out of the implementation of this Agreement, which cannot be resolved by other Committees or Structures established under this Agreement. The Joint Council may amend the articles and provisions of this Agreement.

Article 9: Amendment or Termination

This Agreement may only be amended by agreement between the two parties in the Joint Council. Should either party wish to unilaterally terminate the Agreement then they are obligated to first bring the issue to the Joint Council and engage in and support all efforts by the Joint Council to resolve the problem within a sufficient period of time (no less than 30 days). If the Joint Council is unable to resolve the matter, then either party has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the Agreement.

For the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
Amb. Mr. S. Wiryono

For the Leadership of the Free Aceh Movement
Dr. Zaini Abdullah

Witnessed by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)
Mr. Martin Griffiths

Appendix XI- Tokyo Statement

Source: Government of the United States of America

Date: 9 Apr 2003

Joint Statement by Japan, European Union, United States and the World Bank on the present situation in Aceh.

U.S. EMBASSY PRESS RELEASE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION

We, Co-chairs of the Tokyo Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh, reaffirm in the strongest possible terms our support for the COHA and the peaceful solution of the conflict in Aceh. We welcome the reaffirmation of the Indonesian government's intention to continue down the path of peaceful resolution to the conflict.

We again stress our commitment to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and do not support attempts to challenge Indonesia's present borders. Consequently, we feel that the only appropriate solution to the conflict in Aceh must use Special Autonomy as a starting point as already agreed to by the parties.

We strongly urge both sides to refrain from recourse to armed or any other violence, which is not an effective means to bring a solution to this conflict. Japan, EU, the US and the World Bank deplore the recent violence and threats of violence directed against several of the monitoring teams and urge the GOI to take the immediate steps to ensure the physical security of monitors in the field, in close co-ordination with the JSC, of which the Government is an integral part, and urge both parties to refrain from intimidation or harassment directed at representatives of civil society. We welcome statements by National Police Chief Da'i Bachtiar that the Government of Indonesia will fulfill its responsibility to protect the monitors, investigate the recent incidents and punish those responsible. We call upon the Free Aceh Movement to immediately cease all actions that could undermine the peace process.

The COHA, with its provisions for confidence building measures, demilitarization and an all-inclusive dialogue involving all elements of Acehnese society, is the only way to solve the conflict in Aceh peacefully. We stand ready to reinforce our support for that process.

The December 9th agreement has been successful so far in reducing the violence in the province. We encourage both sides to fully abide by the COHA, but, furthermore, go beyond the purely technical nature of this agreement and restart the political negotiations to find a mutually agreed upon and lasting solution to the conflict. We firmly believe that only political negotiations and concrete action towards free, fair and democratic elections in Aceh in 2004 will truly serve the interest of the people of Aceh and the integrity and stability of Indonesia.

Appendix XIII- Declaration of Martial Law

**PRESIDENTIAL DECREE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
NUMBER 28, 2003 ON
DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY AT A MILITARY EMERGENCE
LEVEL IN THE PROVINCE OF ACEH
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA**

- Considering
- a. That the series of peace efforts carried out by the government, by means of special autonomy decree(s) for Aceh Province, integrated approach(s) in comprehensive development plans, and dialogue that was even carried out overseas, it turns out did not stop the Free Aceh Movement's aims and actions to separate itself from the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia and declare their independence;
 - b. That in conditions like this and [with] increasing armed violence that heads all the more towards terrorist actions carried out by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), it not only damages public order and calm, it interferes with the smooth running of government, and impedes the implementation of various development programs, yet broadens and increases the suffering of the Acehnese society;
 - c. That this situation that recently disturbed the wholeness of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia cannot be allowed to drag on and must be stopped as quickly as possible by means of more integrated efforts, so that the lives of the inhabitants and the implementation of government administration can be quickly restored;
 - d. That in accordance with 1945 Constitution instructions that must be implemented by the President to protect the entire nation and all Indonesian, and in accordance also with authority possessed by the President based on Legislation regarding States of Emergency, as well as after listening to and thoroughly considering all opinions and support that were declared by the Indonesian Legislative Assembly Leadership, Factions and Commissions I and II of the Indonesian Legislative Assembly, as jointly resolved as the conclusion in the Consultation Meeting between the President and all Indonesian Legislative Assembly Leaders, Factions and the two Commissions on 15 May 2003, and furthermore after paying close attention to the development of the situation and the attitude of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in recent days after the Consultation Meeting that did not indicate a change towards a better direction, it is considered necessary to establish a State of Emergency with a Military State of Emergency Phase for the whole region of the Province of Aceh;
- Recalling
1. Article 4(1), Article 10 and Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution as amended by the Fourth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution;
 2. Act Number 23 Via PRP/1959 regarding State of Emergency (State Paper of the Republic of Indonesia 1959, No. 139, Additional State Paper No. 1908) as amended twice, most recently by Act No. 52 PRP/1960 (State Paper of the Republic of Indonesia 1960, No. 170, Additional State Paper No. 2113);
 3. Act No. 2, 2002 on State Police of the Republic of Indonesia (State Paper of the Republic of Indonesia 2002, Additional State Paper No. 4168)

RESOLVES:

To establish THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY WITH A MILITARY STATE OF EMERGENCY PHASE IN THE PROVINCE OF ACEH

Article 1 The whole region of the Province of Aceh is declared to be in a State of Emergency with a Military State of Emergency phase.

- Article 2**
- (1) The highest command of the State of Emergency with a Military State of Emergency phase as intended in Article 1 is to be carried out by the President as Central Military Emergency Administrator.
 - (2) In directing the State of Emergency with a Military State of Emergency phase, the President will be assisted by the Central Military Emergency Administrator's Daily Implementation Agency which consists of:
 1. Chair Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security
 2. Members Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs;

Article 3

The command of the Military State of Emergency in Aceh Province will be carried out by the Commander of the Iskandar Muda Military Region as Regional Military Emergency Administrator.

In directing the Military State of Emergency in the Region, the Commander of the Iskandar Muda Military Region will be assisted by:

The Governor of the Province of Aceh, the Aceh Province Regional Chief of the Indonesian National Police, and the Head of the Judiciary of Aceh Province;

Concerning Aceh Province, as intended in Article 1, the Military State of Emergency stipulations as intended in Act Number 23 PRP/1959 regarding State of Emergency as amended twice, most recently by Act No. 52 PRP 1960 will operate.

All expenses required in the framework of the implementation of this Presidential Decree will be borne by the Annual National Budget (APBN) and the Annual Regional Budget (APBD) of Province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.

This Presidential Decree takes effect at midnight Western Indonesian Time on 19 May 2003 for a period of six (6) months, unless it is extended by a special Presidential Decree.

In order to make it known to the public, it is ordered that this Presidential Decree be placed in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia.

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